TB  B 

SEVENTH  GREAT  ORIENTAL  MONARCH! 


THE  SEVENTH 


GREAT  ORIENTAL  MONARCHY 

OR  THE 

GEOGRAPHY,  HISTORY,  AND  ANTIQUITIES 
OF  THE  SASSANIAN  OR  NEW 
PERSIAN  EMPIRE 


COLLECTED   AND   ILLUSTRATED   FROM  ANCIENT  AND 
MODERN  SOURCES 


BY 

GEORGE  RAWLINSON,  M.A. 

CAMDEN  PROFESSOR  OP  ANCIENT  HISTORY  IN  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  OXFORD 
CANON  OF  CANTERBURY 


IN    TWO  VOLUMES 

Vol.  I. 


DODD, 


NEW  YORK 
MEAD,  AND 
1882 


COMPANY 


Electrotyped  and  Printed  by  Rand,  Avery,  <5r»  Co., 
ny  Franklin  Street,  Boston. 


TO 

THE  RIGHT  HONOURABLE 

WILLIAM  EWART  GLADSTONE,  M.P. 

ETC.,  ETC. 

TO  WHOM,  EIGHTEEN  YEARS  AGO,  HIS   FIRST  WORK  WAS  DEDICATED 

2Ef)ts  Uolume 

WHICH    MAY    BE    HIS  LAST 
IS  INSCRIBED 

AS  A  TOKEN  OF  UNINTERRUPTED  REGARD  AND  ESTEEM 

BY 

THE  AUTHOR 


PREFACE. 


This  work  completes  the  Ancient  History  of  the  East, 
to  which  the  author  has  devoted  his  main  attention 
during  the  last  eighteen  years.  It  is  a  sequel  to  his 
4  Parthians,'  published  in  1873  ;  and  carries  down  the 
History  of  Western  Asia  from  the  third  century  of  our 
era  to  the  middle  of  the  seventh.  So  far  as  the  pres- 
ent writer  is  aware,  no  European  author  has  previously 
treated  this  period  from  the  Oriental  stand-point,  in 
any  work  aspiring  to  be  more  than  a  mere  sketch  or 
outline.  Very  many  such  sketches  have  been  pub- 
lished ;  but  they  have  been  scanty  in  the  extreme,  and 
the  greater  number  of  them  have  been  based  on  the 
authority  of  a  single  class  of  writers.  It  has  been  the 
present  author's  aim  to  combine  the  various  classes  of 
authorities  which  are  now  accessible  to  the  historical 
student,  and  to  give  their  due  weight  to  each  of  them. 
The  labours  of  M.  C.  Miiller,  of  the  Abbe  Gregoire 
Kabaragy  Garabed,  and  of  M.  J.  St.  Martin  have 
opened  to  us  the  stores  of  ancient  Armenian  literature, 
which  were  previously  a  sealed  volume  to  all  but  a 
small  class  of  students.  The  early  Arab  historians 
have  been  translated  or  analysed  by  Kosegarten,  Zoten- 
berg,  M.  Jules  Mohl,  and  others.    The  coinage  of  the 

vii 


Vlll  PREFACE. 

Sassanians  has  been  elaborately —  almost  exhaustively 
—  treated  by  Mordtmann  and  Thomas.  Mr.  Fergus- 
son  has  applied  his  acute  and  practised  powers  to  the 
elucidation  of  the  Sassanian  architecture.  By  com- 
bining the  results  thus  obtained  with  the  old  sources 
of  information  —  the  classical,  especially  the  Byzantine, 
writers  —  it  has  become  possible  to  compose  a  history 
of  the  Sassanian  Empire  which  is  at  once  consecutive, 
and  not  absolutely  meagre.  How  the  author  has  per- 
formed his  task,  he  must  leave  it  to  the  public  to 
judge ;  he  will  only  venture  to  say  that  he  has  spared 
no  labour,  but  has  gone  carefully  through  the  entire 
series  of  the  Byzantine  writers  who  treat  of  the  time, 
besides  availing  himself  of  the  various  modern  works 
to  which  reference  has  been  made  above.  If  he  has 
been  sometimes  obliged  to  draw  conclusions  from  his 
authorities  other  than  those  drawn  by  Gibbon,  and 
has  deemed  it  right,  in  the  interests  of  historic  truth, 
to  express  occasionally  his  dissent  from  that  writer's 
views,  he  must  not  be  thought  blind  to  the  many  and 
great  excellencies  which  render  the  c  Decline  and 
Fall '  one  of  the  best,  if  not  the  best,  of  our  histories. 
The  mistakes  of  a  writer  less  eminent  and  less  popular 
might  have  been  left  unnoticed  without  ill  results. 
Those  of  an  historian  generally  regarded  as  an  author- 
ity from  whom  there  is  no  appeal  could  not  be  so 
lightly  treated. 

The  author  begs  to  acknowledge  his  great  obliga- 
tions, especially,  to  the  following  living  writers  :  M. 
Patkanian,  M.  Jules  Mohl,  Dr.  Haug,  Herr  Spiegel, 
Herr  Windischmann,  Herr  Mordtmann,  Canon  Tris- 
tram, Mr.  James  Fergusson,  and  Mr.  E.  Thomas.  He 
is  also  largely  beholden  to  the  works  of  M.  Texier  and 


PREFACE. 


ix 


of  MM.  Flandin  and  Coste  for  the  illustrations,  which 
he  has  been  able  to  give,  of  Sassanian  sculpture  and 
architecture.  The  photographic  illustrations  of  the 
newly-discovered  palace  at  Mashita  are  due  to  the 
liberality  of  Mr.  R.  C.  Johnson  (the  amateur  artist  who 
accompanied  Canon  Tristram  in  his  exploration  of  the 
1  Land  of  Moab' ),  who,  with  Canon  Tristram's  kind  con- 
sent, has  allowed  them  to  appear  in  the  present  volume. 
The  numismatic  illustrations  are  chiefly  derived  from 
Longperier  ;  but  one  or  two  have  been  borrowed  from 
other  sources.  For  his  frontispiece  the  author  is  in- 
debted to  his  brother,  Sir  Henry  Rawlinson,  who  has 
permitted  it  to  be  taken  from  an  original  drawing  in 
his  possession,  which  is  believed  to  be  a  truthful  rep- 
resentation of  the  great  Sassanian  building. 


Cantekbuky:  December  1875. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

PACE 

Condition  of  the  Persians  under  the  Successors  of  Alexander. 
Under  the  Arsacidae.  Favour  shown  them  by  the  latter.  Allowed 
to  have  Kings  of  their  own.  Their  Religion  at  first  held  in 
Honour.  Power  of  their  Priests.  Gradual  Change  of  Policy  on 
the  part  of  the  Parthian  Monarchs,  and  final  Oppression  of  the 
Magi.    Causes  which  produced  the  Insurrection  of  Artaxerxes    .  1 


CHAPTER  II. 

Situation  and  Size  of  Persia.  General  Character  of  the  Country  and 
Climate.  Chief  Products.  Characteristics  of  the  Persian  People, 
Physical  and  Moral.  Differences  observable  in  the  Race  at  differ- 
ent Periods        .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .16 


CHAPTER  III. 

Reign  of  Artaxerxes  I.  Stories  told  of  him.  Most  probable  Account 
of  his  Descent,  Rank,  and  Parentage.  His  Contest  with  Artabanus. 
First  War  with  Chosroes  of  Armenia.  Contest  with  Alexander 
Severus.  Second  War  with  Chosroes  and  Conquest  of  Armenia. 
Religious  Reforms.  Internal  Administration  and  Government. 
Art.    Coinage.    Inscriptions  .  .  .  .  .  .30 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Death  of  Artaxerxes  I.  and  Accession  of  Sapor  I.  War  of  Sapor 
with  Manizen.  His  first  War  with  Rome.  Invasion  of  Mesopo- 
tamia, A.i).  241.  Occupation  of  Antioch.  Expedition  of  Gordian 
to  the  East.  Recovery  by  Rome  of  her  lost  Territory.  Peace 
made  between  Rome  and  Persia.  Obscure  Interval.  Second 
War  with  Rome.  Mesopotamia  again  invaded,  A.D.  258.  Valerian 
takes  the  Command  in  the  East.    Struggle  between  him  and 

xi 


CONTENTS. 


*  PAGE 

Sapor.  Defeat  and  Capture  of  Valerian,  a.d.  260.  Sapor  invests 
Miriades  with  the  Purple.  He  takes  Syria  and  Southern  Cappa- 
docia,  but  is  shortly  afterwards  attacked  by  Odenathus.  Successes 
of  Odenathus.  Treatment  of  Valerian.  Further  Successes  of 
Odenathus.  Period  of  Tranquillity.  Great  Works  of  Sapor.  His 
Sculptures.  His  Dyke.  His  Inscriptions.  His  Coins.  His  Re- 
ligion. Religious  Condition  of  the  East  in  his  Time.  Rise  into 
Notice  of  Manes.  His  Rejection  by  Sapor.  Sapor's  Death.  His 
Character  ........  73 

CHAPTER  V. 

Short  Reign  of  Hormisdas  I.  His  Dealings  with  Manes.  Accession 
of  Varahran  I.  He  puts  Manes  to  Death.  Persecutes  the  Mani- 
chaeans  and  the  Christians.  His  Relations  with  Zenobia.  He  is 
threatened  by  Aurelian.  His  Death.  Reign  of  Varahran  II.  His 
Tyrannical  Conduct.  His  Conquest  of  Seistan,  and  War  with 
India.  His  War  with  the  Roman  Emperors  Cams  and  Diocletian. 
His  Loss  of  Armenia.    His  Death.    Short  Reign  of  Varahran  III.  101 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Civil  War  of  Narses  and  his  Brother  Hormisdas.  Narses  victorious. 
He  attacks  and  expels  Tiridates.  War  declared  against  him  by 
Diocletian.  First  Campaign  of  Galerius,  a.d.  297.  Second  Cam- 
paign, a.d.  298.  Defeat  suffered  by  Narses.  Negotiations.  Con- 
ditions of  Peace.    Abdication  and  Death  of  Narses  .         .  .116 

CHAPTER  VII. 

Reign  of  Hormisdas  II.  His  Disposition.  General  Character  of  his 
Reign.  His  Taste  for  Building.  His  new  Court  of  Justice.  His 
Marriage  with  a  Princess  of  Cabul.  Story  of  his  Son  Hormisdas. 
Death  of  Hormisdas  II.,  and  Imprisonment  of  his  Son  Hormisdas. 
Interregnum.  Crown  assigned  to  Sapor  II.  before  his  birth. 
Long  Reign  of  Sapor.  First  Period  of  his  Reign,  from  a.d.  809 
to  a.d.  337.  Persia  plundered  by  the  Arabs  and  the  Turks.  Vic- 
tories of  Sapor  over  the  Arabs.  Persecution  of  the  Christians. 
Escape  of  Hormisdas.    Feelings  and  Conduct  of  Sapor      .         .  138 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

Position  of  Affairs  on  the  Death  of  Constantine.  First  War  of  Sapor 
with  Rome,  a.d.  337-350.  First  Siege  of  Nisibis.  Obscure  Inter- 
val. Troubles  in  Armenia,  and  Recovery  of  Armenia  by  the 
Persians.    Sapor's  Second  Siege  of  Nisibis.    Its  Failure.  Great 


CONTENTS. 


xiii 


Battle  of  Singara.  Sapor's  Son  made  Prisoner  and  murdered  in 
Cold  Blood.  Third  Siege  of  Nisibis.  Sapor  called  away  by  an 
Invasion  of  the  Massagetse      .         .         .         .  .151 

CHAPTER  IX. 

Revolt  of  Armenia  and  Acceptance  by  Arsaces  of  the  Position  of  a 
Roman  Feudatory.  Character  and  Issue  of  Sapor's  Eastern  Wars. 
His  Negotiations  with  Constantius.  His  Extreme  Demands.  Cir- 
cumstances under  which  he  determines  to  renew  the  War.  His 
Preparations.  Desertion  to  him  of  Antoninus.  Great  Invasion 
of  Sapor.  Siege  of  Amida.  Sapor's  Severities.  Siege  and  Cap- 
ture of  Singara ;  of  Bezabde.  Attack  on  Virta  fails.  Aggressive 
Movement  of  Constantius.  He  attacks  Bezabde,  but  fails.  Cam- 
paign of  a.d.  301.    Death  of  Constantius     ....  167 

CHAPTER  X. 

Julian  becomes  Emperor  of  Rome.  His  Resolution  to  invade 
Persia.  His  Views  and  Motives.  His  Proceedings.  Proposals  of 
Sapor  rejected.  Other  Embassies.  Relations  of  Julian  with 
xVrmenia.  Strength  of  his  Army.  His  Invasion  of  Mesopotamia. 
His  Line  of  March.  Siege  of  Perisabor;  of  Maogamalcha.  Battle 
of  the  Tigris.  Further  Progress  of  Julian  checked  by  his  inabil- 
ity to  invest  Ctesiphon.  His  Retreat.  His  Death.  Retreat 
continued  by  Jovian.  Sapor  offers  Terms  of  Peace.  Peace  made 
by  Jovian.  Its  Conditions.  Reflections  on  the  Peace  and  on  the 
Termination  of  the  Second  Period  of  Struggle  between  Rome  and 
Persia      .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .  .191 

CHAPTER  XI. 

Attitude  of  Armenia  during  the  War  between  Sapor  and  Julian. 
Sapor's  Treachery  towards  Arsaces.  Sapor  conquers  Armenia. 
He  attacks  Iberia,  deposes  Sauromaces,  and  sets  up  a  new  King. 
Resistance  and  Capture  of  Artogerassa.  Difficulties  of  Sapor. 
Division  of  Iberia  between  the  Roman  and  Persian  Pretenders. 
Renewal  of  Hostilities  between  Rome  and  Persia.  Peace  made 
with  Valens.    Death  of  Sapor.    His  Coins    ....  241 

CHAPTER  XII. 

Short  Reigns  of  Artaxerxes  II.  and  Sapor  III.  Obscurity  of  their 
History.  Their  Relations  with  Armenia.  Monument  of  Sapor 
III.  at  Takht-i-Bostan.  Coins  of  Artaxerxes  II.  and  Sapor  III. 
Reign  of  Varahran  IY.  His  Signets.  His  Dealings  with  Armenia. 
His  Death  .         .         .         .         .         .         .  .254 


xiv 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

PAGE 

Accession  of  Isdigerd  I.  Peaceful  Character  of  his  Reign.  His 
alleged  Guardianship  of  Theodosius  II.  His  Leaning  towards 
Christianity,  and  consequent  Unpopularity  with  his  Subjects.  His 
Change  of  View  and  Persecution  of  the  Christians.  His  Relations 
with  Armenia.    His  Coins.    His  Personal  Character.    His  Death,  269 

CHAPTER  XIV. 

Internal  Troubles  on  the  Death  of  Isdigerd  I.  Accession  of  Varah- 
ran  V.  His  Persecution  of  the  Christians.  His  War  with 
Rome.  His  Relations  with  Armenia  from  a.d.  422  to  a.d.  428. 
His  Wars  with  the  Scythic  Tribes  on  his  Eastern  Frontier.  His 
Strange  Death.    His  Coins.    His  Character  ....  282 

CHAPTER  XY. 

Reign  of  Isdigerd  II.  His  War  with  Rome.  His  Nine  Years' 
War  with  the  Ephthalites.  His  Policy  towards  Armenia.  His 
Second  Ephthalite  War.    His  Character.    His  Coins         .         .  301 

CHAPTER  XVI. 

Right  of  Succession  disputed  between  the  two  Sons  of  Isdigerd  II., 
Perozes  (or  Firuz)  and  Hormisdas.  Civil  War  for  two  years. 
Success  of  Perozes,  through  aid  given  him  by  the  Ephthalites. 
Great  Famine.  Perozes  declares  War  against  the  Ephthalites, 
and  makes  an  Expedition  into  their  Country.  His  111  Success. 
Conditions  of  Peace  granted  him.  Armenian  Revolt  and  War. 
Perozes,  after  some  years,  resumes  the  Ephthalite  War.  His 
Attack  fails,  and  he  is  slain  in  Battle.  Summary  of  his  Character. 
Coins  of  Hormisdas  III.  and  Perozes.    Vase  of  Perozes     .         .  311 

CHAPTER  XVII. 

Accession  of  Balas  or  Palash.  His  Relationship  to  Perozes.  Peace 
made  with  the  Ephthalites.  Pacification  of  Armenia  and  General 
Edict  of  Toleration.  Revolt  of  Zareh,  Son  of  Perozes,  and  Sup- 
pression of  the  Revolt  with  the  help  of  the  Armenians.  Flight  of 
Kobad  to  the  Ephthalites.  Further  Changes  in  Armenia.  Vahan 
made  Governor.  Death  of  Balas;  his  Character.  Coins  ascribed 
to  him     .........  331 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS. 


1.  General  View  of  the  Tak-i-Kesra  or  Palace  of 

Chosroes  I.,  at  Ctesiphon  (from  a  drawing  in  the 

possession  of  Sir  H.  Kawlinson)       .         .         To  face  Title-page 

2.  Map  of  the  Sassanian  Empire  and  adjacent  countries      "    page  1 


3.  Artaxerxes  I.  giving  the  crown  to  his  son,  Sapor 

(after  Ker  Porter)       .....       u  64 

4.  Sapor  I.  presenting  Cyriades  to  the  Romans  as  their 

Emperor  (after  Flandin)  82 

5.  Valerian  doing  homage  to  Cyriades  (after  Flandin)       "  91 

6.  Yarahran  II.  addressing  his  nobles  (after  Ker  Porter)       "  108 

7.  Yarahran  II.  receiving  the  submission  of  the  Seges- 

tani  (after  Flandin)    .  .  .  .  "  109 

8.  Bas-relief  representing  Sapor  II.  and  Sapor  III. 

(after  Ker  Porter)  261 


WOODCUTS  IN  THE  TEXT. 


PAGE 

9.  Ancient  Persians,  from  a 
bas-relief  at  Persepolis 
(after  Ker  Porter)  .  25 

10.  Earlier  coins  of  Artaxer- 

xes I.  .  .66 

11.  Later    Coins   of  Artaxer- 

xes I.  .  .67 

12.  Coins  of  Sapor  I.     .  .  94 

13.  Head  of  Sapor  I.,  from  a 

gem  (after  Mordtmann)  .  100 


PAGE 

14.  Coin  of  Hormisdas  I.         .  103 

15.  Coin  of  Yarahran  I.          .  105 

16.  Coin  of  Yarahran  II.         .  108 

17.  Coin  of  Yarahran  III.       .  115 

18.  Head  of  Narses,  from  a 

bas-relief  (after  Flandin)  118 

19.  Coins  of  Narses      .  .  137 

20.  Head    of   Hormisdas  II., 

from  a  gem  (after  Mordt- 
mann)      .  .  .  138 
xv. 


XVI 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS. 


PAGE 

21.  Coin    of    Hormisdas  II. 

(after  Thomas)     .         .  138 

22.  Coins  of  Sapor  II.   .  .  253 

23.  Coin  of  Artaxerxes  II.       .  262 

24.  Coins  of  Sapor  III.  .  263 

25.  Portrait  of  Varahran  IV., 

from     a      seal  (after 
Thomas)    .         .  .265 

26.  Later  seal  of  Yarahran  IV. 

(after  Thomas)     .         .  265 


PAGE 

27.  Coin  of  Varahran  IV.       .  266 

28.  Coin  of  Isdigerd  I.  .  .  278 

29.  Coin  of  Varahran  V.         .  299 

30.  Coin  of  Isdigerd  II.  .  310 

31.  Doubtful  coin  of  Hormis- 

das III.      .  .  .328 

32.  Coin  of  Perozes      .         .  329 

33.  Coin  of  Balas         .         .  33S 


HISTOKY 

OF  THE 

SASSANIAN  OK  NEW  PERSIAN  EMPIRE. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Condition  of  the  Persians  under  the  Successors  of  Alexander —  under  the 
Arsacidai.  Favour  shown  them  by  the  latter  —  allowed  to  have  Kings 
of  their  own.  Their  Religion  at  first  held  in  honour.  Power  of  their 
Priests.  Gradual  Change  of  Policy  on  the  part  of  the  Parthian  Mon- 
archs,  and  final  Oppression  of  the  Magi.  Causes  which  produced  the 
Insurrection  of  Artaxerxes. 

'  The  Parthians  had  been  barbarians;  they  had  ruled  over  a  nation  far 
more  civilised  than  themselves,  and  had  oppressed  them  and  their  religion.' 

Niebuhr,  Lectures  on  Roman  History,  vol.  iii.  p.  27(5. 

When  the  great  Empire  of  the  Persians,  founded  by 
Cyrus,  collapsed  under  the  attack  of  Alexander  the 
Great,  the  dominant  race  of  Western  Asia  did  not  feel 
itself  at  the  first  reduced  to  an  intolerable  condition 
It  was  the  benevolent  design  of  Alexander  to  fuse  into 
one  the  two  leading  peoples  of  Europe  and  Asia,  and 
to  establish  himself  at  the  head  of  a  Perso-Hellenic 
State,  the  capital  of  which  was  to  have  been  Babylon.1 
Had  this  idea  been  carried  out,  the  Persians  would, 
it  is  evident,  have  lost  but  little  by  their  subjugation. 
Placed  on  a  par  with  the  Greeks,  united  with  them  in 


1  See,  on  this  point,  Bishop  Thirl- 
wall's  excellent  remarks,  Hist,  of 
Greece,  vol.  vii.  pp.  121-124,  which 


are  incompletely  met  by  Mr.  Grote, 
Hist,  of  Greece,  vol.  xii.  pp.  352- 
360. 


2 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  I. 


marriage  bonds,1  and  equally  favoured  by  their  common 
ruler,  they  could  scarcely  have  uttered  a  murmur,  or 
have  been  seriously  discontented  with  their  position. 
But  when  the  successors  of  the  great  Macedonian, 
unable  to  rise  to  the  height  of  his  grand  conception, 
took  lower  ground,  and,  giving  up  the  idea  of  a  fusion, 
fell  back  upon  the  ordinary  status,  and  proceeded  to 
enact  the  ordinary  r6le,  of  conquerors,  the  feelings  of 
the  late  lords  of  Asia,  the  countrymen  of  Cyrus  and 
Darius,  must  have  undergone  a  complete  change.  It 
had  been  the  intention  of  Alexander  to  conciliate  and 
elevate  the  leading  Asiatics  by  uniting  them  with  the 
Macedonians  and  the  Greeks,  by  promoting  social 
intercourse  between  the  two  classes  of  his  subjects  and 
encouraging  them  to  intermarry,  by  opening  his  court 
to  Asiatics,  by  educating  them  in  Greek  ideas  and  in 
Greek  schools,  by  promoting  them  to  high  employ- 
ments, and  making  them  feel  that  they  were  as  much 
valued  and  as  well  cared  for  as  the  people  of  the  con- 
quering race  :  it  was  the  plan  of  the  Seleucidse  to 
govern  wholly  by  means  of  European  officials,  Greek 
or  Macedonian,  and  to  regard  and  treat  the  entire 
mass  of  their  Asiatic  subjects  as  mere  slaves.2  Alex- 
ander had  placed  Persian  satraps  over  most  of  the 
provinces,  attaching  to  them  Greek  or  Macedonian 
commandants  as  checks.3  Seleucus  divided  his  empire 
into  seventy-two  satrapies ;  but  among  his  satraps  not 
one  was  an  Asiatic  —  all  were  either  Macedonians  or 
Greeks.  Asiatics,  indeed,  formed  the  bulk  of  his 
standing  army,  and  so  far  were  admitted  to  employ- 
ment; they  might  also,  no  doubt,  be  tax-gatherers, 


1  Arrian,  Exp.  Al.  vii.  4. 

2  Compare  the  Author's  Sixth 
Monarchy,  p.  36. 


"  Arrian,  iii.  1G,  22,  23;  vi.  27,  29, 
&c. 


Ch.  I.J 


RULE  OF  THE  SELEUCID^E. 


3 


couriers,  scribes,  constables,  and  officials  of  that  mean 
stamp ;  but  they  were  as  carefully  excluded  from  all 
honourable  and  lucrative  offices  as  the  natives  of  Hin- 
dustan under  the  rule  of  the  East  India  Company. 
The  standing  army  of  the  Seleucidse  was  wholly 
officered,  just  as  was  that  of  our  own  Sepoys,  by 
Europeans ;  Europeans  thronged  the  court,  and  filled 
every  important  post  under  the  government.  There 
cannot  be  a  doubt  that  such  a  high-spirited  and  in- 
deed arrogant  people  as  the  Persians  must  have  fretted 
and  chafed  under  this  treatment,  and  have  detested 
the  nation  and  dynasty  which  had  thrust  them  down 
from  their  pre-eminence  and  converted  them  from 
masters  into  slaves.  It  would  scarcely  much  tend  to 
mitigate  the  painfulness  of  their  feelings  that  they 
could  not  but  confess  their  conquerors  to  be  a  civilised 
people  —  as  civilised,  perhaps  more  civilised  than 
themselves  —  since  the  civilisation  was  of  a  type  and 
character  which  did  not  please  them  or  command  their 
approval.  There  is  an  essential  antagonism  between 
European  and  Asiatic  ideas  and  modes  of  thought, 
such  as  seemingly  to  preclude  the  possibility  of  Asiat- 
ics appreciating  a  European  civilisation.  The  Persians 
must  have  felt  towards  the  Greco-Macedonians  much 
as  the  Mahometans  of  India  feel  towards  ourselves  — 
they  may  have  feared  and  even  respected  them  — 
but  they  must  have  very  bitterly  hated  them. 

Nor  was  the  rule  of  the  Seleucidse  such  as  to  over- 
come by  its  justice  or  its  wisdom  the  original  antipathy 
of  the  dispossessed  lords  of  Asia  towards  those  by  whom 
they  had  been  ousted.  The  satrapial  system,  which 
these  monarchs  lazily  adopted  from  their  predecessors, 
the  Achaemenians,  is  one  always  open  to  great  abuses, 


4 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  I. 


and  needs  the  strictest  superintendence  and  supervision. 
There  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  any  sufficient  watch 
was  kept  over  their  satraps  by  the  Seleucid  kings,  or 
even  any  system  of  checks  established,  such  as  the 
Achaemenidae  had,  at  least  in  theory,  set  up  and  main- 
tained.1 The  Greco-Macedonian  governors  of  prov- 
inces seem  to  have  been  left  to  themselves  almost 
entirely,  and  to  have  been  only  controlled  in  the  exer- 
cise of  their  authority  by  their  own  notions  of  what 
was  right  or  expedient.  Under  these  circumstances, 
abuses  were  sure  to  creep  in  ;  and  it  is  not  improbable 
that  gross  outrages  were  sometimes  perpetrated  by 
those  in  power  —  outrages  calculated  to  make  the 
blood  of  a  nation  boil,  and  to  produce  a  keen  longing 
for  vengeance.  We  have  no  direct  evidence  that  the 
Persians  of  the  time  did  actually  suffer  from  such  a 
misuse  of  satrapial  authority ;  but  it  is  unlikely  that 
they  entirely  escaped  the  miseries  which  are  incidental 
to  the  system  in  question.  Public  opinion  ascribed 
the  grossest  acts  of  tyranny  and  oppression  to  some 
of  the  Seleucid  satraps ; 2  probably  the  Persians  were 
not  exempt  from  the  common  lot  of  the  subject  races. 

Moreover,  the  Seleucid  monarchs  themselves  were 
occasionally  guilty  of  acts  of  tyranny,  which  must  have 
intensified  the  dislike  wherewith  they  were  regarded 
by  their  Asiatic  subjects.  The  reckless  conduct  of 
Antiochus  Epiphanes  towards  the  Jews  is  well  known ; 
but  it  is  not  perhaps  generally  recognised  that  intol- 
erance and  impious  cupidity  formed  a  portion  of  the 
system  on  which  he  governed.    There  seems,  however, 


1  See  Xen.  Cyrop.  viii.  0,  §§  3-16  ; 
and  compare  the  Author's  Herodo- 
tus,  vol.  ii.  pp.  4()2-:>,  2nd  ed.,  and 
his  Ancient  Monarchies,  vol.  iii.  p. 


424,  2nd  ed. 

2  Arrian,  Fr.  1;  Zosim.  i.  18;  Syn- 
cell.  p.  284,  B.    Compare  the  Au- 
I  thor's  Sixth  Monarchy,  p.  48. 


Ch.  L] 


RISE  OF  THE  PARTHIANS. 


5 


to  be  good  reason  to  believe  that,  having  exhausted  his 
treasury  by  his  wars  and  his  extravagances,  Epiphanes 
formed  a  general  design  of  recruiting  it  by  means  of 
the  plunder  of  his  subjects.  The  temples  of  the  Asiatics 
had  hitherto  been  for  the  most  part  respected  by  their 
European  conquerors,1  and  large  stores  of  the  precious 
metals  were  accumulated  in  them.  Epiphanes  saw  in 
these  hoards  the  means  of  relieving  his  own  necessities, 
and  determined  to  seize  and  confiscate  them.  Besides 
plundering  the  Temple  of  Jehovah  at  Jerusalem,  he 
made  a  journey  into  the  south-eastern  portion  of  his 
empire,  about  B.C.  165,  for  the  express  purpose  of  con- 
ducting in  person  the  collection  of  the  sacred  treasures. 
It  was  while  he  was  engaged  in  this  unpopular  work 
that  a  spirit  of  disaffection  showed  itself ;  the  East  took 
arms  no  less  than  the  West ;  and  in  Persia,  or  upon  its 
borders,  the  avaricious  monarch  was  forced  to  retire 
before  the  opposition  which  his  ill-judged  measures  had 
provoked,  and  to  allow  one  of  the  doomed  temples  to 
escape  him.2  When  he  soon  afterwards  sickened  and 
died,  the  natives  of  this  part  of  Asia  saw  in  his  death 
a  judgment  upon  him  for  his  attempted  sacrilege.3 

It  was  within  twenty  years  of  this  unfortunate 
attempt  that  the  dominion  of  the  Seleucidse  over  Persia 
and  the  adjacent  countries  came  to  an  end.  The  Par- 
thian Empire  had  for  nearly  a  century  been  gradually 
growing  in  power  and  extending  itself  at  the  expense 
of  the  Syro-Macedonian ;  and,  about  B.C.  163,  an 
energetic  prince,  Mithridates  L,  commenced  a  series  of 
conquests  towards  the  West,  which  terminated  (about 

1  Some  were  no  doubt  plundered  remained  untouched, 

under  Alexander,  and  others  by  his  2  See  Polyb.  xxxi.  j1  ;  1  Macab. 

early  successors  (Arrian,  vi.  29,  30;  vi,  1-4;  Appian,  Syr.  p.  161,  C. 

Polyb.  x.  27,  §  12;  &c).    But  many  3  Polyb.  l.s.c. 


6 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


LCH.  L 


b.c.  150)  hi  the  transference  from  the  Syro-Macedonian 
to  the  Parthian  rule  of  Media  Magna,  Susiana,  Persia, 
Babylonia,  and  Assyria  Proper.  It  would  seem  that 
the  Persians  offered  no  resistance  to  the  progress  of 
the  new  conqueror.1  The  Seleucidas  had  not  tried  to 
conciliate  their  attachment,  and  it  was  impossible  that 
they  should  dislike  the  rupture  of  ties  which  had  only 
galled  hitherto.  Perhaps  their  feeling,  in  prospect  of 
the  change,  was  one  of  simple  indifference.  Perhaps 
it  was  not  without  some  stir  of  satisfaction  and  com- 
placency that  they  saw  the  pride  of  the  hated 
Europeans  abased,  and  a  race,  which,  however  much 
it  might  differ  from  their  own,  was  at  least  Asiatic, 
installed  in  power.  The  Parthian  system,  moreover, 
was  one  which  allowed  greater  liberty  to  the  subject 
races  than  the  Macedonian,  as  it  had  been  understood 
and  carried  out  by  the  Seleucidse ;  and  so  far,  some 
real  gain  was  to  be  expected  from  the  change.  Reli- 
gious motives  must  also  have  conspired  to  make  the 
Persians  sympathise  with  the  new  power,  rather  than 
with  that  which  for  centuries  had  despised  their  faith, 
and  had  recently  insulted  it. 

The  treatment  of  the  Persians  by  their  Parthian 
lords  seems,  on  the  whole,  to  have  been  marked  by 
moderation.  Mithridates  indeed,  the  original  con- 
queror, is  accused  of  having  alienated  his  new  subjects 
by  the  harshness  of  his  rule  ; 2  and  in  the  struggle 
which  occurred  between  him  and  the  Seleucid  king, 
Demetrius  II.,  Persians,  as  well  as  Elymseans  and  Bac- 
trians,  are  said  to  have  fought  on  the  side  of  the 
Syro-Macedonian.3    But  this  is  the  only  occasion  in 


1  Compare  the  Author's  Sixth 
Monarchy,  p.  77. 


2  Justin,  xxxvi.  1,  §  3. 

3  Ibid.  §  4,  and  xxxviii.  9,  §  2. 


Ch.  LJ        THEIR  TREATMENT  OF  THE  PERSIANS. 


7 


Parthian  history,  between  the  submission  of  Persia  and 
the  great  revolt  under  Artaxerxes,  where  there  is  any 
appearance  of  the  Persians  regarding  their  masters 
with  hostile  feelings.  In  general  they  show  them- 
selves submissive  and  contented  with  their  position, 
which  was  certainly,  on  the  whole,  a  less  irksome  one 
than  they  had  occupied  under  the  Seleucidge. 

It  was  a  principle  of  the  Parthian  governmental 
system  to  allow  the  subject  peoples,  to  a  large  extent, 
to  govern  themselves.  These  peoples  generally,  and 
notably  the  Persians,  were  ruled  by  native  kings,1 
who  succeeded  to  the  throne  by  hereditary  right,  had 
the  full  power  of  life  and  death,2  and  ruled  very  much 
as  they  pleased,  so  long  as  they  paid  regularly  the 
tribute  imposed  upon  them  by  the  1  King  of  Kings,1 
and  sent  him  a  respectable  contingent  when  he  was 
about  to  engage  in  a  military  expedition.3  Such  a 
system  implies  that  the  conquered  peoples  have  the  en- 
joyment of  their  own  laws  and  institutions,  are  exempt 
from  troublesome  interference,  and  possess  a  sort  of 
semi-independence.  Oriental  nations,  having  once  as- 
sumed this  position,  are  usually  contented  with  it,  and 
rarely  make  any  effort  to  better  themselves.  It  would 
seem  that,  thus  far  at  any  rate,  the  Persians  could  not 
complain  of  the  Parthian  rule,  but  must  have  been 
fairly  satisfied  with  their  condition. 

Again,  the  Greco-Macedonians  had  tolerated,  but 
they  had  not  viewed  with  much  respect,  the  religion 
which  they  had  found  established  in  Persia.  Alex- 
ander, indeed,  with  the  enlightened  curiosity  which 
characterised  him,  had  made  inquiries  concerning  the 

1  Strabo,  xv.  3,  §§  3  and  24.  I  Tfirjdel^    nepalr/v    nat    (Spaxtova  pln- 

2  Ibid.    §   17.      BaoikevovTat  vtto  tetcil 

tuv   and  yevovc   6  6'   uneid&v   arro- \     3  Tabari,  Chronique,  torn.  ii.  p.  5. 


8 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


ICh.  I. 


tenets  of  the  Magi,  and  endeavoured  to  collect  in  one 
the  writings  of  Zoroaster.1  But  the  later  monarchs, 
and  still  more  their  subjects,  had  held  the  system  in 
contempt,  and,  as  we  have  seen,  Epiphanes  had  openly 
insulted  the  religious  feelings  of  his  Asiatic  subjects. 
The  Parthians,  on  the  other  hand,  began  at  any  rate 
with  a  treatment  of  the  Persian  religion  which  was 
respectful  and  gratifying.  Though  perhaps  at  no  time 
very  sincere  Zoroastrians,  they  had  conformed  to  the 
State  religion  under  the  Achsemenian  kings;  and 
when  the  period  came  that  they  had  themselves  to  es- 
tablish a  system  of  government,  they  gave  to  the  Ma- 
gian  hierarchy  a  distinct  and  important  place  in  their 
governmental  machinery.  The  council,  which  advised 
the  monarch,  and  which  helped  to  elect  and  (if  need 
were)  depose  him,  was  composed  of  two  elements  — 
the  Sophi,  or  wise  men,  who  were  civilians ;  and  the 
Magi,  or  priests  of  the  Zoroastrian  religion.2  The  Magi 
had  thus  an  important  political  status  in  Parthia  dur- 
ing the  early  period  of  the  Empire ;  but  they  seem 
gradually  to  have  declined  in  favour,  and  ultimately  to 
have  fallen  into  disrepute.3  The  Zoroastrian  creed  was, 
little  by  little,  superseded  among  the  Parthians  by  a 
complex  idolatry,  which,  beginning  with  an  image- 
worship  of  the  Sun  and  Moon,  proceeded  to  an  asso- 
ciation with  those  deities  of  the  deceased  kings  of  the 
nation,  and  finally  added  to  both  a  worship  of  ances- 
tral idols,  which  formed  the  most  cherished  posses- 
sion of  each  family,  and  practically  monopolised  the 
religious  sentiment.4  All  the  old  Zoroastrian  practices 


1  Having  obtained  the  writings, 
Alexander  is  said  to  have  burned 
them;  but  the  whole  character  of 
his  policy  makes  this  incredible. 


2  Strabo,  xi.  9,  §  3. 

3  Agathias,  ii.  26. 

4  See  the  Authors  Sixth  Mon- 
archy, p.  -'](.)(.). 


Ch.  L]  their  religious  policy.  9 

were  by  degrees  laid  aside.  In  Armenia  the  Arsacid 
monarchs  allowed  the  sacred  fire  of  Ormazd  to  become 
extinguished ; 1  and  in  their  own  territories  the  Par- 
thian Arsacidse  introduced  the  practice,  hateful  to 
Zoroastrians,  of  burning  the  dead.2  The  ultimate  reli- 
gion of  these  monarchs  seems  in  fact  to  have  been 
a  syncretism  wherein  Sabaism,  Confucianism,  Greco- 
Macedonian  notions,  and  an  inveterate  primitive  idol- 
atry3 were  mixed  together.  It  is  not  impossible 
that  the  very  names  of  Ormazd  and  Ahriman  had 
ceased  to  be  known  at  the  Parthian  Court,  or  were 
regarded  as  those  of  exploded  deities,  whose  domin- 
ion over  men's  minds  had  passed  away. 

On  the  other  hand,  in  Persia  itself,  and  to  some 
extent  doubtless  among  the  neighbouring  countries, 
Zoroastrianism  (or  what  went  by  the  name)  had  a 
firm  hold  on  the  religious  sentiments  of  the  multitude, 
who  viewed  with  disfavour  the  tolerant  and  eclectic 
spirit  which  animated  the  Court  of  Ctesiphon.  The 
perpetual  fire,  kindled,  as  it  was  said,  from  heaven, 
was  carefully  tended  and  preserved  on  the  fire-altars 
of  the  Persian  holy  places ; 4  the  Magian  hierarchy 
was  held  in  the  highest  repute,  the  kings  themselves 
(as  it  would  seem)  not  disdaining  to  be  Magi ; 5  the 
ideas  —  even  perhaps  the  forms6  —  of  Ormazd  and 


1  Moses  of  Chorene  tells  us  that, 
when  Artaxerxes  conquered  Ar- 
menia, he  found  the  sacred  fire 
extinguished,  and  caused  it  to  be 
rekindled  (Hist.  Armen.  ii.  94). 

2  Herodian.  iv.  30. 

3  Compare  the  domestic  image- 
worship,  witnessed  to  by  Joseph  us 
(Ant.  Jud.  xviii.  9,  §  5),  with  the 
teraphim-worsh\\d  of  the  ancient 
Syrians  (Gen.  xxxi.  19-35). 


4  The  coins  of  the  Sassanians 
exhibit  from  the  first  the  fire-altar 
upon  their  reverse.  (See  below, 
pp.  66  and  94. ) 

5  Agathias,  ii.  26;  Nicephorus, 
Hist,  Eccl.  i.  6;  p.  55,  B. 

6  These  forms  appear  on  the 
earliest  Sassanian  bas-reliefs,  and 
would  scarcely  have  been  thus 
used  unless  previously  familiar  to 
the  people. 


10 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  L 


Ahriman  were  familiar  to  all ;  image-worship  was  ab- 
horred ; 1  the  sacred  writings  in  the  Zend  or  most 
ancient  Iranian  language  were  diligently  preserved 
and  multiplied ;  a  pompous  ritual  was  kept  up ;  the 
old  national  religion,  the  religion  of  the  Achaeme- 
nians,  of  the  glorious  period  of  Persian  ascendency 
in  Asia,  was  with  the  utmost  strictness  maintained, 
probably  the  more  zealously  as  it  fell  more  and  more 
into  disfavour  with  the  Parthians. 

The  consequence  of  this  divergence  of  religious 
opinion  between  the  Persians  and  their  feudal  lords 
must  undoubtedly  have  been  a  certain  amount  of 
alienation  and  discontent.  The  Persian  Magi  must 
have  been  especially  dissatisfied  with  the  position  of 
their  brethren  at  Court;  and  they  would  doubtless 
use  their  influence  to^  arouse  the  indignation  of  their 
countrymen  generally.  But  it  is  scarcely  probable 
that  this  cause  alone  would  have  produced  any  striking 
result.  Religious  sympathy  rarely  leads  men  to  engage 
in  important  Avars,  unless  it  has  the  support  of  other 
concurrent  motives.  To  account  for  the  revolt  of  the 
Persians  against  their  Parthian  lords  under  Artaxerxes, 
something  more  is  needed  than  the  consideration  of  the 
religious  differences  which  separated  the  two  peoples. 

First,  then,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the 
Parthian  rule  must  have  been  from  the  beginning  dis- 
tasteful to  the  Persians,  owinc:  to  the  rude  and  coarse 
character  of  the  people.  At  the  moment  of  Mithri- 
dates'  successes,  the  Persians  might  experience  a  senti- 
ment of  satisfaction 2  that  the  European  invader  was  at 
last  thrust  back,  and  that  Asia  had  reasserted  herself ; 
but  a  very  little  experience  of  Parthian  rule  was  suf- 


Mos.  Chor.  l.s.c. 


2  See  above,  p.  6. 


Ch.  LI 


THEIR  GRADUAL  DEGENERACY. 


11 


ficient  to  call  forth  different  feelings.  There  can  be  no 
doubt  that  the  Parthians,  whether  they  were  actually 
Turanians  or  no,1  were,  in  comparison  with  the  Per- 
sians, unpolished  and  uncivilised.  They  showed  their 
own  sense  of  this  inferiority  by  an  affectation  of  Per- 
sian manners.2  But  this  affectation  was  not  very  suc- 
cessful. It  is  evident  that  in  art,  in  architecture,  in 
manners,  in  habits  of  life,  the  Parthian  race  reached 
only  a  low  standard  ;  they  stood  to  their  Hellenic  and 
Iranian  subjects  in  much  the  same  relation  that  the 
Turks  of  the  present  day  stand  to  the  modern  Greeks; 
they  made  themselves  respected  by  their  strength  and 
their  talent  for  organisation;  but  in  all  that  adorns 
and  beautifies  life  they  were  deficient.3  The  Persians 
must,  during  the  whole  time  of  their  subjection  to 
Parthia,  have  been  sensible  of  a  feeling  of  shame  at 
the  want  of  refinement  and  of  a  high  type  of  civilisa- 
tion in  their  masters. 

Again,  the  later  sovereigns  of  the  Arsacid  dynasty 
were  for  the  most  part  of  weak  and  contemptible 
character.  From  the  time  of  Volagases  I.  to  that  of 
Artabanus  IV.,  the  last  king,  the  military  reputation  of 
Parthia  had  declined.  Foreign  enemies  ravaged  the 
territories  of  Parthian  vassal  kings,  and  retired,  when 
they  chose,  unpunished.4  Provinces  revolted  and  estab- 
lished their  independence.5  Rome  was  entreated  to 
lend  assistance  to  her  distressed  and  afflicted  rival,  and 
met  the  entreaties  with  a  refusal.6  In  the  wars  which 
still  from  time  to  time  were  waged  between  the  two 
empires,  Parthia  was  almost  uniformly  worsted.  Three 


1  See,  on  this  point,  the  Authors 
Sixth  Monarchy,  pp.  19-26. 

2  Julian,  Orat.  ii.  p.  63. 

3  See  the  Author's  Sixth  Mon- 
archy, pp.  396-7  and  426-430. 


4  See  the  Author's  Sixth  Mon- 
archy, pp.  291-2. 

5  Ibid.  pp.  286  and  293. 
y  Ibid.  p.  292. 


12 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  I. 


times  her  capital  was  occupied,1  and  once  her  monarch's 
summer  palace  was  burned.2  Province  after  province 
had  to  be  ceded  to  Rome.3  The  golden  throne  which 
symbolised  her  glory  and  magnificence  was  carried 
off.4  Meanwhile  feuds  raged  between  the  different 
branches  of  the  Arsacid  family ;  civil  wars  were  fre- 
quent ;  two  or  three  monarchs  at  a  time  claimed  the 
throne,  or  actually  ruled  in  different  portions  of  the 
Empire.5  It  is  not  surprising  that  under  these  circum- 
stances the  bonds  were  loosened  between  Parthia  and 
her  vassal  kingdoms,  or  that  the  Persian  tributary 
monarchs  began  to  despise  their  suzerains,  and  to  con- 
template without  alarm  the  prospect  of  a  rebellion 
which  should  place  them  in  an  independent  position. 

While  the  general  weakness  of  the  Arsacid  monarchs 
was  thus  a  cause  naturally  leading  to  a  renunciation 
of  their  allegiance  on  the  part  of  the  Persians,  a  special 
influence  upon  the  decision  taken  by  Artaxerxes  is 
probably  to  be  assigned  to  one,  in  particular,  of  the 
results  of  that  weakness.  When  provinces  long  subject 
to  Parthian  rule  revolted,  and  revolted  successfully,  as 
seems  to  have  been  the  case  with  Hyrcania,  and  par- 
tially with  Bactria,6  Persia  could  scarcely  for  very 
shame  continue  submissive.  Of  all  the  races  subject 
to  Parthia,  the  Persians  were  the  one  which  had  held 
the  most  brilliant  position  in  the  past,  and  which  re- 
tained the  liveliest  remembrance  of  its  ancient  glories. 
This  is  evidenced  not  only  by  the  grand  claims  which 
Artaxerxes  put  forward  in  his  early  negotiations  with 


1  By  Trajan  a.d.  116;  by  Avidius 
Cassius  a.d.  165;  and  by  Sept.  Se- 
verus  a.d.  198. 

2  Dio  Cassius,  lxxi.  2. 

:}  See  the  Author's  Sixth  Mon- 
archy, pp.  329  and  346. 


4  Ibid.  p.  312. 

5  Ibid.  pp.  284-6.  296-7,  318,  348- 

9. 

G  See  Mos.  Chor.  Hist.  Armen.  ii. 
65  and  08. 


Ch.  L]     CAUSES  OF  ARTAXERXES'  insurrection.  13 

the  Romans,1  but  by  the  whole  course  of  Persian 
literature,  which  has  fundamentally  an  historic  char- 
acter, and  exhibits  the  people  as  attached,  almost 
more  than  any  other  Oriental  nation,  to  the  memory 
of  its  great  men  and  of  their  noble  achievements.2 
The  countrymen  of  Cyrus,  of  Darius,  of  Xerxes,  of 
Ochus,  of  the  conquerors  of  Media,  Bactria,  Babylon, 
Syria,  Asia  Minor,  Egypt,  of  the  invaders  of  Scythia 
and  Greece,  aware  that  they  had  once  borne  sway 
over  the  whole  region  between  Tunis  and  the  Indian 
Desert,  between  the  Caucasus  and  the  Cataracts,  when 
they  saw  a  petty  mountain  clan,  like  the  Hyrcanians, 
establish  and  maintain  their  independence  despite  the 
efforts  of  Parthia  to  coerce  them,  could  not  very  well 
remain  quiet.  If  so  weak  and  small  a  race  could 
defy  the  power  of  the  Arsacid  monarchs,  much  more 
might  the  far  more  numerous  and  at  least  equally 
courageous  Persians  expect  to  succeed,  if  they  made 
a  resolute  attempt  to  recover  their  freedom. 

It  is  probable  that  Artaxerxes,  in  his  capacity  of 
vassal,  served  personally  in  the  army  with  which  the 
Parthian  monarch  Artabanus  carried  on  the  struggle 
against  Rome,  and  thus  acquired  the  power  of  esti- 
mating correctly  the  military  strength  still  possessed 
by  the  Arsacidae,  and  of  measuring  it  against  that 
which  he  knew  to  belong  to  his  nation.  It  is  not  un- 
likely that  he  formed  his  plans  during  the  earlier  period 
of  Artabanus's  reign,  when  that  monarch  allowed  him- 
self to  be  imposed  upon  by  Caracallus,  and  suffered 


1  Herodian.  vi.  6  and  11.  See 
below,  p.  42. 

2  The  generally  historical  charac- 
ter of  Firdusi's  Shalis-nameh,  or 
'  Book  of  the  Kings,'  is  well  known. 


The  best  critics  admit  that  Firdusi 
wrote  from  materials  belonging  to 
Sassanian  times  (Max  Midler  in 
Bunsen's  Philosophy  of  History, 
vol.  iii.  p.  121). 


14 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  L 


calamities  and  indignities  in  consequence  of  his  folly.1 
When  the  Parthian  monarch  atoned  for  his  indiscre- 
tion, and  wiped  out  the  memory  of  his  disgraces  by 
the  brilliant  victory  of  Nisibis  and  the  glorious  peace 
which  he  made  with  Macrinus,  Artaxerxes  may  have 
found  that  he  had  gone  too  far  to  recede ;  or,  undazzled 
by  the  splendour  of  these  successes,  he  may  still  have 
judged  that  he  might  with  prudence  persevere  in  his 
enterprise.  Artabanus  had  suffered  great  losses  in  his 
two  campaigns  against  Rome,  and  especially  in  the 
three  days  battle  of  Nisibis.  He  was  at  variance  with 
several  princes  of  his  family,  one  of  whom  certainly 
maintained  himself  during  his  whole  reign  with  the 
state  and  title  of  c  King  of  Parthia.' 2  Though  he  had 
fought  well  at  Nisibis,  he  had  not  given  any  indica- 
tions of  remarkable  military  talent.  Artaxerxes,  having 
taken  the  measure  of  his  antagonist  during  the  course 
of  the  Roman  war,  having  estimated  his  resources  and 
formed  a  decided  opinion  on  the  relative  strength  of 
Persia  and  Parthia,  deliberately  resolved,  a  few  years 
after  the  Roman  war  had  come  to  an  end,3  to  revolt 
and  accept  the  consequences.  He  was  no  doubt  con- 
vinced that  his  nation  would  throw  itself  enthusias- 
tically into  the  struggle,  and  he  believed  that  he  could 
conduct  it  to  a  successful  issue.  He  felt  himself  the 
champion  of  a  depressed,  if  not  an  oppressed,4  nation- 
ality, and  had  faith  in  his  power  to  raise  it  into  a  lofty 
position.    Iran,  at  any  rate,  should  no  longer,  he  re- 


1  See  the  Author's  Sixth  Mon- 
archy, pp.  354-G. 

2  Ibid.  pp.  348-350. 

3  The  Roman  war  terminated 
a.d.  217.  The  first  revolt  of  Ar- 
taxerxes probably  occurred  ab.  a.d. 
220. 


4  Agathangelus,  the  Armenian 
historian,  makes  Artaxerxes  tax 
Artabanus  and  the  Parthians  gen- 
erally with  cruelty  and  oppression 
(ii.  §  5);  but  he  gives  no  instances 
of  either. 


Ch.  L] 


HOPES  OF  ARTAXERXES. 


15 


solved,  submit  patiently  to  be  the  slave  of  Turan  ;  the 
keen,  intelligent,  art-loving  Aryan  people  should  no 
longer  bear  submissively  the  yoke  of  the  rude,  coarse, 
clumsy  Scyths.  An  effort  after  freedom  should  be 
made.  He  had  little  doubt  of  the  result.  The  Persians, 
by  the  strength  of  their  own  right  arms  and  the  bless- 
ing of  Ahuramazda,  the  1  All-bounteous,7 1  would  tri- 
umph over  their  impious  masters,  and  become  once 
more  a  great  and  independent  people.  At  the  worst, 
if  he  had  miscalculated,  there  would  be  the  alternative 
of  a  glorious  death  upon  the  battle-field  in  one  of  the 
noblest  of  all  causes,  the  assertion  of  a  nation's  freedom.2 


1  Ahuva-mazda  is  '  the  much-giv- 
ing Spirit.'  Mazda,  *  much-giving,' 
was  often  used  as  a  name  by  itself, 
instead  of  the  longer  Ahura-mazda. 


2  Agathangelus  makes  Artaxer- 
xes  say  'Op[ir]Gio[i£v  TzpoQ  TrapaTatjtv ' 
Kpeirrov  yap  Oavelv  tj  elvat  dovTioi  deano- 
tov  adiKovvwc  (i.  5,  ad  Jin.). 


16 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


ICh.  II. 


CHAPTER  II. 

Situation  and  Size  of  Persia.  General  Character  of  the  Country  and 
Climate.  Chief  Products.  Characteristics  of  the  Persian  People,  physical 
and  moral.    Differences  observable  in  the  Race  at  different  periods. 

'H  Wepoic  eon  noTikri  fiev  ev  rrj  Txapakia  .  .  .  iroTiv  6e  fid&v  tv  rfj  fieooyaia. 

Stkabo,  xv.  3,  §  1. 

Persia  Proper  was  a  tract  of  country  lying  on  the 
Gulf  to  which  it  has  given  name,  and  extending  about 
450  miles  from  north-west  to  south-east,  with  an  av- 
erage breadth  of  about  250  miles.  Its  entire  area 
may  be  estimated  at  about  a  hundred  thousand  square 
miles.  It  was  thus  larger  than  Great  Britain,  about 
the  size  of  Italy,  and  rather  less  than  half  the  size  of 
France.1  The  boundaries  were,  on  the  west,  Elymais 
or  Susiana  (which,  however,  was  sometimes  reckoned 
a  part  of  Persia) ; 2  on  the  north,  Media ;  on  the  east, 
Carmania ; 3  and  on  the  south,  the  sea.  It  is  nearly 
represented  in  modern  times  by  the  two  Persian  prov- 
inces of  Farsistan  and  Laristan,  the  former  of  which 
retains,  but  slightly  changed,  the  ancient  appellation. 
The  Hindyan  or  Tab  (ancient  Oroatis)  seems  towards 


1  The  area  of  France  was  esti- 
mated in  1868  at  213,324  square 
miles.  It  is  now  not  much  over 
200,000  sq.  miles.  That  of  Great 
Britain  is  about  90,000  sq.  miles; 
that  of  Italy,  without  the  islands, 
under  100,000. 

2  Strabo  says:  I'^fdov  6e  ti  kcu  tj 
l>ovG/.g   uepog    yeyevrjraL  ttjc  Xlepoidoc 


—  'Susiana  has  almost  become  a 
part  of  Persia'  (xv.  3,  §  2). 

3  Carmania  was  in  ancient  times 
reckoned  a  part  of  Persia  (Herod, 
i.  125) ;  but  the  later  classical 
writers  (Strabo,  Arrian)  and  the 
Persian  ruthoritiesforthe  Sassanian 
period  make  it  a  distinct  country. 


Ch.  II.  ]  DESCRIPTION  OF  PERSIA  PROPER. 


17 


its  mouth  to  have  formed  the  western  limit.1  East- 
ward, Persia  extended  to  about  the  site  of  the  modern 
Bunder  Kongo.2  Inland,  the  northern  boundary  ran 
probably  a  little  south  of  the  thirty-second  parallel,  from 
long.  50°  to  55°.  The  line  dividing  Persia  Proper  from 
Carmania  (now  Kerman)  was  somewhat  uncertain. 

The  character  of  the  tract  is  extremely  diversified. 
Ancient  writers  divided  the  country  into  three  strongly 
contrasted  regions.  The  first,  or  coast  tract,  was  (they 
said)  a  sandy  desert,  producing  nothing  but  a  few 
dates,  owing  to  the  intensity  of  the  heat.  Above  this 
was  a  fertile  region,  grassy,  with  well- watered  meadows 
and  numerous  vineyards,  enjoying  a  delicious  climate, 
producing  almost  every  fruit  but  the  olive,  containing 
pleasant  parks  or  paradises,'  watered  by  a  number  of 
limpid  streams  and  clear  lakes,  well  wooded  in  places, 
affording  an  excellent  pasture  for  horses  and  for  all 
sorts  of  cattle,  abounding  in  water-fowl  and  game  of 
every  kind,  and  altogether  a  most  delightful  abode. 
Beyond  this  fertile  region,  towards  the  north,  was  a 
rugged  mountain  tract,  cold  and  mostly  covered  with 
snow,  of  which  they  did  not  profess  to  know  much.3 

In  this  description  there  is  no  doubt  a  certain  amount 
of  truth  ;  but  it  is  mixed  probably  with  a  good  deal  of 
exaggeration,    There  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  the 


1  Arrian,  Hist.  Ind.  xl.  1. 

2  Ibicl.  xxxviii.  1. 

3  See  Strab.  xv.  3,  §  1,  and 
Nearck.  ap.  Arr.  Hist.  Ind.  xl.  2-4. 
The  latter  writer  says  :  Trjv  6e 
TLepoida  yfjv  rpixf]  vevefif/adaL  tcjv 
upsuv  koyoq  Karex^t.  To  fikv  avrr/g 
Tcpbg  ry  'Rpvdpf/  OaXdovy  qlkeo^evov 
ufificjdtg  te  dvai  Kal  aKapnov  vtto 
KdVfMiroc;  '    to   (V    em    if/de   lj£  irpbQ 

UpKTOV    TE    KOI     [30pE7}V     UVFjUOV  LOVTDV 

KakCog  KEKpdadai  tuv  upiuv  '   kol  tj]V 


X&PVV  noiudea  te  eIvcll  Kal  TiEifiibvac 
vdpTjXovg  Kal  u/itteXov  -noXkr/v  (pEpeiv, 
Kal  ocjoi  uXaol  Kapnol  TT/iyv  t/iacTjg ' 
irapadeLGOLOL  te  nai'Toloioi  TEdrfkkvai, 
Kal  TcoTa/LLoioi  Kadapoim  SiappEEcOai  tcai 

TlLjLLVrjGL,     Kal     bpVLOLV     OKOOOLOLV  afi6l 

TzoTafiovg  te  Kal  Xi^ivaq  eotI  tu  yOsa, 
ittttolgl  te  uyadrjv  eivai,  Kal  toIolv 
akkoioiv  VTTO&yloLoi  vi/zeoOcu,  Kal  vku- 

6 ELL   TE  TiOXkaXT}   Kal  TTokvBlJpOV  '   TljV   7  6 

irpocru  ETL  Fit'  apKTOV  iovTtov  xeLil£PL7lv 
Kal  vicpETudEa. 


18 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  IL 


climate  or  character  of  the  country  has  undergone 
any  important  alteration  between  the  time  of  Near- 
chus  or  Strabo  and  the  present  day.  At  present  it 
is  certain  that  the  tract  in  question  answers  but 
very  incompletely  to  the  description  which  those 
writers  give  of  it.  Three  regions  may  indeed  be  dis- 
tinguished, though  the  natives  seem  now  to  speak  of 
only  two  y1  but  none  of  them  corresponds  at  all  ex- 
actly to  the  accounts  of  the  Greeks.  The  coast  tract 
is  represented  with  the  nearest  approach  to  correctness. 
This  is,  in  fact,  a  region  of  arid  plain,  often  impregnated 
with  salt,  ill- watered,  with  a  poor  soil,  consisting  either 
of  sand  or  clay,  and  productive  of  little  besides  dates 
and  a  few  other  fruits.2  A  modern  historian3  says  of 
it  that  1  it  bears  a  greater  resemblance  in  soil  and 
climate  to  Arabia  than  to  the  rest  of  Persia.'  It  is 
very  hot  and  unhealthy,  and  can  at  no  time  have  sup- 
ported more  than  a  sparse  and  scanty  population. 
Above  this,  towards  the  north,  is  the  best  and  most 
fertile  portion  of  the  territory.  A  mountain  tract,4  the 
continuation  of  Zagros,  succeeds  to  the  flat  and  sandy 
coast  region,  occupying  the  greater  portion  of  Persia 
Proper.  It  is  about  two  hundred  miles  in  width,  and 
consists  of  an  alternation  of  mountain,  plain,  and  nar- 
row valley,  curiously  intermixed,  and  hitherto  mapped 
very  imperfectly.5   In  places  this  district  answers  fully 


1  The  natives  speak  of  a  ghermsir 
or  '  warm  district,'  and  a  serdsir  or 
'cold  region'  (Kinneirs  Persian 
Empire,  pp.  54,  200;  Pottinger, 
Travels,  p.  221 ;  Geograph.  Journal, 
vol.  xxvii.  p.  184).  The  '  warm 
region '  is  known  also  as  the  Desh- 
tistan,  or  '  low  country.' 

2  See  Pottinger,  Travels,  p.  54; 
Fraser,  Khorasan,  p.  71;  Kinneir, 
pp.  54,  70,  81,  201. 


3  Malcolm,  History  of  Persia, 
vol.  i.  p.  2. 

4  It  is  curious  that  Strabo  should 
characterise  the  middle  region  as 
'flat'  (ntdivri).  His  authority, 
Nearchus,  did  not  make  this  mis- 
take. 

5  Contributions  towards  a  map 
of  Persia  Proper  have  been  made 

i  by  Mr.  Abbott,  General  Monteith, 
!  the  Baron  do  Bode,  and  others  (see 


Ch.  II.  J     MOUNTAIN-TRACT  OF  PEKSIA  PROPER.  19 

to  the  description  of  Nearchus,  being  1  richly  fertile, 
picturesque,  and  romantic  almost  beyond  imagination, 
with  lovely  wooded  dells,  green  mountain  sides,  and 
broad  plains,  suited  for  the  production  of  almost  any 
crops/1  But  it  is  only  to  the  smaller  moiety  of  the 
region  that  such  a  character  attaches  ;  more  than  half 
the"  mountain  tract  is  sterile  and  barren  ; 2  the  supply 
of  water  is  almost  everywhere  scanty  ;  the  rivers  are 
few,  and  have  not  much  volume ;  many  of  them,  after 
short  courses,  end  in  the  sand,  or  in  small  salt  lakes, 
from  which  the  superfluous  water  is  evaporated.  Much 
of  the  country  is  absolutely  without  streams,  and  would 
be  uninhabitable  were  it  not  for  the  Jcanats  or  Jcareezes* 
—  subterranean  channels  made  by  art  for  the  con- 
veyance of  spring  water  to  be  used  in  irrigation. 
The  most  desolate  portion  of  the  mountain  tract  is 
towards  the  north  and  north-east,  where  it  adjoins 
upon  the  third  region,  which  is  the  worst  of  the  three. 
This  is  a  portion  of  the  high  table-land  of  Iran,  the 
great  desert  which  stretches  from  the  eastern  skirts  of 
Zagros  to  the  Hamoon,  the  Helmend,  and  the  river  of 
Subzawur.  It  is  a  dry  and  hard  plain,  intersected  at 
intervals  by  ranges  of  rocky  hills,4  with  a  climate  ex- 
tremely hot  in  summer  and  extremely  cold  in  winter, 
incapable  of  cultivation,  excepting  so  far  as  water  can 
be  conveyed  by  kanats,  which  is,  of  course,  only  a 
short  distance.  The  fox,  the  jackal,  the  antelope,  and 
the  wild  ass  possess  this  sterile  and  desolate  tract, 


Geograph.  Journal,  vols,  xiii.,  xxv., 
and  xxvii.) ;  but  much  still  remains 
to  be  done,  especially  towards  the 
east  and  south-east. 

1  See  the  Author's  Ancient 
Monarchies,  vol.  iii.  p.  87,  2nd  ed. 

2  See  Kinneir,  Persian  Empire, 
pp.  195-200;   Ker  Porter.  Travels, 


vol.  i.  pp.  459,  472;  Morier,  First 
Journey,  pp.  92, 147,  148;  Geoc/raph. 
Journal,  vol.  xxv.  pp.  29-78,  vol. 
xxvii.  pp.  149-184. 

3  Fraser,  Khorasan,  p.  79;  Morier, 
First  Journey,  p.  150. 

4  Ker  Porter,  vol.  i.  pp.  455-463. 


20 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  II. 


where  'all  is  dry  and  cheerless/1  and  verdure  is 
almost  unknown. 

Perhaps  the  two  most  peculiar  districts  of  Persia  are 
the  lake  basins  of  Neyriz  and  Deriah-i-Nemek.  The 
rivers  given  off  from  the  northern  side  of  the  great 
mountain  chain  between  the  twenty-ninth  and  thirty- 
first  parallels,  being  unable  to  penetrate  the  mountains, 
flow  eastward  towards  the  desert ;  and  their  waters 
gradually  collect  into  two  streams,  which  end  in  two 
lakes,  the  Deriah-i-Nemek  and  that  of  Neyriz,  or  Lake 
Bakhtigan.2  The  basin  of  Lake  Neyriz  lies  towards 
the  north.  Here  the  famous  '  Bendamir ' 3  and  the  Pul- 
war or  Kur-ab,  flowing  respectively  from  the  north- 
east and  the  north,  unite  in  one  near  the  ruins  of  the 
ancient  Persepolis,  and,  after  fertilising  the  plain  of 
Merdasht,4  run  eastward  down  a  rich  vale  for  a  dis- 
tance of  some  forty  miles  into  the  salt  lake  which  swal- 
lows them  up.  This  lake,  when  full,  has  a  length  of 
fifty  or  sixty  miles,  with  a  breadth  of  from  three  to 
six.5  In  summer,  however,  it  is  often  quite  dry,6  the 
water  of  the  Bendamir  being  expended  in  irrigation 
before  reaching  its  natural  terminus.  The  valley  and 
plain  of  the  Bendamir,  and  its  tributaries,  are  among 
the  most  fertile  portions  of  Persia,  as  well  as  among 
those  of  most  historic  interest 7 


1  Ker  Porter,  vol.  i.  p.  462. 

2  Called  also  Lake  Kheir.  The 
name  Bakhtigan,  which  maintains 
its  place  in  our  maps,  is  said  to  be 
at  present  unknown  to  the  natives 
(Abbott,  in  Geograph.  Journal,  vol. 
xxv.  p„  71). 

3  Moore,  Lalla  Bookh,  'Veiled 
Prophet,'  p.  77;  'Fire-Worship- 
pers,' p.  232;  &c. 

4  Ker  Porter,  Travels,  vol.  i.p.683. 
r>  Abbott,  in  Geograph.  Journal,  I 


vol.  xxv.  pp.  72-75. 

6  Kinneir,  Persian  Empire,  p.  60. 

7  The  ancient  capita'!,  Pasargadae, 
was  situated  in  the  valley  of  the 
Pulwar  (or  Cyrus),  a  tributary  of 
the  Bendamir.  Persepolis,  which 
superseded  Pasargadse,  was  at  the 
opening  of  the  Pulwar  into  the 
Bendamir  valley.  Remains  of 
Cyrus,  Darius,  Xerxes,  and  other 
Achsemeniaii  kings  abound  in  these 

i  two  vales. 


Ch.  II.  ] 


LAKE  BASINS. 


21 


The  basin  of  the  Deriah-i-Nemek  is  smaller  than 
that  of  the  Neyriz,  but  it  is  even  more  productive. 
Numerous  brooks  and  streams,  rising  not  far  from 
Shiraz,  run  on  all  sides  into  the  Nemek  lake,  which 
has  a  length  of  about  fifteen  and  a  breadth  of  three  or 
three  and  a  half  miles.1  Among  the  streams  is  the 
celebrated  brook  of  Hafiz,  the  Rocknabad,  which  still 
retains  'its  singular  transparency  and  softness  to  the 
taste.' 2  Other  rills  and  fountains  of  extreme  clearness 
abound,3  and*  a  verdure  is  the  result,  very  unusual  in 
Persia.  The  vines  grown  in  the  basin  produce  the 
famous  Shiraz  wine,  the  only  good  wine  which  is 
manufactured  in  the  East.  The  orchards  are  magnifi- 
cent. In  the  autumn,  L  the  earth  is  covered  with  the 
gathered  harvest,  flowers,  and  fruits ;  melons,  peaches, 
pears,  nectarines,  cherries,  grapes,  pomegranates ;  all 
is  a  garden,  abundant  in  sweets  and  refreshment.' 4 

But,  notwithstanding  the  exceptional  fertility  of  the 
Shiraz  plain  and  of  a  few  other  places,  Persia  Proper 
seems  to  have  been  rightly  characterised  in  ancient 
times  as  'a  scant  land  and  a  rugged.'5  Its  area  was 
less  than  a  fifth  of  the  area  of  modern  Persia ;  and 
of  this  space  nearly  one  half  was  uninhabitable, 
consisting  either  of  barren  stony  mountain  or  of 
scorching  sandy  plain,  ill  supplied  with  water  and 
often  impregnated  with  salt.  Its  products,  conse- 
quently, can  have  been  at  no  time  either  very  abun- 
dant or  very  varied.  Anciently,  the  low  coast  tract 
seems  to  have  been  cultivated  to  a  small  extent  in 


1  Ouseley,  Travels,  vol.  ii.  pp.  69, 
70;  Abbott,  in  Geograph.  Journal, 
vol.  xxvii.  p.  151. 

2  Ker  Porter,  vol.  i.  p.  686. 

3  Ibid.  pp.  689,  693,  697,  &c. 


4  Ibid.  p.  709. 

5  Herod,  ix.  122.  Compare  Plat. 
Ler/.  iii.  p.  695,  A;  Ait.  Exp.  Alex. 
v.  4. 


22 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


|Ch.  II. 


corn,1  and  to  have  produced  good  dates  and  a  few  other 
fruits.2  The  mountain  region  was,  as  we  have  seen,3 
celebrated  for  its  excellent  pastures,  for  its  abundant 
fruits,  and  especially  for  its  grapes.  Within  the 
mountains,  on  the  high  plateau,  assafetida  (silphimri) 
was  found,4  and  probably  some  other  medicinal  herbs.5 
Corn,  no  doubt,  could  be  grown  largely  in  the  plains 
and  valleys  of  the  mountain  tract,  as  well  as  on  the 
plateau,  so  far  as  the  kanats  carried  the  water.  There 
must  have  been,  on  the  whole,  a  deficiency  of  timber, 
though  the  palms  of  the  low  tract,  and  the  oaks, 
planes,  chenars  or  sycomores,  poplars,  and  willows6 
of  the  mountain  regions  sufficed  for  the  wants  of 
the  natives.  Not  much  fuel  was  required,  and  stone 
was  the  general  material  used  for  building.  Among 
the  fruits  for  which  Persia  was  famous  are  especially 
noted  the  peach,7  the  walnut,  and  the  citron.8  The 
walnut  bore  among  the  Romans  the  appellation  of 
4  royal/  9 

Persia,  like  Media,  was  a  good  nursery  for  horses.10 
Fine  grazing  grounds  existed  in  many  parts  of  the 
mountain  region,  and  for  horses  of  the  Arab  breed 
even  the  Deshtistan  was  not  unsuited.11  Camels  were 
reared  in  some  places,12  and  sheep  and  goats  were 


1  Arrian,  Hist.  hid.  xxxvii.  2, 
xxxviii.  9. 

2  Ibid,  xxxviii.  6;  Strab.  xv.  3, 
§1. 

3  Supra,  p.  19. 

4  Plin.  11.  N.  xix.  3. 

5  Ibid.  xxiv.  17,  xxvii.  13. 

6  See  Ancient  Monarchies,  vol.  iii. 
p.  140,  note  18. 

7  Plin.  xv.  13  and  14.  The  word 
4  peach'  is  corrupted  from  the  Latin 
persica.  (Compare  Germ.  Pfirsche, 
Russ.  persikie,  and  French  peche. ) 

8  Plin.  II.  N.  xii.  3. 


9  Ibid.  xv.  22. 

10  Arrian,  Hist.  Ind.  xl.  4.  Com- 
pare Herod,  i.  136;  Nic.  Damasc. 
Fr.  66;  Strab.  xv.  3,  §  18.  The 
statement  of  Xenophon,  that  an- 
ciently a  horse  was  a  rarity  in  Persia 
Proper  {Cyrop.  i.  3,  §  3),  is  one  of 
the  many  to  be  found  in  the  work 
known  as  the  Cyropwdia,  on  which 
no  dependence  can  be  placed. 

11  Kinneir,  Persian  Empire,  p.  41 ; 
Fraser,  Khorasan,  p.  72. 

12  Strab.  xv.  3,  §  1:  npdg  raic 
eoxaTialc  rioiv  ol  Ka(j.7)?io(3onKo'i. 


Ch.  II.  I 


PRODUCTS. 


2:5 


numerous.1  Horned  cattle  were  probably  not  so 
abundant,  as  the  character  of  the  country  is  not 
favourable  for  them.2  Game  existed  in  large  quanti- 
ties,3 the  lakes  abounding  with  water-fowl,4  such  as 
ducks,  teal,  heron,  snipe,  &c. ;  and  the  wooded  por- 
tions of  the  mountain  tract  giving  shelter  to  the  stag, 
the  wild  goat,  the  wild  boar,  the  hare,  the  pheasant, 
and  the  heathcock.5  Fish  were  also  plentiful.  Whales 
visited  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  were  sometimes  stranded 
upon  the  shores,  where  their  carcases  furnished  a  mine 
of  wealth  to  the  inhabitants.6  Dolphins  abounded,  as 
well  as  many  smaller  kinds ;  and  shell-fish,  particularly 
oysters,  could  always  be  obtained  without  difficult}'.7 
The  rivers,  too,  were  capable  of  furnishing  fresh-water 
fish  in  good  quantity,8  though  we  cannot  say  if  this 
source  of  supply  was  utilised  in  antiquity. 

The  mineral  treasures  of  Persia  were  fairly  numer- 
ous. Good  salt  was  yielded  by  the  lakes  of  the  middle 
region,  and  was  also  obtainable  upon  the  plateau. 
Bitumen  and  naphtha  were  produced  by  sources  in  the 
low  country.9  The  mountains  contained  most  of  the 
important  metals  and  a  certain  number  of  valuable 
gems.10   The  pearls  of  the  Gulf  acquired  early  a  great 


1  Arrian,  Hist.  Ind.  xxxvii.  10; 
Herod,  i.  126. 

2  Horned  cattle  are,  however, 
mentioned  among  the  domestic  an- 
imals of  Persia  Proper,  both  by 
Herodotus  (l.s.c.)  and  Nicolas  of 
Damascus  (Fr.  66). 

3  Arrian,  Hist.  Ind.  xl.  4:  xupyv 
7ro?iv0r)pov. 

4  Ancient  Monarchies,  vol.  iii.  p. 
142. 

5  Ibid.  pp.  141-2. 

6  Nearch.  ap.  Arr.  Hist.  Ind. 
xxxix.  4. 


7  Ibid,  xxxix.  5. 

8  Ouseley,  Travels,  vol.  i.  pp.  261, 
446,  <fec. 

9  Plin.  II.  N.  vi.  23. 

10  As  the  iritis,  a  species  of  rock- 
crystal  (Plin.  H.  N.  xxxvii.  9,  sub 
Jin. ) ;  the  atizoe,  a  white  stone  which 
had  a  pleasant  odour  (ib.  xxxvii. 
10) ;  the  mithrax,  a  gem  of  many 
hues  (ibid.);  the  nipparene,  which 
resembled  ivory  (ibid.);  and  the 
thelycardios  or  mule,  which  was  in 
special  favour  among  the  natives  of 
the  country  (ibid.). 


24 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


ICh.  II. 


reputation,  and  a  regular  fishery  was  established  for 
them  before  the  time  of  Alexander.1 

But  the  most  celebrated  of  all  the  products  of  Persia 
were  its  men.  The  1  scant  and  rugged  country  '  gave 
birth,  as  Cyrus  the  Great  is  said  to  have  observed,2  to 
a  race  brave,  hardy,  and  enduring,  calculated  not  only 
to  hold  its  own  against  aggressors,  but  to  extend  its 
sway  and  exercise  dominion  over  the  Western  Asiatics 
generally.  The  Aryan  family  is  the  one  which,  of  all  the 
races  of  mankind,  is  the  most  self-asserting,  and  has 
the  greatest  strength,  physical,  moral,  and  intellectual. 
The  Iranian  branch  of  it,  whereto  the  Persians  be- 
longed, is  not  perhaps  so  gifted  as  some  others ;  but 
it  has  qualities  which  place  it  above  most  of  those  by 
which  Western  Asia  was  anciently  peopled.  In  the 
primitive  times,  from  Cyrus  the  Great  to  Darius  Hys- 
taspis,  the  Persians  seem  to  have  been  rude  mountain- 
eers, probably  not  very  unlike  the  modern  Kurds  and 
Lurs,  who  inhabit  portions  of  the  same  chain  which 
forms  the  heart  of  the  Persian  country.  Their  phy- 
siognomy was  handsome.3  A  high  straight  forehead, 
a  long  slightly  aquiline  nose,  a  short  and  curved  upper 
lip,  a  well-rounded  chin,  characterised  the  Persian. 
The  expression  of  his  face  was  grave  and  noble.  He 
had  abundant  hair,  which  he  wore  very  artificially 


1  Arrian,  Hint.  Ind.  xxxviii.  3. 
The  account  of  pearl-fishing  given 
by  Isidore  (see  Midler's  Geographi 
Minores,  vol.  i.  pp.  254,  255)  is  prob- 
ably a  description  of  the  Persian 
practice,  with  which,  as  a  native  of 
Charax  Spasini,  on  the  Persian  Gulf, 
he  is  likely  to  have  been  familiar. 
The  pearls  were  obtained  wholly 
by  means  of  divers. 

2  Herod,  ix.  122. 

3  Dr.  Prichard  says  of  the  Persian 


physiognomy,  as  represented  in  the 
ancient  sculptures:  6  The  outline 
of  the  countenance  is  not  strictly 
Grecian,  for  it  is  peculiar;  but  it 
is  noble  and  dignified;  and  if  the 
expression  is  not  full  of  life  and 
genius,  it  is  intellectual  and  indica- 
tive of  reflection.  The  shape  of 
the  head  is  entirely  Indo-European, 
and  has  nothing  that  recalls  the 
Tartar  or  Mongolian.'  (Natural 
History  of  Man,  p.  173.) 


Ch.  II.  I    PHYSICAL  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  PERSIANS.  25 


arranged.  Above  and  round  the  brow  it  was  made  to 
stand  away  from  the  face  in  short  crisp  curls ;  on  the 
top  of  the  head  it  was  worn  smooth ;  at  the  back  of 
the  head  it  was  again  trained  into  curls,  which  fol- 
lowed each  other  in  several  rows  from  the  level  of 
the  forehead  to  the  nape  of  the  neck.  The  moustache 
was  always  cultivated,  and  curved  in  a  gentle  sweep. 
A  beard  and  whiskers  were  worn,  the  former  some- 
times long  and  pendent,  like  the  Assyrian,  but  more 
often  clustering  around  the  chin  in  short  close  curls. 
The  figure  was  well-formed,  but  somewhat  stout ;  the 
carriage  was  dignified  and  simple. 


ancient  Persians  (froui  a  bas-relief  at  Persepolis). 


26 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


ICh.  II. 


Simplicity  of  manners  prevailed  during  this  period. 
At  the  court  there  was  some  luxury ;  but  the  bulk  of 
the  nation,  living  in  their  mountain  territory,  and 
attached  to  agriculture  and  hunting,  maintained  the 
habits  of  their  ancestors,  and  were  a  somewhat  rude 
though  not  a  coarse  people.  The  dress  commonly 
worn  was  a  close-fitting  shirt  or  tunic  of  leather,1 
descending  to  the  knee,  and  with  sleeves  that  reached 
down  to  the  wrist.  Round  the  tunic  was  worn  a  belt 
or  sash,  which  was  tied  in  front.  The  head  was  pro- 
tected by  a  loose  felt  cap,2  and  the  feet  by  a  sort  of 
high  shoe  or  low  boot.  The  ordinary  diet  was  bread 
and  cress-seed,3  while  the  sole  beverage  was  water.4 
In  the  higher  ranks,  of  course,  a  different  style  of  living 
prevailed ;  the  elegant  and  flowing  '  Median  robe  1  was 
worn ; 5  flesh  of  various  kinds  was  eaten  ;6  much  wine 
was  consumed; 7  and  meals  were  extended  to  a  great 
length.8  The  Persians,  however,  maintained  during 
this  period  a  general  hardihood  and  bravery  which 
made  them  the  most  dreaded  adversaries  of  the  Greeks,9 
and  enabled  them  to  maintain  an  unquestioned  do- 
minion over  the  other  native  races  of  Western  Asia. 

As  time  went  on,  and  their  monarchs  became  less 
warlike,  and  wealth  accumulated,  and  national  spirit 
decayed,  the  Persian  character  by  degrees  deteriorated, 
and  sank,  even  under  the  ActiEemenian  kings,  to  a  level 
not  much  superior  to  that  of  the  ordinary  Asiatic. 


1  Herod,  i.  71. 

2  -Ibid.  vii.  61 :  nepl  ryot  tcetycikriGi 
eixov  mTiovg  unayiac. 

3  Xen.  Cyrop.  i.  2,  §§  8  and  11. 

4  Herod,  i.  71 ;  Xen.  Cyrop.  i.  2, 
§  8;  Strab.  xv.  3,  §  18. 

5  Herod,  i.  135;  Xen.  Cyrop. 
viii.  1,  §  40. 


6  Herod.  i.  133  ;  Heraclid. 
Cuman.  ap.  Athen.  Deipn.  iv.  p. 
145,  F. 

7  Herod,  l.s.c. ;  Xen.  Cyrop.  viii. 
8,  §  10. 

8  Xen.  Cyrop.  viii,  8,  §  9. 

9  Herod,  vi.  112,  ix.  62,  71. 


Ch.  II. ] 


MOKAL  CHARACTERISTICS. 


27 


The  Persian  antagonists  of  Alexander  were  pretty 
nearly  upon  a  par  with  the  races  which  in  Hindustan 
have  yielded  to  the  British  power ;  they  occasionally 
fought  with  gallantry,1  but  they  were  deficient  in  reso- 
lution, in  endurance,  in  all  the  elements  of  solid 
strength ;  and  they  were  quite  unable  to  stand  their 
ground  against  the  vigour  and  dash  of  the  Macedonians 
and  the  Greeks.  Whether  physically  they  were  very 
different  from  the  soldiers  of  Cyrus  may  be  doubted,  but 
morally  they  had  fallen  far  below  the  ancient  standard ; 
their  self-respect,  their  love  of  country,  their  attach- 
ment to  their  monarch  had  diminished ;  no  one  showed 
any  great  devotion  to  the  cause  for  which  he  fought ; 
after  two  defeats 2  the  empire  wholly  collapsed ;  and 
the  Persians  submitted,  apparently  without  much  re- 
luctance, to  the  Helleno-Macedonian  yoke. 

Five  centuries  and  a  half  of  servitude  could  not 
much  improve  or  elevate  the  character  of  the  people. 
Their  fall  from  power,  their  loss  of  wealth  and  of 
dominion  did  indeed  advantage  them  in  one  way :  it 
put  an  end  to  that  continually  advancing  sloth  and 
luxury  which  had  sapped  the  virtue  of  the  nation, 
depriving  it  of  energy,  endurance,  and  almost  every 
manly  excellence.  It  dashed  the  Persians  back  upon 
the  ground  whence  they  had  sprung,  and  whence, 
Antaeus-like,  they  proceeded  to  derive  fresh  vigour  and 
vital  force.  In  their  1  scant  and  ruggect '  fatherland,  the 
people  of  Cyrus  once  more  recovered  to  a  great  extent 
their  ancient  prowess  and  hardihood  —  their  habits  be- 
came simplified,  their  old  patriotism  revived,  their 
self-respect  grew  greater.    But  while  adversity  thus  in 


1  As  at  the  Granicus  (Arrian, 
Exp.  Alex.  i.  15). 

2  Those  of  Issus  and  Arbela.  The 


engagement  at  the  Granicus  was, 
comparatively  speaking,  unimpor- 
tant. 


28  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [Ch.  II. 


some  respects  proved  its  1  sweet  uses  '  upon  them,  there 
were  other  respects  in  which  submission  to  the  yoke 
of  the  Greeks,  and  still  more  to  that  of  the  Parthians, 
seems  to  have  altered  them  for  the  worse  rather  than 
for  the  better.  There  is  a  coarseness  and  rudeness 
about  the  Sassanian  Persians  which  we  do  not  observe 
in  Achcemenian  times.  The  physique  of  the  nation  is 
not  indeed  much  altered.  Nearly  the  same  counte- 
nance meets  us  in  the  sculptures  of  Artaxerxes,  the  son 
of  Babek,  of  Sapor,  and  of  their  successors,1  with  which 
we  are  familiar  from  the  bas-reliefs  of  Darius  Hystapis 
and  Xerxes.  There  is  the  same  straight  forehead,  the 
same  aquiline  nose,  the  same  well-shaped  mouth,  the 
same  abundant  hair.  The  form  is,  however,  coarser 
and  clumsier ;  the  expression  is  less  refined ;  and  the 
general  effect  produced  is  that  the  people  have,  even 
physically,  deteriorated.  The  mental  and  aesthetic 
standard  seems  still  more  to  have  sunk.  There  is  no 
evidence  that  the  Persians  of  Sassanian  times  possessed 
the  governmental  and  administrative  ability  of  Darius 
Hystapis  or  Artaxerxes  Ochus.  Their  art,  though 
remarkable,  considering  the  almost  entire  disappear- 
ance of  art  from  Western  Asia  under  the  Parthians,2 
is,  compared  with  that  of  Achasmenian  times,  rude 
and  grotesque.  In  architecture,  indeed,  they  are 
not  without  merit,  though  even  here  the  extent  to 
which  they  were  indebted  to  the  Parthians,  which 
cannot  be  exactly  determined,  must  lessen  our  estima- 
tion of  them  ;  but  their  mimetic  art,  while  not  wanting 
in  spirit,  is  remarkably  coarse  and  unrefined.  As  a 
later  chapter  will  be  devoted  to  this  subject,  no  more 


1  See  the  woodcuts  on  pp.  66,  67, 
94,  <fcc. ;  and  compare  them  with  the 
Achaemenian  countenances  on  p.  25. 


2  See  the  Author's  Sixth  Mon- 
archy, pp.  371-397. 


Ch.  II.  ]       PERSIANS  SUPERIOR  TO  PARTHIANS. 


29 


need  be  said  upon  it  here.  It  is  sufficient  for  our 
present  purpose  to  note  that  the  impression  which 
we  obtain  from  the  monumental  remains  of  the  Sas- 
sanian  Persians  accords  with  what  is  to  be  gathered 
of  them  from  the  accounts  of  the  Romans  and  the 
Greeks.  The  great  Asiatic  revolution  of  the  year  a.d. 
226  marks  a  revival  of  the  Iranic  nationality  from  the 
depressed  state  into  which  it  had  sunk  for  more  than 
five  hundred  years ;  but  the  revival  is  not  full  or  com- 
plete. The  Persians  of  the  Sassanian  kingdom  are  not 
equal  to  those  of  the  time  between  Cyrus  the  Great 
and  Darius  Codomannus;  they  have  ruder  manners, 
a  grosser  taste,  less  capacity  for  government  and  organ- 
isation ;  they  have,  in  fact,  been  coarsened  by  centuries 
of  Tartar  rule ;  they  are  vigorous,  active,  energetic, 
proud,  brave ;  but  in  civilisation  and  refinement  they 
do  not  rank  much  above  their  Parthian  predecessors. 
Western  Asia  gained,  perhaps,  something,  but  it  did 
not  gain  much,  from  the  substitution  of  the  Persians 
for  the  Parthians  as  the  dominant  power.  The  change 
is  the  least  marked  among  the  revolutions  which  the 
East  underwent  between  the  accession  of  Cyrus  and 
the  conquests  of  Timour.  But  it  is  a  change,  on  the 
whole,  for  the  better.  It  is  accompanied  by  a  revival 
of  art,  by  improvements  in  architecture  ;  it  inaugurates 
a  religious  revolution  which  has  advantages.  Above 
all,  it  saves  the  East  from  stagnation.  It  is  one  among 
many  of  those  salutary  shocks  which,  in  the  political 
as  in  the  natural  world,  are  needed  from  time  to  time 
to  stimulate  action  and  prevent  torpor  and  apathy. 


30 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


ICh.  HI. 


CHAPTER  III. 

Reign  of  Artaxerxes  I.  Stories  told  of  him.  Most  probable  account  of 
his  Descent,  Rank,  and  Parentage.  His  Contest  with  Artabanus.  First 
War  with  Chosroes  of  Armenia.  Contest  with  Alexander  Severus,  Second 
War  with  Chosroes  and  Conquest  of  Armenia.  Religious  Reforms.  In- 
ternal Administration  and  Government.    Art.    Coinage.  Inscriptions. 

rOv  (sc.  ykpTaftavov)  'Apra^ip^rjC  uizonTeivag,  Ilipaatc  ttjv  tipxyv  avenTTjoaTO'  tu 
7t  yeiTvuovTa  idvn  fSapfiapa  xeipuoafievoCy  padiuc  rjdw  nat  Ty  'Pu/xaiuv  apx^t 
E7Te(3ovlevcev.  —  Herodian.  vi.  2,  ad  Jin. 

Around  the  cradle  of  an  Oriental  sovereign  who  founds 
a  dynasty  there  cluster  commonly  a  number  of  tra- 
ditions, which  have,  more  or  less,  a  mythical  character. 
The  tales  told  of  Cyrus  the  Great,  which  even  Hero- 
dotus set  aside  as  incredible,1  have  their  parallels  in 
narratives  that  were  current  within  one  or  two  cen- 
turies 2  with  respect  to  the  founder  of  the  Second  Per- 
sian Empire,  which  would  not  have  disgraced  the 
inythologers  of  Achsemenian  times.  Artaxerxes,  ac- 
cording to  some,3  was  the  son  of  a  common  soldier 
who  had  an  illicit  connection  with  the  wife  of  a  Persian 
cobbler 4  and  astrologer,  a  certain  Babek  or  Papak,  an 
inhabitant  of  the  Cadusian  country5  and  a  man  of  the 


1  Herod,  i.  95  and  214. 

2  Agathangelus,  the  earliest  of 
those  Armenian  historians  whose 
works  have  come  down  to  ns,  was 
the  secretary  of  Tiridates  the  Great 
(of  Armenia),  and  lived  conse- 
quently in  the  earlier  half  of  the 
fourth  century,  or  ahout  a  hundred 
years  later  than  Artaxerxes.  Moses 
of  Chorene  wrote  a  century  later 
(ab.  A.D.  440).     Agathias  is  still 


later;  he  did  not  write  till  about 
a.d.  580. 

3  Agathias,  ii.  ]>.  65. 

4  Gibbon  calls  Babek  a  4  tanner' 
(Decline  and  Fall,  eh.  viii.  vol.  i. 
p.  331),  and  De  Sacy  a  k  currier ' 
(corroyeur:  Memoire  stir  les  Inscrip- 
tions de  NakhsJi-i-Rustam,  p.  33, 
note  49).  But  Agathias,  their 
authority,  has  okvtotouoc. 

5  So  Agathias,  ii.  p.  05,  C. 


Ch.  III.]  LEGENDS  CONNECTED  WITH  ARTAXERXES  L  31 

lowest  class,1  Papak,  knowing  by  his  art  that  the  sol- 
dier's son  would  attain  a  lofty  position,  voluntarily  ceded 
his  rights  as  husband  to  the  favourite  of  fortune,  and  bred 
up  as  his  own  the  issue  of  this  illegitimate  commerce, 
who,  when  he  attained  to  manhood,  justified  Papak's 
foresight  by  successfully  revolting  from  Artabanus 
and  establishing  the  new  Persian  monarchy.  Others2 
said  that  the  founder  of  the  new  kingdom  was  a 
Parthian  satrap,  the  son  of  a  noble,  and  that,  having 
long  meditated  revolt,  he  took  the  final  plunge  in  con- 
sequence of  a  prophecy  uttered  by  Artabanus,  who 
was  well  skilled  in  magical  arts,  and  saw  in  the  stars 
that  the  Parthian  empire  was  threatened  with  destruc- 
tion. Artabanus,  on  a  certain  occasion,  when  he  com- 
municated this  prophetic  knowledge  to  his  wife,  was 
overheard  by  one  of  her  attendants,  a  noble  damsel 
named  Artaducta,  already  affianced  to  Artaxerxes  and 
a  sharer  in  his  secret  counsels.  At  her  instigation  he 
hastened  his  plans,  raised  the  standard  of  revolt,  and 
upon  the  successful  issue  of  his  enterprise  made  her 
his  queen.  Miraculous  circumstances  were  freely  in- 
terwoven with  these  narratives,3  and  a  result  was 
produced  which  staggered  the  faith  even  of  such  a 
writer  as  Moses  of  Chorine,  who,  desiring  to  confine 
himself  to  what  was  strictly  true  and  certain,  could 
find  no  more  to  say  of  Artaxerxes'  birth  and  origin 


1  JlavrtiTTaaL  fiev  uarjfioTarog.  (Aga- 
thias,  l.s.c. ) 

2  Agathangelus,  i.  9. 

3  See  Moses  of  Chorene  (Hist. 
Armen.  ii.  07),  who  declines  to 
repeat  these  fables,  remarking: 
'Alienum  estfabulas  commemorare, 
de  somnio  cupidinis,  de  judicio,  et 
igne  ab  Sasanc  orlo,  de  grege  con- 


cluso,  atque  ocnli  albugine,  et 
divinorum  sen  Chodiorum  prcedic- 
tione,  cseterisque  quse  sequuntur, 
nempe  de  stuprosa  Artasiris  mente, 
et  caede,  de  vesana  magi  filiae  ob  vi- 
tulum  eloquentia,  &c.'  Compare  the 
story  of  Heftwad  and  the  worm, 
related  in  the  Modjmel-al-Tewarikh 
{Journal  Asiatique  for  1841,  p.  501). 


32 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


LCh.  111. 


than  that  he  was  the  son  of  a  certain  Sasan,  and  a 
native  of  Istakr,  or  Persepolis. 

Even,  however,  the  two  facts  thus  selected  as  be- 
yond criticism  by  Moses  are  far  from  being  entitled 
to  implicit  credence.  Artaxerxes,  the  son  of  Sasan 
according  to  Agathangelus  and  Moses,1  is  the  son  of 
Papak  (or  Babek)  in  his  own2  and  his  son's  inscrip- 
tions. The  Persian  writers  generally  take  the  same 
view,  and  declare  that  Sasan  was  a  remoter  ancestor 
of  Artaxerxes,  the  acknowledged  founder  of  the  family, 
and  not  Artaxerxes7  father.3  In  the  extant  records 
of  the  new  Persian  Kingdom,  the  coins  and  the  inscrip- 
tions, neither  Sasan  nor  the  gentilitial  term  derived 


1  Agathangelus,  i .  §  3  ;  Mos. 
Chor.  Hist.  Armen.  ii.  54,  66,  &e. 

2  De  Sacy,  Memoir  e,  &c,  p.  30; 
Thomas,  in  As.  Society's  Journal, 
New  Series,  vol.  iii.  p.  269;  Spiegel, 
Grammatik  der  Flu  zvaresch-Sjw  ache, 
p.  172;  Haug,  Old  Pahlavi-Pazand 
Glossary,  p.  5.  The  inscription  of 
Artaxerxes  is  confirmed  by  those  of 
his  son,  Sapor,  who  calls  Papak 
(Babek)  his  grandfather  (De  Sacy, 
p.  31;  Thomas,  in  Journal  of  the 
Asiatic  Society,  New  Series,  vol. 
iii.  pp.  301,  314;  Haug,  Glossary,  p. 
46).  There  are  also  coins  of  Arta- 
xerxes which  have  his  head  on  the 
obverse,  with  the  legend  Artahshetr, 
and  on  the  other  side  the  head  of 
his  father,  with  the  legend  Mazddisn 
bag  Papak,  '  the  Ormazd-worship- 
ping  divine  Papak.'  (See  Mordt- 
mann's  article  in  the  Zeitschrift 
der  deutschen  morgenldndisclien  Ge- 
sellschaft,  vol.  viii.  p.  29;  compare 
Thomas  in  Num.  Chron.  for  1872, 
p.  48.) 

3  See  Malcolm,  Hist,  of  Persia,  i. 
p.  89;  Thomas  in  Num.  Citron., 
New  Series,  No.  xlv.  p.  47.  The 
variety,  however,  of  the  Persian 
accounts  is  almost  infinite.  The 
Lebtarikh  makes  Artaxerxes  the 
son  of  Sasan,  and  calls  Babek  his 
maternal  grandfather  (D'Herbelot, 
Bibl.  Orient,  torn.  i.  p.  375).  The 


Tarikh-Kozideh  and  Bina-Kiti  agree 
on  the  latter  point,  but  make  Sasan 
the  other  (paternal)  grandfather 
(ibid).  The  Zeenut-al-Tuarikh 
has  two  Sasan s,  one  of  whom  is 
the  father  and  the  other  the  grand- 
father of  Babek.  Macoudi  gives 
two  genealogies  of  Artaxerxes, 
each  containing  three  Sasans,  and 
one  of  them  two,  the  other  three 
Babeks  (Prairies  (f  Or,  torn.  ii.  p. 
151):  — 


Loh  rasp 

Lohrasp 

Gustasp 

Gustasp 

Isfendiar 

Isfendiar 

i 

Bahman 

i 

Bahman 

i 

Sassan 

i 

Sassan 

i 

Dara 

i 

Mehremas 

Behawend 

i 

Babek 

i 

Sassan 

i 

Sassan 

i 

Babek 

1 

Babek 

1 

Sassan 

i 

Sassan 

Babek (Shah) 

i 

Babek 

1 

Ardeshir 

i 

Ardeshir 

Ch.  III.]       HIS  PARENTAGE  AND  BIRTHPLACE. 


33 


from  it,  Sasanidae,  has  any  place  ;  and  though  it  would 
perhaps  be  rash  to  question  on  this  account  the  em- 
ployment of  the  term  Sasanidae  by  the  dynasty,1  yet 
we  may  regard  it  as  really  '  certain  '  that  the  father  of 
Artaxerxes  was  named,  not  Sasan,  but  Papak ;  and 
that,  if  the  term  Sassanian  was  in  reality  a  patro- 
nymic, it  was  derived,  like  the  term  'Achaemenian,7  2 
from  some  remote  progenitor3  whom  the  royal  fam- 
ily of  the  new  empire  believed  to  have  been  their 
founder. 

The  native  country  of  Artaxerxes  is  also  variously 
stated  by  the  authorities.  Agathangelus  calls  him  an 
Assyrian,4  and  makes  the  Assyrians  play  an  important 
part  in  his  rebellion.5  Agathias  says  that  he  was  born 
in  the  Cadusian  country,6  or  the  low  tract  south-west 
of  the  Caspian,  which  belonged  to  Media  rather  than 
to  Assyria  or  Persia.  Dio  Cassius 7  and  Herodian,8  the 
contemporaries  of  Artaxerxes,  call  him  a  Persian ;  and 
there  can  be  no  reasonable  doubt  that  they  are  correct 
in  so  doing.    Agathangelus  allows  the  predominantly 


1  The  term  seems  to  have  been 
first  used  by  the  Armenian  writers, 
who  regarded  Artaxerxes  as  the 
son  of  Sasan.  (See  Agathang. 
i.  §  3,  ad  Jin.)  Adopted  from 
them  by  the  Byzantines,  it  passed 
into  the  languages  of  modern  Eu- 
rope. 

2  This  term  (Hakhdmanishiya) 
was  actually  used  by  the  kings  of 
the  Great  Persian  Empire  from 
Cyrus  to  Artaxerxes  Mnemon,  as 
appears  from  their  inscriptions. 
(See  Sir  H.  Rawlinson's  Cuneiform 
Inscriptions,  vol.  i.  pp.  270,  271, 
279,  320,  342,  &c. ;  and  Loftus, 
Chaldcea  and  Susiana,  p.  372.)  It 
appears  from  the  Behistun  monu- 
ment that  Darius  Hystapis  con- 
nected the  name  with  a  certain 
Achsemenes  {Hakhdmanish),  whom 
he  regarded  as  his  ancestor  in  the 


fifth  degree.  (Compare  Herod,  i. 
125;  iii.  75;  vii.  11.) 

3  Patkanian  (Journ.  Asiatiqueior 
1866,  p.  128)  notes  that,  according 
to  native  Persian  accounts,  the  first 
Sassan  was  a  son  of  Artaxerxes 
Longimanus.  The  Sassanian  kings 
undoubtedly  claimed  to  descend 
from  the  Acha3menida3 ;  but  it  is 
very  unlikely  that  they  could  really 
trace  their  descent,  nor  has  Sasan 
the  form  of  an  old  Persian  name. 

4  'Etc  rfjg  Trarplac  rye  'Aoovptac 
(i.  §  3). 

5  See  §§  5  and  8. 

6  Sasan,  according  to  Agathias, 
was  travelling  through  the  Cadu- 
sian country  {diu  tt/c  Kadovoatuv 
Xupag)  when  he  fell  in  with  Babek 
who  lived  there  (ii.  p.  65). 

7  Dio  Cass.  lxxx.  3. 

8  Herodian,  vi.  9. 


34 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  IIL 


Persian  character  of  his  revolt,  and  Agathias  is  ap- 
parently unaware  that  the  Cadusian  country  was  no 
part  of  Persia.  The  statement  that  he  was  a  native  of 
Persepolis  (Istakr)  is  first  found  in  Moses  of  Chorine.1 
It  may  be  true,  but  it  is  uncertain ;  for  it  may  have 
grown  out  of  the  earlier  statement  of  Agathangelus, 
that  he  held  the  government  of  the  province  of 
Istakr.2  We  can  only  affirm  with  confidence  that 
the  founder  of  the  new  Persian  monarchy  was  a 
genuine  Persian,  without  attempting  to  determine 
positively  what  Persian  city  or  province  had  the  hon- 
our of  producing  him.3 

A  more  interesting  question,  and  one  which  will  be 
found  perhaps  to  admit  of  a  more  definite  answer,  is 
that  of  the  rank  and  station  in  which  Artaxerxes  was 
born.  We  have  seen4  that  Agathias  (writing  ab.  a.d. 
580)  called  him  the  supposititious  son  of  a  cobbler. 
Others5  spoke  of  him  as  the  child  of  a  shepherd; 
while  some  said  that  his  father  was  'an  inferior  officer 
in  the  service  of  the  government.1 6  But  on  the  other 
hand,  in  the  inscriptions  which  Artaxerxes  himself  set 
up  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Persepolis,7  he  gives  his 


1  Hist.  Armen.  ii.  66.  The  state- 
ment is  repeated  by  Eutychius  (vol. 
i.  p.  367):  6  Anno  imperii  (Commo- 
di)  decimo  exorti  Persae  Babelem, 
Amidum,  et  Persiam  occuparunt, 
duce  nempe  Ardashiro,  filio  Babeci 
filii  Sasani,  Estochrista,' 

2  Ovrog  6  "'kpraapag  Trjg  rcbv 
2  r  ax  p  it  uv  narpldog  oarpd'KrjQ 
V7T7/pX£V    (i.  9). 

3  Tabari  says  lie  was  a  native  of 
a  city  called  Tirouze,  which  was  in 
the  government  of  Istakr.  (Chro- 
nique,  ii.  p.  67.) 

4  Supra,  p.  30. 

5  See  D'Herbelot,  Bibliotheque 
Orientate,  torn.  i.  p.  375,  ad  voc. 
Ardschir-Babegan. 


6  Malcolm,  History  of  Persia,  vol. 

i.  p.  89.  Tabari  calls  him  4  Gov- 
ernor of  Darab-gird.'  (Chronique, 
torn.  ii.  p.  68.) 

7  These  inscriptions  were  first 
copied  by  Carsten  Niebnhr,  the 
father  of  the  historian  of  Home, 
and  are  given  in  his  Voyages,  torn. 

ii.  pi.  xxvii.  They  may  be  found 
also  in  Chard  in,  Voyages  en  Perse, 
torn.  ii.  pi.  lxxiii. ;  De  Sacy,  J/e- 
moire,  pi.  i. ;  Ker  Porter,  Travels, 
vol.  i.  pi.  23;  and  Flandin,  Voyage 
en  Perse,  torn.  iv.  pi.  180.  Papak 
is  called  malfra  in  the  Persian,  and 
[3aoi?ievc  in  the  Greek  version. 


Ch.  III.  I 


RANK  OF  HIS  FATHER,  PAPAK. 


35 


father,  Papak,  the  title  of  'King.'  Agathangelus 
calls  him  a  1  noble  ' 1  and  1  satrap  of  the  Persepolitan 
government ; 7  2  while  Herodian  seems  to  speak  of 
him  as  'king  of  the  Persians/  before  his  victories 
over  Artabanus.3  On  the  whole,  it  is  perhaps  most 
probable  that,  like  Cyrus,  he  was  the  hereditary  mon- 
arch of  the  subject  kingdom  of  Persia,  which  had 
always  its  own  princes  under  the  Parthians,4  and  that 
thus  he  naturally  and  without  effort  took  the  leader- 
ship of  the  revolt  when  circumstances  induced  his 
nation  to  rebel  and  seek  to  establish  its  independ- 
ence. The  stories  told  of  his  humble  origin,  which 
are  contradictory  and  improbable,  are  to  be  paralleled 
with  those  which  made  Cyrus  the  son  of  a  Persian  of 
moderate  rank,5  and  the  foster-child  of  a  herdsman.6 
There  is  always  in  the  East  a  tendency  towards  ro- 
mance and  exaggeration  ;  and  when  a  great  monarch 
emerges  from  a  comparatively  humble  position,  the 
humility  and  obscurity  of  his  first  condition  are  in- 
tensified, to  make  the  contrast  more  striking  between 
his  original  low  estate  and  his  ultimate  splendour  and 
dignity. 

The  circumstances  of  the  struggle  between  Ar- 
taxerxes  and  Artabanus  are  briefly  sketched  by  Dio 
Cassius 7  and  Agathangelus,8  while  they  are  related 
more  at  large  by  the  Persian  writers.9  It  is  probable 
that  the  contest  occupied  a  space  of  four  or  five 


1  Twv  fieyiGTuvcjv  rig  'Apraaipat 
(i.  3). 

2  See  above,  p.  34,  note  2 

3  Herodian,  vi.  2. 

4  Strabo,  xv.  3,  §  24;  Isid.  Char. 
§34. 

5  Herod,  i.  107.  In  an  inscrip- 
tion of  Cyrus  he  calls  his  father 
Cambyses  4  the  powerful  king ' 
(khshayathiya  vazarka). 


6  Ibid.  i.  110-118. 

7  Dio  Cass.  Ixxx.  3. 

8  Agathangelus,  i.  §§  8-9.  The 
three  battles  are  witnessed  to  by 
both  writers. 

9  The  Persian  accounts  will  be 
found  condensed  in  Malcolm,  Hist, 
of  Persia,  vol.  i.  pp.  90-92.  Their 
authority  is  but  slight. 


36  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [Cn.  III. 


years.  At  first,  we  are  told,1  Artabanus  neglected  to 
arouse  himself,  and  took  no  steps  towards  crushing 
the  rebellion,  which  was  limited  to  an  assertion  of  the 
independence  of  Persia  Proper,  or  the  province  of 
Fars.  After  a  time  the  revolted  vassal,  finding  himself 
unmolested,  was  induced  to  raise  his  thoughts  higher, 
and  commenced  a  career  of  conquest.  Turning  his 
arms  eastward,  he  attacked  Kerman  (Carmania),  and 
easily  succeeded  in  reducing  that  scantily-peopled 
tract  under  his  dominion.2  He  then  proceeded  to 
menace  the  north,  and,  making  war  in  that  quarter, 
overran  and  attached  to  his  kingdom  some  of  the  out- 
lying provinces  of  Media.  Roused  by  these  aggres- 
sions, the  Parthian  monarch  at  length  took  the  field, 
collected  an  army  consisting  in  part  of  Parthians,  in 
part  of  the  Persians  who  continued  faithful  to  him,3 
against  his  vassal,  and,  invading  Persia,  soon  brought 
his  adversary  to  a  battle.  A  long  and  bloody  contest 
followed,  both  sides  suffering  great  losses  ;  but  victory 
finally  declared  itself  in  favour  of  Artaxerxes,  through 
the  desertion  to  him,  during  the  engagement,  of  a  por- 
tion of  his  enemy's  forces.4  A  second  conflict  ensued 
within  a  short  period,  in  which  the  insurgents  were 
even  more  completely  successful ;  the  carnage  on  the 
side  of  the  Parthians  was  great,  the  loss  of  the  Persians 
small ;  and  the  great  king  fled  precipitately  from  the 
field.  Still  the  resources  6f  Parthia  were  equal  to  a 
third  trial  of  arms.    After  a  brief  pause,  Artabanus 


1  Malcolm,  p.  91. 

2  Ibid,  l.s.e. ;  Tabari,  ii.  p.  70. 
Thomas  (Num.  Ghron.  N"o.  xlv., 
New  Series,  p.  54)  assigns  the  earli- 
est coins  of  Artaxerxes  to  the  period 
when  he  was  King  of  Fars  only,  or 
perhaps  of  Fars  and  Kerman. 


3  So  Agathangelus :  unl'i&io 
' ApTai3dv7]g  fiera  HupOuv.  ex^v  k  al 
o  v  k  0  Tie  pa  a  f ,  firj  kekoi.- 
VG)vr}K(Wag  7?)  tuv  6fi0({)v?i(jv  (Sov'A?) 
(i.  §8). 

4  Ibid,  l.s.c. 


♦ 


Ch.  III. J         HIS  CONTEST  WITH  ARTABANUS. 


37 


made  a  final  effort  to  reduce  his  revolted  vassal ;  and 
a  last  engagement  took  place  in  the  plain  of  Hormuz,1 
which  was  a  portion  of  the  Jerahi  valley,  in  the 
beautiful  country  between  Bebahan  and  Shuster. 
Here,  after  a  desperate  conflict,  the  Parthian  monarch 
suffered  a  third  and  signal  defeat;  his  army  was 
scattered ;  and  he  himself  lost  his  life  in  the  combat. 
According  to  some,  his  death  was  the  result  of  a 
hand-to-hand  conflict  with  his  great  antagonist,2  who, 
pretending  to  fly,  drew  him  on,  and  then  pierced  his 
heart  with  an  arrow. 

The  victory  of  Hormuz  gave  to  Artaxerxes  the 
dominion  of  the  East ;  but  it  did  not  secure  him  this 
result  at  once,  or  without  further  struggle.  Artabanus 
had  left  sons ;  3  and  both  in  Bactria  and  Armenia 
there  were  powerful  branches  of  the  Arsacid  family,4 
which  could  not  see  unmoved  the  downfall  of  their 
kindred  in  Parthia.  Chosroes,  the  Armenian  monarch, 
was  a  prince  of  considerable  ability,  and  is  said  to  have 
been  set  upon  his  throne  by  Artabanus,  whose  brother 
he  was,  according  to  some  writers.5  At  any  rate  he  was 
an  Arsacid ;  and  he  felt  keenly  the  diminution  of  his 
own  influence  involved  in  the  transfer  to  an  alien  race 
of  the  sovereignty  wielded  for  five  centuries  by  the  de- 
scendants of  the  first  Arsaces.    He  had  set  his  forces  in 


1  Dio  Cassius  (lxxx.  3)  and  Aga- 
thangelus  (l.s.c)  alike  note  the  three 
engagements,  but  give  no  indica- 
tions of  locality.  We  are  indebted 
to  the  Persian  writers  for  the  men- 
tion of  the  'plain  of  Hormuz.'  (See 
Malcolm,  History  of  Persia,  vol.  i. 
p.  91.)  They  are  not,  however,  all 
agreed  upon  the  point,  for  the 
Modjmel  -al- Tewarikh  pi  aces  the 
battle  at  Nehavend  near  Ecbatana. 
(See  the  Journal  Asiatique  for  1841, 
p.  501.) 


2  Metaphrastus,  quoted  by  M. 
Langlois  in  his  edition  of  Agathan- 
gelus,  published  in  the  Frar/m.  Hist. 
Gr.  of  Mons.  C.  Midler,  vol.  v.  pars 
2nda,  p.  113;  Modjmfl-al-Tewarikh, 
l.s.c;  Tabari,  ii.  p.  73. 

3  Dio  Cass,  l.s.c. 

4  Agathang.  Pref.  §  2;  Hist.  JRer/n. 
Tiridat.  i.  §9;  Mos.  Choren.  Hist. 
Armen.  ii.  65-69. 

5  Agathang.  Hist.  i.  §  9  (Greek 
version);  Procop.  Be  . Ed if.  Justin- 
ian, iii.  1. 


38 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  III. 


motion, while  the  contest  between  Artabanus  and  Arta- 
xerxes  was  still  in  progress,  in  the  hope  of  affording  sub- 
stantial help  to  his  relative.1  But  the  march  of  events 
was  too  rapid  for  him ;  and,  ere  he  could  strike  a  blow, 
he  found  that  the  time  for  effectual  action  had  gone  by, 
that  Artabanus  was  no  more,  and  that  the  dominion 
of  Artaxerxes  was  established  over  most  of  the  coun- 
tries which  had  previously  formed  portions  of  the  Par- 
thian Empire.  Still,  he  resolved  to  continue  the 
struggle;  he  was  on  friendly  terms  with  Rome,2  and 
might  count  on  an  imperial  contingent;  he  had  some 
hope  that  the  Bactrian  Arsacidae  would  join  him ; 3  at 
the  worst,  he  regarded  his  own  power  as  firmly  fixed 
and  as  sufficient  to  enable  him  to  maintain  an  equal 
contest  with  the  new  monarchy.  Accordingly  he 
took  the  Parthian  Arsacids  under  his  protection,  and 
gave  them  a  refuge  in  the  Armenian  territory.4  At 
the  same  time  he  negotiated  with  both  Balkh  and 
Rome,  made  arrangements  with  the  barbarians  upon 
his  northern  frontier  to  lend  him  aid,5  and,  having  col- 
lected a  large  army,  invaded  the  new  kingdom  on  the 
north-west,6  and  gained  certain  not  unimportant  suc- 
cesses. According  to  the  Armenian  historians,  Arta- 
xerxes lost  Assyria  and  the  adjacent  regions;  Bactria 
wavered;  and,  after  the  struggle  had  continued  for  a 
year  or  two,  the  founder  of  the  second  Persian  empire 
was  obliged  to  fly  ignominiously  to  India!  7    But  this 


1  Mos.  Chor.  ii.  08;  Agathang. 
I.s.c. 

2  Mos.  Chor.  ii.  09.  Compare 
Herodian,  vi.  5. 

5  Mos.  Chor.  I.s.c. 

4  Dio  Cass.  I.s.c. 

5  According  to  Agathangelus  (ii. 
§  1),  Chosroes  called  in  the  aid  of 
the   Albanians,  the  Iberians,  the 


Lepones,  the  Silvani,  the  Caspians, 
and  the  Huns  (!).  He  was  also 
helped  by  the  Saracens  (ii.  §  4). 

6  Agathang.  ii.  §  Mos.  Chor. 
ii.  09/ 

7  So  Moses  (Hist.  Arm.  ii.  70.  ad 
fin.).  Agathangelus,  however,  the 
earlier  writer,  makes  no  such  ex- 
treme assertion.    According  to  him 


Ch.  III.]     WAR  WITH  CHOSROES  OF  ARMENIA. 


39 


entire  narrative  seems  to  be  deeply  tinged  with  the 
vitiating  stain  of  intense  national  vanity,  a  fault  which 
markedly  characterises  the  Armenian  writers,  and 
renders  them,  when  unconfirmed  by  other  authorities, 
almost  worthless.  The  general  course  of  events,  and 
the  position  which  Artaxerxes  takes  in  his  dealings 
with  Rome  (a.d.  229 — 230),  sufficiently  indicate  that 
any  reverses  which  he  sustained  at  this  time  in  his 
struggle  with  Chosroes  and  the  unsubmitted  Arsacidse1 
must  have  been  trivial,  and  that  they  certainly  had  no 
greater  result  than  to  establish  the  independence  of  Ar- 
menia, which,  by  dint  of  leaning  upon  Rome,2  was  able 
to  maintain  itself  against  the  Persian  monarch  and  to 
check  the  advance  of  the  Persians  in  North-Western 
Asia, 

Artaxerxes,  however,  resisted  in  this  quarter,  and 
unable  to  overcome  the  resistance,  which  he  may  have 
regarded  as  deriving  its  effectiveness  (in  part  at  least) 
from  the  support  lent  it  by  Rome,  determined  (ab. 
a.d.  229)  to  challenge  the  empire  to  an  encounter. 
Aware  that  Artabanus,  his  late  rival,  against  whom  he 
had  measured  himself,  and  whose  power  he  had  com- 
pletely overthrown,  had  been  successful  in  his  war 
with  Macrinus,  had  gained  the  great  battle  of  Nisibis, 
and  forced  the  Imperial  State  to  purchase  an  igno- 
minious peace  by  a  payment  equal  to  nearly  two  mil- 


Artaxerxes  maintained  the  struggle, 
but  with  constant  ill  success,  for 
twelve  years  (Hist.  ii.  §§  2  and  3). 
Patkanian  believes  Chosroes  to  have 
ravaged  the  Persian  territory  as  far 
as  Ctesiphon ;  to  have  there  quar- 
relled with  his  allies,  who  quitted 
him;  and  after  this  to  have  had  no 
great  success,  though  he  continued 
the  war  for  ten  years,  from  a.d.  227 
to  a.d.  237  (Journal  Asiafique,  1806, 
pp.  142-3). 


1  We  might  doubt  whether  any 
reverses  at  all  were  sustained, 
were  it  not  for  the  statement  of 
Dio:  IttI  tt/v  'Apfievlav  rfhaoe,  kuv- 
lavOa  npog  te  tuv  sfix^p'lcov  xat  7rpo^ 
My5d)V  rivCdv  tuv  re  rov  ' kprafiuvov 
TzatSojv  TTTaLGag,  Cyg  fiev  riveg  Xeyov- 
olv,  {(pvyev,  6g  6'  trepoi,  dvexcjpTjoe 
Tcpb^  TcapaoKevTjv  dvvaueo)^  fiei&vog 
(lxxx.  3). 

2  Mos.  Chor.  ii.  58-59. 


40  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [Ch.  IIL 


lions  of  our  money,1  he  may  naturally  have  thought 
that  a  facile  triumph  was  open  to  his  arms  in  this  direc- 
tion. Alexander  Severus,  the  occupant  of  the  imperial 
throne,  was  a  young  man  of  a  weak  character,  controlled 
in  a  great  measure  by  his  mother,  Julia  Mamsea,  and 
as  yet  quite  undistinguished  as  a  general.  The  Roman 
forces  in  the  East  were  known  to  be  licentious  and 
insubordinate ; 2  corrupted  by  the  softness  of  the  cli- 
mate and  the  seductions  of  Oriental  manners,  they 
disregarded  the  restraints  of  discipline,  indulged  in 
the  vices  which  at  once  enervate  the  frame  and  lower 
the  moral  character,  had  scant  respect  for  their  leaders, 
and  seemed  a  defence  which  it  would  be  easy  to 
overpower  and  sweep  away.  Artaxerxes,  like  other 
founders  of  great  empires,  entertained  lofty  views  of 
his  abilities  and  his  destinies ;  the  monarchy  which  he 
had  built  up  in  the  space  of  some  five  or  six  years  was 
far  from  contenting  him ;  well  read  in  the  ancient 
history  of  his  nation,  he  sighed  after  the  glorious  days 
of  Cyrus  the  Great  and  Darius  Hystaspis,  when  all 
Western  Asia  from  the  shores  of  the  JEgean  to  the 
Indian  desert,  and  portions  of  Europe  and  Africa,  had 
acknowledged  the  sway  of  the  Persian  king.  The 
territories  which  these  princes  had  ruled  he  regarded 
as  his  own  by  right  of  inheritance ;  and  we  are  told 
that  he  not  only  entertained,  but  boldly  published, 
these  views.3  His  emissaries  everywhere  declared  that 
their  master  claimed  the  dominion  of  Asia  as  far  as 
the  iEgean  Sea  and  the  Propontis.  It  was  his  duty 
and  his  mission  to  recover  to  the  Persians  their  pristine 


1  See  the  Author's  Sixth  Mon- 
archy, p.  360. 

2  They  had  recently  murdered 
their  general,  Flavius  Heracleon 


(Dio  Cass.  lxxx.  4). 
3  Herodian,  vi.  2;  Dio  Cass,  lxxx* 

3. 


Ch.  III.] 


NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  ROME. 


41 


empire.  What  Cyrus  had  conquered,  what  the  Per- 
sian kings  had  held  from  that  time  until  the  defeat  of 
Codomannus  by  Alexander,  was  his  by  indefeasible 
right,  and  he  was  about  to  take  possession  of  it. 

Nor  were  these  brave  words  a  mere  brutum  fulmen. 
Simultaneously  with  the  putting  forth  of  such .  lofty 
pretensions,  the  troops  of  the  Persian  monarch  crossed 
the  Tigris  and  spread  themselves  over  the  entire 
Roman  province  of  Mesopotamia,1  which  was  rapidly 
overrun  and  offered  scarcely  any  resistance.  Severus 
learned  at  the  same  moment  the  demands  of  his  adver- 
sary and  the  loss  of  one  of  his  best  provinces.  He 
heard  that  his  strong  posts  upon  the  Euphrates,  the  old 
defences  of  the  empire  in  this  quarter,  were  being 
attacked,2  and  that  Syria  daily  expected  the  passage  of 
the  invaders.  The  crisis  was  one  requiring  prompt 
action ;  but  the  weak  and  inexperienced  youth  was 
content  to  meet  it  with  diplomacy,  and,  instead  of 
sending  an  army  to  the  East,  despatched  ambassadors 
to  his  rival  with  a  letter.  1  Artaxerxes,'  he  said, 
1  ought  to  confine  himself  to  his  own  territories  and 
not  seek  to  revolutionise  Asia ;  it  was  unsafe,  on  the 
strength  of  mere  unsubstantial  hopes,  to  commence  a 
great  war.  Every  one  should  be  content  with  keeping 
what  belonged  to  him.  Artaxerxes  would  find  war 
with  Rome  a  very  different  thing  from  the  contests 
in  which  he  had  been  hitherto  engaged  with  bar- 
barous races  like  his  own.  He  should  call  to  mind 
the  successes  of  Augustus  and  Trajan,  and  the  trophies 
carried  off  from  the  East  by  Lucius  Verus  and  by 
Septimius  Severus.7 

1  Heroclian,  l.s.c.  Compare  Lampridius  (Vit.  Al.  Sev.  §  56):  'Terras 
interamnanas  ab  impura  ilia  belua  recepimusS 

2  He  rod  i  an.  l.s  c. 


42 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


ICh.  III. 


The  counsels  of  moderation  have  rarely  much  effect 
in  restraining  princely  ambition.  Artaxerxes  replied 
by  an  embassy  in  which  he  ostentatiously  displayed  the 
wealth  and  magnificence  of  Persia ; 1  but,  so  far  from 
making  any  deduction  from  his  original  demands,  he 
now  distinctly  formulated  them,  and  required  their 
immediate  acceptance.  1  Artaxerxes,  the  Great  King,' 
he  said,  1  ordered2  the  Romans  and  their  ruler  to  take 
their  departure  forthwith  from  Syria  and  the  rest  of 
Western  Asia,  and  to  allow  the  Persians  to  exercise 
dominion  over  Ionia  and  Caria  and  the  other  countries 
within  the  iEgean  and  the  Euxine,  since  these  coun- 
tries belonged  to  Persia  by  right  of  inheritance.' 3  A 
Roman  emperor  had  seldom  received  such  a  message  ; 
and  Alexander,  mild  and  gentle  as  he  was  by  nature, 
seems  to  have  had  his  equanimity  disturbed  by  the 
insolence  of  the  mandate.  Disregarding  the  sacredness 
of  the  ambassadorial  character,  he  stripped  the  envoys 
of  their  splendid  apparel,  treated  them  as  prisoners  of 
war,  and  settled  them  as  agricultural  colonists  in 
Phrygia.  If  we  may  believe  Herodian,  he  even  took 
credit  to  himself  for  sparing  their  lives,  which  he 
regarded  as  justly  forfeit  to  the  offended  majesty  of 
the  empire. 

Meantime  the  angry  prince,  convinced  at  last  against 
his  will  that  negotiations  with  such  an  enemy  were 
futile,  collected  an  army  and  began  his  march  towards 
the  East.    Taking  troops  from  the  various  provinces 


1  Four  hundred  youths,  selected 
from  the  tallest  and  most  beautiful 
of  the  Persians,  dressed  in  rich 
apparel,  and  with  golden  ornaments, 
mounted  moreover  on  fine  steeds, 
and  armed  with  bows,  carried  the 
message  of  the  Persian  monarch  to 
Rome  (Herodian,  vi.  4). 


2  KeTtevei  fieyag  ftaatAevg  Apm- 
&p$rft  (KptaraaOai  'Pu/ialovg  T£  not 
tov  upxovra  avrtiv  Lvplag  ie  (ittuotjc 
ha'iac;  re  ri/g  EvpuTrrj  uvriKei/uevrjc. 
(Ibid.) 

8  Elvat  yap  avrd  Hepacbv  TTpoyovLicd, 
KTT)fj.ara.  (Ibid.) 


Oh.  IILJ 


WAR  WITH  ROME. 


43 


through  which  he  passed,1  he  conducted  to  Antio?h,  in 
the  autumn  of  a.d.  231,2  a  considerable  force,  which 
was  there  augmented  by  the  legions  of  the  East  and  by 
troops  drawn  from  Egypt3  and  other  quarters.  Arta- 
xerxes,  on  his  part,  was  not  idle.  According  to  Severus 
himself,4  the  army  brought  into  the  field  by  the 
Persian  monarch  consisted  of  one  hundred  and  twenty 
thousand  mailed  horsemen,  of  eighteen  hundred 
scythed  chariots,  and  of  seven  hundred  trained  ele- 
phants, bearing  on  their  backs  towers  filled  with 
archers;  and  though  this  pretended  host  has  been 
truly  characterised  as  one  1  the  like  of  which  is  not  to 
be  found  in  Eastern  history,  and  has  scarcely  been 
imagined  in  Eastern  romance,75  yet,  allowing  much  for 
exaggeration,  we  may  still  safely  conclude  that  great 
exertions  had  been  made  on  the  Persian  side,  that  their 
forces  consisted  of  the  three  arms  mentioned,  and  that 
the  numbers  of  each  were  large  beyond  ordinary 
precedent.    The  two  adversaries  were  thus  not  ill 


1  Especially  from  Illyria,  where 
some  of  the  best  Roman  troops 
were  always  stationed  to  defend 
the  frontier  of  the  Danube. 

2  There  is  some  little  doubt  as 
to  the  exact  chronology.  I  follow 
Clinton  [F.  R.  vol.  i.  pp.  244-246). 
De  Champagny  makes  Severus 
arrive  in  Antioch  two  years  later  — 
a.d.  233  (Les  Cisars  du  troisieme 
tiiecle,  torn.  ii.  p.  115). 

3  Herodian,  vi.  4,  sub  fin. 

4  See  the  speech  of  Severus  in 
the  Senate  on  his  return  from  the 
East,  recorded  by  Lampridius  ( Vit. 
Alex.  Sev.  §  56). 

5  So  Gibbon  {Decline  and  Fall, 
ch.  viii.  vol.  i.  p.  253).  The  num- 
bers of  the  chariots  and  of  the 
elephants  are  especially  improbable. 
Though  in  the  more  ancient  period 
of  Oriental  history  we  find  instances 
of  kings  possessing  1,200  (Shishak, 


Benhadad),  1,400  (Solomon),  and 
even  2,000  chariots  (Ahab,  accord- 
ing to  the  Black  Obelisk),  yet  in 
later  times  only  very  moderate 
numbers  were  brought  into  the 
field.  Xenophon  reckons  the 
chariots  of  an  Oriental  army  at 
300  [Cyrop.  vi.  1,  §  28);  and  the 
actual  number  employed  at  Arbela 
was  only  200  (Arrian,  Exp.  Al.  iii. 
11;  Q.  'Curt.  iv.  12;  Diod.  Sic. 
xvii.  53).  The  Arsacid  monarchs 
do  not  seem  to  have  used  chariots 
at  all  in  warfare  (Sixth  Monarchy, 
p.  409).  Nothing  can  well  be 
more  unlikely  than  that  Artaxerxes 
should,  within  six  years  of  his 
establishment  as  4  great  king,' 
have  collected  a  force  of  1,800  war 
chariots. 

On  the  improbability  of  the 
'  seven  hundred  elephants,'  see  the 
excellent  note  of  Gibbon. 


44 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  III. 


matched  ;  each  brought  the  flower  of  his  troops  to  the 
conflict ;  each  commanded  the  army,  on  which  his 
dependence  was  placed,  in  person  ;  each  looked  to 
obtain  from  the  contest  not  only  an  increase  of  mili- 
tary glory,  but  substantial  fruits  of  victory  in  the 
shape  of  plunder  or  territory. 

It  might  have  been  expected  that  the  Persian 
monarch,  after  the  high  tone  which  he  had  taken, 
would  have  maintained  an  aggressive  attitude,  have 
crossed  the  Euphrates,  and  spread  the  hordes  at  his 
disposal  over  Syria,  Cappadocia,  and  Asia  Minor.  But 
it  seems  to  be  certain  that  he  did  not  do  so,  and  that 
the  initiative  was  taken  by  the  other  side.  Probably 
the  Persian  arms,  as  inefficient  in  sieges  as  the 
Parthian,1  were  unable  to  overcome  the  resistance 
offered  by  the  Roman  forts  upon  the  great  river ;  and 
Artaxerxes  was  too  good  a  general  to  throw  his  forces 
into  the  heart  of  an  enemy's  country  without  having 
first  secured  a  safe  retreat.  The  Euphrates  was  there- 
fore crossed  by  his  adversary2  in  the  spring  of  a.d. 
232  ;  the  Roman  province  of  Mesopotamia  was  easily 
recovered  ; 3  and  arrangements  were  made  by  which 
it  was  hoped  to  deal  the  new  monarchy  a  heavy  blow, 
if  not  actually  to  crush  and  conquer  it.4 

Alexander  divided  his  troops  into  three  bodies.  One 


1  On  the  Parthian  incapacity, 
see  the  Author's  Sixth  Monarchy, 
p.  406,  note  4.  The  early  Persians 
had  shown  no  such  weakness 
(Ancient  Monarchies,  vol.  iv.  p. 
180);  but  the  warfare  of  the  later 
Persians  far  more  resembles  that  of 
the  Parthians  than  the  more  scien- 
tific method  of  their  own  ancestors. 

2  Herod i an.  vi.  5.  Compare 
Lampridius,  §  55. 

3  '  Terras  interamnanas  .  .  .  re- 


cepimus.'  (Sever,  ap.  Lamprid. 
§  56.)  The  series  of  Mesopotamian 
coins  shows  this  boast  to  have  been 
true.  (See  Mionnet,  MMailles,  torn, 
v.  pp.  593-637;  Supplement,  torn, 
viii.  pp.  391-416.) 

4  Whatever  judgment  we  form 
of  the  result  of  the  campaign,  it 
seems  to  me  uncritical  to  set  aside 
the  rninu  te  details  of  He  rod  i  an  with 
respect  to  Alexander's  plans  and 
intentions.    The  fact   that  Lam- 


Ch.  III.  I         PLANS  OF  ALEXANDER  SEVERUS. 


45 


division  was  to  act  towards  the  north,  to  take  advan- 
tage of  the  friendly  disposition  of  Chosroes,  king 
of  Armenia,  and,  traversing  his  strong  mountain 
territory,  to  direct  its  attack  upon  Media,  into  which 
Armenia  gave  a  ready  entrance.  Another  was  to  take 
a  southern  line,1  and  to  threaten  Persia  Proper  from 
the  marshy  tract  about  the  junction  of  the  Euphrates 
with  the  Tigris,  a  portion  of  the  Babylonian  territory. 
The  third  and  main  division,  which  was  to  be  com- 
manded by  the  emperor  in  person,  was  to  act  on  a 
line  intermediate  between  the  other  two,  which  would 
conduct  it  to  the  very  heart  of  the  enemy's  territory, 
and  at  the  same  time  allow  of  its  giving  effective  sup- 
port to  either  of  the  two  other  divisions  if  they  should 
need  it. 

The  plan  of  operations  appears  to  have  been  judi- 
ciously constructed,  and  should  perhaps  be  ascribed 
rather  to  the  friends  whom  the  youthful  emperor 
consulted2  than  to  his  own  unassisted  wisdom.  But 
the  best  designed  plans  may  be  frustrated  by  unskilful- 
ness  or  timidity  in  the  execution ;  and  it  was  here,  if 
we  may  trust  the  author  who  alone  gives  us  any 
detailed  account  of  the  campaign,3  that  the  weakness 


pridius  is  completely  silent  with 
respect  to  all  the  details  of  the  war 
( '  indique  aucuii  des  de'tails  de  la 
guerre,'  De  Champagny,  ii.  p.  122) 
is  almost  conclusive  against  the 
veracity  of  his  story. 

1  The  present  text  of  Herodian 
has  '  north  '  for  1  south '  here ;  but 
the  context  clearly  shows  that 
either  he  or  one  of  his  copyists 
has  made  a  mistake. 

2  iKSljjUflSVOC  OVV  TOIC  (j)l?ML(:  EVEl/US 
TO      GT  QCLT  LtOT  LKOV      Etg       TpElC,  [IQipag. 

(Herodian,  v.i.  5.) 

3  The  relative  credibility  of 
Herodian  and  Lampridius  in  their 


respective  accounts  of  Alexander's 
Persian  campaign  has  long  formed 
a  subject  of-  dispute  with  historical 
critics.  Among  important  names 
on  either  side  are  Gibbon  and  Nie- 
buhr  for  Herodian;  Eckhel,  Pro- 
fessor Ramsay,  and  De  Champagny 
for  his  impugner.  The  main  points 
in  favour  of  Herodian  are,  first,  his 
being  a  contemporary  ;  secondly, 
his  general  moderation  and  good 
sense;  and  thirdly,  the  minuteness 
and  circumstantiality  of  his  account, 
which  stands  in  strong  contrast  with 
the  vague  boasts  of  Alexander  him- 
self  and    his    biographer.     It  is 


46 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  III. 


of  Alexander's  character  showed  itself.  The  northern 
army  successfully  traversed  Armenia,  and,  invading 
Media,  proved  itself  in  numerous  small  actions  superior 
to  the  Persian  force  opposed  to  it,  and  was  able  to 
plunder  and  ravage  the  entire  country  at  its  pleasure. 
The  southern  division  crossed  Mesopotamia  in  safety, 
and  threatened  to  invade  Persia  Proper. 1  Had  Alexander 
with  the  third  and  main  division  kept  faith  with  the 
two  secondary  armies,  had  he  marched  briskly  and 
combined  his  movements  with  theirs,  the  triumph  of 
the  Roman  arms  would  have  been  assured.  But,  either 
from  personal  timidity  or  from  an  amiable  regard  for 
the  ahxieties  of  his  mother  Mamsea,  he  hung  back 
while  his  right  and  left  wings  made  their  advance,  and  so 
allowed  the  enemy  to  concentrate  their  efforts  on  these 


sought  to  discredit  Herodian  by 
imputing  to  him  a  prejudice  against 
Alexander;  but,  on  the  whole,  his 
account  of  that  prince  is  not  an  un- 
flattering portrait.  Again,  it  is  said 
(De  Champagny,  ii.  p.  121)  to  be 
inconceivable  that,  if  Herodian's 
account  of  the  campaign  had  been 
true,  the  general  result  of  the  con- 
test should  have  been  so  absolutely 
without  injury  to  Home  as  he  him- 
self admits  it  to  have  been.  Cer- 
tainly there  is  a  difficulty  here;  but 
it  is  not  insuperable.  We,  with 
our  Western  notions,  should  have 
expected  Artaxerxes  to  have  fol- 
lowed up  his  successes  in  a.d.  2-j2 
by  a  great  invasion  of  the  Roman 
territory  in  a.d.  233.  But  we  find 
him  absolutely  passive.  This  appears 
strange  until  we  reflect  that  an 
Eastern  army  after  a  victory  de- 
mands a  time  for  rest  and  enjoy- 
ment;  that  it  has  almost  of  necessity 
to  be  disbanded,  and  can  only  be 
collected  again  after  a  considerable 
interval.  Eastern  kings,  moreover, 
are  often  lazy  or  capricious.  Orodes 
did  not  follow  up  his  victory  over 
Crassus  by  any  serious  attack  on 


the  Roman  territory  until  two  years 
had  passed  (Sixth  Monarchy,  pp. 
177-8).  And  a  similar  neglect  of 
favourable  opportunities  is  observ- 
able throughout  Oriental  history. 

It  may  be  added  that  there  is  at 
least  one  expression  in  Lampridius 
which  betrays  the  truth  that  he 
endeavours  to  conceal.  The  uni- 
versal cry  of  the  Romans  who  ac- 
companied Alexander's  triumphal 
procession  from  the  Capitol  to  the 
Palace  was,  Lampridius  tells  us 
(§  57),  this  —  '  Rome  is  saved,  since 
Alexander  is  safe,9  Safety  is  only 
a  subject  of  congratulation  after 
imminent  danger. 

1  There  is  some  difficulty  in 
understanding  Herodian  here,  since 
his  geographical  ideas  are  confused 
(Gibbon,  ch.  viii.  note  51).  He 
speaks  of  the  second  army  as  threat- 
ening both  PartMa  and  Persia. 
The  real  Parthia,  between  the 
Caspian  and  Bactria,  cannot,  it 
seems  to  me,  be  intended.  I  sus- 
pect that  he  means  by  Parthia  the 
tract  about  Ctesiphon,  recently  the 
head-quarters  of  Parthian  power. 


Ch.  III.1 


FAILURE  OF  THE  INVASION. 


47 


two  isolated  bodies.  The  army  in  Media,  favoured  by 
the  rugged  character  of  the  country,  was  able  to  main- 
tain its  ground  without  much  difficulty  ;  but  that  which 
had  advanced  by  the  line  of  the  Euphrates  and  Tigris, 
and  which  was  still  marching  through  the  boundless 
plains  of  the  great  alluvium,  found  itself  suddenly 
beset  by  a  countless  host,  commanded  by  Artaxerxes 
in  person,  and,  though  it  struggled  gallantly,  was  over- 
whelmed and  utterly  destroyed  by  the  arrows  of  the 
terrible  Persian  bowmen.  Herodian  says,  no  doubt 
with  some  exaggeration,  that  this  was  the  greatest 
calamity  which  had  ever  befallen  the  Romans.1  It 
certainly  cannot  compare  with  Cannae,  with  the  disaster 
of  Varus,  or  even  with  the  similar  defeat  of  Crassus  in 
a  not  very  distant  region.  But  it  was  (if  rightly  repre- 
sented by  Herodian)  a  terrible  blow.  It  absolutely 
determined  the  campaign.  A  Caesar  or  a  Trajan  might 
have  retrieved  such  a  loss.  An  Alexander  Severus 
was  not  likely  even  to  make  an  attempt  to  do  so. 
Already  weakened  in  body  by  the  heat  of  the  climate 
and  the  unwonted  fatigues  of  war,2  he  was  utterly 
prostrated  in  spirit  by  the  intelligence  when  it  reached 
him.  The  signal  was  at  once  given  for  retreat. 
Orders  were  sent  to  the  corps  cTarmee  which  occupied 
Media  to  evacuate  its  conquests  and  to  retire  forth- 
with upon  the  Euphrates.  These  orders  were  executed, 
but  with  difficulty.  Winter  had  already  set  in 
throughout  the  high  regions  ;  and  in  its  retreat  the 
army  of  Media  suffered  great  losses  through  the 
inclemency  of  the  climate,  so  that  those  who  reached 


1  Me  yiGTT)  avrrj  cv(i<popd  .  .  . 
'Pufialovt;   tneaxe,    dvvufieug  fiey'ioTTic 


tuv  apxaiDV  unodsovG7](;.  (v.  5,  sub 
fin.) 

2  Herodian,  vi.  6,  sub  init. 


48 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


|Cn.  III. 


Syria  were  but  a  small  proportion  of  the  original  force. 
Alexander  himself,  and  the  army  which  he  led,  experi- 
enced less  difficulty ;  but  disease  dogged  the  steps  of 
this  division,  and  when  its  columns  reached  Antioch,  it 
was  found  to  be  greatly  reduced  in  numbers  by  sickness, 
though  it  had  never  confronted  an  enemy.  The  three 
armies  of  Severus  suffered  not  indeed  equally,  but  still 
in  every  case  considerably,  from  three  distinct  causes 
—  sickness,  severe  weather,  and  marked  inferiority  to 
the  enemy.1  The  last-named  cause  had  annihilated 
the  southern  division  ;  the  northern  had  succumbed  to 
climate ;  the  main  army,  led  by  Severus  himself,  was 
(comparatively  speaking)  intact,  but  even  this  had 
been  decimated  by  sickness,  and  was  not  in  a  condition 
to  carry  on  the  war  with  vigour.  The  result  of  the 
campaign  had  thus  been  altogether  favourable  to  the 
Persians,2  but  yet  it  had  convinced  Artaxerxes  that 
Rome  was  more  powerful  than  he  had  thought.  It 
had  shown  him  that  in  imagining  the  time  had  arrived 
when  they  might  be  easily  driven  out  of  Asia,  he  had 
made  a  mistake.  The  imperial  power  had  proved 
itself  strong  enough  to  penetrate  deeply  within  his 
territory,  to  ravage  some  of  his  best  provinces,  and  to 
threaten  his  capital.3  The  grand  ideas  with  which  he 
had  entered  upon  the  contest  had  consequently  to  be 


1  Lampridius  thus  sums  up  the 
account  of  Herodiau  and  his  fol- 
lowers:—  'Amisisse  ilium  (sc.Alex- 
ai  id  rum)  exercitum  dicunt  fame, 
frigore,  ac  morbo '  (§  57);  but 
Herodiansays  nothingaboutf amine. 
His  words   are:   rCw  rptfov  fioipCov 

TOV    OTpdTOV,     LJV     £V£1(1F,     TO  'k\u(1TOV 

u7TOi3a?i6vTi  dicKpopoig  ovfi(popal(;^  v6ni.>, 
noliefM*),  tcpvet.  Lampridius  seems 
to  have  read  Xty,^  for  tto?le{ig). 

2  The   Persians    had,  however, 


lost  a  large  number  of  their  best 
troops.  The  Romans  of  the  south- 
ern army  had  fought  well,  and 
their  defeat  had  cost  their  enemy 
dear.  (See  Herodiau,  vi.  6,  sub  fin.) 

3  Persepolis  seems  to  have  now 
become  the  main  Persian  capital, 
under  the  native  name  of  Istakr 
or  Stakr.  (Agathang.  i.  §9,  sub  fin.) 
It  was  threatened  when  the  southern 
army  of  Severus  was  expected  to 
invade  Persia  Proper  (supra,  p.  46). 


Ch.  III.  J  RESULTS  OF  THE  ROMAN  WAR. 


49 


abandoned;  and  it  had  to  be  recognised  that  the 
struggle  with  Rome  was  one  in  which  the  two  parties 
were  very  evenly  matched,  one  in  which  it  was  not  to. 
be  supposed  that  either  side  would  very  soon  obtain 
any  decided  preponderance.  Under  these  circum- 
stances the  grand  ideas  were  quietly  dropped  ;  the 
army  which  had  been  gathered  together  to  enforce 
them  was  allowed  to  disperse,  and  was  not  required 
within  any  given  time  to  reassemble  ;  it  is  not  unlikely 
that  (as  Niebuhr  conjectures1)  a  peace  was  made, 
though  whether  Rome  ceded  any  of  her  territory 2 
by  its  terms  is  exceedingly  doubtful.  Probably  the 
general  principle  of  the  arrangement  was  a  return  to 
the  status  quo  ante  helium,  or,  in  other  words,  the 
acceptance  by  either  side,  as  the  true  territorial  limits 
between  Rome  and  Persia,  of  those  boundaries  which 
had  been  previously  held  to  divide  the  imperial  pos- 
sessions from  the  dominions  of  the  Arsacidse. 

The  issue  of  the  struggle  was  no  doubt  disappoint- 
ing to  Artaxerxes ;  but  if,  on  the  one  hand,  it  dis- 
pelled some  illusions  and  proved  to  him  that  the 
Roman  State,  though  verging  to  its  decline,  never- 
theless still  possessed  a  vigour  and  a  life  which  he 
had  been  far  from  anticipating,  on  the  other  hand  it 
left  him  free  to  concentrate  his  efforts  on  the  reduc- 
tion of  Armenia,  which  was  really  of  more  importance 
to  him,  from  Armenia  being  the  great  stronghold  of 
the  Arsacid  power,  than  the  nominal  attachment  to 
the  empire  of  half-a-dozen  Roman  provinces.    So  long 

1  Lectures  on  Ancient  History,  j  there  having  been  no  loss.  The 
vol.  iii.  p.  278.  j  effigy  of  the  Roman  emperor  con- 

2  '  Rome  must  on  that  occasion  j  tinues  upon  the  coins  of  the  Meso- 
have  lost  many  parts  of  her  Eastern  j  potamian  cities  and  states  after  the 
possessions.'  (Niebuhr,  l.s.c.)  The  .  expedition  of  Alexander  just  as  be- 
numismatic  evidence  is  in  favour  of  '  fore. 


50  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [Ch.  III. 


as  Arsacidse  maintained  themselves  in  a  position  of 
independence  and  substantial  power  so  near  the  Per- 
sian borders,  and  in  a  country  of  such  extent  and  such 
vast  natural  strength  as  Armenia,  there  could  not  but 
be  a  danger  of  reaction,  of  the  nations  again  reverting 
to  the  yoke  whereto  they  had  by  long  use  become 
accustomed,  and  of  the  star  of  the  Sasanidse  paling 
before  that  of  the  former  masters  of  Asia.  It  was  es- 
sential to  the  consolidation  of  the  new  Persian  Empire 
that  Armenia  should  be  subjugated,  or  at  any  rate 
that  Arsacidae  should  cease  to  govern  it ;  and  the  fact 
that  the  peace  which  appears  to  have  been  made  be- 
tween Rome  and  Persia,  a.d.  232,  set  Artaxerxes  at 
liberty  to  direct  all  his  endeavours  to  the  establish- 
ment of  such  relations  between  his  own  state  and 
Armenia  as  he  deemed  required  by  public  policy  and 
necessary  for  the  security  of  his  own  power,  must  be 
regarded  as  one  of  paramount  importance,  and  as 
probably  one  of  the  causes  mainly  actuating  him  in 
the  negotiations  and  inclining  him  to  consent  to  peace 
on  any  fair  and  equitable  terms. 

Consequently,  the  immediate  result  of  hostilities 
ceasing  between  Persia  and  Rome  w^as  their  renewal 
between  Persia  and  Armenia.  The  war  had  indeed, 
in  one  sense,  never  ceased ;  for  Chosroes  had  been  an 
ally  of  the  Romans  during  the  campaign  of  Severus,1 
and  had  no  doubt  played  a  part  in  the  invasion  and 
devastation  of  Media  which  have  been  described 
above.2  But,  the  Romans  having  withdrawn,  he  was 
left  wholly  dependent  on  his  own  resources ;  and  the 


1  Herod ian,  vi.  5;  Mos.  Chor.  ii. 
69.  Moses,  it  is  true,  calls  the  Ro- 
man emperor,  who  was  the  ally  of 
Chosroes,  Philip  (!);  but  it  is  evi- 


dent that  he  lias  been  misled  by  a 
false  view  of  Roman  chronology. 
2  See  p.  46. 


Ch.  III.]         WAR  RENEWED  WITH  ARMENIA. 


51 


entire  strength  of  Persia  was  now  doubtless  brought 
into  the  field  against  him.  Still  he  defended  himself 
with  such  success,  and  caused  Artaxerxes  so  much 
alarm,  that  after  a  time  that  monarch  began  to  despair 
of  ever  conquering  his  adversary  by  fair  means,  and 
cast  about  for  some  other  mode  of  accomplishing  his 
purpose.  Summoning  an  assembly  of  all  the  vassal 
kings,  the  governors,  and  the  commandants  throughout 
the  empire,  he  besought  them  to  find  some  cure  for 
the  existing  distress,  at  the  same  time  promising  a  rich 
reward  to  the  man  who  should  contrive  an  effectual 
remedy.  The  second  place  in  the  kingdom  should  be 
his;  he  should  have  dominion  over  one-half  of  the 
Arians; 1  nay,  he  should  share  the  Persian  throne  with 
Artaxerxes  himself,  and  hold  a  rank  and  dignity  only 
slightly  inferior.  We  are  told  that  these  offers  pre- 
vailed with  a  noble  of  the  empire,  named  Anak,2  a 
man  who  had  Arsacid  blood  in  his  veins,  and  belonged 
to  that  one  of  the  three  branches  of  the  old  royal  stock 
which  had  long  been  settled  at  Bactria  (Balkh),  and 
that  he  was  induced  thereby  to  come  forward  and 
undertake  the  assassination  of  Chosroes,  who  was  his 
near  relative  and  would  not  be  likely  to  suspect  him 
of  an  ill  intent.  Artaxerxes  warmly  encouraged  him 
in  his  design,  and  in  a  little  time  it  was  successfully 
carried  out.  Anak,  with  his  wife,  his  children,  his 
brother,  and  a  train  of  attendants,  pretended  to  take 
refuge  in  Armenia  from  the  threatened  vengeance  of 
his  sovereign,  who  caused  his  troops  to  pursue  him,  as 
a  rebel  and  deserter,  to  the  very  borders  of  Armenia. 


1  Mos.  Chor.  ii.  71 :  4  Ut  dimidiam 
partem  Ariorum  in  sua  ditione  tene- 
ret.' 

2  "Ava/c  in  the  Greek  text  of  Aga- 


thangelusj*  Anag  in  the  Armenian 
(§  13) ;  Anacus  in  Winston's  version 
of  Moses  of  Chorene  (ii.  71);  Anak 
in  Sepeos  (iii.  1). 


52. 


THE  SEVENTH  MONAKCHY 


[Cii.  III. 


Unsuspicious  of  any  evil  design,  Chosroes  received  the 
exiles  with  favour,  discussed  with  them  his  plans  for 
the  subjugation  of  Persia,  and,  having  sheltered  them 
during  the  whole  of  the  autumn  and  winter,  proposed 
to  them  in  the  spring  that  they  should  accompany  him 
and  take  part  in  the  year  s  campaign.1  Anak,  forced 
by  this  proposal  to  precipitate  his  designs,  contrived  a 
meeting  between  himself,  his  brother,  and  Chosroes, 
without  attendants,  on  the  pretext  of  discussing  plans 
of  attack,  and,  having  thus  got  the  Armenian  monarch 
at  a  disadvantage,  drew  sword  upon  him,  together  with 
his  brother,  and  easily  put  him  to  death.  The  crime 
which  he  had  undertaken  was  thus  accomplished ;  but 
he  did  not  live  to  receive  the  reward  promised  him 
for  it.  Armenia  rose  in  arms  on  learning  the  foul 
deed  wrought  upon  its  king;  the  bridges  and  the  few 
practicable  outlets  by  which  the  capital  could  be 
quitted  were  occupied  by  armed  men ;  and  the  mur- 
derers, driven  to  desperation,  lost  their  lives  in  an 
attempt  to  make  their  escape  by  swimming  the  river 
Araxes.2  Thus  Artaxerxes  obtained  his  object  with- 
out having  to  pay  the  price  that  he  had  agreed  upon ; 
his  dreaded  rival  was  removed;  Armenia  lay  at  his 
mercy ;  and  he  had  not  to  weaken  his  power  at  home 
by  sharing  it  with  an  Arsacid  partner. 

The  Persian  monarch  allowed  the  Armenians  no 
time  to  recover  from  the  blow  which  he  had  treach- 
erously dealt  them.  His  armies  at  once  entered  their 
territory 3  and  carried  everything  before  them.  Chos- 
roes seems  to  have  had  no  son  of  sufficient  age  to  suc- 
ceed him,  and  the  defence  of  the  country  fell  upon  the 


1  Agathang.  §  14.  I  tCw   yetyvpuv   tvdev   kcu   kvOev,  mora- 

2  'Ev     TOlQ    OTEVOiS    1T£pi,KVK?i6)aaVT£g    flOppVXLOVC  IZETTOiTJIiaCLV.     (Ib.  §  15. ) 

[oi  GaTpuTrcu]    rovg  (pvyadac  ev  (ikou  I     3  Ibid.  c.  iii.  §  16. 


Ch.  III.) 


ARMENIA  SUBJUGATED. 


53 


satraps,  or  governors  of  the  several  provinces.  These 
chiefs  implored  the  aid  of  the  Roman  emperor,1  and 
received  a  contingent ;  but  neither  were  their  own 
exertions  nor  was  the  valour  of  their  allies  of  any 
avail.  Artaxerxes  easily  defeated  the  confederate 
army,  and  forced  the  satraps  to  take  refuge  in  Roman 
territory.  Armenia  submitted  to  his  arms,  and  became 
an  integral  portion  of  his  empire.2  It  probably  did 
not  greatly  trouble  him  that  Artavasdes,  one  of  the 
satraps,  succeeded  in  carrying  off  one  of  the  sons  of 
Chosroes,  a  boy  named  Tiridates,  whom  he  conveyed 
to  Rome,  and  placed  under  the  protection  of  the 
reigning  emperor.3 

Such  were  the  chief  military  successes  of  Artaxerxes. 
The  greatest  of  our  historians,  Gibbon,  ventures  indeed 
to  assign  to  him,  in  addition,  1  some  easy  victories  over 
the  wild  Scythians  and  the  effeminate  Indians.'4  But 
there  is  no  good  authority  for  this  statement ;  and  on 
the  whole  it  is  unlikely  that  he  came  into  contact  with 
either  nation.  His  coins  are  not  found  in  Affghaiiis- 
tan ; 5  and  it  may  be  doubted  whether  he  ever  made 
any  eastern  expedition.  His  reign  was  not  long ;  and 
it  was  sufficiently  occupied  by  the  Roman  and  Arme- 
nian wars,  and  by  the  greatest  of  all  his  works,  the 
reformation  of  religion. 

The  religious  aspect  of  the  insurrection  which 
transferred  the  headship  of  Western  Asia  from  the 
Parthians  to  the  Persians,  from  Artabanus  to  Arta- 
xerxes, has  been  already  noticed ; 6  but  we  have  now 


1  Mos.  Clior.  ii.  73.  Agathange- 
lus  is  silent  on  this  point. 

2  Agathang.  l.s.c .;  Mos.  Chor.  ii. 
74. 

3  Tacitus,  according  to  Moses  (ii. 
73);  but  really,  it  is  probable,  the 
third  Gordiaii. 


4  Decline  and  Fall,  ch.  viii.  (vol. 
i.  p.  249). 

5  Wilson,  Ariana  Antiqua,  p. 
383.  This  writer  notes  that  the 
assertion  of  Gibbon  is  'somewhat 
unwarrantable.' 

G  See  above,  pp.  8-10. 


54 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  hi. 


to  trace,  so  far  as  we  can,  the  steps  by  which  the 
religious  revolution  was  accomplished,  and  the  faith  of 
Zoroaster,  or  what  was  believed  to  be  such,  estab- 
lished as  the  religion  of  the  State  throughout  the 
new  empire.  Artaxerxes,  himself  (if  we  may  believe 
Agathias1)  a  Magus,  was  resolved  from  the  first  that, 
if  his  efforts  to  shake  off  the  Parthian  yoke  succeeded, 
he  would  use  his  best  endeavours  to  overthrow  the 
Parthian  idolatry  and  instal  in  its  stead  the  ancestral 
religion  of  the  Persians.  This  religion  consisted  of  a 
combination  of  Dualism  with  a  qualified  creature- 
worship,  and  a  special  reverence  for  the  elements, 
earth,  air,  water,  and  fire.  Zoroastrianism,  in  the 
earliest  form  which  is  historically  known  to  us,2 
postulated  two  independent  and  contending  principles 
—  a  principle  of  good,  Ahura-Mazda,  and  a  principle 
of  evil,  Angro-Mainyus.  These  beings,  who  were 
coeternal  and  coequal,  were  engaged  in  a  perpetual 
struggle  for  supremacy  ;  and  the  world  was  the  battle- 
field wherein  the  strife  was  carried  on.  Each  had 
called  into  existence  numerous  inferior  beings,  through 
whose  agency  they  waged  their  interminable  conflict. 
Ahura-Mazda  (Oromazdes,  Ormazd)  had  created  thou- 
sands of  angelic  beings  to  perform  his  will  and  fight 
on  his  side  against  the  Evil  One ;  and  Angro-Mainyus 
(Arimanius,  Ahriman)  had  equally  on  his  part  called 
into  being  thousands  of  malignant  spirits  to  be  his 
emissaries  in  the  world,  to  do  his  work,  and  fight  his 
battles.    The  greater  of  the  powers  called  into  being 


1  Agath.  ii.  p.  64. 

2  A  critical  analysis  of  the 
Zendavesta  into  its  earlier  and 
later  portions  seems  to  show  that 
Dualism  was  a  development  out 
of  an  earlier  Monotheism.  (See 


the  Author's  Ancient  Monarchies, 
vol  iii.  pp.  104-107.)  But  we 
only  know  the  Persian  religion 
historically  from  the  time  of  Darius 
Hystaspis,  when  Dualism  was  cer- 
tainly a  part  of  it. 


Ch.  III.] 


CHARACTER  OF  ZOROASTRIANISM. 


55 


by  Ahura-Mazda  were  proper  objects  of  the  worship  of 
man,1  though,  of  course,  his  main  worship  was  to  be 
given  to  Ahura-Mazda.  Angro-Mainyus  was  not  to  be 
worshipped,  but  to  be  hated  and  feared.  With  this 
dualistic  belief  had  been  combined,  at  a  time  not 
much  later  than  that  of  Darius  Hystaspis,  an  entirely 
separate  system,2  the  worship  of  the  elements.  Fire, 
air,  earth,  and  water  were  regarded  as  essentially  holy, 
and  to  pollute  any  of  them  was  a  crime.  Fire  was 
especially  to  be  held  in  honour ;  and  it  became  an 
essential  part  of  the  Persian  religion  to  maintain  per- 
petually upon  the  fire-altars  the  sacred  flame,  supposed 
to  have  been  originally  kindled  from  heaven,  and  to 
see  that  it  never  went  out.3  Together  with  this  ele- 
mental worship  was  introduced  into  the  religion  a 
profound  regard  for  an  order  of  priests  called  Magians, 
who  interposed  themselves  between  the  deity  and 
the  worshipper,4  and  claimed  to  possess  prophetic 
powers.5  This  Magian  order  was  a  priest-caste,  and 
exercised  vast  influence,  being  internally  organised 
into  a  hierarchy  containing  many  ranks,  and  claiming 
a  sanctity  far  above  that  of  the  best  laymen. 

Artaxerxes  found  the  Magian  order  depressed  by 
the  systematic  action  of  the  later  Parthian  princes,6  who 
had  practically  fallen  away  from  the  Zoroastrian  faith 


1  Especially  Mithra,  the  sun- 
god,  whose  worship  may  be  traced 
back  to  the  earliest  Iranic  times. 

2  See  the  Author's  Ancient 
Monarchies,  vol.  iii.  pp.  122-128. 

8  Strabo,  xv.  3,  §§  14  and  15 ; 
Dio  Chrysost.  Orat.  Borysth.  p. 
449,  A;  Amm.  Marc,  xxiii.  6; 
Agathias,  ii.  25. 

4  Herod,  i.  132;  Strab.  xv.  3,  § 
13;  Amm.  Marc,  l.s.c.  The  early 
priests  of  the  Zoroastrians  were 
called  kavij  'seers,'  karapan,  '  sac- 


ri  fleers,'  or  usikhs,  6  wise  men' 
(Haug,  Essays  on  the  Sacred  Lan- 
guage, Writings,  and  Religion  of  the 
Par  sees,  pp.  245-247);  never  Magi. 
A  term  which  some  identify  with 
Magus  (maga  or  maghava)  occurs 
twice,  but  twice  only,  in  the  Zend- 
avesta.  (See  Westergaard,  Intro- 
duction to  Zendavesta,  p.  17. ) 

5  Dino,  Fr.  8;  Schol.  ad  Nicandr. 
Ther.  613;  Cic.  Be  Div.  i.  23,41; 
Val.  Max.  i.  6. 

6  Agathias,  ii.  p.  65. 


56 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


ICh.  III. 


and  become  mere  idolaters.  He  found  the  fire-altars 
in  ruins,  the  sacred  flame  extinguished,1  the  most 
essential  of  the  Magian  ceremonies  and  practices  dis- 
regarded.2 Everywhere,  except  perhaps  in  his  own 
province  of  Persia  Proper,  he  found  idolatry  estab- 
lished. Temples  of  the  sun  abounded,  where  images 
of  Mithra  were  the  object  of  worship,3  and  the 
Mithraic  cult  was  carried  out  with  a  variety  of  impos- 
ing ceremonies.  Similar  temples  to  the  moon  existed 
in  many  places  ;  and  the  images  of  the  Arsacidas  were 
associated  with  those  of  the  sun  and  moon  gods  in 
the  sanctuaries  dedicated  to  them.4  The  precepts 
of  Zoroaster  were  forgotten.  The  sacred  compositions 
which  bore  that  sage's  name,  and  had  been  handed 
down  from  a  remote  antiquity,  were  still  indeed  pre- 
served, if  not  in  a  written  form,5  yet  in  the  memory 
of  the  faithful  few  who  clung  to  the  old  creed ;  but 
they  had  ceased  to  be  regarded  as  binding  upon  their 
consciences  by  the  great  mass  of  the  Western  Asiatics. 
Western  Asia  was  a  seething-pot,  in  which  were  mixed 
up  a  score  of  contradictory  creeds,  old  and  new, 
rational  and  irrational,  Sabaism,  Magism,  Zoroastrian- 
ism,  Grecian  polytheism,  teraphim-worship,  Judaism, 
Chaldee  mysticism, Christianity.  Artaxerxes  conceived 
it  to  be  his  mission  to  evoke  order  out  of  this  confusion, 
to  establish  in  lieu  of  this  extreme  diversity  an  abso- 
lute uniformity  of  religion. 


1  Mos.  Chor.  ii.  74. 

2  Herodian,  iv.  30. 

8  Mos.  Chor.  l.s.c.  ;  Dio  Cass, 
lxxv.  12. 

4  Mos.  Chor.  l.s.c. 

5  i  Whether,'  says  Professor  Max 
Miiller,  '  on  the  revival  of  the  Per- 
sian religion  and  literature,  500 
years  after  Alexander,  the  works 


of  Zoroaster  were  collected  and 
restored  from  extant  MSS.  or  from 
oral  tradition,  must  remain  uncer- 
tain; and  the  disturbed  state  of  the. 
phonetic  system  would  rather  lead  us 
to  suppose  a  long-continued  influence 
of  oral  tradition^  (Bunsen's  Phi- 
losophy of  History,  vol.  iii.  pp. 
110-7.) 


Ch.  III.]     ART  A  XEKXES  RESTORES  ZOROASTRIANISM.  57 

The  steps  which  he  took  to  effect  his  purpose  seem 
to  have  been  the  following.  He  put  down  idolatry  by 
a  general  destruction  of  the  images,  which  he  over- 
threw and  broke  to  pieces.1  He  raised  the  Magi  an 
hierarchy  to  a  position  of  honour  and  dignity  such  as 
they  had  scarcely  enjoyed  even  under  the  later 
Achaemenian  princes,2  securing  them  in  a  condi- 
tion of  pecuniary  independence  by  assignments  of 
lands,3  and  also  by  allowing  their  title  to  claim  from 
the  faithful  the  tithe  of  all  their  possessions.4  He 
caused  the  sacred  fire  to  be  rekindled  on  the  altars 
where  it  was  extinguished,5  and  assigned  to  certain 
bodies  of  priests  the  charge  of  maintaining  the  fire  in 
each  locality.  He  then  proceeded  to  collect  the  sup- 
posed precepts  of  Zoroaster  into  a  volume,  in  order 
to  establish  a  standard  of  orthodoxy  whereto  he  might 
require  all  to  conform.  He  found  the  Zoroastrians 
themselves  divided  into  a  number  of  sects.6  Among 
these  he  established  uniformity  by  means  of  a  c  general 
council, '  which  was  attended  by  Magi  from  all  parts  of 
the  empire,  and  which  settled  what  was  to  be  regarded 
as  the  true  Zoroastrian  faith.  According  to  the  Ori- 
ental writers,  this  was  effected  in  the  following  way  :  — 
Forty  thousand,  or,  according  to  others,  eighty  thou- 
sand Magi  having  assembled,  they  were  successively 
reduced  by  their  own  act  to  four  thousand,  to  four 
hundred,  to  forty,  and  finally  to  seven,  the  most  highly 


1  Mos.  Chor.  l.s.c. :  4  Statuas  .  .  . 
Solisque  et  Luiise  simulachra,  Arta- 
sires  conf regit.' 

2  Agathias,  l.s.c. 

3  Amm.  Marc,  xxiii.  6;  p.  373. 
The  '  Magi  an  lands  '  mentioned  in 
this  passage  may  have  been  in  the 
possession  of  the  caste  under  the 
Parthians;  but  at  any  rate  Arta- 


xerxes  must  have  sanctioned  the 
arrangement. 

4  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol. 
i.  p.  338. 

*  Mos.  Chor.  ii.  74. 

6  Seventy,  according  to  the  Ori- 
ental writers  (see  Gibbon,  vol.  i.  p. 
332);  but  this  round  number,  a 
multiple  of  seven,  is  suspicious. 


58 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


|Ch.  III. 


respected  for  their  piety  and  learning.  Of  these  seven 
there  was  one,  a  young  but  holy  priest,  whom  the  uni- 
versal consent  of  his  brethren  recognised  as  pre-emi- 
nent. His  name  was  Ard&-Yiraf.  'Having  passed 
through  the  strictest  ablutions,  and  drunk  a  powerful 
opiate,  he  was  covered  with  a  white  linen  and  laid  to 
sleep.  Watched  by  seven  of  the  nobles,  including 
the  king,  he  slept  for  seven  days  and  nights ;  and,  on 
his  reawaking,  the  whole  nation  listened  with  believ- 
ing wonder  to  his  exposition  of  the  faith  of  Ormazd, 
which  was  carefully  written  down  by  an  attendant 
scribe  for  the  benefit  of  posterity.7 1 

The  result,  however  brought  about,  which  must  al- 
ways remain  doubtful,  was  the  authoritative  issue  of  a 
volume  which  the  learned  of  Europe  have  now  pos- 
sessed for  some  quarter  of  a  century,2  and  which  has 
recently  been  made  accessible  to  the  general  reader  by 
the  labours  of  Spiegel.3  This  work,  the  Zendavesta, 
while  it  may  contain  fragments  of  a  very  ancient 
literature,4  took  its  present  shape  in  the  time  of  Arta- 
xerxes,  and  was  probably  then  first  collected  from 
the  mouths  of  the  Zoroastrian  priests  and  published 
by  Ard&-Viraf.  Certain  additions  may  since  have 
been  made  to  it ;  but  we  are  assured  that  '  their  num- 
ber is  small,'  and  that  we  '  have  no  reason  to  doubt 


1  Milman,  History  of  Christian- 
ity, vol.  ii.  p.  251.  (Compare  the 
dissertation  of  Bredow,  prefixed  to 
Syncellus,  vol.  ii.,  in  the  Corpus 
Hist.  Byzant  of  B.  G.  Niebuhr, 
Bonn,  1821).) 

2  Anqnetil  Dnperron,  who,  to- 
wards the  close  of  the  last  century, 
professed  to  translate  the  Zend- 
avesta into  French,  was  incompe- 
tent to  the  task,  and  gave  a  wrong 
impression  of  the  true  character  of 


the  volume.  Burnouf  first  edited 
with  correctness  a  portion  of  the 
text,  which  has  since  been  published 
in  its  entirety  by  Westergaard 
(1852-1854)  and  Spiegel  (1851- 
1858). 

3  See  his  Translation  of  the 
Avesta,  Berlin,  1861. 

4  On  this  point  the  reader  may 
consult  Haug's  Essays  on  the  Sacred 

j  Language  <lv.  cf  the  Parsees,  Bom- 
bay,  1862. 


Ch.  III.] 


THE  ZENDA VESTA  PUBLISHED. 


59 


that  the  text  of  the  Avesta,  in  the  days  of  Ard&- 
Viraf,  was  on  the  whole  exactly  the  same  as  at 
present.' 1  The  religious  system  of  the  new  Persian 
monarchy  is  thus  completely  known  to  us,  and  will 
be  described  minutely  in  a  later  chapter.  At  present 
we  have  to  consider,  not  what  the  exact  tenets  of 
the  Zoroastrians  were,  but  only  the  mode  in  which 
Artaxerxes  imposed  them  upon  his  subjects. 

The  next  step,  after  settling  the  true  text  of  the 
sacred  volume,  was  to  agree  upon  its  interpretation. 
The  language  of  the  Avesta,  though  pure  Persian,2  was 
of  so  archaic  a  type  that  none  but  the  most  learned 
of  the  Magi  understood  it ;  to  the  common  people, 
even  to  the  ordinary  priest,  it  was  a  dead  letter. 
Artaxerxes  seems  to  have  recognised  the  necessity  of 
accompanying  the  Zend  text  with  a  translation  and 
a  commentary  in  the  language  of  his  own  time,  the 
Pehlevi  or  Huzvaresh.  Such  a  translation  and  com- 
mentary exist ;  and  though  in  part  belonging  to  later 
Sassanian  times,  they  reach  back  probably  in  their 
earlier  portions  to  the  era  of  Artaxerxes,  who  may 
fairly  be  credited  with  the  desire  to  make  the  sacred 
book  '  understanded  of  the  people.1 

Further,  it  was  necessary,  in  order  to  secure  perma- 
nent uniformity  of  belief,  to  give  to  the  Magian  priest- 
hood, the  keepers  and  interpreters  of  the  sacred  book, 
very  extensive  powers.    The  Magian  hierarchy  was 


1  Max  Miiller,  in  Bun  sen's  Philo- 
sophy of  History,  vol.  iii.  p.  116. 

2  The  Aryan  character  of  the 
Zend  was  first  proved  by  Rask, 
and  is  now  admitted  by  all  scholars. 
Zend  and  Sanskrit  were  two  ancient 
sister  forms  of  speech.  From  Zend 
came,  first,  Achremenian  Persian, 
or  the  language  of  the  Persian 


cuneiform  inscriptions;  then  Peh- 
levi or  Huzvaresh, Persian  in  its  soul 
(Max  Miiller,  p.  119),  but  to  a  large 
extent  Semitic  in  its  vocabulary; 
next.  Parsi,  which  is  Huzvaresh 
purified  from  its  Semitic  ingre- 
dients; and  finally,  the  language  of 
Firdusi,  which  continues  to  be 
spoken  at  the  present  day, 


60  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [Ch.  III. 


therefore  associated  with  the  monarch  in  the  govern- 
ment and  administration  of  the  State.  It  was  declared 
that  the  altar  and  the  throne  were  inseparable,  and  must 
always  sustain  each  other.1  The  Magi  were  made  to  form 
the  great  council  of  the  nation.2  While  they  lent  their 
support  to  the  crown,  the  crown  upheld  them  against 
all  impugners,  and  enforced  by  pains  and  penalties 
their  decisions.  Persecution  was  adopted  and  as- 
serted as  a  principle  of  action  without  any  disguise. 
By  an  edict  of  Artaxerxes,  all  places  of  worship  were 
closed  except  the  temples  of  the  fire- worshippers. 3 
If  no  violent  outbreak  of  fanaticism  followed,  it  was 
because  the  various  sectaries  and  schismatics  succumbed 
to  the  decree  without  resistance.  Christian,  and  Jew, 
and  Greek,  and  Parthian,  and  Arab  allowed  their 
sanctuaries  to  be  closed  without  striking  a  blow  to 
prevent  it ;  and  the  non-Zoroastrians  of  the  empire, 
the  votaries  of  foreign  religions,  were  shortly  reckoned 
at  the  insignificant  number  of  80,000. 4 

Of  the  internal  administration  and  government  of 
his  extensive  empire  by  Artaxerxes,  but  little  is 
known.5  That  little  seems,  however,  to  show  that 
while  in  general  type  and  character  it  conformed  to 
the  usual  Oriental  model,  in  its  practical  working  it  was 


1  See  the  account  given  by 
Malcolm,  from  Persian  sources,  of 
the  dying  speech  of  Artaxerxes 
{History  of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p.  95). 
Compare  Macoudi,  Prairies  d'Or, 
vol.  ii.  p.  102. 

2  So  Milman  (Hist  of  Christi- 
anity, vol.  ii.  p.  254),  whom  I 
venture  to  follow,  though  I  have 
not  found  ancient  authority  for  the 
statement. 

3  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol. 
i.  p.  338;  Milman,  vol.  ii.  p.  252. 


4  Hyde,  Be  Beligione  Persarum, 
c.  21. 

5  The  account  which  Macoudi 
gives  of  the  Court  and  govern- 
mental system  of  Artaxerxes 
(Prairies  tVOr,  torn.  ii.  pp.  153-157) 
is  curious  and  interesting,  but 
can  scarcely  be  regarded  as  authen- 
tic. Macoudi  did  not  write  till 
about  a.d.  950;  and  the  picture 
which  he  draws  represents  probably 
the  later  rather  than  the  earlier 
period  of  the  Sassanian  kingdom. 


Ch.  Ill  ]       ADMINISTRATION  OF  ARTAXERXES.  61 

such  as  to  obtain  the  approval  of  the  bulk  of  his 
subjects.  Artaxerxes  governed  his  provinces  either 
through  native  kings,  or  else  through  Persian  sa- 
traps,1 At  the  same  time,  like  the  Achsemenian 
monarchs,  he  kept  the  armed  force  under  his  own 
control  by  the  appointment  of  c  generals  '  or  c  com- 
mandants 5  distinct  from  the  satraps.2  Discarding  the 
Parthian  plan  of  intrusting  the  military  defence  of  the 
empire  and  the  preservation  of  domestic  order  to  a 
mere  militia,  he  maintained  on  a  war  footing  a  con- 
siderable force,  regularly  paid  and  drilled.  1  There 
can  be  no  power,'  he  remarked,  'without  an  army, 
no  army  without  money,  no  money  without  agricul- 
ture, and  no  agriculture  without  justice.13  To 
administer  strict  justice  was  therefore  among  his  chief 
endeavours.  Daily  reports  were  made  to  him  of  all 
that  passed,  not  only  in  his  capital,  but  in  every  prov- 
ince of  his  vast  empire  ;  and  his  knowledge  extended 
even  to  the  private  actions  of  his  subjects.4  It  was 
his  earnest  desire  that  all  well-disposed  persons  should 
feel  an  absolute  assurance  of  security  with  respect  to 


1  Gibbon  declares,  but  incor- 
rectly, that  6  the  prudent  Artaxerxes, 
suffering  no  person  except  himself 
to  assume  the  title  of  king,  abolished 
every  intermediary  power  between 
the  throne  and  the  people'  (Decline 
and  Fall,  vol.  i.  p.  340).  Agathan- 
gelus  tells  us  that  he  called  a 
council  of  6  all  the  kings,  the  rulers, 
and  the  generals'  (§12);  and  we 
see  from  Moses  that  he  was  willing 
to  have  granted  the  kingly  title  to 
Anak  (Hist.  Armen.  ii.  71).  The 
very  retention  of  the  title  '  King  of 
kings,'  so  frequent  on  the  coins  and 
in  the  inscriptions,  indicates  a  state 
of  things  exactly  the  opposite  of 
that  described  by  Gibbon.  Note 
further  the  mention  of  the  subject 


'  king  of  the  Cadusians,'  by  Jul. 
Capitolinus  ( Valer.  §  5). 

2  Agathang.  l.s.c.  :  KpooKalEGa- 
/hevoc,  navrag  rovg  [SaoiTiEig,  ml  roizap- 
Xag,  Kcil  cTpairjvovg. 

3  So  Malcolm  (Hist,  of  Persia, 
vol.  i.  p.  94).  Gibbon  paraphrases 
thus :  '  The  authority  of  the  prince 
must  be  defended  by  a  military 
force ;  that  force  can  only  be  main- 
tained by  taxes ;  all  taxes  must,  at 
last,  fall  upon  agriculture;  and  agri- 
culture can  never  nourish  except 
under  the  protection  of  justice  and 
moderation  '  Decline  and  Fall,  vol. 
i.  p.  340). 

4  Malcolm,  Hist  of  Persia,  vol. 
i.  p.  94. 


G2  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [Ch.  III. 


their  lives,  their  property,  and  their  honour.1  At  the 
same  time  he  punished  crimes  with  severity,  and  even 
visited  upon  entire  families  the  transgression  of  one  of 
their  members.  It  is  said  to  have  been  one  of  his 
maxims,  that  1  kings  should  never  use  the  sword 
where  the  cane  would  answer ;  5  2  but,  if  the  Armenian 
historians  are  to  be  trusted,  in  practice  he  certainly 
did  not  err  on  the  side  of  clemency.3 

Artaxerxes  was,  of  course,  an  absolute  monarch, 
having  the  entire  power  of  life  or  death,  and  entitled, 
if  he  chose,  to  decide  all  matters  at  his  own  mere  will 
and  pleasure.  But,  in  practice,  he,  like  most  Oriental 
despots,  was  wont  to  summon  and  take  the  advice 
of  counsellors.  It  is  perhaps  doubtful  whether  any 
regular  1  Council  of  State  '  existed  under  him.  Such 
an  institution  had  prevailed  under  the  Parthians,  where 
the  monarchs  were  elected  and  might  be  deposed  by 
the  Megistanes  ; 4  but  there  is  no  evidence  that  Arta- 
xerxes continued  it,  or  did  more  than  call  on  each 
occasion  for  the  advice  of  such  persons  among  his 
subjects  as  he  thought  most  capable.  In  matters 
affecting  his  relations  towards  foreign  powers,  he  con- 
sulted with  the  subject  kings,  the  satraps,  and  the 
generals ; 5  in  religious  affairs  he  no  doubt  took 
counsel  with  the  chief  Magi.6    The  general  principles 


1  Malcolm,  Hist.of  Persia, vol.  i. p. 
96.  There  is  a  remarkable  consensus 
of  authors  on  the  point  of  Artaxerxes' 
love  of  justice.  Agathangelus,  the 
Armenian  historian,  says:  Ej3aoL%£VGe 
iravra  npaTTCuv  f/kleikuc,  evvofua  xnL- 
ptov  ml  noXiTua  fiiKaioruTr)  (§9).  Eu- 
tychius,  the  Latin  writer,  notes  of 
him:  '  Quanta  fieri  potuit  cum  jus- 
titia  inter  homines  versatus  est' 
(vol.  i.  p.  373).  The  Persian  histori- 
ans make  the  assertions  given  in  the 


text.  (See  Mohl's  extracts  from 
the  Modjmel-al-Tewarikh,  in  the 
Journal  Asiatique  for  1841,  p.  502.) 

2  D'Herbelot,  Bibliotheque  Orim- 
tale,  torn.  i.  p.  380. 

3  See  Mos.  Chor.  ii.  70  and  75. 

4  See  the  Author's  Sixth  Mon- 
arch//, p.  85. 

5  Agathang.  §  12. 

6  This  is  probably  what  Dean 
Milman  meant  when  he  said  that 
'  the  Magian  hierarchy  formed  the 


Ch.  III.] 


HIS  *  TESTAMENT. 


63 


which  guided  his  conduct  both  in  religious  and  other 
matters  may  perhaps  be  best  gathered  from  the  words 
of  that  1  testament/  or  'dying  speech,'  which  he  is 
said  to  have  addressed  to  his  son  Sapor.  1  Never  forget/ 
he  said,  4  that,  as  a  king,  you  are  at  once  the  protector  of 
religion  and  of  your  country.  Consider  the  altar  and 
the  throne  as  inseparable ;  they  must  always  sustain  each 
other.  A  sovereign  without  religion  is  a  tyrant ;  and 
a  people  who  have  none  may  be  deemed  the  most 
monstrous  of  all  societies.  Religion  may  exist  without 
a  state ;  but  a  state  cannot  exist  without  religion  ; 
and  it  is  by  holy  laws  that  a  political  association  can 
alone  be  bound.  You  should  be  to  your  people  an 
example  of  piety  and  of  virtue,  but  without  pride  or 

ostentation  Remember,  my  son,  that  it  is 

the  prosperity  or  adversity  of  the  ruler  which  forms 
the  happiness  or  misery  of  his  subjects,  and  that  the 
fate  of  the  nation  depends  on  the  conduct  of  the 
individual  who  fills  the  throne.  The  world  is  exposed 
to  constant  vicissitudes ;  learn,  therefore,  to  meet  the 
frowns  of  fortune  with  courage  and  fortitude,  and  to 
receive  her  smiles  with  moderation  and  wisdom.  To 
sum  up  all  —  may  your  administration  be  such  as  to 
bring,  at  a  future  day,  the  blessings  of  those  whom 
God  has  confided  to  our  parental  care  upon  both  your 
memory  and  mine !  ' 1 

There  is  reason  to  believe  that  Artaxerxes,  some 
short  time  before  his  death,  invested  Sapor  with  the 
emblems  of  sovereignty,  and  either  associated  him  in 


great  council  of  the  state  '  (History 
of  Christianity,  vol.  ii.  p.  254;  see 
above,  p.  60,  note2).  It  is  implied 
in  the  terms  of  the  '  testament,'  as 
given  in  the  text. 
1  See  Malcolm,  Hist,  of  Persia, 


vol.  i.  pp.  95-96,  who  in  this  follows 
Firdusi.  Firdusi  wrote,  according 
to  Malcolm,  from  trustworthy 
Pehlevi  materials.  Milman  regards 
the  record  as  authentic  {History  of 
Christianity,  vol.  ii.  p.  253). 


64 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  III. 


the  empire,  or  wholly  ceded  to  him  his  own  place. 
The  Arabian  writer,  Magoudi,  declares  that,  sated  with 
glory  and  with  power,  he  withdrew  altogether  from  the 
government,  and,  making  over  the  administration  of 
affairs  to  his  favourite  son,  devoted  himself  to  religious 
contemplation.1  Tabari  knows  nothing  of  the  re- 
ligious motive,  but  relates  that  towards  the  close  of  his 
life  Artaxerxes  '  made  Sapor  regent,  appointed  him 
formally  to  be  his  successor,  and  with  his  own  hands 
placed  the  crown  on  his  head.' 2  These  notices  would, 
by  themselves,  have  been  of  small  importance  ;  but 
force  is  lent  to  them  by  the  facts  that  Artaxerxes  is 
found  to  have  placed  the  effigy  of  Sapor  on  his  later 
coins,3  and  that  in  one  of  his  bas-reliefs  he  seems  to 
be  represented  as  investing  Sapor  with  the  diadem.4 
This  tablet,  which  is  at  Takht-i-Bostan,  has  been 
variously  explained,5  and,  as  it  is  unaccompanied  by 
any  inscription,  no  certain  account  can  be  given  of  it ; 
but,  on  the  whole,  the  opinion  of  those  most  competent 
to  judge  seems  to  be  that  the  intention  of  the  artist 
was  to  represent  Artaxerxes  (who  wears  the  cap  and 
inflated  ball)  as  handing  the  diadem  to  Sapor  —  dis- 
tinguished by  the  mural  crown  of  his  own  tablets  and 
coins 6  —  while  Ormazd,  marked  by  his  customary 


1  Macoudi,  Prairies  <TOr,  vol.  ii. 
pp.  159,  160. 

2  Tabari,  Chronique,  vol.  ii.  p.  74. 

3  See  below,  p.  67. 

4  See  Flandin,  Voyage  en  Perse, 
torn.  i.  pi.  14;  Ker  Porter,  Travels, 
vol.  ii.  pi.  66. 

5  Sir  K.  Ker  Porter  regarded  the 
two  main  figures  as  Artaxerxes  and 
Ormazd,  the  prostrate  figure  as  a 
symbol  of  the  fallen  Arsacidse,  and 
the  radiated  personage  as  either  Zo- 
roaster ( ! )  or  '  a  personification  of 


the  Mithratic  religion '  ( Travels,  vol. 
ii.  p.  193).  Flandin  also  thought 
the  radiated  figure  to  be  Zoroaster 
(Voyage  en  Perse,  torn.  i.  p.  442). 
Mr.  Thomas  takes  the  view  of  the 
matter  which  is  followed  in  the 
text.  (Journal  of  As.  Society,  New 
Series,  vol.  iii.  p.  267,  note  3. ) 

6  See  below,  p.  94;  and  compare 
Ker  Porter,  vol.  i.  pis.  21  and  28; 
Flandin,  vol.  i.  pis.  31  and  33; 
vol.  ii.  pis.  49  and  53;  vol.  iv.  pi. 
185;  Texier,  pi.  129. 


Ch.  III.] 


COINS  OF  ARTAXERXES. 


65 


baton,  and  further  indicated  by  a  halo  of  glory  around 
his  head,  looks  on,  sanctioning  and  approving  the 
transaction.  A  prostrate  figure  under  the  feet  of  the 
two  Sassanian  kings  represents  either  Artabanus  or 
the  extinct  Parthian  monarchy,  probably  the  former  ; 
while  the  sunflower  upon  which  Ormazd  stands, 
together  with  the  rays  that  stream  from  his  head, 
denote  an  intention  to  present  him  under  a  Mithraitic 
aspect,  suggestive  to  the  beholder  of  a  real  latent 
identity  between  the  two  great  objects  of  Persian 
worship. 

The  coins  of  Artaxerxes  present  five  different 
types.1  In  the  earliest  his  effigy  appears  on  the  ob- 
verse, front-faced,  with  the  simple  legend  ARTaHSHaTR 
(Artaxerxes),  or  sometimes  with  the  longer  one,  BaGi 
ARTaHSHaTR  MaLKA,  1  Divine  Artaxerxes,  King ;  '  while 
the  reverse  bears  the  profile  of  his  father,  Papak,  look- 
ing to  the  left,  with  the  legend  BaGi  PAPaia  MaLKA, 
L  Divine  Papak,  King ; '  or  BaRi  BaGi  PAPaKi  MaLKA, 
4  Son  of  Divine  Papak,  King.'  Both  heads  wear  the 
ordinary  Parthian  diadem  and  tiara ;  and  the  head  of 
Artaxerxes  much  resembles  that  of  Volagases  V.,  one 
of  the  later  Parthian  kings.2  The  coins  of  the  next 
period  have  a  head  on  one  side  only.  This  is  in 
profile,  looking  to  the  right,  and  bears  a  highly 
ornamental  tiara,  exactly  like  that  of  Mithridates  I.  of 
Parthia,3  the  great  conqueror.  It  is  usually  accom- 
panied by  the  legend  MazmsN  BaGi  ARTaHSHaTR  MaLKA 


1  See  Mordtmann,  in  the  Zeit- 
schrift  der  deutschen  morc/enlan- 
dischen  Gesellschaft  (vol.  viii.  pp. 
29-34;  and  vol.  xix.  pp.  415-6, 
477-8);  and  Thomas,  in  the  Nu- 
mismatic Chronicle  for  1872  (No. 
xlv.  pp.  48-55). 


2  Thomas,  Num.  Chron.  1872, 
p.  54. 

3  Mr.  Thomas  regards  these  coins 
as  the  third  in  order  (ibid.);  hut 
Mordtmann  is,  I  think,  right  in 
giving  them  the  second  place 
(Zeitschrift,  vol.  viii.  pp.  31-33). 


66 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  III. 


(or  MaLKAN  MaLKA)  airan,  i.e.  'The  Ormazd-worship- 
ping  Divine  Artaxerxes,  King  of  Iran,'  or  '  King  of  the 
Kings  of  Iran.'  The  reverse  of  these  coins  bears  a 
fire-altar,  with  the  legend  ARTaHSHaTR  nuvazi,  a  phrase 
of  doubtful  import.1  In  the  third  period,  while  the 
reverse  remains  unchanged,  on  the  obverse  the  Par- 
thian costume  is  entirely  given  up  ;  and  the  king  takes, 
instead  of  the  Parthian  tiara,  a  low  cap  surmounted  by 
the  inflated  ball,  which  thenceforth  becomes  the  almost 
universal  badge  of  a  Sassanian  monarch.  The  legend  is 


EARLIER  COINS  OF  ARTAXERXES  I. 


now  longer,  being  commonly  MazmsN  BaGi  ARTaHSHaTR 

MaLKAN  MaLKA   AIRAN  MINUCHiTRI  MiN  YaZDAN,  Or  '  The 

Ormazd- worshipping  Divine  Artaxerxes,  King  of  the 
Kings  of  Iran,  heaven-descended  of  (the  race  of)  the 


1  Mr.  Thomas  renders  the  phrase 
by  'Ardeshir's  fire-altar,'  comparing 
nuvazi  with  the  Pehlevi  naus,  which 
has  this  meaning  (Num.  Chron. 
1S72,  p.  51).  Mordtmann  thinks 
this   translation    impossible,  and 


suggests  '  Artaxerxes  the  chanter ' 
(der  Anrufende).  (See  the  Zeit- 
schrift,  vol.  viii.  p.  32.)  De  Sacy 
originally  road  iezdani  for  nuvazi  ; 
but  this  reading  is  now  generally 
regarded  as  mistaken. 


Ch.  III.]  COINS  OF  AKTAXERXES. 


67 


Gods.'  The  fourth  period  is  marked  by  the  assump- 
tion of  the  mural  crown,1  which  in  the  sculptures  of 
Artaxerxes  is  given  only  to  Ormazd,  but  which  was 
afterwards  adopted  by  Sapor  I.  and  many  later  kings,2 
in  combination  with  the  ball,  as  their  usual  head-dress. 
The  legend  on  these  coins  remains  as  in  the  third 
period,  and  the  reverse  is  likewise  unchanged.  Finally, 
there  are  a  few  coins  of  Artaxerxes,  belonging  to  the 
very  close  of  his  reign,  where  he  is  represented  with 
the  tiara  of  the  third  period,  looking  to  the  right ; 
while  in  front  of  him,  and  looking  towards  him,  is 
another  profile,  that  of  a  boy,  in  whom  numismatists 
recognise  his  eldest  son  and  successor,  Sapor.3 


LATER  COINS  OF  ARTAXERXES  I. 


It  is  remarkable  that  with  the  accession  of  Arta- 
xerxes there  is  at  once  a  revival  of  art.  Art  had  sunk 
under  the  Parthians,  despite  their  Grecian  leanings, 
to  the  lowest  ebb  which  it  had  known  in  Western  Asia 
since  the  accession  of  Asshur-izir-pal  to  the  throne  of 
Assyria  (b.c.  886).  Parthian  attempts  at  art  were 
few  and  far  between,  and  when  made  were  unhappy, 
not  to  say  ridiculous.4    The  coins  of  Artaxerxes,  com- 


1  See  Longperier,  Medailles  des 
Sassanides,  pi.  2,  Nos.  4  and  5. 

2  As  Sapor  II.,  Varahran  IV., 
Izdegird  I.,  and  others. 

3  Thomas,  in  Num.  Chron.  for 


1872,  p.  55,  and  pi.  2,  No.  12; 
Mordtmann,  in  the  Zeitschrift,  vol. 
viii .  p.  34,  and  pi.  10,  No.  6. 

4  See  the  Author's  Sixth  Mon- 
archy, pp.  388-397. 


(58 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  III. 


pared  with  those  of  the  later  Parthian  monarchs,  show 
at  once  a  renaissance.1  The  head  is  well  cut;  the 
features  have  individuality  and  expression ;  the  epi- 
graph is  sufficiently  legible.  Still  more  is  his  sculpture 
calculated  to  surprise  us.  Artaxerxes  represents  him- 
self as  receiving  the  Persian  diadem  from  the  hands  of 
Ormazd;  both  he  and  the  god  are  mounted  upon 
chargers  of  a  stout  breed,  which  are  spiritedly  por- 
trayed ;  Artabanus  lies  prostrate  under  the  feet  of  the 
king's  steed,  while  under  those  of  the  deity's  we  observe 
the  form  of  Ahriman,  also  prostrate,  and  indeed  seem- 
ingly dead.2  Though  the  tablet  has  not  really  any 
great  artistic  merit,  it  is  far  better  than  anything  that 
remains  to  us  of  the  Parthians;  it  has  energy  and 
vigour;  the  physiognomies  are  carefully  rendered ;  and 
the  only  flagrant  fault  is  a  certain  over-robustness  in 
the  figures,  which  has  an  effect  that  is  not  altogether 
pleasing.  Still,  we  cannot  but  see  in  the  new  Per- 
sian art  —  even  at  its  very  beginning  —  a  movement 
towards  life  after  a  long  period  of  stagnation;  an 
evidence  of  that  general  stir  of  mind  which  the  down- 
fall of  Tartar  oppression  rendered  possible ;  a  token 
that  Aryan  intelligence  was  beginning  to  recover 
and  reassert  itself  in  all  the  various  fields  in  which  it 
had  formerly  won  its  triumphs.3 


1  Longperier,  Medailles  des  Sas- 
sanides,  p.  2. 

2  For  a  representation  of  this 
Nakhsh-i-Rustam  tablet,  see  the 
Chapter  on  the  Art  of  the  Sassa- 
nians. 

3  Besides  the  bas-relief  above 
described,  Artaxerxes  has  left 
either  three  or  four  others.  One, 
also  at  Nakhsh-i-Rustam,  repre- 
sents Ormazd,  giving  Artaxerxes 
the  diadem,  on  foot  (Ker  Porter, 


vol.  i.  pi.  27,  No.  2  ;  Flandin, 
Voyage  en  Perse,  pi.  193).  Another, 
at  Firuzabad,  is  similar,  but  shows 
us  Artaxerxes  accompanied  by  four 
attendants  (Flandin,  pi.  44).  A 
third,  at  Takht-i-Bostan,  exhibits 
Artaxerxes  handing  the  diadem  to 
his  son,  Sapor  (Ker  Porter,  pi.  66; 
Flandin,  pi.  14).  The  fourth,  at 
Salmos,  to  the  west  of  Lake  Uru- 
miyeh,  which  may  have  been  the 
work  of   Sapor,  represents  Arta- 


Ch.  III.] 


BASIS  OF  THE  COINAGE. 


69 


The  coinage  of  Artaxerxes,  and  of  the  other  Sassa- 
nian  monarchs,  is  based,  in  part  upon  Roman,  in  part 
upon  Parthian,  models.  The  Roman  aureus  furnishes 
the  type  which  is  reproduced  in  the  Sassanian  gold 
coins,1  while  the  silver  coins  follow  the  standard  long 
established  in  Western  Asia,  first  under  the  Seleucid, 
and  then  under  the  Arsacid  princes.  This  standard 
is  based  upon  the  Attic  drachm,  which  was  adopted 
by  Alexander  as  the  basis  of  his  monetary  system. 
The  curious  occurrence  of  a  completely  different 
standard  for  gold  and  silver  in  Persia  during  this 
period  is  accounted  for  by  the  circumstances  of  the 
time  at  which  the  coinage  took  its  rise.  The  Arsa- 
cida3  had  employed  no  gold  coins,2  but  had  been  con- 
tent with  a  silver  currency  ;  any  gold  coin  that  may 
have  been  in  use  among  their  subjects  for  purposes  of 
trade  during  the  continuance  of  their  empire  must  have 
been  foreign  money  —  Roman,  Bactrian,  or  Indian ; 3 
but  the  quantity  had  probably  for  the  most  part  been 
very  small.  But,  about  ten  years  before  the  accession 
of  Artaxerxes,  there  had  been  a  sudden  influx  into 
Western  Asia  of  Roman  gold,  in  consequence  of  the 
terms  of  the  treaty  concluded  between  Artabanus  and 
Macrinus  (a,d.  217),  whereby  Rome  undertook  to  pay 
to  Parthia  an  indemnity  of  above  a  million  and  a  half 
of  our  money.4    It  is  probable  that  the  payment  was 


xerxes  and  Sapor  on  horseback, 
receiving  the  submission  of  the 
Armenians  (Ker  Porter,  vol.  ii. 
pi.  82). 

1  Longperier,  Medailles  des 
Sassanides,  Preface,  p.  iv.  and  also 
p.  14.  The  aureus  of  Macrinus 
weighs  from  135  to  136  grains; 
the  gold  coins  of  the  early  Sassa- 
nians  weigh  exactly  130  grains. 


2  Ibid.  p.  14. 

3  Bactrian  gold  coins  are  rare, 
but  have  been  found  (Wilson, 
Ariana  Antiqua,  pp.  218,  223); 
Indian  are  common  (ibid.  pp.  347- 
380). 

4  Dio  Cassius,  lxxviii.  27.  Com- 
pare the  Author's  Sixth  Monarchy, 
p.  360. 


70 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  III. 


mostly  made  in  aurei.  Artaxerxes  thus  found  current 
in  the  countries,  which  he  overran  and  formed  into  an 
empire,  two  coinages  —  a  gold  and  a  silver  —  coming 
from  different  sources  and  possessing  no  common 
measure.  It  was  simpler  and  easier  to  retain  what 
existed,  and  what  had  sufficiently  adjusted  itself 
through  the  working  of  commercial  needs,  than  to 
invent  something  new ;  and  hence  the  anomalous 
character  of  the  New  Persian  monetary  system. 

The  remarkable  bas-relief  of  Artaxerxes  described 
above,1  and  figured  below  in  the  chapter  on  the  Art  of 
the  Sassanians,  is  accompanied  by  a  bilingual  inscrip- 
tion,2 or  perhaps  we  should  say  by  two  bilingual 
inscriptions,  which  possess  much  antiquarian  and 
some  historic  interest.  The  longer  of  the  two  runs 
as  follows :  — ''Pathkar  zani  mazdisn  bagi  Artahshatr, 
malkan  malka  Air  an,  minuchitri  min  Y&ztan,  bari  bagi 
Papaki  malka  ;  '  while  the  Greek  version  of  it  is  — 

TO  YTOTO  0  PO  CO  n  O  N  M  AC  A  AC  N  O  Y 
e€OYAPTA^APOYBAClA€U;CBACIAEWN 
APIANU3N£Kr£NOVCe€C0NYIOY 
eeOYnAnAKOYBAC=A€WC 

The  shorter  inscription  runs  — '  Pathkar  zani  Ahura- 
mazda  bagi,  the  Greek  being 

TOYTOTonpoctonoNAtoceeoY. 


*  Supra,  p.  08. 

2  This  inscription,  which  was 
first  copied  with  any  accuracy  by 
Carsten  Niebuhr,  will  be  found  in 
his  Voyages,  torn.  ii.  pi.  27.  It 
is  also  represented  in  the  work  of 
Ker  Porter,  vol.  i.  pi.  22,  opp. 
p.  548.    Though  bilingual  only,  it 


is  triliteral ;  the  Persian  transcript 
being  given,  with  only  slight  differ- 
ences, in  the  two  sets  of  characters, 
which  have  been  recently  distin- 
guished as  4  Chakheo-Pehlevi '  and 
4  Sassanian  Pehlevi  '  (Taylor,  in 
Journal  of  Asiatic  Society,  vol.  xii. 
pp.  264-206).    The  latter  and  sim- 


Ch.  III.  J  INSCRIPTIONS  OF  ART  AXE  RXES. 


71 


The  inscriptions  are  interesting,  first,  as  proving  the 
continued  use  of  the  Greek  character  and  language  by 
a  dynasty  that  was  intensely  national  and  that  wished 
to  drive  the  Greeks  out  of  Asia.  Secondly,  they  are 
interesting  as  showing  the  character  of  the  native 
language,  and  letters,  employed  by  the  Persians,  when 
they  came  suddenly  into  notice  as  the  ruling  people  of 
Western  Asia.  Thirdly,  they  have  an  historic  interest 
in  what  they  tell  us  of  the  relationship  of  Artaxerxes 
to  Babek  (Papak),  of  the  rank  of  Babek,  and  of  the 
religious  sympathies  of  the  Sassanians.  In  this  last 
respect  they  do  indeed,  in  themselves,  little  but  con- 
firm the  evidence  of  the  coins  and  the  general  voice 
of  antiquity  on  the  subject.  Coupled,  however,  with 
the  reliefs  to  which  they  are  appended,  they  do  more. 
They  prove  to  us  that  the  Persians  of  the  earliest  Sas- 
sanian  times  were  not  averse  to  exhibiting  the  great 
personages  of  their  theology  in  sculptured  forms ;  nay, 
they  reveal  to  us  the  actual  forms  then  considered  ap- 
propriate to  Ahura-Mazda  (Ormazd)  and  Angro-mainy  us 
( Ahriman) ;  for  we  can  scarcely  be  mistaken  in  regarding 
the  prostrate  figure  under  the  hoofs  of  Ahura-Mazda's 
steed  as  the  antagonist  Spirit  of  Evil.1  Finally,  the  in- 
scriptions show  that,  from  the  commencement  of  their 
sovereignty,  the  Sassanian  princes  claimed  for  them- 
selves a  qualified  divinity,  assuming  the  title  of  bag,2 


pier  character  was  successfully  de- 
ciphered by  M.  De  Sacy,  who  was 
thus  enabled  to  translate  the  in- 
scription { Memoir e  sur  les  Inscrip- 
tions de  Nakschi-Boustan,  pp.  76  et 
seqq.).  The  other  character  has 
been  satisfactorily  read  by  Mr. 
Thomas,  and,  more  recently,  by 
Dr.  Martin  Haug. 

1  Ker  Porter's  drawing  shows  us 
that  this  figure  was  represented 


with  snakes  at  the  front  of  the 
helmet.  The  connection  of  the 
serpent  or  snake  with  Ahriman  is 
a  well-known  feature  of  the  Zoro- 
astrian  religion  (Vendidad,  i.  3; 
xviii.  1-6;  Herod,  i.  140;  &c). 

2  Baga  is  the  term  used  for 
'  god  '  throughout  the  Achae- 
menian  inscriptions.  It  is  there 
applied  both  to  Ormazd  and  the 
inferior  deities.    That  the  bag  or 


72  THE  SEVENTH  M0NAKCHY.  [Ch.  III. 


or  alha,1  'god,'  and  taking,  in  the  Greek  version  of 
their  legends,  the  correspondent  epithet  of  OE02. 


bagi  of  the  early  Sassanians  repre- 
sents this  word  is  generally  agreed 
upon. 

1  alha  is  used  as  an  equivalent 
term  for  bagi  in  the  Chaldseo- 


Pehlevi  transcript  of  this  and  other 
inscriptions  of  the  early  Sassanian 
kings.  It  clearly  represents  the 
Jewish  El,  or  Elohim,  and  the 
Arabic  Allah* 


Ch.  IV.] 


REIGN  OF  SAPOR  I. 


73 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Death  of  Artaxerxes  I.  and  Accession  of  Sapor  I.  War  of  Sapor  with 
Manizen.  His  first  War  with  Rome.  Invasion  of  Mesopotamia,  a.d. 
241.  Occupation  of  Antioch.  Expedition  of  Gordian  to  the  East. 
Recovery  by  Rome  of  her  lost  Territory.  Peace  made  between  Rome 
and  Persia.  Obscure  Interval.  Second  War  with  Rome.  Mesopotamia 
again  invaded,  a.d.  258.  Valerian  takes  the  Command  in  the  East. 
Struggle  between  him  and  Sapor.  Defeat  and  Capture  of  Valerian,  a.d. 
260.  Sapor  invests  Miriades  with  the  Purple.  He  takes  Syria  and 
Southern  Cappadocia,  but  is  shortly  afterwards  attacked  by  Odenathus. 
Successes  of  Odenathus.  Treatment  of  Valerian.  Further  Successes  of 
Odenathus.  Period  of  Tranquillity.  Great  Works  of  Sapor.  His 
Sculptures.  His  Dyke.  His  Inscriptions.  His  Coins.  His  Religion. 
Religious  Condition  of  the  East  in  his  Time.  Rise  into  Notice  of 
Mani.    His  Rejection  by  Sapor.    Sapor's  Death.    His  Character. 

AiabEX£Tat  to  KpuTOC  ^anidprjc;  EKelvog  6  evayeoTaroc,  Kat  die(3lu  izpbc  tCj  evi 
rpLUKOvra  rovg  iruvrac  eviavrovc,  irXeiora  boa  rovg  'Pco/Lta'covg  Tivfiaivo/Lievog.  — 
Agathias,  iv.  p.  134,  B. 

Artaxerxes  appears  to  have  died  in  a.d.  240. 1  He 
was  succeeded  by  his  son,  Shahpuhri,2  or  Sapor,  the 
first  Sassanian  prince  of  that  name.  According  to 
the  Persian  historians,  the  mother  of  Sapor  was  a 


1  The  M o  dj  m  e  l-al-Te  w  a  r  i  k  h 
agrees  with  Agathias  (iv.  24;  p. 
259,  A)  and  Eutychius  (vol.  i.  p. 
375)  in  giving  Artaxerxes  a  reign 
of  fourteen  years  only.  (See  the 
Journal  Asiatique  for  1841,  p.  502; 
and  compare  Macoudi,  torn.  ii.  p. 
159.)  When  the  Armenian  writers 
give  him  forty,  forty-five,  or  even 
fifty  years  (Patkanian,  in  the  Jour- 
nal Asiatique  for  1866,  p.  145),  they 
perhaps  include  the  time  during 
which  he  was  tributary  king  of 


Persia.  (See  Tabari,  Chronique,  ii. 
p.  75:  '  Ardeschir  regna  quatorze 
ans  apres  la  mort  d'Ardewan;  puis 
il  mourut,  apres  avoir  regne  en  tout 
quarante-quatre  ans. ) 

2  This  is  the  form  of  the  name 
on  the  coins  of  Sapor,  and  in  his 
inscriptions.  The  word  means 
k  prince  '  —  literally  *  king's  son  '  — 
from  Shah  (contracted  form  of 
khshayathiya,  'king')  and  puhr 
(=Acha3menian  putra),  4  son.'  (See 
Mos.  Choren.  Hist  Armen.  ii.  74.) 


74 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


LCh.  IV. 


daughter  of  the  last  Parthian  king,  Artabanus,1  whom 
Artaxerxes  had  taken  to  wife  after  his  conquest  of  her 
father.  But  the  facts  known  of  Sapor  throw  doubt  on 
this  story,2  which  has  too  many  parallels  in  Oriental 
romance  to  claim  implicit  credence.3  Nothing  authen- 
tic has  come  down  to  us  respecting  Sapor  during  his 
father's  lifetime ;  4  but  from  the  moment  that  he 
mounted  the  throne,  we  find  him  engaged  in  a  series 
of  wars,  which  show  him  to  have  been  of  a  most  active 
and  energetic  character.  Armenia,  which  Artaxerxes 
had  subjected,  attempted  (it  would  seem)  to  regain  its 
independence  at  the  commencement  of  the  new  reign ; 
but  Sapor  easily  crushed  the  nascent  insurrection,5  and 
the  Armenians  made  no  further  effort  to  free  them- 
selves till  several  years  after  his  death.  Contem- 
poraneously with  this  revolt  in  the  mountain  region 
of  the  north,  a  danger  showed  itself  in  the  plain 
country  of  the  south,  where  Manizen,6  king  of  Hatra, 
or  El  Hadhr,  not  only  declared  himself  independent, 
but  assumed  dominion  over  the  entire  tract  between 


1  Malcolm,  History  of  Persia, 
vol.  i.  p.  96,  note;  D'Herbelot, 
Bibliotheque  Orientate,  torn.  i.  pp* 
378-9.  Some  writers  are  content 
to  make  her  an  Arsacid  princess 
(Tabari,  ii.  p.  76). 

2  As  Artaxerxes  only  reigned 
fourteen  years  after  his  last  victory 
over  Artabanus,  if  he  then  married 
that  king's  daughter,  and  Sapor  was 
their  son,  he  (Sapor)  could  not  have 
been  more  than  thirteen  at  his 
father's  death.  But  the  wars  in 
which  he  is  at  once  engaged  do  not 
suit  this  age. 

3  Compare  the  stories  that  Cam- 
byses  was  the  son  of  Kitetis,  a 
daughter  of  Amasis  (Herod,  iii.  2); 
that  Cyrus  was  a  son  of  Mandane, 
daughter  of  Astyages  (ib.  i.  108); 
and  that  Alexander  the  Great  was 
the  son  of  Darius  Codomaimus,  the 


last  Achsemenian  monarch  (Mal- 
colm, vol.  i.  p.  70). 

4  The  tale  that  his  mother  was 
condemned  to  death,  but  spared  by 
the  chief  vizier  because  she  was 
with  child,  and  that  her  offspring 
was  brought  up  secretly  by  the 
minister,  who  after  a  time  revealed 
the  matter  to  Artaxerxes  (Tabari, 
ii.  pp.  75-79;  Malcolm,  i.  96,  note; 
D'Herbelot,  1  s.c),  deserves  no  cre- 
dence. Its  details  are  contradic- 
tory. 

5  Malcolm,  vol.  i.  p.  97,  note. 

6  Tabari  calls  this  king  Satiroun, 
and  places  the  siege  of  Hatra  after 
the  capture  of  Valerian  (Chronique, 
ii.  pp.  80-82).  Satiroun  is  also 
given  as  the  name  of  the  Hatra 
monarch  by  Macoudi  (torn.  iv.  pp. 
81-82). 


Ch.  IV.]       FIRST  WAR  OF  SAPOR  WITH  ROME.  75 

the  Euphrates  and  the  Tigris,  the  Jezireh  of  the 
Arabian  geographers.  The  strength  of  Hatra  was 
great,  as  had  been  proved  by  Trajan  and  Severus  ;  1 
its  thick  walls  and  valiant  inhabitants  would  probably 
have  defied  every  attempt  of  the  Persian  prince  to 
make  himself  master  of  it  by  force.  He  therefore 
condescended  to  stratagem.  Manizen  had  a  daughter 
who  cherished  ambitious  views.  On  obtaining  a  prom- 
ise from  Sapor  that  if  she  gave  Hatra  into  his  power 
he  would  make  her  his  queen,  this  unnatural  child 
turned  against  her  father,  betrayed  him  into  Sapor's 
hands,  and  thus  brought  the  war  to  an  end.  Sapor 
recovered  his  lost  territory  ;  but  he  did  not  fulfil  his 
bargain.  Instead  of  marrying  the  traitress,  he  handed 
her  over  to  an  executioner,  to  receive  the  death  that 
she  had  deserved,  though  scarcely  at  his  hands.2 

Encouraged  by  his  success  in  these  two  lesser  con- 
tests, Sapor  resolved  (apparently  in  a.d.  241 3)  to 
resume  the  bold  projects  of  his  father,  and  engage  in 
a  great  war  with  Rome.  The  confusion  and  troubles 
which  afflicted  the  Roman  Empire  at  this  time  were 
such  as  might  well  give  him  hopes  of  obtaining  a 
decided  advantage.  Alexander,  his  father's  adversary, 
had  been  murdered  in  a.d.  235  by  Maximin,4  who 
from  the  condition  of  a  Thracian  peasant  had  risen 
into  the  higher  ranks  of  the  army.  The  upstart  had 
ruled  like  the  savage  that  he  was ;  and,  after  three 


1  See  the  Author's  Sixth  Mon- 
archy, pp.  315  and  344. 

2  Malcolm,  i.  pp.  96-7.  Macoudi 
(iv.  p.  84)  and  Tabari  make  Sapor 
marry  this  princess;  but  say  that 
shortly  afterwards  he  put  her  to 
death  (Chronique,  ii.  p.  84). 

3  Gordian's  journey  to  the  East 
is  placed  by  Clinton  in  this  year 


(F.R.  i.  p.  256).  Sapor's  aggressions 
certainly  preceded  this  journey. 
They  must  have  occurred  in  the 
earlier  months  of  a.d.  241,  or  the 
later  ones  of  a.d.  240. 

4  See  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall, 
vol.  i.  pp.  307-8;  De  Champagny, 
Cesar s  du  3me  Steele,  torn.  ii.  ppt 
134-136. 


76  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [Gh.  IV. 


years  of  misery,  the  whole  Roman  world  had  risen 
against  him.  Two  emperors  had  been  proclaimed  in 
Africa ;  1  on  their  fall,  two  others  had  been  elected  by 
the  Senate  ;  2  a  third,  a  mere  boy,3  had  been  added 
at  the  demand  of  the  Roman  populace.  All  the  pre- 
tenders except  the  last  had  met  with  violent  deaths ; 
and,  after  the  shocks  of  a  year  unparalleled  since 
a.d.  69,  the  administration  of  the  greatest  kingdom  in 
the  world  was  in  the  hands  of  a  youth  of  fifteen. 
Sapor,  no  doubt,  thought  he  saw  in  this  condition  of 
things  an  opportunity  that  he  ought  not  to  miss,  and 
rapidly  matured  his  plans  lest  the  favourable  moment 
should  pass  away. 

Crossing  the  middle  Tigris  into  Mesopotamia,  the 
bands  of  Sapor  first  attacked  the  important  city  of 
Nisibis.  Nisibis,  at  this  time  a  Roman  colony,4  was 
strongly  situated  on  the  outskirts  of  the  mountain 
range  which  traverses  Northern  Mesopotamia  between 
the  37th  and  38th  parallels.  The  place  was  well 
fortified  and  well  defended ;  it  offered  a  prolonged 
resistance ;  but  at  last  the  walls  were  breached,  and  it 
was  forced  to  yield  itself.5  The  advance  was  then 
made  along  the  southern  flank  of  the  mountains,  by 
Carrhas  (Harran)  and  Edessa  to  the  Euphrates,  which 
was  probably  reached  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Bireh- 
jik.    The  hordes  then  poured  into  Syria,  and,  spread- 


1  The  two  Gordians,  father  and 
son,  who  were  shortly  afterwards 
put  down  by  Capelianus  (Gibbon, 
vol.  i.  pp.  213-218). 

2  Maximus  and  Balbinus  (ibid, 
p.  219). 

8  M.  Antonius  Gordianus,  a 
grandson  of  the  elder  and  a  nephew 
of  the  younger  Gordian.  He  was 
only  thirteen  years  of  age  when  he 


was  proclaimed,  in  a.d.  238  (Hero- 
dian,  viii.  8). 

4  See  the  coins  (Mionnet, 
Medallles,  torn.  v.  pp.  625-028; 
and  Supplement,  torn.  viii.  pp.  415, 
410). 

5  According  to  Persian  authori- 
ties, the  wall  fell  down  in  answer 
to  the  prayers  of  the  besiegers 
(Malcolm,  vol.  i.  p.  93.  Compare 
Tabari,  Chronique,  ii.  p.  79). 


Ch.  IV.] 


SAPOR  INVADES  SYRIA. 


77 


ing  themselves  over  that  fertile  region,  surprised  and 
took  the  metropolis  of  the  Roman  East,  the  rich  and 
luxurious  city  of  Antioch.1  But  meantime  the 
Romans  had  shown  a  spirit  which  had  not  been  ex- 
pected from  them.  Gordian,  young  as  he  was,  had 
quitted  Rome  and  marched  through  Moesia  and 
Thrace  into  Asia,2  accompanied  by  a  formidable  army, 
and  by  at  least  one  good  general.  Timesitheus,3 
whose  daughter  Gordian  had  recently  married,  though 
his  life  had  hitherto  been  that  of  a  civilian,4  exhibited, 
on  his  elevation  to  the  dignity  of  Praetorian  prefect, 
considerable  military  ability.  The  army,  nominally 
commanded  by  Gordian,  really  acted  under  his  orders. 
With  it  Timesitheus  attacked  and  beat  the  bands  of 
Sapor  in  a  number  of  engagements,5  recovered  An- 
tioch, crossed  the  Euphrates,  retook  Carrhae,  defeated 
the  Persian  monarch  in  a  pitched  battle  near  Resaina6 
(Ras-el-Ain),  recovered  Nisibis,  and  once  more  planted 
the  Roman  standards  on  the  banks  of  the  Tigris. 
Sapor  hastily  evacuated  most  of  his  conquests,7  and  re- 
tired first  across  the  Euphrates  and  then  across  the 
more  eastern  river ;  while  the  Romans  advanced  as  he 
retreated,  placed  garrisons  in  the  various  Mesopotamian 
towns,  and  even  threatened  the  great  city  of  Ctesiphon.8 
Gordian  was  confident  that  his  general  would  gain 


1  Hist.  August.  Gordiani,  §  27. 

2  Ibid.  §  26. 

3  The  name  is  given  as  Misithens 
in  the  Historia  Augusta  (which  is 
followed  by  Gibbon  and  others),  as 
Timesicles  by  Zosimus  (i.  17).  But 
inscriptions  show  that  the  true  form 
was  Timesitheus  (Eckhel,  Doctr. 
Num.  Vet.  vii.  p.  319;  De  Cham- 
pagny,  Cesars  du  Sme  Steele,  torn, 
ii.  p.  204,  note). 

4  See  the  inscription  (No.  5530 
in  the  collection  of  Henzen)  sum- 


marised by  De  Champagny,  l.s.c. 

6  '  Frequentibus  praeliis  pugnavit 
et  vicit'  (Hist.  Aug.  Gord.  §  26). 

G  Amm.  Marc,  xxiii.  5:  'Apud 
Resainam  fuso  fugatoque  Persarum 
rege.' 

7  Hist.  Aug.  Gord.  §  27. 

8  In  the  letter  which  he  wrote 
to  the  Senate  from  Mesopotamia, 
Gordian  said  :  '  Nisibin  usque  per- 
venimus,  et,  si  di  faverint,  Ctesi- 
phonta  usque  veniemus '  (Hist. 
Aug.  l.s.c). 


78 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  IV. 


further  triumphs,  and  wrote  to  the  Senate  to  that 
effect ;  but  either  disease  or  the  arts  of  a  rival  cut 
short  the  career  of  the  victor,1  and  from  the  time 
of  his  death  the  Romans  ceased  to  be  successful. 
The  legions  had,  it  would  seem,  invaded  Southern 
Mesopotamia  2  when  the  Praetorian  prefect  who  had 
succeeded  Timesitheus  brought  them  intentionally  into 
difficulties  by  his  mismanagement  of  the  commissa- 
riat ;  3  and  at  last  retreat  was  determined  on.  The 
young  emperor  was  approaching  the  Khabour,  and 
had  almost  reached  his  own  frontier,  when  the  discon- 
tent of  the  army,  fomented  by  the  prefect,  Philip, 
came  to  a  head.  Gordian  was  murdered  at  a  place 
called  Zaitha,  about  twenty  miles  south  of  Circesium, 
and  was  buried  where  he  fell,  the  soldiers  raising  a 
tumulus  in  his  honour.  His  successor,  Philip,  was  glad 
to  make  peace  on  any  tolerable  terms  with  the  Persians; 
he  felt  himself  insecure  upon  his  throne,  and  was  anx- 
ious to  obtain  the  Senate's  sanction  of  his  usurpation. 
He  therefore  quitted  the  East  in  a.d.  244,  having  con- 
cluded a  treaty  with  Sapor,  by  which  Armenia  seems 
to  have  been  left  to  the  Persians,  while  Mesopotamia 
returned  to  its  old  condition  of  a  Roman  prov- 
ince.4 


1  Hist.  Aug.  Gord.  §  28. 

2  John  of  Antioch  makes  the 
Roman  army  penetrate  to  the 
'months  of  the  Tigris'  (slg  ra  rov 
TlyprjToc  orofiia,  Fr.  147);  but  this 
is  very  improbable.  An  advance 
into  Southern  Mesopotamia  is,  how- 
ever, distinctly  implied  in  the  posi- 
tion of  Gordian's  tomb,  which  was 
some  way  south  of  the  Khabour 
(Amm.  Marc,  xxiii.  5). 

3  Hist,  August.  Gord.  §  29. 

4  De  Champagny  represents  the 
peace  made  as  altogether  favourable 
to  Rome   (torn.   ii.   p.  216),  and 


speaks  of  Armenia  as  having  be- 
come Roman  in  consequence.  But 
this  was  certainly  not  so.  Armenia 
did  not  cease  to  be  Persian  till  the 
third  year  of  Diocletian,  a.d.  286 
(Mos.  Chor.  ii.  79).  Some  ancient 
writers  called  the  peace  4  very  dis- 
graceful to  Rome'  (Zosim.  iii.  32: 
eiprjvriv  aiGxio~r,v);  but  Niebuhr's 
conclusion  seems  to  be  just,  viz. 
that  '  Philip  concluded  a  peace  with 
the  Persians,  which  was  as  honour- 
able to  the  Romans  as  circum- 
stances would  allow'  (Lectures  on 
Anc.  Hist,  vol.  iii.  p.  284,  E.  T.). 


Ch.  IV.]      supposed  troubles  in  bactria.  79 

The  peace  made  between  Philip  and  Sapor  was 
followed  by  an  interval  of  fourteen  years,1  during 
which  scarcely  anything  is  known  of  the  condition  of 
Persia.  We  may  suspect  that  troubles  in  the  north- 
east of  his  empire  occupied  Sapor  during  this  period, 
for  at  the  end  of  it  we  find  Bactria,  which  was 
certainly  subject  to  Persia  during  the  earlier  years 
of  the  monarchy,2  occupying  an  independent  position, 
and  even  assuming  an  attitude  of  hostility  towards  the 
Persian  monarch.3  Bactria  had,  from  a  remote  an- 
tiquity, claims  to  pre-eminence  among  the  Aryan 
nations.4  She  was  more  than  once  inclined  to  revolt 
from  the  Achgemenidse  ; 5  and  during  the  later  Parthian 
period  she  had  enjoyed  a  sort  of  semi-independence.6 
It  would  seem  that  she  now  succeeded  in  detaching 
herself  altogether  from  her  southern  neighbor,  and 
becoming  a  distinct  and  separate  power.  To 
strengthen  her  position,  she  entered  into  relations 
with  Rome,  which  gladly  welcomed  any  adhesions  to 
her  cause  in  this  remote  region. 

Sapor's  second  war  with  Rome  was,  like  his  first, 
provoked  by  himself.  After  concluding  his  peace  with 
Philip,  he  had  seen  the  Roman  world  governed  suc- 
cessively by  six  weak  emperors,7  of  whom  four  had 
died  violent  deaths,  while  at  the  same  time  there  had 
been  a  continued  series  of  attacks  upon  the  northern 


1  From  a.d  244  to  a.d.  258. 

2  Mos.  Chor.  ii.  69,  71,  &c. 

3  See  the  statement  in  the  His- 
toria  Augusta  that  the  Bactrians, 
among  others,  declined  to  receive 
the  overtures  made  to  them  hy 
Sapor  after  his  defeat  of  Valerian, 
and  placed  their  services  at  the 
disposal  of  the  Komans  (Jul.  Capit. 
Valer.  §  7). 


4  See  the  Author's  Ancient  Mon- 
archies, vol.  iv.  p.  309. 

5  Ibid.  vol.  iv.  p.  487;  Herod,  ix. 
113. 

6  Supra,  p.  12. 

7  Philip,  Decius,  Gallus,  ^Eniili- 
anus,  Valerian,  and  Gallienus, 
whom  he  associated.  Of  these  the 
first  four  perished  within  the  space 
of  five  years  (a.d.  249-254). 


80  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  ICh.  IV. 

frontiers  of  the  empire  by  Alemanni,  Goths,  and 
Franks,  who  had  ravaged  at  their  will  a  number  of  the 
finest  provinces,  and  threatened  the  absolute  destruc- 
tion of  the  great  monarchy  of  the  W est.1  It  was 
natural  that  the  chief  kingdom  of  Western  Asia 
should  note  these  events,  and  should  seek  to  pro- 
mote its  own  interests  by  taking  advantage  of  the 
circumstances  of  the  time.  Sapor,  in  a.d.  258,  deter- 
mined on  a  fresh  invasion  of  the  Roman  provinces,  and, 
once  more  entering  Mesopotamia,  carried  all  before 
him,  became  master  of  Nisibis,  Carrhae,  and  Edessa, 
and,  crossing  the  Euphrates,  surprised  Antioch,  which 
was  wrapped  in  the  enjoyment  of  theatrical  and  other 
representations,  and  only  knew  its  fate  on  the  exclama- 
tion of  a  couple  of  actors  '  that  the  Persians  were  in 
possession  of  the  town.'2  The  aged  emperor,  Vale- 
rian, hastened  to  the  protection  of  his  more  eastern 
territories,  and  at  first  gained  some  successes,  retak- 
ing Antioch,  and  making  that  city  his  head-quarters 
during  his  stay  in  the  East.3  But,  after  this,  the  tide 
turned.  Valerian  entrusted  the  whole  conduct  of  the 
war  to  Macrianus,  his  Praetorian  prefect,  whose  talents 
he  admired,  and  of  whose  fidelity  he  did  not  enter- 
tain a  suspicion.4    Macrianus,  however,  aspired  to  the 


1  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol. 
i.  pp.  298-326;  Niebuhr,  Lectures 
on  Ancient  History,  vol.  iii.  pp. 
290-294,  E.  T. 

2  Aram.  Marc,  xxiii.  5.  Some 
place  this  capture  later,  as  Gibbon 
(vol.  i.  p.  328)  and  Clinton  (F.  R. 
vol.  i.  p.  288);  but  it  seems  to  me 
that  the  capture  of  the  city  by  a 
sudden  surprise  (as  related  by 
Ammianus)  is  to  be  distinguished 
from  the  capture  of  which  the  in- 
habitants had  due  noticefmentioned 
by  the  anonymous  author  of  the 


Td  jieTu  Alova,  Fr.  Hist.  Gr.  vol. 
iv.  p.  192),  and  that  the  former 
preceded  the  other.  The  fact  that 
Ammianus  refers  the  surprise  to 
the  reign  of  Gallienus  is  not  con- 
clusive against  this  view,  since 
Gallienus  was  associated  in  the 
empire  as  early  as  a.d.  253. 

3  Zosim.  i.  32-34.  A  coin  of 
Valerian,  assigned  to  this  year,  has 
the  legend  'VICT.  PARTHIC A ' 
(Clinton,  F.  B.  i.  p.  282). 

4  See  the  letter  of  Valerian  to 
the  Senate,  written  from  Mesopo- 


Ch.  IV.  1      SECOND  WAR  OF  SAPOR  WITH  ROME.  .  81 

empire,  and  intentionally  brought  Valerian  into  diffi- 
culties,1 in  the  hope  of  disgracing  or  removing  him. 
His  tactics  were  successful.  The  Roman  army  in 
Mesopotamia  was  betrayed  into  a  situation  whence 
escape  was  impossible,  and  where  its  capitulation  was 
only  a  question  of  time.  A  bold  attempt  made  to 
force  a  way  through  the  enemy's  lines  failed  utterly,2 
after  which  famine  and  pestilence  began  to  do  their 
work.  In  vain  did  the  aged  emperor  send  envoys 
to  propose  a  peace,  and  offer  to  purchase  escape  by 
the  payment  of  an  immense  sum  in  gold.3  Sapor, 
confident  of  victory,  refused  the  overture,  and,  waiting 
patiently  till  his  adversary  was  at  the  last  gasp,  invited 
him  to  a  conference,  and  then  treacherously  seized 
his  person.4  The  army  surrendered  or  dispersed.5 
Macrianus,  the  Praetorian  prefect,  shortly  assumed  the 
title  of  emperor,  and  marched  against  Gallienus,  the 
son  and  colleague  of  Valerian,  who  had  been  left  to 
direct  affairs  in  the  West.  But  another  rival  started  up 
in  the  East.  Sapor  conceived  the  idea  of  complicat- 
ing the  Roman  affairs  by  himself  putting  forward  a 
pretender ;  and  an  obscure  citizen  of  Antioch,  a  certain 


tamia,  and  preserved  in  the  Historia 
Augusta,  Macrian.  §  12  :  —  '  Ego, 
Patres  Conscripti,  bellum  Persicnm 
gerens,  Macriano  totam  rempubli- 
cam  credidi  quidem  a  parte  militari. 
Ille  nobis  fidelis,  ille  mini  devotus, 
&c.' 

1  Hist.  August.  Valerian.  §  3: 
'  Victus  est  a  Sapore  rege  Persa- 
rum,  dum  ductal  cujusdam  sui  ducis, 
cui  summam  omnium  bellicarum 
rerum  agendarum  commiserat,  seu 
fraude  seu  adversa  fortuna,  in  ea 
esset  loca  deductus,  ubi  nec  vigor 
nec  disciplina  militaris,  quin  cape- 
retur,  quidquam  valere  potuit.'  I 
do  not  know  why  the  recent  editors, 


Jordan  and  Eyssenhardt,  reject  this 
passage  (ed.  of  1864,  p.  70). 

2  Eutrop.  ix.  7. 

3  Petrus  Patric.  Fr.  9;  Zosim.  i. 
36. 

4  Zosim.  I.s.c.  Zonaras  (xii.  23) 
has  a  different  account.  According 
to  him,  Valerian  was  simply  cap- 
tured as  he  tried  to  escape. 

5  Gibbon  speaks  of  the  whole 
army  laying  down  its  arms  (vol.  i. 
p.  328);  but  the  position  of  Macri- 
anus at  the  head  of  a  considerable 
force,  expressly  said  to  be  the  rem- 
nant of  the  lost  army,  implies  the 
escape  of  a  certain  number  (Hist. 
Aug.  Gallien.  §  1). 


82 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  IV. 


Miriades  or  Cyriades,1  a  refugee  in  his  camp,  was 
invested  with  the  purple,  and  assumed  the  title  of 
Csesar.2 

The  blow  struck  at  Edessa  laid  the  whole  of  Roman 
Asia  open  to  attack,  and  the  Persian  monarch  was  not 
slow  to  seize  the  occasion.  His  troops  crossed  the 
Euphrates  in  force,  and,  marching  on  Antioch,  once 
more  captured  that  unfortunate  town,  from  which  the 
more  prudent  citizens  had  withdrawn,  but  where  the 
bulk  of  the  people,  not  displeased  at  the  turn  of 
affairs,  remained  and  welcomed  the  conqueror.3 
Miriades  was  installed  in  power,  while  Sapor  himself, 
at  the  head  of  his  irresistible  squadrons,  pressed  for- 
ward, bursting  '  like  a  mountain  torrent ' 4  into  Cilicia, 
and  thence  into  Cappadocia.  Tarsus,  the  birthplace  of 
St.  Paul,  at  once  a  famous  seat  of  learning  and  a  great 
emporium  of  commerce,  fell ;  Cilicia  Campestris  was 
overrun  ;  and  the  passes  of  Taurus,  deserted  or  weakly 
defended  by  the  Romans,  came  into  Sapor's  hands. 
Penetrating  through  them  and  entering  the  champaign 
country  beyond,  his  bands  soon  formed  the  siege  of 
Caesarea  Mazaca,  the  greatest  city  of  these  parts, 


1  The  Miriades  (Mariades)  of 
Malala  (xii.  p.  295)  can  scarcely  be 
a  different  person  from  the  Cyriades 
of  the  Historia  Augusta,  Triginta 
Tyranni,  §  2.  Whether  he  was 
brought  forward  as  a  pretender  be- 
fore the  death  of  Valerian  or  after 
is  perhaps  doubtful  (DeChampagny, 
Cesar s  du  3me  Steele,  torn.  ii.  p. 
436).  But  on  the  whole  Gibbon's 
nexus  of  the  events  has  the  greatest 
probability. 

2  The  setting  up  of  Miriades  as 
emperor  is  thought  to  be  repre- 
sented on  more  than  one  of  Sapor's 
bas-reliefs.  A  tablet  on  a  large 
scale  at  Darabgerd  (Flandin,  pi. 
33)  seems  to  exhibit  the  Persian 


king  on  horseback,  with  Valerian 
prostrate  beneath  his  charger's  feet, 
in  the  act  of  designating  Miriades 
as  monarch  to  the  assembled  Ro- 
mans; Sapor's  guards  stand  behind 
him  with  their  hands  upon  their 
sword-hilts,  while  in  front  of  him 
the  Roman  soldiers  accept  their 
new  ruler  with  acclamations.  He 
himself  raises  his  right  arm  as  he 
takes  an  oath  of  fidelity  to  his 
suzerain. 

3  See  the  fragment  of  the  anony- 
mous continuator  of  Dio's  Roman 
History,  in  the  Fr.  Hist  Gr.  vol. 
iv.  p.  192. 

4  The  simile  is  used  by  Niebuhr 
(Lectures,  vol.  iii.  p.  294,  E.  T.). 


Ch.  IV.  J 


SAPOR  INVADES  ASIA  MINOR. 


83 


estimated  at  this  time  to  have  contained  a  population 
of  four  hundred  thousand  souls.  Demosthenes,  the 
governor  of  Caesarea,  defended  it  bravely,  and,  had 
force  only  been  used  against  him,  might  have  pre- 
vailed ;  but  Sapor  found  friends  within  the  walls,  and 
by  their  help  made  himself  master  of  the  place,  while 
its  bold  defender  was  obliged  to  content  himself  with 
escaping  by  cutting  his  way  through  the  victorious 
host.1  All  Asia  Minor  now  seemed  open  to  the 
conqueror ;  and  it  is  difficult  to  understand  why  he 
did  not  at  any  rate  attempt  a  permanent  occupation  of 
the  territory  which  he  had  so  easily  overrun.  But 
it  seems  certain  that  he  entertained  no  such  idea.2 
Devastation  and  plunder,  revenge  and  gain,  not 
permanent  conquest,  were  his  objects ;  and  hence  his 
course  was  everywhere  marked  by  ruin  and  carnage, 
by  smoking  towns,  ravaged  fields,  and  heaps  of  slain. 
His  cruelties  have  no  doubt  been  exaggerated ;  but 
when  we  hear  that  he  filled  the  ravines  and  valleys  of 
Cappadocia  with  dead  bodies,  and  so  led  his  cavalry 
across  them ; 3  that  he  depopulated  Antioch,  killing  or 
carrying  off  into  slavery  almost  the  whole  population  ; 
that  he  suffered  his  prisoners  in  many  cases  to  perish 
of  hunger,  and  that  he  drove  them  to  water  once  a 
day  like  beasts,4  we  may  be  sure  that  the  guise  in 
which  he  showed  himself  to  the  Romans  was  that  of  a 
merciless  scourge  —  an  avenger  bent  on  speading  the 
terror  of  his  name  —  not  of  one  who  really  sought  to 
enlarge  the  limits  of  his  empire. 

During  the  whole  course  of  this  plundering  expedi- 


1  Zonaras,  xii.  23;  p.  630. 

2  See  Zosim.  i.  27  ad  fin.,  and 
the  comment  of  Gibbon  (vol.  i.  pp. 


329,  330). 

3  Agathias,  iv.  24;  p.  259,  B 

4  Zonar.  l.s.c. 


84  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [Ch.  IV. 


tion,  until  the  retreat  began,  we  hear  but  of  one  check 
that  the  bands  of  Sapor  received.  It  had  been 
determined  to  attack  Emesa  (now  Hems),  one  of  the 
most  important  of  the  Syrian  towns,  where  the  temple 
of  Venus  was  known  to  contain  a  vast  treasure.  The 
invaders  approached,  scarcely  expecting  to  be  resisted ; 
but  the  high  priest  of  the  temple,  having  collected  a 
large  body  of  peasants,  appeared,  in  his  sacerdotal 
robes,  at  the  head  of  a  fanatic  multitude  armed  with 
slings,  and  succeeded  in  beating  off  the  assailants.1 
Emesa,  its  temple,  and  its  treasure,  escaped  the  ra- 
pacity of  the  Persians ;  and  an  example  of  resistance 
was  set,  which  was  not  perhaps  without  important 
consequences. 

For  it  seems  certain  that  the  return  of  Sapor  across 
the  Euphrates  was  not  effected  without  considerable 
loss  and  difficulty.  On  his  advance  into  Syria  he  had 
received  an  embassy  from  a  certain  Odenathus,  a 
Syrian  or  Arab  chief,  who  occupied  a  position  of  semi- 
independence  at  Palmyra,  which,  through  the  advan- 
tages of  its  situation,  had  lately  become  a  flourishing 
commercial  town.  Odenathus  sent  a  long  train  of 
camels  laden  with  gifts,  consisting  in  part  of  rare  and 
precious  merchandise,  to  the  Persian  monarch,  begging 
him  to  accept  them,  and  claiming  his  favourable  regard 
on  the  ground  that  he  had  hitherto  refrained  from  all 
acts  of  hostility  against  the  Persians.  It  appears  that 
Sapor  took  offence  at  the  tone  of  the  communication, 
which  was  not  sufficiently  humble  to  please  him. 
Tearing  the  letter  to  fragments  and  trampling  it 
beneath  his  feet,  he  exclaimed —  1  Who  is  this  Odena- 


1  Johann.  Malal.  Chronographia,  xii.  p.  296. 


Ch.  IV.]       SAPOR  ATTACKED  BY  ODENATHUS.  85 

thus,  and  of  what  country,  that  he  ventures  thus  to 
address  his  lord  ?  Let  him  now,  if  he  would  lighten 
his  punishment,  come  here  and  fall  prostrate  before 
me  with  his  hands  tied  behind  his  back.  Should  he 
refuse,  let  him  be  well  assured  that  I  will  destroy 
himself,  his  race,  and  his  land.'  At  the  same  time  he 
ordered  his  servants  to  cast  the  costly  presents  of  the 
Palmy rene  prince  into  the  Euphrates.1 

This  arrogant  and  offensive  behaviour  naturally 
turned  the  willing  friend  into  an  enemy.2  Odenathus, 
finding  himself  forced  into  a  hostile  position,  took 
arms  and  watched  his  opportunity.  So  long  as  Sapor 
continued  to  advance,  he  kept  aloof.  As  soon,  how- 
ever, as  the  retreat  commenced,  and  the  Persian  army, 
encumbered  with  its  spoil  and  captives,  proceeded  to 
make  its  way  back  slowly  and  painfully  to  the 
Euphrates,  Odenathus,  who  had  collected  a  large  force, 
in  part  from  the  Syrian  villages,3  in  part  from  the  wild 
tribes  of  Arabia,4  made  his  appearance  in  the  field. 
His  light  and  agile  horsemen  hovered  about  the 
Persian  host,  cut  off  their  stragglers,  made  prize  of 
much  of  their  spoil,  and  even  captured  a  portion  of 
the  seraglio  of  the  Great  King.5  The  harassed  troops 
were  glad  when  they  had  placed  the  Euphrates  be- 
tween themselves  and  their  pursuer,  and  congratulated 
each  other  on  their  escape.6  So  much  had  they 
suffered,  and  so  little  did  they  feel  equal  to  further 


1  See  the  fragments  of  Peter 
Patricius  in  the  Fragmenta  Hist. 
Graze,  of  C.  Muller,  vol.  iv.  p.  187, 
Fr.  10. 

2  Hist.  August.  Valer.  §  7;  Gal- 
lien.  §  10;  Odenat.  §  15;  Agath. 
l.s.c. ;  &c. 

3  Sext.  Rufus,  c.  23.  Compare 
Hieronym.  Chron.  anno  2281. 

4  Odenathus  is  called  '  Prince  of 


the  Saracens'  by  Procopius  (Bell. 
Pers.  ii.  5),  and  John  of  Malala 
(xii.  p.  297). 

5  Hist.  August.  Valerian,  §  7. 
(Compare,  however,  the  life  of 
Odenathus,  where  the  capture  of 
the  concubines  is  referred  to  a  later 
date. ) 

G  Pet.  Patric.  Fr.  11. 


86 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  IV. 


conflicts,  that  on  their  march  through  Mesopotamia 
they  consented  to  purchase  the  neutrality  of  the 
people  of  Edessa  by  making  over  to  them  all  the 
coined  money  that  they  had  carried  off'  in  their  Syrian 
raid.1  After  this  it  would  seem  that  the  retreat 
was  unmolested,  and  Sapor  succeeded  in  conveying  the 
greater  part  of  his  army,  together  with  his  illustrious 
prisoner,  to  his  own  country. 

With  regard  to  the  treatment  that  Valerian  received 
at  the  hands  of  his  conqueror,  it  is  difficult  to  form  a 
decided  opinion.  The  writers  nearest  to  the  time 
speak  vaguely  and  moderately,  merely  telling  us  that 
he  grew  old  in  his  captivity,2  and  was  kept  in  the 
condition  of  a  slave.3  It  is  reserved  for  authors  of 
the  next  generation4  to  inform  us  that  he  was  exposed 
to  the  constant  gaze  of  the  multitude,  fettered,  but 
clad  in  the  imperial  purple ; 5  and  that  Sapor,  when- 
ever he  mounted  on  horseback,  placed  his  foot  upon 
his  prisoner's  neck.6    Some  add  that,  when  the  un- 


1  Pet.  Patric.  Fr.  11. 

2  Historia  Augusta,  Valer,  §  7 : 
'  Valeriano  apud  Persas  consenes- 
cente.'  Macrian.  §  12:  '  Infelicis- 
simo,  quod  senex  apud  Persas  con- 
senuit.' 

8  Ibid.  Grallien.  §  1 :  '  Erat  ingens 
omnibus  moeror,  quod  imperator 
Komanus  in  Perside  serviliter  tene- 
retur.' 

4  The  stories  of  the  extreme  ill- 
treatment  of  Valerian  start  with 
Lactantius,  or  the  author  of  the 
treatise  Be  Morte  Persecutorum, 
whoever  he  may  be.  This  author 
wrote  between  a.d.  312  and  315 
(Smith's  Diet,  of  Biography,  ad  voc. 
Csecilius),  or  above  fifty  years  after 
the  capture  of  Valerian.  He  asserts 
positively  (c.  s. )  the  use  of  Valerian 
as  a  footstool  by  Sapor,  and  the 
hanging  of  his  skin  in  a  temple, 
where  it  was  often  seen  by  Roman 


ambassadors.  Lactantius  is  fol- 
lowed by  Eusebius  of  Coesarea,  ex- 
cepting with  regard  to  the  employ- 
ment of  Valerian  as  a  footstool;  and 
then  the  tales  are  repeated  by  Au- 
relius  Victor  (De  Ccesaribus,  c.  33), 
by  his  epitomator  (Epit.  c.  32),  by 
Orosius  (viii.  22),  and  by  Petrus 
Patricius  (Fr.  13).  On  the  whole  it 
seems  to  me  that  the  preservation 
of  the  skin  is  probably  true  (Euseb. 
Vit.  Constant,  iv.  li;  Orat.  Con- 
stant, xxiv.  2;  Lactant.  Be  M.  P. 
c.  5);  but  that  the  employment  of 
the  captive  emperor  as  a  stool  from 
which  Sapor  mounted  his  horse  is  a 
rhetorical  invention  of  Lactantius, 
fifty  years  after  the  time,  from 
whom  alone  later  writers  received  it. 

5  Euseb.  Orat.  Constant,  xxiv.  2. 

6  Lactant.  l.s.c. ;  Victor,  Epit. 
32;  Oros.  vii.  22. 


Ch.  IV.]     TREATMENT  OF  VALERIAN  BY  SAPOR.  87 

happy  captive  died,  about  the  year  a.d.  265  or  266, 
his  body  was  flayed,  and  the  skin  inflated  and  hung 
up  to  view  in  one  of  the  most  frequented  temples  of 
Persia,  where  it  was  seen  by  Roman  envoys  on  their 
visits  to  the  Great  King's  court.1 

It  is  impossible  to  deny  that  Oriental  barbarism  may 
conceivably  have  gone  to  these  lengths  ;  and  it  is  in 
favour  of  the  truth  of  the  details  that  Roman  vanity 
would  naturally  have  been  opposed  to  their  invention. 
But,  on  the  other  hand,  we  have  to  remember  that  in 
the  East  the  person  of  a  king  is  generally  regarded  as 
sacred,  and  that  self-interest  restrains  the  conquering 
monarch  from  dishonouring  one  of  his  own  class.  We 
have  also  to  give  due  weight  to  the  fact  that  the 
earlier  authorities  are  silent  with  respect  to  any  such 
atrocities,  and  that  they  are  first  related  half  a  century 
after  the  time  when  they  are  said  to  have  occurred. 
Under  these  circumstances  the  scepticism  of  Gibbon 
with  respect  to  them 2  is  perhaps  more  worthy  of 
commendation  than  the  ready  faith  of  a  recent  French 
writer.3 

It  may  be  added  that  Oriental  monarchs,  when  they 
are  cruel,  do  not  show  themselves  ashamed  of  their 
cruelties,  but  usually  relate  them  openly  in  their 
inscriptions,  or  represent  them  in  their  bas-reliefs.4 
The  remains  ascribed  on  good  grounds  to  Sapor  do 
not,  however,  contain  anything  confirmatory  of  the 


1  Lactant.  l.s.c. ;  Euseb.  l.s.c. ; 
Agath.  iv.  p.  133,  A. 

2  Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  i.  p.  331. 

3  De  Champagny,  Cesars,  &c. 
torn.  ii.  p.  437. 

4  See  the  bas-reliefs  of  Sargon 
(Botta,  Monument  de  Ninive,  pls.^83, 
118,    120)     and  Asslmr-bani-pal 


(Layard,  Monuments  of  Nineveh, 
2nd  series,  pis.  45  and  47);  and 
compare  the  Behistim  Inscription 
(col.  ii.  par.  13  and  14;  col.  iii. 
par.  8)  and  the  Sassanian  relief 
described  by  Malcolm  (Hist  of 
Persia,  vol.  i.  p.  254). 


88 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  IV. 


stories  which  we  are  considering.  Valerian  is  repre- 
sented on  them  in  a  humble  attitude,1  but  not  fet- 
tered,2 and  never  in  the  posture  of  extreme  degrada- 
tion commonly  associated  with  his  name.  He  bends 
his  knee,  as  no  doubt  he  would  be  required  to  do,  on 
being  brought  into  the  Great  King's  presence  ;  but 
otherwise  he  does  not  appear  to  be  subjected  to  any 
indignity.  It  seems  thus  to  be  on  the  whole  most 
probable  that  the  Roman  emperor  was  not  more  se- 
verely treated  than  the  generality  of  captive  princes, 
and  that  Sapor  has  been  unjustly  taxed  with  abusing 
the  rights  of  conquest.3 

The  hostile  feeling  of  Odenathus  against  Sapor  did 
not  cease  with  the  retreat  of  the  latter  across  the 
Euphrates.  The  Palmyrene  prince  was  bent  on  tak- 
ing advantage  of  the  general  confusion  of  the  times 
to  carve  out  for  himself  a  considerable  kingdom,  of 
which  Palmyra  should  be  the  capital.  Syria  and 
Palestine  on  the  one  hand,  Mesopotamia  on  the  other, 
were  the  provinces  that  lay  most  conveniently  near  to 
him,  and  that  he  especially  coveted.  But  Mesopota- 
mia had  remained  in  the  possession  of  the  Persians  as 
the  prize  of  their  victory  over  Valerian,  and  could 
only  be  obtained  by  wresting  it  from  the  hands  into 
which  it  had  fallen.  Odenathus  did  not  shrink  from 
this  contest.  It  has  been  with  some  reason  conjec- 
tured 4  that  Sapor  must  have  been  at  this  time  occu- 


1  See  Flandin,  pis.  33,  49,  53, 
&c;  Texier,  pi.  129,  &c. 

2  It  has  been  said  that  there  is 
one  exception  (Thomas  in  As.  Soc. 
Journal,  vol.  iii.  N.  S.  p.  304). 
But  the  figure  referred  to  repre- 
sents, I  believe,  Miriades.  (See 
the  cut,  opp.  p.  91.) 

3  Tabari    is   the   only  Oriental 


writer  who  reports  that  Valerian 
was  used  cruelly;  but  his  state- 
ment that  Sapor  cut  off  his  pris- 
oner's nose  and  then  set  him  at 
liberty  (Chronique,  torn.  ii.  p.  80) 
can  scarcely  be  thought  worthy  of 
credit. 

4  Niebuhr,  Lectures  on  Ancient 
History,  vol.  iii.  p.  295. 


Ch.  iv.j      odenathus  attacks  ctesiphon.    .  89 

pied  with  troubles  which  had  broken  out  on  the 
eastern  side  of  his  empire.  At  any  rate,  it  appears 
that  Odenathus,  after  a  short  contest  with  Macrianus 
and  his  son,  Quietus,1  turned  his  arms  once  more,  about 
a.d.  263,  against  the  Persians,  crossed  the  Euphrates 
into  Mesopotamia,  took  Carrhse  and  Nisibis,  defeated 
Sapor  and  some  of  his  sons  in  a  battle,2  and  drove  the 
entire  Persian  host  in  confusion  to  the  gates  of  Ctesi- 
phon. He  even  ventured  to  form  the  siege  of  that 
city  ; 3  but  it  was  not  long  before  effectual  relief  ar- 
rived ;  from  all  the  provinces  flocked  in  contingents  for 
the  defence  of  the  Western  capital ;  several  engage- 
ments were  fought,  in  some  of  which  Odenathus  was 
defeated ; 4  and  at  last  he  found  himself  involved  in 
difficulties  through  his  ignorance  of  the  localities,5  and 
so  thought  it  best  to  retire.  Apparently  his  retreat 
was  undisturbed;  he  succeeded  in  carrying  off  his  booty 
and  his  prisoners,  among  whom  were  several  satraps,6 
and  he  retained  possession  of  Mesopotamia,  which 
continued  to  form  a  part  of  the  Palmyrene  kingdom 
until  the  capture  of  Zenobia  by  Aurelian  (a.d.  273). 

The  successes  of  Odenathus  in  a.d.  263  were  fol- 
lowed by  a  period  of  comparative  tranquillity.  That 
ambitious  prince  seems  to  have  been  content  with 
ruling  from  the  Tigris  to  the  Mediterranean,  and  with 


1  Hist.  August  Gallien.  §  3; 
Quietus,  §  14. 

2  Ibid.  Odenath.  §  15.  Compare 
the  letter  of  Aurelian  preserved  in 
this  valuable  compilation  (Zenob. 
§30). 

3  Ibid.  Gallien.  §  10:  'Ad 
Ctesiphontem  Parthorum  multi- 
tudinem  obsedit.'  Zosim.  i.  p.  39: 
Uepaaq  toIq  oUeloic  £va7reK'A.ci(j£i'. 
Syucellus  makes  him  succeed  in 
taking  the  city  [Kt^gi^Cwtu  iroXiop- 


ida  Tzapaarrjouuevog ) ;  but  this  is 
an  exaggeration.  (See  his  Chrono- 
gr aphid,  pp.  710-7.) 

4  Hist.  August.  Gallien.  §  10: 
'  Fuerunt  longa  et  varia  praslia.' 

5  lb.  '  Locorum  difficultatibus  in 
alieno  solo  imperator  optimus  labo- 
rabat. ' 

G  Of  these  he  sent  some  to  Galli- 
enus,  whom  that  weak  monarch 
led  in  triumph  (Hist.  August. 
l.s.c). 


90 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [Ch.  IT. 


the  titles  of  'Augustus,'  which  he  received  from  the 
Roman  emperor,  Gallienus,1  and  1  king  of  kings/ 
which  he  assumed  upon  his  coins.2  He  did  not  press 
further  upon  Sapor ;  nor  did  the  Roman  emperor  make 
any  serious  attempt  to  recover  his  father's  person  or 
revenge  his  defeat  upon  the  Persians.  An  expedition 
which  he  sent  out  to  the  East,  professedly  with  this 
object,  in  the  year  a.d.  267,  failed  utterly,  its  com- 
mander, Heraclianus,  being  completely  defeated  by 
Zenobia,  the  widow  and  successor  of  Odenathus.3 
Odenathus  himself  was  murdered  by  a  kinsman  three 
or  four  years  after  his  great  successes ;  and,  though 
Zenobia  ruled  his  kingdom  almost  with  a  man's 
vigour,4  the  removal  of  his  powerful  adversary  must 
have  been  felt  as  a  relief  by  the  Persian  monarch.  It 
is  evident,  too,  that  from  the  time  of  the  accession  of 
Zenobia,  the  relations  between  Rome  and  Palmyra  had 
become  unfriendly ; 5  the  old  empire  grew  jealous 
of  the  new  kingdom  which  had  sprung  up  upon  its 
borders ;  and  the  effect  of  this  jealousy,  while  it 
lasted,  was  to  secure  Persia  from  any  attack  on  the 
part  of  either. 

It  appears  that  Sapor,  relieved  from  any  further 
necessity  of  defending  his  empire  in  arms,  employed 
the  remaining  years  of  his  life  in  the  construction  of 
great  works,  and  especially  in  the  erection  and 
ornamentation  of  a  new  capital.  The  ruins  of 
Shahpur,  which  still  exist  near    Kazerun,  in  the 


1  '  Odenathum,  participate*  im- 
pede-, Augustum  vocavit '  (Hist. 
Aug.  Gallien.  §  12). 

2  See  De  Champagny,  Cesars,  &c. 
torn.  iii.  p.  45. 

3  Hist.  Aug.  Gallien.  §  13. 

4  '  Zenobia  Palmyrenis  et  orien- 


tal ibus  plerisque  viriliter  hnperante' 
ibid.  (Compare  the  letter  of  Aure- 
lian  to  the  Senate,  preserved  in  the 
Hist.  August.,  Triginta  Tyranni, 
Zenob.  §  30.) 

6  See  above,  note  3 ;  and  compare 
Hist.  Aug.  Claud.  §  4. 


Ch.  IV.] 


SAPOR'S  GREAT  WORKS. 


91 


province  of  Fars,1  commemorate  the  name,  and  afford 
some  indication  of  the  grandeur,  of  the  second  Per- 
sian monarch.  Besides  remains  of  buildings,  they 
comprise  a  number  of  bas-reliefs  and  rock  inscrip- 
tions, some  of  which  were  beyond  a  doubt  set  up  by 
Sapor  I.2  In  one  of  the  most  remarkable  the  Persian 
monarch  is  represented  on  horseback,  wearing  the 
crown  usual  upon  his  coins,  and  holding  by  the  hand 
a  tunicked  figure,  probably  Miriades,  whom  he  is 
presenting  to  the  captured  Romans  as  their  sovereign. 
Foremost  to  do  him  homage  is  the  kneeling  figure  of  a 
chieftain,  probably  Valerian,  behind  whom  are  arranged 
in  a  double  line  seventeen  persons,  representing  ap- 
parently the  different  corps  of  the  Roman  army.  All 
these  persons  are  on  foot,  while  in  contrast  with  them 
are  arranged  behind  Sapor  ten  guards  on  horseback, 
who  represent  his  irresistible  cavalry.3  Another  bas- 
relief  at  the  same  place 4  gives  us  a  general  view  of 
the  triumph  of  Sapor  on  his  return  to  Persia  with 
his  illustrious  prisoner.  Here  fifty-seven  guards  are 
ranged  behind  him,  while  in  front  are  thirty-three 
tribute-bearers,  having  with  them  an  elephant  and  a 
chariot.  In  the  centre  is  a  group  of  seven  figures, 
comprising  Sapor,  who  is  on  horseback  in  his  usual 
costume ;  Valerian,  who  is  under  the  horse's  feet ; 
Miriades,  who  stands  by  Sapor's  side ;  three  principal 


1  Malcolm,  Hist,  of  Persia,  vol.  i. 
p.  98;  Texier,  Description  de  V Ar- 
menie,  de  la  Perse,  &c.  pp.  205-208 ; 
pis.  146  to  151;  Flandin,  Voyage 
en  Perse,  torn.  ii.  pp.  248-281,  pis. 
45-54. 

2  The  sculptures  at  Shahpur  are 
generally  Sapor  the  First's.  They 
may  be  identified  by  the  resemblance 


of  the  chief  figure  to  the  head  upon 
Sapor's  coins,  and  to  the  figure  de- 
clared by  an  inscription  to  be  Sapor 
at  Nakhsh-i-Rajab  (Ker  Porter, 
pi.  28). 

3  See  Malcolm,  vol.  i.  opp.  p. 
255;  Texier,  pi.  146;  Flandin,  pi. 
49. 

4  Texier,  pi.  147;  Flandin,  pi.  53. 


92 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


LCh.  IV. 


tribute-bearers  in  front  of  the  main  figure ;  and  a 
Victory  which  floats  in  the  sky. 

Another  important  work,  assigned  by  tradition  to 
Sapor  I.,  is  the  great  dyke  at  Shuster.  This  is  a  dam 
across  the  river  Karun,  formed  of  cut  stones,  cemented 
by  lime,  and  fastened  together  by  clamps  of  iron ;  it 
is  twenty  feet  broad,  and  no  less  than  twelve  hundred 
feet  in  length,  The  whole  is  a  solid  mass  excepting 
in  the  centre,  where  two  small  arches  have  been  con- 
structed for  the  purpose  of  allowing  a  part  of  the 
stream  to  flow  in  its  natural  bed.  The  greater  por- 
tion of  the  water  is  directed  eastward  into  a  canal  cut 
for  it ;  and  the  town  of  Shuster  is  thus  defended  on 
both  sides  by  a  water  barrier,  whereby  the  position 
becomes  one  of  great  strength.1  Tradition  says  that 
Sapor  used  his  power  over  Valerian  to  obtain  Roman 
engineers  for  this  work  ; 2  and  the  great  dam  is  still 
known  as  the  Bund-i-Kaisar,3  or  1  dam  of  Csesar,'  to 
the  inhabitants  of  the  neighbouring  country. 

Besides  his  works  at  Shahpur  and  Shuster,  Sapor 
set  up  memorials  of  himself  at  Haji-abad,  Nakhsh-i- 
Rajab,  and  Nakhsh-i-Rustam,  near  Persepolis,  at 
Darabgerd  in  South-eastern  Persia,  and  elsewhere ; 
most  of  which  still  exist  and  have  been  described  by 
various  travellers.4  At  Nakhsh-i-Rustam,  Valerian  is 
seen  making  his  submission  in  one  tablet,5  while 


1  See  the  Journal  of  the  Geogra- 
phical Society,  vol.  ix.  pp.  73-4; 
vol.  xvi.  pp.  27-8;  Loftus,  Chaldcea 
and  Susiana,  p.  298. 

2  Tabari,  Chronique,  torn.  ii.  p.  80. 

3  Loftus,  p.  299.  Compare  Geo- 
graph.  Journal,  vol.  ix.  p.  75;  vol. 
xvi.  p.  28. 

4  Niebuhr,  C,  Voyages,  torn.  ii. 


p.  129;  Ker  Porter,  Travels,  vol.  i. 
pp.  540-575;  Malcolm,  Hist,  of 
Persia,  vol.  i.  p.  254;  Flandin, 
Voyage  en  Perse,  torn.  ii.  pp.  97- 
135,  &c. ;  Texier,  Description  de 
VArmenie,  <fcc.  torn.  ii.  pp.  226-231, 
&c. 

5  Ker  Porter,  vol.  i.  pi.  21 ;  Tex- 
ier, pi.  129. 


Oh.  IV.  I 


HIS  INSCRIPTIONS. 


93 


another  exhibits  the  glories  of  Sapor's  court.1  The 
sculptures  are  in  some  instances  accompanied  by  in- 
scriptions. One  of  these  is,  like  those  of  Artaxerxes, 
bilingual,  Greek  and  Persian.  The  Greek  inscription 
runs  as  follows :  — 

to  n  poco  n  o  nto  yto  m  ac  a  acn  o  ygco  y 

eAntOPOY8ACIA€WCBACIA€U)NAPSANU)N 
KAIANAPIAN(ON€KrSNOYC0€^N'?lOY 

M  A  C  A  AC  N  O  Y©  €  O  Y  A  PT  A  ~.  A  PO  Y  3  AC = AC  W  O 
BACIA€h)NAPIANh)N€Kr€NOYCe€UN. 
€KrONOY©eOYnAnAKOYBAC8A€tuC 

Its  Persian  transcript  is  read  thus :  —  L  Pathkar  (?)  zant 
mazdisn  bag  Shahpuhri,  malkan  malka  Airan  ve  Ant- 
ran  minuchitri  min  yaztan,  bar%  mazdisn  bag  Artah- 
shetr  malkan  malka  Airan,  minuchitri  min  yaztan, 
napi  bag  Papaki  malka.'' 2  In  the  main,  Sapor,  it  will 
be  seen,  follows  the  phrases  of  his  father  Artaxerxes ; 
but  he  claims  a  wider  dominion.  Artaxerxes  is  con- 
tent to  rule  over  Ariana  (or  Iran)  only ;  his  son  calls 
himself  lord  both  of  the  Arians  and  the  non-Arians,  or 
of  Iran  and  Turan.  We  may  conclude  from  this  as 
probable  that  he  held  some  Scythic  tribes  under  his 
sway,  probably  in  Segestan,  or  Seistan,  the  country 


1  Texier,  pi.  139. 

2  See  Thomas  in  Journal  of  As. 
Society,  iii.  N.  S.  p.  301 ;  and  com- 
pare De  Sacy,  Inscriptions  de  Nak- 
schi-Roustam,  pp.  31  and  105; 
Spiegel,  Grammatik,  p.  169.  The 
inscription  may  be  thus  rendered :  — 
'This  is  the  representation  of  the 
Ormazd- worshipping  divine  Sapor, 
king  of  kings  Arian  and  non-Arian, 


heaven-descended,  of  the  race  of 
the  gods,  son  of  the  Ormazd-wor- 
shipping  divine  Artaxerxes,  king  of 
the  kings  of  Aria,  heaven-de- 
scended, of  the  race  of  the  gods, 
grandson  of  the  divine  Papak,  the 
king.'  See  Hang  on  the  Haji-abad 
Inscription,  which  commences  in 
exactly  the  same  way.  (Old  Pali- 
lavi-Pazand  Glossary,  pp.  48-51.) 


94 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  LCh.  IV. 


south  and  east  of  the  Hamoon,  or  lake  in  which  the 
Helmend  is  swallowed  up.  Scythians  had  been  settled 
in  these  parts,  and  in  portions  of  Affghanistan  and 
India,  since  the  great  invasion  of  the  Yue-chi,1  about 
B.C.  200  ;  and  it  is  not  unlikely  that  some  of  them  may 
have  passed  under  the  Persian  rule  during  the  reign  of 
Sapor,  but  we  have  no  particulars  of  these  conquests. 

Sapor's  coins  resemble  those  of  Artaxerxes  in 
general  type,2  but  may  be  distinguished  from  them, 


COINS  OF  SAPOR  I. 


first,  by  the  head-dress,  which  is  either  a  cap  terminat- 
ing in  the  head  of  an  eagle,  or  else  a  mural  crown 
surmounted  by  an  inflated  ball ;  and,  secondly,  by  the 
emblem  on  the  reverse,  which  is  almost  always  a  fire- 
altar  between  two  supporters?    The  ordinary  legend  on 


1  Compare  the  Author's  Sixth  3  A  few  coins  of  Sapor  I.  have, 
Monarchy,  p.  115.  on  the  reverse,  a  fire-altar  without 

2  See  Longperier,  Medailles  des  supporters,  like  the  coins  of  his 
Sassanides,  pi.  3  and  pp.  13-18.  father. 


COIN  OF  SAPOR  I. 


Ch.  IV.] 


HIS  COINS. 


95 


the  coins  is  LMazdisn  bag  Shahpuhri,  malkan  malka 
Air  an,  minuchitri  min  yazdan  '  on  the  obverse ;  and 
on  the  reverse  '  Shahpuhri  nuvazV  1 

It  appears  from  these  legends,  and  from  the  inscrip- 
tion above  given,  that  Sapor  was,  like  his  father,  a 
zealous  Zoroastrian.  His  faith  was  exposed  to  con- 
siderable trial.  Never  was  there  a  time  of  greater 
religious  ferment  in  the  East,  or  a  crisis  which  more 
shook  men's  belief  in  ancestral  creeds.  The  absurd 
idolatry  which  had  generally  prevailed  through  Western 
Asia  for  two  thousand  years  —  a  nature- worship  which 
gave  the  sanction  of  religion  to  the  gratification  of 
men's  lowest  propensities  —  was  shaken  to  its  founda- 
tion ;  and  everywhere  men  were  striving  after  something 
higher,  nobler,  and  truer  than  had  satisfied  previous 
generations  for  twenty  centuries.  The  sudden  revivi- 
fication of  Zoroastrianism,  after  it  had  been  depressed 
and  almost  forgotten  for  five  hundred  years,  was  one 
result  of  this  stir  of  men's  minds.  Another  result  was 
the  rapid  progress  of  Christianity,  which  in  the  course 
of  the  third  century  overspread  large  portions  of  the 
East,  rooting  itself  with  great  firmness  in  Armenia,  and 
obtaining  a  hold  to  some  extent  on  Babylonia,  Bactria, 
and  perhaps  even  on  India.2  Judaism,  also,  which  had 
long  had  a  footing  in  Mesopotamia,  and  which  after 
the  time  of  Hadrian  may  be  regarded  as  having  its 
head-quarters  at  Babylon  —  Judaism  itself,  usually  so 
immovable,  at  this  time  showed  signs  of  life  and 
change,  taking  something  like  a  new  form  in  the 
schools  wherein  was  compiled  the  vast  and  strange 
work  known  as  '  the  Babylonian  Talmud.' 3 


1  For  the  meaning  of  these  le- 
gends, see  above,  p.  66. 

2  See  Bohlen,  Das  alte  Indien, 


vol.  i.  pp.  369,  et  seq. 

3  Milman,  History  of  the  Jews, 
vol.  ii.  p.  485. 


96  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [Ch.  IV. 


Amid  the  strife  and  jar  of  so  many  conflicting 
systems,  each  having  a  root  in  the  past,  and  each  able 
to  appeal  with  more  or  less  of  force  to  noble  examples 
of  virtue  and  constancy  among  its  professors  in  the 
present,  we  cannot  be  surprised  that  in  some  minds  the 
idea  grew  up  that,  while  all  the  systems  possessed 
some  truth,  no  one  of  them  was  perfect  or  indeed 
much  superior  to  its  fellows.  Eclectic  or  syncretic 
views  are  always  congenial  to  some  intellects ;  and  in 
times  when  religious  thought  is  deeply  stirred,  and 
antagonistic  creeds  are  brought  into  direct  collision, 
the  amiable  feeling  of  a  desire  for  peace  comes  in  to 
strengthen  the  inclination  for  reconciling  opponents  by 
means  of  a  fusion,  and  producing  harmony  by  a 
happy  combination  of  discords.  It  was  in  Persia,  and 
in  the  reign  of  Sapor,  that  one  of  the  most  remark- 
able of  these  well-meaiiing  attempts  at  fusion  and 
reconciliation  that  the  whole  of  history  can  show  was 
made,  and  with  results  which  ought  to  be  a  lasting 
warning  to  the  apostles  of  comprehension.  A  certain 
Mani  (or  Manes,  as  the  ecclesiastical  writers  call  him  *), 
born  in  Persia  about  a.d.  240,2  grew  to  manhood 
under  Sapor,  exposed  to  the  various  religious  influences 
of  which  we  have  spoken.  With  a  mind  free  from 
prejudice  and  open  to  conviction,  he  studied  the 
various  systems  of  belief  which  he  found  established 
in  Western  Asia  —  the  Cabalism  of  the  Babylonian 
Jews,  the  Dualism  of  the  Magi,  the  mysterious  doc- 
trines of  the  Christians,  and  even  the  Buddhism  of 
India.3    At  first  he  inclined  to  Christianity,  and  is  said 


1  Routh,  Reliquiae  Sacrce,  vol.  iv. 
pp.  147,  153,  &c. ;  Augustin,  De 
Nat.  Boni,  p.  515;  Contr.  Faust. 
passim;  Epiphan.  Adv.  llceres.  lxvi. 


2  Burton,  Eccles.  Hist,  of  First 
Three  Centuries,  vol.  ii.  p.  408. 

3  Epiphan.  Adv.  Hceres.  lxvi. 
§§  1-3.    Compare  Milman,  History 


Ch.  IV.]       RELIGIOUS  STIR  —  RISE  OF  MANES.  97 

to  have  been  admitted  to  priest's  orders  and  to  have 
ministered  to  a  congregation ;  1  but  after  a  time  he 
thought  that  he  saw  his  way  to  the  formation  of  a 
new  creed,  which  should  combine  all  that  was  best  in 
the  religious  systems  which  he  was  acquainted  with, 
and  omit  what  was  superfluous  or  objectionable.  He 
adopted  the  Dualism  of  the  Zoroastrians,  the  metemp- 
sychosis of  India,  the  angelism  and  demonism  of  the 
Talmud,  and  the  Trinitarianism  of  the  Gospel  of  Christ. 
Christ  himself  he  identified  with  Mithra,  and  gave 
Him  his  dwelling  in  the  sun.  He  assumed  to  be 
the  Paraclete  promised  by  Christ,  who  should  guide 
men  into  all  truth,  and  claimed  that  his  L  Ertang,7 
a  sacred  book  illustrated  by  pictures  of  his  own 
painting,  should  supersede  the  New  Testament.2  Such 
pretensions  were  not  likely  to  be  tolerated  by  the 
Christian  community  ;  and  Manes  had  not  put  them 
forward  very  long  when  he  was  expelled  from  the 
church  3  and  forced  to  carry  his  teaching  elsewhere. 
Under  these  circumstances  he  is  said  to  have  addressed 
himself  to  Sapor,  who  was  at  first  inclined  to  show  him 
some  favour ;  4  but  when  he  found  out  what  the  doc- 


of  Christianity,  vol.  ii.  pp.  259,  260, 
261,  &c. 

1  Burton,  p.  409;  Milman,  p. 
263. 

2  Milman,  pp.  259-271. 

3  Burton,  p.  410. 

4  According  to  the  interpretation 
of  one  writer,  Sapor  has  left  a  rec- 
ord which  sufficiently  indicates  his 
adoption  at  one  time  in  his  life  of 
a  species  of  mongrel  Christianity. 
Mr.  Thomas  finds  the  name  of 
JESUS  in  the  Haji-abad  inscrip- 
tion, accompanied  by  the  epithet 
'  the  Lord,'  and  the  statement  that 
He  6  mercifully  brought  joy  to  the 
people  of  the  world.'    (See  his  ex- 


planation of  the  inscription  in»  the 
Journal  of  the  Royal  Asiatic  Socie/y, 
vol.  iii.,  New  Series,  pp.  338-9.) 
Another  interpreter,  however,  with 
at  least  equal  claims  to  attention, Dr. 
Martin  Haug,  finds  no  reference  at 
all  to  Jesus  or  to  religion  in  the 
record,  which  describes,  according 
to  him,  Sapor's  shooting  of  an  ar- 
row from  the  Haji-abad  cave  at  a 
target  placed  without  it,  and  his 
failure  to  hit  the  mark,  thence  pro- 
ceedi  ng  togive  a  mystical  account 
of  the  failure,  which  is  ascribed  to 
the  existence  of  an  invisible  target 
at  the  spot  where  the  arrow  fell. 
(Old  Pahlavi-Pazand  Glossary,  pp. 


98 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


LCh.  IV. 


trines  of  the  new  teacher  actually  were,  his  feelings 
underwent  a  change,  and  Manes,  proscribed,  or  at  any 
rate  threatened  with  penalties,  had  to  retire  into  a 
foreign  country.1 

The  Zoroastrian  faith  was  thus  maintained  in  its 
purity  by  the  Persian  monarch,  who  did  not  allow 
himself  to  be  imposed  upon  by  the  specious  eloquence 
of  the  new  teacher,  but  ultimately  rejected  the  strange 
amalgamation  that  was  offered  to  his  acceptance.  It 
is  scarcely  to  be  regretted  that  he  so  determined. 
Though  the  morality  of  the  Manichees  was  pure,2  and 
though  their  religion  is  regarded  by  some  as  a  sort  of 
Christianity,  there  were  but  few  points  in  which  it  was 
an  improvement  on  Zoroastrianism.  Its  Dualism  was 
pronounced  and  decided ;  its  Trinitarianism  was  ques- 
tionable ;  its  teaching  with  respect  to  Christ  destroyed 
the  doctrines  of  the  incarnation  and  atonement ;  its 
1  Ertang '  was  a  poor  substitute  for  Holy  Scripture. 
Even  its  morality,  being  deeply  penetrated  with 
asceticism,  was  of  a  wrong  type  and  inferior  to  that 
preached  by  Zoroaster.  Had  the  creed  of  Manes 
been  accepted  by  the  Persian  monarch,  the  progress 
of  real  Christianity  in  the  East  would,  it  is  probable, 
have  been  impeded  rather  than  forwarded  —  the  gen- 
eral currency  of  the  debased  amalgam  would  have 
checked  the  introduction  of  the  pure  metal. 

It  must  have  been  shortly  after  his  rejection  of  the 


45-65.)  It  seems  to  result  from 
the  extreme  difference  between  the 
interpretations  of  these  two  schol- 
ars, that  the  language  of  the  early 
Sassanian  inscriptions  is  as  yet 
too  imperfectly  known  to  allow  of 
any  conclusions  being  drawn  from 
them,  excepting  where  they  are  ac- 
companied by  a  Greek  transcript. 
Macoudi  says  that,  on  the  first 


preaching  of  Manes,  Sapor  '  abjured 
the  doctrine  of  the  Magi  to  em- 
brace that  of  the  new  teacher,'  but 
that  lie  afterwards  returned  to  the 
worship  of  his  ancestors  (torn.  ii. 
p.  164). 

1  Burton,  l.s.c. ;  Milman,  p.  263. 

2  Augustin.  Contr.  Fortunat.  ad 
init. ;  Contr.  Fauat.  v.  1. 


Ch.  IV.] 


CHARACTER  OF  SAPOR  I. 


99 


teaching  of  Manes  that  Sapor  died,  having  reigned 
thirty-one  years,  from  a.d.  240  to  a.d.  271.  He  was 
undoubtedly  one  of  the  most  remarkable  princes  of  the 
Sassanian  series.  In  military  talent,  indeed,  he  may 
not  have  equalled  his  father ;  for  though  he  defeated 
Valerian,  he  had  to  confess  himself  inferior  to  Odena- 
thus.  But  in  general  governmental  ability  he  is  among 
the  foremost  of  the  Neo-Persian  monarchs,  and  may 
compare  favourably  with  almost  any  prince  of  the 
series.  He  baffled  Odenathus,  when  he  was  not  able 
to  defeat  him,  by  placing  himself  behind  walls,  and  by 
bringing  into  play  those  advantages  which  naturally 
belonged  to  the  position  of  a  monarch  attacked  in  his 
own  country.1  He  maintained,  if  he  did  not  per- 
manently advance,  the  power  of  Persia  in  the  west ; 
while  in  the  east  it  is  probable  that  he  considerably 
extended  the  bounds  of  his  dominion.2  In  the  internal 
administration  of  his  empire,  he  united  works  of  use- 
fulness 3  with  the  construction  of  memorials  which  had 
only  a  sentimental  and  aesthetic  value.  He  was  a  liberal 
patron  of  art,  and  is  thought  not  to  have  confined  his 
patronage  to  the  encouragement  of  native  talent.4  On 
the  subject  of  religion  he  did  not  suffer  himself  to  be 
permanently  led  away  by  the  enthusiasm  of  a  young 
and  bold  freethinker.  He  decided  to  maintain  the 
religious  system  that  had  descended  to  him  from  his 
ancestors,  and  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  persuasions  that 


1  See  above,  p.  89. 

2  Supra,  p.  93. 

3  Besides  the  works  of  useful- 
ness already  mentioned  (p.  92), 
Sapor  is  said  to  have  constructed 
the  great  bridge  of  Dizful,  which 
has  22  arches,  and  is  450  paces 
long.  (See  M.  Mohl's  translation  of 


the  Modjmel-al-Tewarlkh  in  the 
Journal  Asiatique  for  1841,  p.  511.) 

4  Longperier  thinks  that  the 
hand  of  Greek  artists  is  to  be  recog- 
nised in  the  heads  and  emblems 
upon  early  Sassanian  coins  (Me- 
dailles  des  Sassanides,  p.  5). 


100 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


|Ch.  IV. 


would  have  led  him  to  revolutionise  the  religious 

opinion  of  the  East  without 
placing  it  upon  a  satisfac- 
tory footing.  The  Orientals  add 
to  these  commendable  features 
of  character,  that  he  was  a  man 
of  remarkable  beauty,1  of  great 
personal  courage,  and  of  a  noble 
and  princely  liberality.  Accord- 
ing to  them,  'he  only  desired 
wealth  that  he  might  use  it 
for  good  and  great  purposes.  ' 2 


HEAD  OF  SAPOR  I. 

(from  a  gem). 


1  Tabari,  Chronique,  torn.  ii.  p. 
81;  Macoudi,  Prairies  d'Or,  torn.  ii. 
p.  160,  torn.  iv.  p.  83;  Mirkhond, 
Histoire  des  Sassanides,  pp.  285-7. 
The  portrait  on  the  gem  above 


given  tends  to  confirm  the  testi- 
mony. 

2  Malcolm,  History  of  Persia, 
vol.  i.  p.  99. 


r 


Ch.  V.] 


KEIGN  OF  HORMISDAS  I. 


101 


CHAPTER  V. 

Short  Reign  of  Hormisdas  I.  His  Dealings  with  Manes.  Accession  of 
Varahran  I.  He  puts  Manes  to  Death.  Persecutes  the  Manichceans  and 
the  Christians.  His  Relations  icith  Zenobia.  He  is  threatened  by 
Aurelian.  His  death.  Reign  of  Varahran  II.  His  Tyrannical  Con- 
duct. His  Conquest  of  Seistan,  and  War  with  India.  His  War 
with  the  Roman  Emperors  Cams  and  Diocletian.  His  Loss  of  Armenia. 
His  Death.    Short  Reign  of  Varahran  III. 

TedvrjKorog  tov  Zanupov,  'OpuiodaTTjc,  6  rovrov  irate,  ttjv  ^aaCkeiav  irapcika[ifiav£L. 

Agath.  iv.  p.  134,  C. 

The  first  and  second  kings  of  the  Neo-Persian  Empire 
were  men  of  mark  and  renown.  Their  successors 
for  several  generations  were,  comparatively  speaking, 
feeble  and  insignificant.  The  first  burst  of  vigour  and 
freshness  which  commonly  attends  the  advent  to  power 
of  a  new  race  in  the  East,  or  the  recovery  of  its  former 
position  by  an  old  one,  had  passed  away,  and  was 
succeeded,  as  so  often  happens,  by  reaction  and  ex- 
haustion, the  monarchs  becoming  luxurious  and  inert, 
while  the  people  willingly  acquiesced  in  a  policy  of 
which  the  principle  was  'Rest  and  be  thankful.'  It 
helped  to  keep  matters  in  this  quiescent  state,  that  the 
kings  who  ruled  during  this  period  had,  in  almost 
every  instance,  short  reigns,  four  monarchs  coming  to 
the  throne  and  dying  within  the  space  of  a  little  more 
than  twenty-one  years.1  The  first  of  these  four  was 
Hormisdates,  Hormisdas,  or  Hormuz,2  the  son  of  Sapor, 

1  See  Agathias,  iv.  p.  134;  Eu- I  or  Ormisdates,  i  given  by  Ormazd.' 
tychius,  vol.  i.  pp.  384,  387,  395.        This  is  first  contracted  into  Hor- 

2  The  full  form  is  Hormisdates  I  misdas,  and  then  by  the  later  Per- 


102 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  V. 


who  succeeded  his  father  in  a.d.  271.  His  reign  lasted 
no  more  than  a  year  and  ten  days,1  and  was  dis- 
tinguished by  only  a  single  event  of  any  importance. 
Mani,  who  liad  fled  from  Sapor,  ventured  to  return  to 
Persia  on  the  accession  of  his  son,2  and  was  received 
with  respect  and  favour.  Whether  Hormisdas  was 
inclined  to  accept  his  religious  teaching  or  no,  we  are 
not  told;  but  at  any  rate  he  treated  him  kindly, 
allowed  him  to  propagate  his  doctrines,  and  even 
assigned  him  as  his  residence  a  castle  named  Arabion. 
From  this  place  Mani  proceeded  to  spread  his  views 
among  the  Christians  of  Mesopotamia,  and  in  a  short 
time  succeeded  in  founding  the  sect  which,  under  the 
name  of  Manichaeans  or  Manichees,  gave  so  much 
trouble  to  the  Church  for  several  centuries.  Hormis- 
das, who,  according  to  some,3  founded  the  city  of 
Ram-Hormuz  in  Eastern  Persia,  died  in  a.d.  272,  and 
was  succeeded  by  his  son  or  brother,4  Vararanes  or 
Varahran.5  He  left  no  inscriptions,  and  it  is  doubted 
whether  we  possess  any  of  his  coins.6 


sians  into  Hormuz.  The  form  of 
the  name  on  the  coins  of  Hormisdas 
II.  is  Auhrmazdi. 

1  Agath.  l.s.c.  Compare  Tabari, 
ii.  p.  89;  Macoudi,  ii.  p.  166. 

2  So  Milman  (History  of  Christi- 
anity, vol.  ii.  p.  272);  but  Malcolm 
places  his  return  to  Persia  under 
Varahran  I.  (Hist,  of  Persia,  vol.  i. 
p.  101).  So  Mirkhond  (Histoire 
des  Sassanides,  p.  295). 

3  Macoudi,  torn.  ii.  p.  166;  Mal- 
colm, Hist,  of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p.  100; 
Mirkhond,  Histoire  des  Sassanides. 
p.  293. 

4  Macoudi  tells  us  (torn.  ii.  p.  238) 
that,  according  to  Abu  Obeidah, 
Varahran  was  the  son  of  Sapor 
and  brother  of  Hormisdas;  but  all 
other  authorities,  so  far  as  I  know, 
make  him  the  son  of  Hormisdas. 


5  The  orthography  of  the  name 
upon  the  coins  is  Varahran  (Long- 
perier,  Medailles,  p.  20).  This 
the  Greeks  expressed  by  Ovapuvrjg, 
or  Ovapapuvrjg.  The  later  Persians 
corrupted  the  name  into  Bahrain. 
That  the  Achsemenian  Persians  had 
some  similar  contracted  form  of  the 
word  appears  from  the  name  Pha- 
mndates,  or  Pherendates.  (See  Sir 
H.  Rawlinson's  remarks  on  this 
name  in  the  Author's  Herodotus, 
vol.  iii.  p.  452,  2nd  ed.) 

0  Mr.  Thomas  does  not  allow 
that  any  of  the  extant  coins  belong 
to  Hormisdas  the  First  (see  Num. 
Chron.  for  1872,  p.  105).  Mordt- 
mann  (Zeitschrift,  vol.  viii.  pp.  37-9; 
vol.  xix.  pp.  423,  478)  regards  as 
his  the  coins  having  the  lion-crested 
cap  with  a  flower  rising  from  the 


Ch.  V.| 


ACCESSION  OF  VARAHKAN  I. 


103 


Varahran  I.,  whose  reign  lasted  three  years  only,1 
from  a.d.  272  to  275,  is  declared  by  the  native  his- 
torians to  have  been  a  mild  and  amiable  prince ; 2  but 
the  little  that  is  positively  known  of  him  does  not 
bear  out  this  testimony.  It  seems  certain  that  he  put 
Mani  to  death,  and  probable  that  he  enticed  him  to 
leave  the  shelter  of  his  castle  by  artifice,3  thus  showing 
himself  not  only  harsh  but  treacherous  towards  the 
unfortunate  heresiarch.  If  it  be  true  that  he  caused 
him  to  be  flayed  alive,4  we  can  scarcely  exonerate  him 
from  the  charge  of  actual  cruelty,  unless  indeed  we 
regard  the  punishment  as  an  ordinary  mode  of  execu- 
tion in  Persia.5  Perhaps,  however,  in  this  case,  as  in 
other  similar  ones,  there  is  no  sufficient  evidence  that 
the  process  of  flaying  took  place  until  the  culprit  was 
dead,6  the  real  object  of  the  excoriation  being,  not  the 


summit.  These  coins,  however, 
must,  from  the  Indian  emblems  on 
some  of  them  (Thomas,  l.s.c. ),  be- 
long to  Hormisdas  II.  As  the  por- 
traits on  these  coins  and  on  those 
with  the  eagle  cap  are  wholly  dif- 
ferent, I  suspect  that  the  latter 
may  be  coins  of  the  first  Hormis- 
das. 


COIN  OF  HORMISDAS  I. 


The  gem  regarded  by  Mordtmann 
as  bearing  the  name  and  head  of 
the  first  Hormisdas  {Zeitschrift,  vol. 
xviii.  p.  7;  pi.  i.  fig.  5)  must  be 
assigned  to  the  second  prince  of  the 
name,  from  the  resemblance  of  the 


head  to  the  portraits  on  the  lion 
coins. 

1  Agath.  iv.  p.  134,  D:  rpiolv 
ereoL  (Sacilavoac.  So  Macoudi  (ii.  p. 
167).  Eutych.  vol.  i.  p.  384:  '  Tres 
annos  cum  tribus  mensibus  regna- 
vit.' 

2  Malcolm,  History  of  Persia, 
l.s.c;  Tabari,  torn.  ii.  p.  89;  Mir- 
khond, H istoire des  Sassanides,  l.s.c. 

3  So  Milman  {Hist,  of  Christi- 
anity, vol.  ii.  p.  272).  Compare 
Macoudi,  torn.  ii.  p.  107. 

4  Milman,  l.s.c. ;  Mirkhond,  p. 
290;  Suidas  ad  voc.  &c. 

5  Besides  Valerian  (who,  accord- 
ing to  some,  was  flayed  alive)  and 
Manes,  we  hear  of  a  certain  Na- 
choragan  being  flayed  alive  by 
Chosroes  (Agath.  iv.  p.  132,  D). 
Some  of  the  ecclesiastical  writers 
call  flaying  alive  'the  Persian 
punishment'  (Theodoret,  Adv.  Ha- 
reses,  i.  20;  Cyrill.  Catech.  vii.). 
It  is  also  mentioned  as  a  Persian 
custom  by  Faustus  (Bibl,  Hist.  iv. 
21). 

u  In  early  times  the  Achamienian 


104 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  V. 


infliction  of  pain,  but  the  preservation  of  a  memorial 
which  could  be  used  as  a  warning  and  a  terror  to 
others.  The  skin  of  Mani,  stuffed  with  straw,  was 
no  doubt  suspended  for  some  time  after  his  execution 
over  one  of  the  gates  of  the  great  city  of  Shahpur ; 1 
and  it  is  possible  that  this  fact  may  have  been  the  sole 
ground  of  the  belief  (which,  it  is  to  be  remembered, 
was  not  universal 2)  that  he  actually  suffered  death  by 
flaying. 

The  death  of  the  leader  was  followed  by  the  per- 
secution of  his  disciples.     Mani  had  organised  a 
hierarchy,  consisting  of  twelve  apostles,  seventy-two 
bishops,  and  a  numerous  priesthood ; 3  and  his  sect  was 
widely  established  at  the  time  of  his  execution. 
Varahran  handed  over  these  unfortunates,  or  at  any 
rate  such  of  them  as  he  was  able  to  seize,  to  the  tender 
mercies  of  the  Magians,  who  put  to  death  great  num- 
bers of  Manichaeans.    Many  Christians  at  the  same 
time  perished,  either  because  they  were  confounded 
with  the  followers  of  Mani,  or  because  the  spirit  of 
persecution,  once  let  loose,  could  not  be  restrained, 
but  passed  on  from  victims  of  one  class  to  those  of 
another,  the  Magian  priesthood  seizing  the  opportunity 
of  devoting  all  heretics  to  a  common  destruction. 


Persians  flayed  men  after  killing 
them  (Herod,  v.  25,  ocpa^ac  unideLpe). 
The  same  was  the  practice  of  the 
European  Scythians  (ibid.  iv.  64). 
It  may  be  suspected  that  the  flaying 
process  which  is  represented  in  the 
Assyrian  sculptures  was  performed 
on  dead  bodies  (Ancient  Monar- 
chies, vol.  i.  p.  244,  2nd  edition). 
Malcolm  cautiously  says  of  Mani : 
4  Mani  and  almost  all  his  disciples 
were  put  to  death  by  order  of  Ba- 
haram;  and  the  skin  of  the  im- 
postor was  hung  up;'  which  does 
not  imply  flaying  alive  (see  Hist. 


of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p.  101). 

1  Malcolm,  l.s.c. ;  Mirkhond,  l.s.c. ; 
Tabari,  torn.  ii.  p.  90. 

2  Burton  says  :  '  Manes  was  put 
to  death,  either  by  crucifixion  or  by 
excoriation '  (Lectures  on  the  First 
Three  Centuries,  vol.  ii.  p.  410), 
which  shows  that  two  accounts 
were  known  to  him.  Eutychius 
gives  a  different  account  from 
either  of  these.  According  to  him, 
Varahran  i  cut  Manes  asunder ' 
( '  Manem  prehensum  medium  divisit 
Bahrain,'  vol.  i.  p.  301). 

3  Milman,  vol.  ii.  p.  273. 


Ch.  V.l 


WARS  OF  VARAHRAN  I. 


105 


Thus  unhappy  in  his  domestic  administration, 
Varahran  was  not  much  more  fortunate  in  his  wars. 
Zenobia,  the  queen  of  the  East,  held  for  some  time 
to  the  policy  of  her  illustrious  husband,  maintaining  a 
position  inimical  alike  to  Rome  and  Persia  from  the 
death  of  Odenathus- in  a.d.  267  to  Aurelian's  expedi- 
tion against  her  in  a.d.  272.  When,  however,  in  this 
year,  Aurelian  marched  to  attack  her  with  the  full 
forces  of  the  empire,  she  recognised  the  necessity  of 
calling  to  her  aid  other  troops  besides  her  own.  It 
was  at  this  time  that  she  made  overtures  to  the  Per- 
sians, which  were  favourably  received  ;  1  and,  in  the 
year  a.d.  273,  Persian  troops  are  mentioned  among 
those  with  whom  Aurelian  contended  in  the  vicinity  of 
Palmyra,2  But  the  succours  sent  were  inconsiderable, 
and  were  easily  overpowered  by  the  arts  or  arms  of 
the  emperor.  The  young  king  had  not  the  courage  to 
throw  himself  boldly  into  the  war.  He  allowed  Ze- 
nobia to  be  defeated  and  reduced  to 
extremities  without  making  anything 
like  an  earnest  or  determined  effort 
to  save  her.  He  continued  her  ally, 
indeed,  to  the  end,  and  probably 
offered  her  an  asylum  at  his  court, 
if  she  were  compelled  to  quit  her 
capital ;  but  even  this  poor  boon  he 
was  prevented  from  conferring  by  the  capture  of  the 
unfortunate  princess  just  as  she  reached  the  banks 
of  the  Euphrates.3 

In  the  aid  which  he  lent  Zenobia,  Varahran,  while 


COIN  OF  VARAHRAN  I. 


i  1  Vopisc.  Vit.  Aurelian.  (in  the 
Ilistoria  Auqusta),  §  27. 

2  Ibid.  §  28. 

3  '  Zenobia,  cum  fu^eret  camelis, 


quos  clromadas  vocitant,  of  que  ad 
Perms  iter  tender  et,  equitibus  est 
capta.'    (Vopisc.  l.s.c.) 


106 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


ICh.  V. 


he  had  done  too  little  to  affect  in  any  degree  the  issue 
of  the  struggle,  had  done  quite  enough  to  provoke 
Rome  and  draw  down  upon  him  the  vengeance  of  the 
Empire.  It  seems  that  he  quite  realised  the  position  in 
which  circumstances  had  placed  him.  Feeling  that  he 
had  thrown  out  a  challenge  to  Rome,  and  yet  shrink- 
ing from  the  impending  conflict,  he  sent  an  embassy 
to  the  conqueror,  deprecating  his  anger  and  seeking  to 
propitiate  him  by  rare  and  costly  gifts.  Among  these 
were  a  purple  robe 1  from  Cashmere,  or  some  other 
remote  province  of  India,  of  so  brilliant  a  hue  that  the 
ordinary  purple  of  the  imperial  robes  could  not  com- 
pare with  it,  and  a  chariot  like  to  those  in  which  the 
Persian  monarch  was  himself  wont  to  be  carried.2 
Aurelian  accepted  these  gifts ;  and  it  would  seem  to 
follow  that  he  condoned  Varahran's  conduct,  and 
granted  him  terms  of  peace.  Hence,  in  the  triumph 
which  Aurelian  celebrated  at  Rome  in  the  year  a.d. 
274,  no  Persian  captives  appeared  in  the  procession, 
but  Persian  envoys3  were  exhibited  instead,  who  bore 
with  them  the  presents  wherewith  their  master  had 
appeased  the  anger  of  the  emperor. 

A  full  year,  however,  had  not  elapsed  from  the 
time  of  the  triumph  when  the  master  of  the  Roman 
world  thought  fit  to  change  his  policy,  and,  suddenly 
declaring  war  against  the  Persians,4  commenced  his 


1  i  Hoc  munus  [sc.  pallium  breve 
purpureum  lanestre,  ad  quod  cum 
matronce  atque  ipse  Aurelianus  juu- 
gerent  purpuras  suas,  cineris  specie 
decolorari  videbantur  craters  di- 
vini  comparatione  fulgoris]  rex 
Persarum  ab  Indis  interioribus 
sumptum  Aureliano  dedisse  perhi- 
betur,  scribens,  "  Sume  purpuram, 
qualis  apud  uos  est."  '  (Vopisc. 
Aurel.  §  29. ) 

2  Ibid.     §    33:    '  Currus  regii 


tres  fuerunt  .  .  .  uiius  Odenati 
argento,  auro,  gemmis  operosus  at- 
que distinctus;  alter,  qaem  rex 
Persarum  Aureliano  dono  dediV  De 
Cbampagny  lias  represented  tbis  as 
a  chariot  which  the  Persian  king 
had  given  to  Odenathus  (Cesar s 
du  3*°  Steele,  torn.  iii.  p.  119). 

3  Vopisc.  l.s.c. 

4  Ibid.  §  35:  <  Persis  .  .  .  hel- 
ium indixit  [Aurelian us].' 


Ch.  Y.J     VARAHRAN  THREATENED  BY  AURELIAN.  107 

march  towards  the  East.  We  are  not  told  that  he 
discovered,  or  even  sought  to  discover,  any  fresh 
ground  of  complaint.  His  talents  were  best  suited 
for  employment  in  the  field,  and  he  regarded  it  as 
expedient  to  4  exercise  the  restless  temper  of  the 
legions  in  some  foreign  war.' 1  Thus  it  was  desirable 
to  find  or  make  an  enemy  ;  and  the  Persians  presented 
themselves  as  the  foe  which  could  be  attacked  most 
conveniently.  There  was  no  doubt  a  general  desire 
to  efface  the  memory  of  Valerian's  disaster  by  some 
considerable  success ;  and  war  with  Persia  was  there- 
fore likely  to  be  popular  at  once  with  the  Senate, 
with  the  army,  and  with  the  mixed  multitude  which 
was  dignified  with  the  title  of  c  the  Roman  people.' 

Aurelian,  therefore,  set  out  for  Persia  at  the  head  of 
a  numerous,  but  still  a  manageable,  force.2  He  pro- 
ceeded through  Illyricum  and  Macedonia  towards  By- 
zantium, and  had  almost  reached  the  straits,  when  a 
conspiracy,  fomented  by  one  of  his  secretaries,  cut  short 
his  career,  and  saved  the  Persian  empire  from  invasion. 
Aurelian  was  murdered  in  the  spring  of  a.d.  275,  at 
Coenophrurium,  a  small  station  between  Heraclea  (Pe- 
rinthus)  and  Byzantium.3  The  adversary  with  whom 
he  had  hoped  to  contend,  Varahran,  cannot  have  sur- 
vived him  long,  since  he  died  (of  disease  as  it  would 
seem)  in  the  course  of  the  year,  leaving  his  crown  to 
a  young  son  who  bore  the  same  name  with  himself, 
and  is  known  in  history  as  Varahran  the  Second.4 


1  See  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall, 
vol.  i.  p.  382. 

2  i  Parato  magno  potius  quam 
ingenti  exercitu.'  (Vopisc.  Aurel. 
§35.) 

3  '  Mansionem  q\\?e  est  inter 
Heracliam  et  Byzantium.'  (Vopisc. 
§   36.)    For  the  exact  situation, 


see  Itiner.  Antonin.  (p.  153,  ed. 
Parthey  et  Pinder),  where  we  find 
that  it  was  18  Roman  miles  from 
Heraclea  (Perinthus),  and  47  from 
Byzantium. 
4  Aarath.  iv.  p.  134,  C;  Eutych. 

i.  p.  387;  Mirkhond,  p.  297;  Tabari, 

ii.  p.  90. 


108 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  V. 


Varahran  II,  is  said  to  have  ruled  at  first  tyrannically,1 
and  to  have  greatly  disgusted  all  his  principal  nobles, 
who  went  so  far  as  to  form  a  conspiracy  against  him, 
and  intended  to  put  him  to  death.  The  chief  of  the 
Magians,  however,  interposed,  and,  having  effectually 
alarmed  the  king,  brought  him  to  acknowledge  him- 
self wrong  and  to  promise  an  entire  change  of  con- 
duct.2 The  nobles  upon  this  returned  to  their  alle- 
giance ;  and  Varahran,  during  the  remainder  of  his 
reign,  is  said  to  have  been  distinguished  for  wisdom 
and  moderation,  and  to  have  rendered  himself  popular 
with  every  class  of  his  subjects. 

It  appears  that  this  prince  was  not  without  military 
ambition.  He  engaged  in  a  war  with  the  Segestani 3 
(or  Sacastani),  the  inhabitants  of  Segestan  or  Seistan,  a 
people  of  Scythic  origin,4  and  after  a  time  reduced 
them  to  subjection.5  He  then  became  involved  in  a 
quarrel  with  some  of  the  natives  of  Affghanistan,  who 
were  at  this  time  regarded  as  c  Indians.'    A  long  and 


1  Malcolm,  Hist,  of  Persia,  vol.  i. 
p.  102;  Mirkhond,  Histoire  des 
Sassanides,  pp.  297-8.  Macoudi 
says  that  he  abandoned  himself  to 
pleasure  and  idleness,  passed  his 
.time  in  hunting  and  other  amuse- 
ments, gave  the  management  of 
the  empire  to  unworthy  favourites, 
and  allowed  hundreds  of  towns  and 
villages  to  fall  into  ruin  (torn.  ii. 
pp.  168-173).    It  is  perhaps  a  sign 


COIN  OF  VARAHRAN  II. 


of  his  soft  and  pleasure-loving  tem- 
perament that  he  alone  of  the 
Sassanian  kings  places  the  effigy 
of  his  wife  upon  his  coins.  This 
emplacement  implies  association  in 
the  kingdom. 

2  Is  the  bas-relief  at  Nakhsh-i- 
Rustam,  represented  by  Ker  Porter 
(vol.  i.  pi.  24),  intended  to  com- 
memorate this  scene?  It  4  consists 
of  a  king  '  (wearing  the  peculiar 
headdress  of  Varahran  II.)  'stand- 
ing in  a  niche  or  rostrum,  as  if 
delivering  a  harangue  '  (ibid.  vol.  i. 
p.  557).    See  the  cut  opposite. 

3  Agatli.  iv.  i>.  135,  A. 

4  Saca-stan  is  '  the  country  of 
the  Saka'  (Sacse  or  Scyths).  It 
received  the  name  probably  at  the 
time  of  the  great  invasion  of  the 
Yue-Chi.  (See  the  Author's  Sixth 
Monarchy,  p.  117.) 

5  The  subjection  of  the  Segestani 
is  perhaps  the  subject  of  the  bas- 


Ch.  v.]  reign  of  VARAHRAN  II.  109 

desultory  contest  followed  without  definite  result, 
which  was  not  concluded  by  the  year  a.d.  283,  when 
he  found  himself  suddenly  engaged  in  hostilities  on 
the  opposite  side  of  the  empire.1 

Rome,  in  the  latter  part  of  the  third  century,  had 
experienced  one  of  those  reactions  which  mark  her 
later  history,  and  which  alone  enabled  her  to  complete 
her  predestined  term  of  twelve  centuries.  Between 
the  years  a.d.  274  and  282,  under  Aurelian,  Tacitus, 
Probus,  and  Cams,  she  showed  herself  once  more  very 
decidedly  the  first  military  power  in  the  world,  drove 
back  the  barbarians  on  all  sides,  and  even  ventured  to 
indulge  in  an  aggressive  policy.  Aurelian,  as  we  have 
seen,  was  on  the  point  of  invading  Persia  when  a  do- 
mestic conspiracy  brought  his  reign  and  life  to  an  end. 
Tacitus,  his  successor,  scarcely  obtained  such  a  firm 
hold  upon  the  throne  as  to  feel  that  he  could  with  any 
prudence  provoke  a  war.  But  Probus,  the  next  em- 
peror, revived  the  project  of  a  Persian  expedition,2  and 
would  probably  have  led  the  Roman  armies  into  Me- 
sopotamia, had  not  his  career  been  cut  short  by  the 
revolt  of  the  legions  in  Illyria  (a.d.  282).  Cams,  who 
had  been  his  praetorian  prefect,  and  who  became  em- 
peror at  his  death,  adhered  steadily  to  his  policy.  It 
was  the  first  act  of  his  reign  to  march  the  forces  of  the 
empire  to  the  extreme  east,  and  to  commence  in 
earnest  the  war  which  had  so  long  been  threatened. 
Led  by  the  Emperor  in  person,  the  legions  once  more 


relief  represented  by  Flandin  (pi. 
51),  where  the  monarch  wears  the 
peculiar  headdress  of  Varahran  II. 

1  The  bulk  of  the  Persian  forces 
were  '  detained  on  the  frontiers  of 
India'  when  Cams  crossed  the 
Euphrates  (Gibbon,  vol.  ii.  p.  55). 

2  probus,  in  a.d.  279,  dismissed 


a  Persian  embassy  with  threats 
(Yopisc.  prob.  §  17).  Soon  after- 
wards, however,  he  'made  peace 
with  the  Persians'  (ibid.  §  18). 
But  a  little  before  his  death,  in 
a.d.  282,  we  hear  of  his  meditating 
a  Persian  expedition  (ibid.  §  20). 


110 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  V. 


crossed  the  Euphrates.  Mesopotamia  was  rapidly- 
overrun,  since  the  Persians  (we  are  told)  were  at  va- 
riance among  themselves,  and  a  civil  war  was  raging.1 
The  bulk  of  their  forces,  moreover,  were  engaged  on 
the  opposite  side  of  the  empire  in  a  struggle  with  the 
Indians,2  probably  those  of  Affghanistan.  Under  these 
circumstances,  no  effectual  resistance  was  possible ; 
and,  if  we  may  believe  the  Roman  writers,  not  only 
was  the  Roman  province  of  Mesopotamia  recovered, 
but  the  entire  tract  between  the  rivers  as  far  south  as 
the  latitude  of  Baghdad  was  ravaged,  and  even  the  two 
great  cities  of  Seleucia  and  Ctesiphon  were  taken  with- 
out the  slightest  difficulty.3  Persia  Proper  seemed 
to  lie  open  to  the  invader,  and  Cams  was  preparing  to 
penetrate  still  further  to  the  east,  when  again  an  oppor- 
tune death  checked  the  progress  of  the  Roman  arms, 
and  perhaps  saved  the  Persian  monarchy  from  destruc- 
tion. Carus  had  announced  his  intention  of  continuing 
his  march ;  some  discontent  had  shown  itself ;  and  an 
oracle  had  been  quoted  which  declared  that  a  Roman 
emperor  would  never  proceed  victoriously  beyond 
Ctesiphon.  Carus  was  not  convinced,  but  he  fell  sick, 
and  his  projects  were  delayed ;  he  was  still  in  his  camp 
near  Ctesiphon,  when  a  terrible  thunderstorm  broke 
over  the  ground  occupied  by  the  Roman  army.  A 
weird  darkness  was  spread  around,  amid  which  flash 
followed  flash  at  brief  intervals,  and  peal  upon  peal 
terrified  the  superstitious  soldiery.  Suddenly,  after  the 
most  violent  clap  of  all,  the  cry  arose  that  the  Emperor 
was  dead.4  Some  said  that  his  tent  had  been  struck  by 

1  Vopisc.  Car.  §  8.  4  See  the  letter  of  the  secretary, 

2  Gibhon,  l.s.c.  Julius  Calpurnius,   preserved  by 

3  Vopisc.  l.s.c;  Eutrop.  ix.  18;  Vopiscus  (l.s.c),  and  translated  by 
Aurel.  Vict.  Cces.  xxxviii.  Com-  Gibbon  (Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  ii. 
pare  Mos.  Chor.  Hist.  Arm.  ii.  76.  pp.  55-0). 


Ch.  V.]      WAR  OF  VARAHRAN  II.  WITH  CARUS.  Ill 

lightning,  and  that  his  death  was  owing  to  this  cause ; 
others  believed  that  he  had  simply  happened  to  suc- 
cumb to  his  malady  at  the  exact  moment  of  the  last 
thunder-clap ;  a  third  theory  was  that  his  attendants 
had  taken  advantage  of  the  general  confusion  to  assas- 
sinate him,  and  that  he  merely  added  another  to  the 
long  list  of  Roman  emperors  murdered  by  those  who 
hoped  to  profit  by  their  removal.  It  is  not  likely  that 
the  problem  of  what  really  caused  the  death  of  Carus 
will  ever  be  solved.1  That  he  died  very  late  in  a.d. 
283,  or  within  the  first  fortnight  of  a.d.  284,  is  certain  ; 2 
and  it  is  no  less  certain  that  his  death  was  most  fortu- 
nate for  Persia,  since  it  brought  the  war  to  an  end 
when  it  had  reached  a  point  at  which  any  further  re- 
verses would  have  been  disastrous,  and  gave  the  Per- 
sians a  breathing-space  during  which  they  might,  at 
least  partially,  recover  from  their  prostration. 

Upon  the  death  of  Carus,  the  Romans  at  once  de- 
termined on  retreat.  It  was  generally  believed  that 
the  imperial  tent  had  been  struck  by  lightning ;  and  it 
was  concluded  that  the  decision  of  the  gods  against  the 
further  advance  of  the  invading  army  had  been  thereby 
unmistakably  declared.3  The  army  considered  that  it 
had  done  enough,  and  was  anxious  to  return  home  ; 
the  feeble  successor  of  Carus,  his  son  Numerian,  if  he 
possessed  the  will,  was  at  any  rate  without  the  power 


1  Gibbon  seems  to  believe  that 
Carus  was  killed  by  lightning 
(vol.  ii.  p.  56).  Niebuhr  wavers 
between  lightning  and  assassination 
(Lectures,  vol.  iii.  p.  305,  E.  T.). 
De  Champagny  says  that  the  whole 
matter  is  shrouded  in  impenetrable 
mysterv  (Cesars  du  3me  Steele,  torn, 
iii.  p.  186). 

2  See  Clinton,  F.  B.  vol.  i.  p.  324; 
and  compare  De  Champagny,  torn. 


iii.  p.  186,  note  *. 

3  It  was  an  old  Roman  super- 
stition that  'places  or  persons 
struck  with  lightning  were  sin- 
gularly devoted  to  the  wrath  of 
heaven'  (Gibbon,  vol.  i.  p.  413). 
There  was  also  a  special  belief 
that  '  when  the  prsetorium  was 
struck,  it  foreboded  the  destruction 
of  the  army  itself  (Niebuhr, 
Lectures,  vol.  iii.  p.  305,  E.T.). 


112 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  V. 


to  resist  the  wishes  of  the  troops  ;  and  the  result  was 
that  the  legions  quitted  the  East  without  further 
fighting,1  and  without  securing,  by  the  conclusion  of 
formal  terms  of  peace,  any  permanent  advantage  from 
their  victories. 

A  pause  of  two  years  now  occurred,  during  which 
Varahran  had  the  opportunity  of  strengthening  his 
position  while  Rome  was  occupied  by  civil  wars  and 
distracted  between  the  claims  of  pretenders.2  No  great 
use  seems,  however,  to  have  been  made  of  this  interval. 
When,  in  a.d.  286,  the  celebrated  Diocletian  deter- 
mined to  resume  the  war  with  Persia,  and,  embracing 
the  cause  of  Tiridates,  son  of  Chosroes,  directed  his 
efforts  to  the  establishment  of  that  prince,  as  a  Roman 
feudatory,  on  his  father's  throne,  Varahran  found  him- 
self once  more  overmatched,  and  could  offer  no  effec- 
tual resistance.  Armenia  had  now  been  a  province  of 
Persia  for  the  space  of  twenty-six  (or  perhaps  forty- 
six)  years ; 3  but  it  had  in  no  degree  been  conciliated 
or  united  with  the  rest  of  the  empire.  The  people  had 
been  distrusted  and  oppressed ;  the  nobles  had  been 
deprived  of  employment ;  a  heavy  tribute  had  been 
laid  on  the  land ;  and  a  religious  revolution  had  been 


1  When  Numerian  is  credited 
with  Persian  victories  (Nemes. 
Cyneget.  71-2),  it  is  on  the  notion 
that,  having  been  associated  by 
Cams,  he  had  part  in  the  successes 
of  a.d.  283.  That  Numerian  re- 
treated upon  the  death  of  his  father 
without  tempting  fortune  any  fur- 
ther, is  clear  from  Aur.  Vict.  Cces. 
xxxviii.,  and  Vopiscus,  Numer.  § 
11. 

2  During  this  interval  Kumerian 
was  killed,  Diocletian  invested 
with  the  purple,  Carinus  defeated 
and  slain,  and  Maximian  associated. 


(Gibbon,  vol.  ii.  pp.  60-66.) 

3  Moses  of  Chorene  makes  the 
subjection  of  Armenia  to  Persia 
last  twenty-six  years  (Hist.  Arm. 
ii.  74,  sub  fin.).  But  if  he  is  right 
in  making  Artaxerxes  the  king 
who  reduced  Armenia,  and  in  stat- 
ing that  Tiridates  regained  the 
throne  in  the  third  year  of  Diocletian 
(ii.  79),  the  duration  of  the  sub- 
jection must  have  been,  at  least, 
forty-six  years,  since  Artaxerxes 
died  in  a.d.  241,  and  the  third  of 
Diocletian  was  a.d.  286. 


Gh.  V.] 


REVOLT  OF  ARMENIA. 


113 


violently  effected.1  It  is  not  surprising  that  when 
Tiridates,  supported  by  a  Roman  corps  d'armee?  ap- 
peared upon  the  frontiers,  the  whole  population  received 
him  with  transports  of  loyalty  and  joy.  All  the  nobles 
flocked  to  his  standard,  and  at  once  acknowledged  him 
for  their  king.3  The  people  everywhere  welcomed  him 
with  acclamations.  A  native  prince  of  the  Arsacid 
dynasty  united  the  suffrages  of  all ;  and  the  nation 
threw  itself  with  enthusiastic  zeal  into  a  struggle  which 
was  viewed  as  a  war  of  independence.  It  was  for- 
gotten that  Tiridates  was  in  fact  only  a  puppet  in  the 
hand  of  the  Roman  emperor,  and  that,  whatever  the 
result  of  the  contest,  Armenia  would  remain  at  its 
close,  as  she  had  been  at  its  commencement,  a  depend- 
ant upon  a  foreign  power. 

The  success  of  Tiridates  at  the  first  was  such  as 
might  have  been  expected  from  the  forces  arrayed  in 
his  favour.  He  defeated  two  Persian  armies  in  the 
open  field,  drove  out  the  garrisons  which  held  the  more 
important  of  the  fortified  towns,  and  became  undis- 
puted master  of  Armenia.4  He  even  crossed  the  bor- 
der which  separated  Armenia  from  Persia,  and  gained 
signal  victories  on  admitted  Persian  ground.5  Accord- 
ing to  the  native  writers,  his  personal  exploits  were 
extraordinary  ;  he  defeated  singly  a  corps  of  giants, 
and  routed  on  foot  a  large  detachment  mounted  on 
elephants !  6    The  narrative  is  here,  no  doubt,  tinged 


1  Mos.  Chor.  ii.  77. 

2  Moses  omits  this  feature  of  the 
struggle,  but  Agathangelus  supplies 
it.  (Agathang.  Hist.  Regn.  Tiridat. 
C.  iii.  §  21 :  6  fiaoilevs  tov  TrjprjduTTjv, 
.  .  .  OTparev/Lia  elg  [3ur/6eiav  tyxzip'iaaQ) 
unehvaev  etc  77/v  id'tav  xupav.) 

8  Mos.  Chor.  ii.  79. 

4  Agathang.    iii.    §    21;  Mos. 


Chor.  l.s.c. 

5  Especially  in  Assyria.  (Aga- 
thang. iv.  §  55:  u/v  enapx'tav  ttjc 
'Aocvp'iac  en('na^e  deivoruraig  n?i7]yai(;. 
Mos.  Chor.  ii.  79,  ad  fin.) 

G  So  Moses.  Agathangelus,  while 
praising  highly  the  warlike  quali- 
ties of  Tiridates  (l.s.c.),  avoids 
these  improbable  details. 


114 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


|Ch.  V. 


with  exaggeration ;  but  the  general  result  is  correctly 
stated.  Tiridates,  within  a  year  of  his  invasion,  was 
complete  master  of  the  entire  Armenian  highland,  and 
was  in  a  position  to  carry  his  arms  beyond  his  own 
frontiers. 

Such  seems  to  have  been  the  position  of  things,  when 
Varahran  II.  suddenly  died,  after  a  reign  of  seventeen 
years,1  a.d.  292.  He  is  generally  said  to  have  left 
behind  him  two  sons,2  Varahran  and  Narsehi,  or  Narses, 
of  whom  the  elder,  Varahran,  was  proclaimed  king. 
This  prince  was  of  an  amiable  temper,  but  apparently 
of  a  weekly  constitution.  He  was  with  difficulty  per- 
suaded to  accept  the  throne,3  and  anticipated  from  the 
first  an  early  demise.4  No  events  are  assigned  to  his 
short  reign,  which  (according  to  the  best  authorities) 
did  not  exceed  the  length  of  four  months.5  It  is  evi- 
dent that  he  must  have  been  powerless  to  offer  any 


1  Agathias,  iv.  p.  134,  D;  Eu- 
tych.  vol.  i.  p.  387.  Mirkhond 
agrees  (Histoire  des  Sassanides,  p. 
299),  but  notes  that  his  authorities 
varied.  Malcolm  says  that  some 
of  the  native  writers  allow  him 
only  thirteen  years  (History  of 
Persia,  vol.  i.  p.  103,  note).  Ta- 
bari  gives  him  no  more  than  four! 
(Chronique,  ii.  p.  90). 

2  Tabari  says  (l.s.c.)  that  Varah- 
ran II.  had  no  son,  but  was  suc- 
ceeded by  his  brother  Narses. 
Narses  himself  says  that  he  was 
the  son  of  Sapor  and  grandson  of 
Artaxerxes.  It  is  thought  that  he 
may  have  omitted  his  immediate 
ancestors  as  persons  of  small  ac- 
count (Thomas  in  Num.  Chron.  for 
1872,  p.  113);  but  such  omission 
is  very  unusual. 

3  Mirkhond,  p.  300.  A  bas- 
relief  at  Nakhsh-i-Rustam  seems 
to  represent  him  as  receiving  the 
crown  from  his  mother.  (Ker  Por- 
ter, pi.  19.) 


4  The  inaugural  address  of  Va- 
rahran III.  is  reported  as  follows: 
4  I  ascend  this  throne  by  right,  as 
the  issue  of  your  kings;  but  the 
sole  end  which  I  propose  to  myself 
in  ruling  is  to  obtain  for  the  people 
who  shall  be  subject  to  me  a 
happy  and  quiet  life.  I  place  all 
my  trust  in  the  goodness  of  God, 
through  whose  help  all  things  may 
end  happily.  If  God  preserves  my 
life,  I  will  conduct  myself  towards 
you  in  such  a  way  that  all  who  hear 
me  spoken  of  will  load  me  with 
blessings.  If,  on  the  contrary,  the 
angel  of  death  comes  and  carries  me 
away,  I  hope  that  God  will  not 
forsake  you  or  suffer  you  to  perish.' 
(Mirkhond,  Hist  des  Sassanides, 
l.s.c.) 

5  Agathias,  l.s.c. ;  Eutych.  vol.  i. 
p.  395.  So  also  Firdusi  in  the 
Shah-nameh.  Some  Oriental  writers, 
however,  gave  him  a  reign  of  nine 
years.    (Mirkhond,  l.s.c.) 


Ch.  V.] 


REIGN  OF  VARAHRAN  III. 


115 


COIN  OF  VARAHRAN  III. 


effectual  opposition  to  Tiridates,  whose  forces  continued 
to  ravage,  year  after  year,  the  north- 
western provinces  of  the  Persian  em- 
pire.1 Had  Tiridates  been  a  prince  of 
real  military  talent,  it  could  scarcely 
have  been  difficult  for  him  to  obtain 
still  greater  advantages.  But  he  was 
content  with  annual  raids,  which  left 
the  substantial  power  of  Persia  untouched.  He  al- 
lowed the  occasion  of  the  throne's  being  occupied  by  a 
weak  and  invalid  prince  to  slip  by.  The  consequences 
of  this  negligence  will  appear  in  the  next  chapter.  Per- 
sia, permitted  to  escape  serious  attack  in  her  time  of 
weakness,  was  able  shortly  to  take  the  offensive  and  to 
make  the  Armenian  prince  regret  his  indolence  or  want 
of  ambition.  The  son  of  Chosroes  became  a  second 
time  a  fugitive  ;  and  once  more  the  Romans  were 
called  in  to  settle  the  affairs  of  the  East.  We  have 
now  to  trace  the  circumstances  of  this  struggle,  and 
to  show  how  Rome  under  able  leaders  succeeded 
in  revenging  the  defeat  and  captivity  of  Valerian,  and 
in  inflicting,  in  her  turn,  a  grievous  humiliation  upon 
her  adversary. 


1  Agathang.  iv.  §§  55  and  57. 


116 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  VL 


CHAPTER  VI. 

Civil  War  of  Narses  and  his  Brother  Hormisdas.  Narses  victorious. 
He  attacks  and  expels  Tiridates.  War  declared  against  him  by  Dio- 
cletian. First  Campaign  of  Galerius,  a.d.  297.  Second  Campaign, 
a.d.  298.  Defeat  suffered  by  Narses.  Negotiations.  Conditions  of 
Peace.    Abdication  and  Death  of  Narses. 

Napcrjg  efidofiog  avaypufcTai  pacikevcai  Hepetiv  and  'Apra^ep^ov. 

Zonoras,  xii.  31. 

It  appears  that  on  the  death  of  Varahran  III.,  prob- 
ably without  issue,  there  was  a  contention  for  the 
crown  between  two  brothers,1  Narses  and  Hormisdas.2 
We  are  not  informed  which  of  them  was  the  elder, 
nor  on  what  grounds  they  respectively  rested  their 
claims ;  but  it  seems  that  Narses  was  from  the  first 
preferred  by  the  Persians,  and  that  his  rival  relied 
mainly  for  success  on  the  arms  of  foreign  barbarians. 


1  The  relationship  of  Narses 
to  his  predecessor  is  exceedingly 
doubtful.  He  himself  declares  in 
an  inscription  that  he  was  the  son 
of  Sapor  and  the  grandson  of 
Artaxerxes  (see  above,  p.  114, 
note'2);  and  his  statement  is  con- 
firmed by  the  Arabian  writer,  Abu 
Obei'dah  (Macoudi,  torn.  ii.  p.  2o8), 
and  by  the  Armenian  historian, 
Sepeos.  (See  the  Journal  Asiatique 
for  1866,  p.  149.)  Tabari,  how- 
ever, makes  him  the  son  of  Varah- 
ran I.  (C/ironique,  torn.  ii.  p.  90.) 
So  Macoudi  (torn.  ii.  p.  174). 
Agathias  avoids  the  question  of 
relationship.  Mirkhond  (p.  301) 
and  the  Persian  writers  generally 


say  that  he  was  the  son  of  Varah- 
ran II.  For  my  own  part,  I  should 
incline  to  accept  his  own  statement, 
and  to  suppose  that,  Varahran  III. 
having  died  without  issue,  the 
crown  reverted  to  his  great-great- 
uncle,  a  man  of  years  and  ex- 
perience, who,  however,  was  not 
allowed  to  enjoy  the  throne  with- 
out a  struggle  with  another  prince 
of  the  royal  house,  a  certain  Hor- 
misdas. 

2  This  passage  of  history  rests 
entirely  on  a  single  sentence  in  a 
Latin  writer  of  uncertain  date,  the 
author  of  the  4  Panegyric '  quoted 
by  Gibbon  {Decline  and  Fall,  vol. 
ii.  p.  81,  note  61). 


Ch.  VI.  ] 


ACCESSION  OF  NARSES. 


117 


Worsted  in  encounters  wherein  none  but  Persians 
fought  on  either  side,  Hormisdas  summoned  to  his  aid 
the  hordes  of  the  north 1 — Gelli  from  the  shores  of  the 
Caspian,  Scyths  from  the  Oxus  or  the  regions  beyond, 
and  Russians,  now  first  mentioned  by  a  classical  writer. 
But  the  perilous  attempt  to  settle  a  domestic  struggle 
by  the  swords  of  foreigners  was  not  destined  on  this 
occasion  to  prosper,  Hormisdas  failed  in  his  endeavour 
to  obtain  the  throne ;  and,  as  we  hear  no  more  of  him, 
we  may  regard  it  as  probable  that  he  was  defeated  and 
slain.  At  any  rate  Narses  was,  within  a  year  or  two 
of  his  accession,  so  firmly  settled  in  his  kingdom,  that 
he  was  able  to  turn  his  thoughts  to  the  external  affairs 
of  the  empire,  and  to  engage  in  a  great  war.  All 
danger  from  internal  disorder  must  have  been  pretty 
certainly  removed  before  Narses  could  venture  to 
affront,  as  he  did,  the  strongest  of  existing  military 
powers. 

Narses  ascended  the  throne  in  a. d.  292  or  293.  It 
was  at  least  as  early  as  a.d.  296  that  he  challenged 
Rome  to  an  encounter  by  attacking  in  force  the  vassal 
monarch  whom  her  arms  had  established  in  Armenia.2 
Tiridates  had,  it  is  evident,  done  much  to  provoke  the 
attack  by  his  constant  raids  into  Persian  territory,3 


1  '  Ipsos  Persas  ipsumque  regem 
adseitis  Saccis,  et  Russis,  et  Gellis, 
petit  frater  Ormies.'  (Paneq.  Vet 
ii.  17.)  The  Gelli  are  well  identi- 
fied by  Gibbon  with  the  inhabitants 
of  Ghilan,  the  Gela3  of  earlier 
writers.  The  Saccse  (Sacae)  are 
undoubtedly  Scyths.  They  may 
have  dwelt  on  the  Oxus,  or  pos- 
sibly in  Afghanistan.  The  Russi 
should,  by  their  name,  be  4  Rus- 
sians;' but  it  must  be  admitted 
that  we  have  otherwise  no  mention 
of  them  by  the   classical  writers 


till  the  ninth  century  A.D.  If, 
however,  they  are  intended  in  Ezek. 
xxxviii.  2,  3,  xxxix.  1  (as  Gesenius 
and  Dean  Stanley  argue),  they  may 
be  meant  also  in  the  present  pas- 
sage. 

'A  See  Clinton,  F.  E.  vol.  i.  p. 
340,  where  it  is  proved  that  the 
first  campaign  of  Galerius  was  as 
early  as  a.d.  297.  If  so,  the  move- 
ments which  provoked  it  must  have 
fallen,  at  the  latest,  in  a.d.  296. 

3  See  above,  p.  115. 


118 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


ICh.  VI. 


which  were  sometimes  carried  even  to  the  south  of 
Ctesiphon.1  He  was  probably  surprised  by  the  sudden 


head  of  n arses  (after  Flandin). 


march  and  vigorous  assault  of  an  enemy  whom  he  had 
learned  to  despise  ;  and,  feeling  himself  unable  to  orga- 
nise an  effectual  resistance,  he  had  recourse  to  flight, 
gave  up  Armenia  to  the  Persians,2  and  for  a  second 
time  placed  himself  under  the  protection  of  the  Roman 
emperor.  The  monarch  who  held  this  proud  position 
was  still  Diocletian,  the  greatest  emperor  that  had 
occupied  the  Roman  throne  since  Trajan,  and  the 
prince  to  whom  Tiridates  was  indebted  for  his  restora- 
tion to  his  kingdom.  It  was  impossible  that  Diocletian 
should  submit  to  the  affront  put  upon  him  without  an 


1  Mos.  Chor.  ii.  79,  ad  fin.: 
'Etiam  ultra  Ctesiphontem  incur- 
siones  fecit.' 


2  Amm.  Marc,  xxiii.  5.  Com- 
pare the  treatise  De  Morte  Perse- 
cutomim,  §  9. 


Ch.  VI.]  WAR  OF  XARSES  WITH  ROME.  119 

earnest  effort  to  avenge  it.  His  own  power  rested,  in 
a  great  measure,  on  his  military  prestige  ;  and  the 
unpunished  insolence  of  a  foreign  king  would  have 
seriously  endangered  an  authority  not  very  firmly  es- 
tablished. The  position  of  Diocletian  compelled  him  to 
declare  war  against  Narses 1  in  the  year  a.d.  296,  and  to 
address  himself  to  a  struggle  of  which  he  is  not  likely 
to  have  misconceived  the  importance.  It  might  have 
been  expected  that  he  would  have  undertaken  the  con- 
duct of  the  war  in  person  ;  but  the  internal  condition 
of  the  empire  was  far  from  satisfactory,  and  the  chief  of 
the  State  seems  to  have  felt  that  he  could  not  conven- 
iently quit  his  dominions  to  engage  in  war  beyond 
his  borders.  He  therefore  committed  the  task  of  re- 
instating Tiridates  and  punishing  Narses  to  his  favourite 
and  son-in-law,  Galerius,2  while  he  himself  took  up  a 
position  within  the  limits  of  the  empire,3  which  at  once 
enabled  him  to  overawe  his  domestic  adversaries  and 
to  support  and  countenance  his  lieutenant. 

The  first  attempts  of  Galerius  were  unfortunate. 
Summoned  suddenly  from  the  Danube  to  the  Eu- 
phrates, and  placed  at  the  head  of  an  army  composed 
chiefly  of  the  levies  of  Asia,  ill-disciplined,  and  un- 
acquainted with  their  commander,  he  had  to  meet  an 
adversary  of  whom  he  knew  little  or  nothing,  in  a 
region  the  character  of  which  was  adverse  to  his  own 
troops  and  favourable  to  those  of  the  enemy.  Narses 
had  invaded  the  Roman  province  of  Mesopotamia,  had 
penetrated  to  the  Khabour,  and  was  threatening  to 
cross  the  Euphrates  into   Syria.4    Galerius  had  no 


1  Aurel.  Vict.  Ccesar.  §  39;  Zonar. 
xii.  31. 

2  Amm.  Marc,  xxiii.  5;  Zonar. 
l.s.c. ;  Eutrop.  ix.  24;  &c. 

3  First    at  Alexandria  (Aurel. 


Vict,  l.s.c);  then  at  Antioch  (Lac- 
tant.  De  Morte  Persec.  l.s.c). 

4  Lactant.  De  Morte  Persecutor. 
§  9;  Aurel.  Victory  De  Ctesaribux, 
§  39.    Zonaras  makes  him  actually 


120 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


LCh.  VI. 


choice  but  to  encounter  him  on  the  ground  which  he 
had  chosen.  Now,  though  Western  Mesopotamia  is 
ill-described  as  4  a  smooth  and  barren  surface  of  sandy 
desert,  without  a  hillock,  without  a  tree,  and  without  a 
spring  of  fresh  water,' 1  it  is  undoubtedly  an  open 
country,  possessing  numerous  plains,  where,  in  a  battle, 
the  advantage  of  numbers  is  likelv  to  be  felt,  and 
where  there  is  abundant  room  for  the  evolutions  of 
cavalry.  The  Persians,  like  their  predecessors  the 
Parthians,  were  especially  strong  in  horse;  and  the 
host  which  Narses  had  brought  into  the  field  greatly 
outnumbered  the  troops  which  Diocletian  had  placed 
at  the  disposal  of  Galerius.  Yet  Galerius  took  the 
offensive.  Fighting  under  the  eye  of  a  somewhat  stern 
master,  he  was  scarcely  free  to  choose  his  plan  of 
campaign.  Diocletian  expected  him  to  drive  the  Per- 
sians from  Mesopotamia,2  and  he  was  therefore  bound 
to  make  the  attempt.  He  accordingly  sought  out  his 
adversary  in  this  region,  and  engaged  him  in  three 
great  battles.3  The  first  and  second  appear  to  have 
been  indecisive ;  but  in  the  third  the  Roman  gen- 
eral suffered  a  complete  defeat.4  The  catastrophe  of 
Crassus  was  repeated  almost  upon  the  same  battle- 
field, and  probably  almost  by  the  same  means.5  But, 


invade  Syria  (rov  Nupaov  tolvvv 
tovtov  ioi  e  ttjv  Zvplav  fofify/Liivov, 
xii.  31). 

1  See  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall, 
ch.  xiii.  (vol.  ii.  p.  82).  On  the  real 
character  of  the  region  see  the  Au- 
thor's Sixth  Monarchy,  pp.  102,  103. 

2  Victor  expresses  the  commis- 
sion of  Galerius  as  follows:  'Pro- 
vincia  credita  Maximiano  Caesari, 
uti  relictis  flnibus  in  Mesopotamiam 
proyrederetur,  ad  arcendos  Persa- 
rum  impetus.'    (l.s.c. ) 

3  Oros.    vii.   25:   4  Cum  duobus 


jam  prseliis  ad  versus  Narseum  con- 
flixisset,  tertio  inter  Callinicum  et 
Carras  congressus  et  victus,  amissis 
copiis,  ad  Diocletianum  refugit. 

4  Aurel.  Vict.  Cms.  §  39;  Zonar. 
l.s.c. ;  Eutrop.  ix.  24;  Julian  Paneg, 
Constant,  p.  18,  A. 

5  Gibbon's  description  of  the 
battle  (l.s.c.)  is  wholly  imaginary, 
no  classical  writer  having  left  us 
any  account  of  it.  He  transfers 
to  the  conflict  between  Galerius 
and  Narses  all  that  Plutarch  and 
Dio  relate  of  Crassus  and  Surenas. 


Ch.  VI.  I 


HIS  VICTORY  OVER  GALERIUS. 


121 


personally,  Galerius  was  more  fortunate  than  his  prede- 
cessor. He  escaped  from  the  carnage,  and,  recrossing 
the  Euphrates,  rejoined  his  father-in-law  in  Syria.  A 
conjecture,  not  altogether  destitute  of  probability,1 
makes  Tiridates  share  both  the  calamity  and  the  good 
fortune  of  the  Roman  Csesar.  Like  Galerius,  he  escaped 
from  the  battle-field,  and  reached  the  banks  of  the 
Euphrates.  But  his  horse,  which  had  received  a 
wound,  could  not  be  trusted  to  pass  the  river.  In 
this  emergency  the  Armenian  prince  dismounted,  and, 
armed  as  he  was,  plunged  into  the  stream.  The  river 
was  both  wide  and  deep  ;  the  current  was  rapid ;  but 
the  hardy  adventurer,  inured  to  danger  and  accus- 
tomed to  every  athletic  exercise,  swam  across  and 
reached  the  opposite  bank  in  safety.2 

Thus,  while  the  rank  and  file  perished  ignominiously, 
the  two  personages  of  most  importance  on  the  Roman 
side  were  saved.  Galerius  hastened  towards  Antioch, 
to  rejoin  his  colleague  and  sovereign.  The  latter 
came  out  to  meet  him,  but,  instead  of  congratulating 
him  on  his  escape,  assumed  the  air  of  an  offended  mas- 
ter, and,  declining  to  speak  to  him  or  to  stop  his  char- 
iot, forced  the  Csesar  to  follow  him  on  foot  for  nearly 
a  mile  before  he  would  condescend  to  receive  his 
explanations  and  apologies  for  defeat.3  The  disgrace 
was  keenly  felt,  and  was  ultimately  revenged  upon  the 
prince  who  had  contrived  it.    But,  at  the  time,  its  main 


This  is  scarcely  an  allowable  mode 
of  writing  history. 

1  In  transferring  to  this  occasion 
an  anecdote  related  of  Tiridates 
by  Moses  of  Chorene,  and  attached 
by  him  to  a  defeat  of  Cams  by  the 
Persians,  which  never  took  place, 
our  great  historian  does  not  per- 
haps transcend  the  limits  of  a  sound 


historical  criticism. 

2  Mos.  Chor.  ii.  76. 

3  Eutrop.  l.s.c. ;  Amm.  Marc, 
xiv.  11.  The  4  mile  almost'  of 
Ammianns  becomes  '  several  miles ' 
in  En  tropins,  Festns  (§  25),  and 
Orosius  (vii.  25);  and  'several 
leagues'  in  Tillemont  (Hist,  des 
Empereurs,  iv.  p.  37). 


122  -THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [Ch.  VI. 

effect  doubtless  was  to  awake  in  the  young  Csesar 
the  strongest  desire  of  retrieving  his  honour,  and 
wiping  out  the  memory  of  his  great  reverse  by  a 
yet  more  signal  victory.  Galerius  did  not  cease 
through  the  winter  of  a.d.  297  to  importune  his  father- 
in-law  for  an  opportunity  of  redeeming  the  past  and 
recovering  his  lost  laurels. 

The  emperor,  having  sufficiently  indulged  his  resent- 
ment, acceded  to  the  wishes  of  his  favourite.  Galerius 
was  continued  in  his  command.  A  new  army  was 
collected  during  the  winter,  to  replace  that  which  had 
been  lost ;  and  the  greatest  care  was  taken  that  its 
material  should  be  of  good  quality,  and  that  it  should 
be  employed  where  it  had  the  best  chance  of  success. 
The  veterans  of  Illyria  and  Moesia  constituted  the 
flower  of  the  force  now  enrolled  ;  1  and  it  was  further 
strengthened  by  the  addition  of  a  body  of  Gothic  aux- 
iliaries.2 It  was  determined,  moreover,  that  the  attack 
should  this  time  be  made  on  the  side  of  Armenia, 
where  it  was  felt  that  the  Romans  would  have  the 
double  advantage  of  a  friendly  country,  and  of  one  far 
more  favourable  for  the  movements  of  infantry  than 
for  those  of  an  army  whose  strength  lay  in  its  horse.3 
The  number  of  the  troops  employed  was  still  small. 
Galerius  entered  Armenia  at  the  head  of  only  25,000 
men  ;  4  but  they  were  a  picked  force,  and  they  might 
be  augmented,  almost  to  any  extent,  by  the  national 
militia  of  the  Armenians.  He  was  now,  moreover,  as 
cautious  as  he  had  previously  been  rash ;  he  advanced 
slowly,  feeling  his  way  ;   he  even  personally  made 


1  Oros.  l.s.c. :  'Per  Illyricum  et 
Moesiam  undique  copias  contraxit.' 

2  Jornandes,  De  Gothorum  rebus 
gestis,  c.  21. 


3  Aurel.  Victor,  Cces.  §  39:  4  Per 
Armenian!  in  hostes  contendit,  quae 
sola,  seu  facilior,  vincendi  via  est.' 

4  Festus,  §  25. 


Ch.  VI.  ] 


GALERIUS  DEFEATS  NARSES. 


123 


reconnaissances,  accompanied  by  only  one  or  two 
horsemen,  and,  under  the  shelter  of  a  flag  of  truce, 
explored  the  position  of  his  adversary.1  Narses  found 
himself  overmatched  alike  in  art  and  in  force.  He 
allowed  himself  to  be  surprised  in  his  camp  by  his 
active  enemy,2  and  suffered  a  defeat  by  which  he 
more  than  lost  all  the  fruits  of  his  former  victory. 
Most  of  his  army  was  destroyed ;  he  himself  received 
a  wound,3  and  with  difficulty  escaped  by  a  hasty  flight. 
Galerius  pursued,  and,  though  he  did  not  succeed  in 
taking  the  monarch  himself,  made  prize  of  his  wives, 
his  sisters,  and  a  number  of  his  children,4  besides 
capturing  his  military  chest.  He  also  took  many  of 
the  most  illustrious  Persians  prisoners.5  How  far  he 
followed  his  flying  adversary  is  uncertain  ;  6  but  it  is 
scarcely  probable  that  he  proceeded  much  southward 
of  the  Armenian  frontier.  He  had  to  reinstate  Tiri- 
dates  in  his  dominions,  to  recover  Eastern  Mesopo- 
tamia, and  to  lay  his  laurels  at  the  feet  of  his  colleague 
and  master.  It  seems  probable  that  having  driven 
Narses  from  Armenia,  and  left  Tiridates  there  to  ad- 
minister the  government,  he  hastened  to  rejoin  Diocle- 
tian before  attempting  any  further  conquests. 

The  Persian  monarch,  on  his  side,  having  recovered 
from  his  wound,7  which  could  have  been  but  slight,  set 


1  Synes.  Beg.  p.  19,  A.  Com- 
pare Festus,  l.s.c,  and  Eutropius, 
ix.  25. 

2  Festus,  l.s.c.  Compare  Aram, 
Marc.  xxii.  4:  'Sub  Maximiano 
Caesare  vallo  regis  Persarum  di- 
repto.' 

3  Zonaras,  xii.  31. 

4  Ibid.  Compare  Eutrop.  ix. 
25;  Oros.  vii.  25. 

5  '  Captivos  quamplurimos  Per- 
sarum nobilium  abduxit.'  (Oros. 
l.s.c.) 


6  Zonaras  makes  him  pursue 
Narses  '  into  the  inner  parts  of 
Persia '  {^XPL  TVC  svdorepag  Hepol- 
dog) ;  and  Eutropius  speaks  of 
Narses  as  betaking  himself  to  the 
remotest  solitudes  of  his  kingdom 
(ix.  25).  But  it  may  be  ques- 
tioned whether  the  defeated  mon- 
arch ever  fled  further  than  Media, 
where  we  find  him  when  an  am- 
bassador is  sent  to  him  by  Diocle- 
tian (Pet.  Patric.  Fr.  14). 

7  Zonaras,  l.s.c. 


124 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  VI. 


himself  to  collect  another  army,  but  at  the  same  time 
sent  an  ambassador  to  the  camp  of  Galerius,  requesting 
to  know  the  terms  on  which  Rome  would  consent  to 
make  peace.  A  writer  of  good  authority  1  has  left  us 
an  account  of  the  interview  which  followed  between 
the  envoy  of  the  Persian  monarch  and  the  victorious 
Roman.  Apharban  (so  was  the  envoy  named)  opened 
the  negotiations  with  the  following  speech  2 :  — 

L  The  whole  human  race  knows,'  he  said,  c  that  the 
Roman  and  Persian  kingdoms  resemble  two  great  lumi- 
naries, and  that,  like  a  man's  two  eyes,  they  ought 
mutually  to  adorn  and  illustrate  each  other,  and  not  in 
the  extremity  of  their  wrath  to  seek  rather  each  other's 
destruction.  So  to  act  is  not  to  act  manfully,  but  is 
indicative  rather  of  levity  and  weakness ;  for  it  is  to 
suppose  that  our  inferiors  can  never  be  of  any  service 
to  us,  and  that  therefore  we  had  better  get  rid  of  them. 
Narses,  moreover,  ought  not  to  be  accounted  a  weaker 
prince  than  other  Persian  kings ;  thou  hast  indeed  con- 
quered him,  but  then  thou  surpassest  all  other  monarchs; 
and  thus  Narses  has  of  course  been  worsted  by  thee, 
though  he  is  no  whit  inferior  in  merit  to  the  best  of  his 
ancestors.  The  orders  which  my  master  has  given  me 
are  to  entrust  all  the  rights  of  Persia  to  the  clemency 
of  Rome ;  and  I  therefore  do  not  even  bring  with  me 
any  conditions  of  peace,  since  it  is  for  the  emperor  to 
determine  everything.    I  have  only  to  pray,  on  my 


1  Petrus  Patricius.  Although 
this  author  did  not  write  till  to- 
wards the  close  of  the  sixth  cen- 
tury, he  is  generally  allowed  by 
historical  critics  to  be  among  the 
best  authorities  even  for  the  events 
of  three  centuries  previously.  (See 
Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  ch.  xiii. 
vol.  ii.  p.  84,  note  74 ;  C.  Midler, 
Fr.  Hist.  Gr.  vol.  iv.  pp.  181-4; 


Niebuhr,  Preface  to  the  Bonn 
edition  of  the  Excerpta  de  Leya- 
tlonibus.) 

2  I  have  been  content  to  translate 
Patricius.  Gibbon,  by  recasting 
the  entire  oration  and  changing 
the  position  of  all  its  parts,  pro- 
duces a  fine  result;  but  I  have  not 
felt  at  liberty  to  work  up  the 
ancient  materials  after  his  fashion. 


Ch.  VI. ]         PEHSIAN  EMBASSY  TO  GALERIUS.  125 

master's  behalf,  for  the  restoration  of  his  wives  and 
male  children  ;  if  he  receives  them  at  your  hands,  he 
will  be  for  ever  beholden  to  you,  and  will  be  better 
pleased  than  if  he  recovered  them  by  force  of  arms. 
Even  now  my  master  cannot  sufficiently  thank  you  for 
the  kind  treatment  which  he  hears  you  have  vouch- 
safed them,  in  that  you  have  offered  them  no  insult, 
but  have  behaved  towards  them  as  though  on  the 
point  of  giving  them  back  to  their  kith  and  kin.  He 
sees  herein  that  you  bear  in  mind  the  changes  of  for- 
tune and  the  instability  of  all  human  affairs.7 

At  this  point  Galerius,  who  had  listened  with  impa- 
tience to  the  long  harangue,  burst  in  with  a  movement 
of  anger  that  shook  his  whole  frame  —  L  What  ?  Do  the 
Persians  dare  to  remind  us  of  the  vicissitudes  of  fortune, 
as  though  we  could  forget  how  they  behave  when  vic- 
tory inclines  to  them  ?  Is  it  not  their  wont  to  push 
their  advantage  to  the  uttermost  and  press  as  heavily 
as  may  be  on  the  unfortunate  ?  How  charmingly  they 
showed  the  moderation  that  becomes  a  victor  in  Vale- 
rian's time !  They  vanquished  him  by  fraud ;  they  kept 
him  a  prisoner  to  advanced  old  age  ;  they  let  him  die  in 
dishonour ;  and  then,  when  he  was  dead,  they  stripped 
off  his  skin,  and  with  diabolical  ingenuity  made  of  a 
perishable  human  body  an  imperishable  monument  of 
our  shame.1  Verily,  if  we  follow  this  envoy's  advice, 
and  look  to  the  changes  of  human  affairs,  we  shall  not 
be  moved  to  clemency,  but  to  anger,  when  we  consider 
the  past  conduct  of  the  Persians.  If  pity  be  shown 
them,  if  their  requests  be  granted,  it  will  not  be  for 
what  they  have  urged,  but  because  it  is  a  principle  of 


1  Note  the  absence  here  of  any 
allusion  to  fetters,  or  to  the  em- 
ployment of  Valerian  by  his  captor 


as  a  horseblock;  and  remark  that 
the  flaying  is  distinctly  made  sub- 
sequent to  his  decease. 


126 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  VI. 


action  with  us —  a  principle  handed  down  to  us  from 
our  ancestors —  u  to  spare  the  humble  and  chastise  the 
proud."  '  Apharban,  therefore,  was  dismissed  with  no 
definite  answer  to  his  question,  what  terms  of  peace 
Rome  would  require ;  but  he  was  told  to  assure  his 
master  that  Rome's  clemency  equalled  her  valour,  and 
that  it  would  not  be  long  before  he  would  receive  a 
Roman  envoy  authorised  to  signify  the  Imperial 
pleasure,  and  to  conclude  a  treaty  with  him. 

Having  held  this  interview  with  Apharban,  Galerius 
hastened  to  meet  and  consult  his  colleague.1  Diocle- 
tian had  remained  in  Syria,  at  the  head  of  an  army  of 
observation,2  while  Galerius  penetrated  into  Armenia 
and  engaged  the  forces  of  Persia.  When  he  heard  of 
his  son-in-law's  great  victory,  he  crossed  the  Euphrates, 
and  advancing  through  Western  Mesopotamia,  from 
which  the  Persians  probably  retired,  took  up  his  resi- 
dence at  Nisibis,3  now  the  chief  town  of  these  parts.  It 
is  perhaps  true  that  his  object  was  '  to  moderate,  by 
his  presence  and  counsels,  the  pride  of  Galerius.' 4  That 
prince  was  bold  to  rashness,  and  nourished  an  excessive 
ambition.  He  is  said  to  have  at  this  time  entertained 
a  design  of  grasping  at  the  conquest  of  the  East,  and  to 
have  even  proposed  to  himself  to  reduce  the  Persian 
Empire  into  the  form  of  a  Roman  province.5  But  the 
views  of  Diocletian  were  humbler  and  more  prudent. 
He  held  to  the  opinion  of  Augustus  and  Hadrian,  that 


1  Gibbon  (l.s.c. )  has  incorrectly 
placed  the  embassy  of  Apharban 
after  the  meeting  of  Galerius  with 
Diocletian  at  Nisibis,  and  lias  made 
both  monarchs  present  at  the  inter- 
view. De  Champagny  has  seen 
the  true  order  of  the  events  (Cesars 
du  3me  Steele,  torn.  iii.  pp.  304-5). 

2  Eutrop.  ix.  25;  Julian,  Orat. 


i.  p.  IS,  A. 
8  Pet.  Patric.  Fr.  14. 

4  Gibbon,  ch.  xiii.  (vol.  ii.  p.  84). 

5  Aurel.  Vict,  l.s.c:  'Adeo  vic- 
tor [Galerius  erat],  ut,  ni  Valerius, 
cujus  nutu  omnia  gerebantur,  in- 
certum  qua  causa,  abnuisset,  Ro- 
man i  fasces  in  provinciam  novam 
ferrentur.' 


Ch.  VI.] 


KOME  CONSENTS  TO  PEACE. 


127 


Rome  did  not  need  any  enlargement  of  her  territory, 
and  that  the  absorption  of  the  East  was  especially  un- 
desirable. When  he  and  his  son-in-law  met  and  inter- 
changed ideas  at  Nisibis,  the  views  of  the  elder  ruler 
naturally  prevailed  ;  and  it  was  resolved  to  offer  to  the 
Persians  tolerable  terms  of  peace.  A  civilian  of  import- 
ance,1 Sicorius  Probus,  was  selected  for  the  delicate  office 
of  envoy,  and  was  sent,  with  a  train  of  attendants,  into 
Media,  where  Narses  had  fixed  his  head-quarters.  We 
are  told  that  the  Persian  monarch  received  him  with  all 
honour,  but,  under  pretence  of  allowing  him  to  rest  and 
refresh  himself  after  his  long  journey,  deferred  his  audi- 
ence from  day  to  day  ;  while  he  employed  the  time  thus 
gained  in  collecting  from  various  quarters  such  a  num- 
ber of  detachments  and  garrisons  as  might  constitute  a 
respectable  army.  He  had  no  intention  of  renewing  the 
war, but  he  knew  the  weight  which  military  preparation 
ever  lends  to  the  representations  of  diplomacy.  Accord- 
ingly, it  was  not  until  he  had  brought  under  the  notice 
of  Sicorius  a  force  of  no  inconsiderable  size  that  he  at 
last  admitted  him  to  an  interview.  The  Roman  ambas- 
sador was  introduced  into  an  inner  chamber  of  the 
royal  palace  in  Media,2  where  he  found  only  the  king 
and  three  others  —  Apharban,  the  envoy  sent  to  Gale* 
rius,  Archapetes,  the  captain  of  the  guard,  and  Barsa- 
borsus,  the  governor  of  a  province  on  the  Armenian 
frontier.3  He  was  asked  to  unfold  the  particulars  of  his 
message,  and  say  what  were  the  terms  on  which  Rome 
would  make  peace.  Sicorius  complied.  The  emperors, 


1  Patrieius  (l.s.c.)  calls  him 
avTiypayea  rf/g  fivrjfiriq,  a  sort  of 
'Secretary  of  State.' 

2  'Ev  roi(;  kvdoTepo  Ttbv  (3aoi?iELG)v. 
(Pet.  Patric.  l.s.c.)  The  palace 
seems  to  have  been  on  the  river  As- 


prudis,  which  cannot  be  identified. 

3  Patricins  calls  him  *  governor 
of  Symium.'  Gibbon  identifies 
Symium  with  Synia,  a  tract  east 
of  Mount  Ararat  (Armen.  Geograph. 
§  74). 


128 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  VI. 


he  said,  required  five  things :  —  (i.)  The  cession  to  Rome 
of  five  provinces  beyond  the  river  Tigris,  which  are 
given  by  one  writer 1  as  Intilene,  Sophene,  Arzanene, 
Carduene,  and  Zabdicene;  by  another2  as  Arzanene, 
Moxoene,  Zabdicene,  Rehimene,  and  Corduene ;  (ii.) 
the  recognition  of  the  Tigris  as  the  general  boundary 
between  the  two  empires ;  (iii.)  the  extension  of  Arme- 
nia to  the  fortress  of  Zintha,  in  Media;  (iv.)  the  relin- 
quishment by  Persia  to  Rome  of  her  protectorate  over 
Iberia,  including  the  right  of  giving  investiture  to  the 
Iberian  kings;  and  (v.)  the  recognition  of  Nisibis  as 
the  place  at  which  alone  commercial  dealings  could 
take  place  between  the  two  nations. 

It  would  seem  that  the  Persians  were  surprised  at 
the  moderation  of  these  demands.  Their  exact  value 
and  force  will  require  some  discussion ;  but  at  any  rate 
it  is  clear  that,  under  the  circumstances,  they  were  not 
felt  to  be  excessive.  Narses  did  not  dispute  any  of 
them  except  the  last;  and  it  seems  to  have  been  rather 
because  he  did  not  wish  it  to  be  said  that  he  had 
yielded  everything,  than  because  the  condition  was 
really  very  onerous,  that  he  made  objection  in  this 
instance.3  Sicorius  was  fortunately  at  liberty  to  yield 
the  point.  He  at  once  withdrew  the  fifth  article  of 
the  treaty,  and,  the  other  four  being  accepted,  a  formal 
peace  was  concluded  between  the  two  nations. 

To  understand  the  real  character  of  the  peace  now 
made,  and  to  appreciate  properly  the  relations  thereby 
established  between  Rome  and  Persia,  it  will  be  neces- 
sary to  examine  at  some  length  the  several  conditions 


1  Patricius,  l.s.c. 

2  Ammianus  Marcellinus,  xxv.  7. 
Gibbon  lias  strangely  intermixed 
the  statements  of  the  two  writers, 
ascribing  the  mention  of  Intilene 


to  Ammianiis,  and  that  of  Rehi- 
mene to  Patricius  (vol.  ii.  p.  87, 
note  79),  which  is  the  reverse  of 
the  truth. 
3  Pet.  Patric.  Fr.  14. 


Ch.  VI.  I         THE  CONDITIONS  OF  THE  PEACE.  129 

of  the  treaty,  and  to  see  exactly  what  was  imported  by 
each  of  them.  There  is  scarcely  one  out  of  the  whole 
number  that  carries  its  meaning  plainly  upon  its  face ; 
and  on  the  more  important  very  various  interpretations 
have  been  put,  so  that  a  discussion  and  settlement  of 
some  rather  intricate  points  is  here  necessary. 

(i.)  There  is  a  considerable  difference  of  opinion  as  to 
the  five  provinces  ceded  to  Rome  by  the  first  article  of 
the  treaty,  as  to  their  position  and  extent,  and  conse- 
quently as  to  their  importance.  By  some  they  are  put 
on  the  right,1  by  others  on  the  left,  bank  of  the  Tigris ; 
while  of  those  who  assign  them  this  latter  position 
some  place  them  in  a  cluster  about  the  sources  of  the 
river,2  while  others  extend  them  very  much  further  to 
the  southward.3  Of  the  five  provinces  three  only  can 
be  certainly  named,  since  the  authorities  differ  as  to  the 
two  others.4  These  three  are  Arzanene,  Cordyene,  and 
Zabdicene,  which  occur  in  that  order  in  Patricius.  If 
we  can  determine  the  position  of  these  three,  that  of 
the  others  will  follow,  at  least  within  certain  limits. 

Now  Arzanene  was  certainly  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Tigris.  It  adjoined  Armenia,5  and  is  reasonably  iden- 
tified with  the  modern  district  of  Kherzan,  which  lies 
between  Lake  Van  and  the  Tigris,  to  the  west  of  the 
Bitlis  river.6    All  the  notices  of  Arzanene  7  suit  this 


1  This  was  the  view  of  Valesius 
{ad  Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  7),  of  Tille- 
mont  (Histoire  des  Empereurs,  torn, 
iv.  p.  40),  and  of  most  writers 
anterior  to  Gibbon.  It  was  argued 
that  the  provinces  were  called 
4  Trans  tigritanse,'  because  they  were 
•so  to  the  Persians! 

2  De  Champagny  places  them 
all  '  west  of  Lake  Van  and  south 
of  Armenia.'  (Cesars  da  3me  Steele, 
torn.  jii.  p.  305,  note.) 

3  As  Gibbon,  vol.  ii.  p.  87;  Nie- 


buhr,  Lectures  on  Roman  History, 
vol.  iii.  p.  311,  E.  T. ;  and  Mr. 
James  in  Smith's  Diet,  of  Geog- 
raphy, ad  voc.  Cordyene. 

4  See  above,  p.  128,  notes  1  and  2. 

5  Menander  Protect.  Fr.  55,  p. 
257. 

0  See  Layard's  Nineveh  and 
Babylon,  p.  39,  and  compare  the 
map  of  Armenia,  Assyria,  and 
Kurdisflfh  at  the  end  of  the  book. 

7  The  most  important  are  Eu- 
trop.  vi.  7;  Procop.  Be  Bell.  Pers. 


130 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  YL 


locality ;  and  the  name  1  Kherzan  '  may  be  regarded  as 
representing  the  ancient  appellation.1 

Zabdicene  was  a  little  south,  and  a  little  east  of  this 
position.  It  was  the  tract  about  a  town  known  as 
Bezabda  (perhaps  a  corruption  of  Beit-Zabda),  which 
had  been  anciently  called  Phoenica.2  This  town  is 
almost  certainly  represented  by  the  modern  Fynyk,a 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  Tigris,  a  little  above  Jezireh. 
The  province  whereof  it  was  the  capital  may  perhaps 
have  adjoined  Arzanene,  reaching  as  far  north  as  the 
Bitlis  river. 

If  these  two  tracts  are  rightly  placed,  Cordyene 
must  also  be  sought  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Tigris. 
The  word  is  no  doubt  the  ancient  representative  of  the 
modern  Kurdistan,  and  means  a  country  in  which 
Kurds  dwelt.  Now  Kurds  seem  to  have  been  at  one 
time  the  chief  inhabitants  of  the  Mons  Masius,  the 
modern  Jebel  Karajah  Dagh  and  Jebel  Tur,  which  was 
thence  called  Cordyene,  Gordyene,  or  the  Gordiaean 
mountain  chain.4  But  there  was  another  and  a  more 
important  Cordyene  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  river. 
The  tract  to  this  day  known  as  Kurdistan,  the  high 
mountain  region  south  and  south-east  of  Lake  Van 
between  Persia  and  Mesopotamia,  was  in  the  possession 
of  Kurds  from  before  the  time  of  Xenophon,  and  was 
known  as  the  country  of  the  Carduchi,  as  Cardyene, 
and  as  Cordyene.5   This  tract,  which  was  contiguous  to 


i.  8;  Be  ^dific.  iii.  2;  Menand. 
Protect.  Fr.  55,  57,  and  60;  Jo- 
hann.  Epiphan.  Fr.  1,  §  3;  Armen. 
Geoc/r.  §  68. 

1  It  is  remarkable  that  the  ap- 
pellation has  changed  so  little  in 
the  course  of  centuries.  The  As- 
syrian monarchs  call  the  country 
Kirzan. 


2  Amm.  Marc.  xx.  7. 

3  Layard,  Nineveh  and  Babylon, 
p.  53. 

4  Strab.  xi.  12,  §  4,  xvi.  1,  §  24; 
Plutarch,  Lumll.  26;  &c. 

5  Xen.  Anab.  iv.  i,  §§  2-3;  Strab. 
xvi.  1,  §  8;  Arrian,  Exp.  Alex. 
iii.  7;  Pirn.  H.  N.  vi.  15;  Ptol.  v. 
13. 


Ch.  VI.]      POSITION  OF  THE  CEDED  PKOVINCES.  131 

Arzanene  and  Zabdicene,  if  we  have  rightly  placed 
those  regions,  must  almost  certainly  have  been  the 
Cordyene  of  the  treaty,  which,  if  it  corresponded  at 
all  nearly  in  extent  with  the  modern  Kurdistan,  must 
have  been  by  far  the  largest  and  most  important  of 
the  five  provinces. 

The  two  remaining  tracts,  whatever  their  names,1 
must  undoubtedly  have  lain  on  the  same  side  of  the 
Tigris  with  these  three.  As  they  are  otherwise  un- 
known to  us  (for  Sophene,  which  had  long  been  Roman, 
cannot  have  been  one  of  them),  it  is  impossible  that 
they  should  have  been  of  much  importance.  No  doubt 
they  helped  to  round  off  the  Roman  dominion  in  this 
quarter ;  but  the  great  value  of  the  entire  cession  lay  in 
the  acquisition  of  the  large  and  fruitful 2  province  of 
Cordyene,  inhabited  by  a  brave  and  hardy  population, 
and  afterwards  the  seat  of  fifteen  fortresses,3  which 
brought  the  Roman  dominion  to  the  very  edge  of 
Adiabene,  made  them  masters  of  the  passes  into  Media, 
and  laid  the  whole  of  Southern  Mesopotamia  open  to 
their  incursions.  It  is  probable  that  the  hold  of  Persia 
on  the  territory  had  never  been  strong ;  and  in  relin- 
quishing it  she  may  have  imagined  that  she  gave  up  no 
very  great  advantage  ;  but  in  the  hands  of  Rome  Kur- 
distan became  a  standing  menace  to  the  Persian  power, 
and  we  shall  find  that  on  the  first  opportunity  the  false 


1  The  4  Sophene  '  of  Patricius 
may  safely  be  set  aside,  since  it 
had  long  been  Roman.  His  4  In- 
tilene'  some  would  change  into 
Ingilene,  a  district  mentioned  as 
4  lying  beyond  Mesopotamia'  by 
Epiphanius  (Be  11  ceres,  lx.  vol.  i. 
p.  505,  ed  Vales.).  The  4  Rehi- 
mene '  of  Ammianns  is  confirmed 
by  Zosimus,  who  mentions  4  Re- 
menians '  among  the  tribes  ceded 


by  Jovian  (iii.  31).  The  'Moxoene' 
of  Ammianns  does  not  elsewhere 
occur.  Is  it  the  modern  4  district 
of  Mokus '  (Layard,  Nhi.  and  Bab. 
p.  417,  note)?  Zosimns  has  in  its 
place  4  Zalene,'  a  name  of  which  I 
can  make  nothing. 

2  4  Cordnena?,  uberis  region  is  et 
nostra?.'    (Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  7.) 

3  Ibid.    Compare  Zosim.  iii.  31. 


132 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


ICh.  VI. 


step  now  taken  was  retrieved,  Cordyene  with  its  ad- 
joining districts  was  pertinaciously  demanded  of  the 
Romans,1  was  grudgingly  surrendered,  and  was  then 
firmly  reattached  to  the  Sassanian  dominions. 

(ii.)  The  Tigris  is  said  by  Patricius  and  Festus2  to 
have  been  made  the  boundary  of  the  two  empires. 
Gibbon  here  boldly  substitutes  the  Western  Khabour, 
and  maintains  that  1  the  Roman  frontier  traversed,  but 
never  followed,  the  course  of  the  Tigris.' 3  He  appears 
not  to  be  able  to  understand  how  the  Tigris  could  be 
the  frontier,  when  five  provinces  across  the  Tigris  were 
Roman.  But  the  intention  of  the  article  probably  was, 
first,  to  mark  the  complete  cession  to  Rome  of  Eastern 
as  well  as  Western  Mesopotamia,  and,  secondly,  to  es- 
tablish the  Tigris  as  the  line  separating  the  empires 
below^  the  point  down  to  which  the  Romans  held  both 
banks.  Cordyene  may  not  have  touched  the  Tigris  at 
all,  or  may  have  touched  it  only  about  the  37th  parallel. 
From  this  point  southwards,  as  far  as  Mosul,  or  Nim- 
rud,  or  possibly  Kileh  Sherghat,  the  Tigris  was  prob- 
ably now  recognised  as  the  dividing  line  between 
the  empires.  By  the  letter  of  the  treaty  the  whole 
Euphrates  valley  might  indeed  have  been  claimed  by 
Rome ;  but  practically  she  did  not  push  her  occupation 
of  Mesopotamia  below  Circesium.  The  real  frontier 
from  this  point  was  the  Mesopotamian  desert,  which 
extends  from  Kerkesiyeh  to  Nimrud,  a  distance  of  150 
miles.  Above  this,  it  was  the  Tigris,  as  far  probably 
as  Feshapoor ;  after  which  it  followed  the  line,  what- 


1  Aram.  Marc,  l.s.c. :  6  Petebat 
rex  obstinatius  sua  dudum  a  Maxi- 
miano  erepta.' 

2  '  Pace  facta,  Mesopotamia  est 
restituta;  et  super  ripam  Tigridis 
limes  est  confirmatus,  ut  ('  with  the 


further  condition  that')  quinque 
gentium  trans  Tigridem  consti- 
tutarum  ditionem  assequeremur.' 
(Festus,  §  14.) 

3  Decline  and  Fall,  ch.  xiii.  (vol. 
ii.  p.  87,  note  77). 


Ch.  VI.  1  EXTENSION  OF  ARMENIA. 


133 


ever  it  was,  which  divided  Cordyene  from  Assyria 
and  Media. 

(iii.)  The  extension  of  Armenia  to  the  fortress  of 
Zintha,  in  Media,  seems  to  have  imported  much  more 
than  would  at  first  sight  appear  from  the  words.  Gib- 
bon interprets  it  as  implying  the  cession  of  all  Media 
Atropatene,1  which  certainly  appears  a  little  later  to  be 
in  the  possession  of  the  Armenian  monarch,  Tiridates.2 
A  large  addition  to  the  Armenian  territory  out  of  the 
Median  is  doubtless  intended ;  but  it  is  quite  impos- 
sible to  determine  definitely  the  extent  or  exact  char- 
acter of  the  cession.3 

(iv.)  The  fourth  article  of  the  treaty  is  sufficiently 
intelligible.  So  long  as  Armenia  had  been  a  fief  of 
the  Persian  empire,  it  naturally  belonged  to  Persia  to 
exercise  influence  over  the  neighbouring  Iberia,  which 
corresponded  closely  to  the  modern  Georgia,  interven- 
ing between  Armenia  and  the  Caucasus.  Now,  when 
Armenia  had  become  a  dependency  of  Rome,  the  pro- 
tectorate hitherto  exercised  by  the  Sassanian  princes 
passed  naturally  to  the  Caesars ;  and  with  the  protecto- 
rate was  bound  up  the  right  of  granting  investiture  to 
the  kingdom,  whereby  the  protecting  power  was  se- 
cured against  the  establishment  on  the  throne  of  an 
unfriendly  person.  Iberia  was  not  herself  a  state  of 
much  strength ;  but  her  power  of  opening  or  shutting 
the  passes  of  the  Caucasus  gave  her  considerable  im- 
portance, since  by  the  admission  of  the  Tatar  hordes, 
which  were  always  ready  to  pour  in  from  the  plains  of 
the  North,  she  could  suddenly  change  the  whole  face 


1  Decline  and  Fall,  ch.  xiii. 
(vol.  ii.  p.  88). 

2  Mos.  Ohor.  ii.  84. 

3  We  can  only  say  with  De 
Champiagny:   *  L'Arttieriie,  vassale 


de  Home,  fut  agrandie'  [Cesars, 
torn.  iii.  p.  305),  and  that  the 
augmentation  was  on  the  side  of 
Media. 


134 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


LCh.  VI. 


of  affairs  in  North-Western  Asia,  and  inflict  a  terrible 
revenge  on  any  enemy  that  had  provoked  her.  It  is 
true  that  she  might  also  bring  suffering  on  her  friends, 
or  even  on  herself,  for  the  hordes,  once  admitted,  were 
apt  to  make  little  distinction  between  friend  and  foe  ; 
but  prudential  considerations  did  not  always  prevail 
over  the  promptings  of  passion,  and  there  had  been 
occasions  when,  in  spite  of  them,  the  gates  had  been 
thrown  open  and  the  barbarians  invited  to  enter.1  It 
was  well  for  Rome  to  have  it  in  her  power  to  check 
this  peril.  Her  own  strength  and  the  tranquillity  of 
her  eastern  provinces  were  confirmed  and  secured  by 
the  right  wrhich  she  (practically)  obtained  of  nomi- 
nating the  Iberian  monarchs. 

(v.)  The  fifth  article  of  the  treaty,  having  been  re- 
jected by  Narses  and  then  withdrawn  by  Sicorius, 
need  not  detain  us  long.  By  limiting  the  commercial 
intercourse  of  the  two  nations  to  a  single  city,  and 
that  a  city  within  their  own  dominions,  the  Romans 
would  have  obtained  enormous  commercial  advan- 
tages. While  their  own  merchants  remained  quietly 
at  home,  the  foreign  merchants  would  have  had  the 
trouble  and  expense  of  bringing  their  commodities  to 
market  a  distance  of  sixty  miles  from  the  Persian 
frontier  and  of  above  a  hundred  from  any  considerable 
town  ; 2  they  would  of  course  have  been  liable  to  mar- 
ket dues,  which  would  have  fallen  wholly  into  Roman 
hands ;  and  they  would  further  have  been  chargeable 
with  any  duty,  protective  or  even  prohibitive,  which 


1  Tacit.  Ann.  vi.  33:  '  Iberi, 
locorum  potentes,  Caspia  via  Sar- 
matam  in  Armenios  raptim  effun- 
dunt.'   Compare  Dio  Cass.  lxix.  15. 

2  Nineveh,  which  was  now  once 
more  a  place  of  importance  (see  Tac. 

t  Ann.  xii.  13;  A  mm.  Marc,  xviii.  7, 


ad  init.;  Layard,  Nin.  and  Bab. 
pp.  590-1),  and  which  was  nearer 
Nisibis  than  any  other  Persian 
town  of  consequence,  lay  at  the 
distance  of  nearly  120  miles.  Ar- 
bela  was  nearly  60  miles  further 
off. 


Cf.  VI. I      IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  ROMAN  , GAINS.  135 


Rome  chose  to  impose.  It  is  not  surprising  that 
Narses  here  made  a  stand,  and  insisted  on  commerce 
being  left  to  flow  in  the  broader  channels  which  it 
had  formed  for  itself  in  the  course  of  ages.1 

Rome  thus  terminated  her  first  period  of  struggle 
with  the  newly  revived  monarchy  of  Persia  by  a  great 
victory  and  a  great  diplomatic  success.  If  Narses  re- 
garded the  terms  —  and  by  his  conduct  he  would  seem 
to  have  done  so  —  as  moderate  under  thecircumstances,2 
our  conclusion  must  be  that  the  disaster  which  he  had 
suffered  was  extreme,  and  that  he  knew  the  strength  of 
Persia  to  be,  for  the  time,  exhausted.  Forced  to  relin- 
quish his  suzerainty  over  Armenia  and  Iberia,  he  saw 
those  countries  not  merely  wrested  from  himself,  but 
placed  under  the  protectorate,  and  so  made  to  minister 
to  the  strength,  of  his  rival.  Nor  was  this  all.  Rome 
had  gradually  been  advancing  across  Mesopotamia  and 
working  her  way  from  the  Euphrates  to  the  Tigris. 
Narses  had  to  acknowledge,  in  so  many  words,  that  the 
Tigris,  and  not  the  Euphrates,  was  to  be  regarded  as 
her  true  boundary,  and  that  nothing  consequently  was 
to  be  considered  as  Persian  beyond  the  more  eastern 
of  the  two  rivers.  Even  this  concession  was  not  the 
last  or  the  worst,  Narses  had  finally  to  submit  to  see 
his  empire  dismembered,  a  portion  of  Media  attached 
to  Armenia,  and  five  provinces,  never  hitherto  in  dis- 
pute, torn  from  Persia  and  added  to  the  dominion  of 
Rome.  He  had  to  allow  Rome  to  establish  herself  in 
force  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Tigris,  and  so  to  lay  open 
to  her  assaults  a  great  portion  of  his  northern  besides 

1  On  the  trade  between  Rome  j  for  Parthian  rule  had  made  but 
and  Parthia,  see  Herodian,  iv.  18;  |  little   difference  in  the  course  or 
and  compare  the  Author's   Sixth  |  character  of  the  traffic. 
Monarchy,  pp.  425-6.    It  is  prob-      2  See  above,  p.  128. 
able  that  the  exchange  of  Persian  I 


136 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  VL 


all  his  western  frontier.  He  had  to  see  her  brought 
to  the  very  edge  of  the  Iranic  plateau,  and  within  a  fort- 
night's march  of  Persia  Proper.  The  ambition  to  rival 
his  ancestor  Sapor,  if  really  entertained,1  was  severely 
punished ;  and  the  defeated  prince  must  have  felt  that 
he  had  been  most  ill-advised  in  making  the  venture. 

Narses  did  not  long  continue  on  the  throne  after  the 
conclusion  of  this  disgraceful,  though,  it  may  be,  neces- 
sary, treaty.  It  was  made  in  a.d.  297.  He  abdicated 
in  a.d.  301.  It  may  have  been  disgust  at  his  ill-successT 
it  may  have  been  mere  weariness  of  absolute  power, 
which  caused  him  to  descend  from  his  high  position 
and  retire  into  private  life.2  He  was  so  fortunate  as  to 
have  a  son  of  full  age  in  whose  favour  he  could  resign, 
so  that  there  was  no  difficulty  about  the  succession. 
His  ministers  seem  to  have  thought  it  necessary  to  offer 
some  opposition  to  his  project ; 3  but  their  resistance 
was  feeble,  perhaps  because  they  hoped  that  a  young 
prince  would  be  more  entirely  guided  by  their  counsels. 
Narses  was  allowed  to  complete  his  act  of  self-renuncia- 
tion, and,  after  crowning  his  son  Hormisdas  with  his 
own  hand,  to  spend  the  remainder  of  his  days  in  retire- 
ment. According  to  the  native  writers,  his  main  object 
was  to  contemplate  death  and  prepare  himself  for  it. 
In  his  youth  he  had  evinced  some  levity  of  character, 
and  had  been  noted  for  his  devotion  to  games  and  to 
the  chase ;  4  in  his  middle  age  he  laid  aside  these  pur- 


1  Lac  tan  t.  Be  Morte  Persec.  §  9: 
i  Concitatus  domesticis  exemplis 
avi  sui  Saporis,  ad  occupandum 
Orientem  magnis  copiis  [Narses) 
inhiabat.' 

2  The  abdication  of  Narses  rests 
wholly  upon  the  authority  of  the 
Oriental  writers.  (See  Mirkhond, 
Histoire  des  Sassanides,   p.  302; 


Malcolm,  History  of  Persia,  vol.  i. 
p.  104.)  It  is  accepted,  however, 
as  a  fact  by  most  moderns.  (See 
Malcolm,  l.s.c. ;  Plate  in  Smith's 
Diet,  of  Biography,  vol.  iii.  p.  717, 
&c.) 

3  Mirkhond,  l.s.c. 

4  He  is  said  to  have  been  sur- 
named  Nakhdjirkan,  or  4  Hunter  of 


Ch.  VI.  ] 


ABDICATION  OF  N ARSES. 


137 


suits,  and,  applying  himself  actively  to  business,  was  a 
good  admimistrator,  as  well  as  a  brave  soldier.  But  at 
last  it  seemed  to  him  that  the  only  life  worth  living  was 
the  contemplative,  and  that  the  happiness  of  the  hunter 
and  the  statesman  must  yield  to  that  of  the  philoso- 
pher. It  is  doubtful  how  long  he  survived  his  resig- 
nation of  the  throne,1  but  tolerably  certain  that  he 
did  not  outlive  his  son  and  successor,  who  reigned 
less  than  eight  years. 


wild  beasts'  (Mirkhond,  p.  303). 
It  is  remarkable  that  the  headdress 
which   distinguishes  him  on  his 


coins  is  adorned  with*  horns,  either 
of  the  ibex  or  the  stag. 


COINS  OF  NARSES. 


This  ornamentation  is  quite  pe- 
culiar to  him ;  and  it  adds  a  weight 
to  the  other  statements  of  the 
native  writers  as  to  his  predilec- 
tions. 

1  Dr.  Plate  says  he  died  in  the 
year  that  he  abdicated  ;  but  I  know 
no  authority  for  this.  That  lie 
did  not  outlive  a.d.  309,  the  year 


of  his  son's  death,  seems  to  follow 
from  the  difficulty  then  felt  about 
the  succession.  Perhaps  it  is  most 
probable  that  he  died  in  a.d.  306, 
since  the  Armenians  regard  him  as 
king  up  to  this  date.  (See  Pat- 
kanian  in  the  Journal  Asiatique  for 
1866,  p.  150.) 


138 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


LCh.  VII. 


CHAPTER  VII. 


Reign  of  Hormisdas  II.  His  Disposition.  General  Character  of  his 
Reign.  His  Taste  for  Building.  His  new  Court  of  Justice.  His  Mar- 
riage with  a  Princess  of  Cabul.  Story  of  his  Son  Hormisdas.  Death 
of  Hormisdas  II.,  and  Imprisonment  of  his  Son  Hormisdas.  Inter- 
regnum. Crown  assigned  to  Sapor  II.  before  his  Birth.  Long  Reign  of 
Sapor.  First  Period  of  his  Reign,  from  a.d.  309  to  a.d.  337.  Persia 
plundered  by  the  Arabs  and  the  Turks.  Victories  of  Sapor  over  the 
Arabs.  Persecution  of  the  Christians.  Escape  of  Hormisdas.  Feelings 
and  Conduct  of  Sapor. 

*  Regnum  in  Persas  obtinuit  Horrnoz,  Narsis  films.'  — Eutych.  vol.  i.  p.  396. 


Hormisdas  II.,  who  became  king  on  the  abdication  of 
his  father,  Narses,  had,  like  his  father,  a  short  reign. 
He  ascended  the  throne  a.d.  301 ;  he  died  a.d.  309, 


not  quite  eight  years  later.1 
assign  scarcely  any  events. 


The  personal  appearance 


hormisdas  ii.  (from  a 
gem). 


1  See  Clinton,  F.  R.  vol.  ii.  p. 
260.  Agathias  declares  that  both 
Narses    and    Hormisdas  reigned 


exactly  seven  years  and  five  months 
(p.  135,  A.).   So  Macoudi,  ii.  p.  174. 


Ch.  VII.] 


REIGN  OF  HORMISDAS  II. 


139 


of  Hormisdas,  if  we  may  judge  by  a  gem,  was  pleasing  ; 
he  is  said,  however,  to  have  been  of  a  harsh  temper 
bv  nature,  but  to  have  controlled  his  evil  inclinations 
after  he  became  king,  and  in  fact  to  have  then  neglected 
nothing  that  could  contribute  to  the  welfare  of  his  sub- 
jects.1 He  engaged  in  no  wars ;  and  his  reign  was  thus 
one  of  those  quiet  and  uneventful  intervals  which,  fur- 
nishing no  materials  for  history,  indicate  thereby  the 
happiness  of  a  nation.2  We  are  told  that  he  had  a 
strong  taste  for  building,3  and  could  never  see  a  crum- 
bling edifice  without  instantly  setting  to  work  to  restore 
it.  Ruined  towns  and  villages,  so  common  throughout 
the  East  in  all  ages,  ceased  to  be  seen  in  Persia  while 
he  filled  the  throne.  An  army  of  masons  always  fol- 
lowed him  in  his  frequent  journeys  throughout  his 
empire,  and  repaired  dilapidated  homesteads  and  cot- 
tages with  as  much  care  and  diligence  as  edifices  of  a 
public  character.  According  to  some  writers  he 
founded  several  entirely  new  towns  in  Khuzistan  or 
Susiana,4  while,  according  to  others,5  he  built  the  im- 
portant city  of  Hormuz,  or  (as  it  is  sometimes  called) 
Ram-Hormuz,  in  the  province  of  Kerman,  which  is  still 
a  flourishing  place.  Other  authorities 6  ascribe  this  city, 
however,  to  the  first  Hormisdas,  the  son  of  Sapor  I. 
and  grandson  of  Artaxerxes. 

Among  the  means  devised  by  Hormisdas  II.  for 
bettering  the  condition  of  his  people,  the  most  remark- 
able was  his  establishment  of  a  new  Court  of  Justice. 


1  Mirkhond,  Histoire  des  Sassa- 
nides,  pp.  303-4.  Compare  Tabari, 
ii.  p.  90. 

2  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  ch.  iii. 
(vol.  i.  p.  215). 

3  Mirkhond,  p.  304;  D'Herbelol, 
Bibliotheque  Orientate,  torn.  iii.  p. 


221. 

4  D'Herbelot,  l.s.c. 

5  D'Herbelot  quotes  the  Leb- 
tarikh  and  the  Tarikh-Cozideh  to 
this  effect. 

6  Mirkhond,  p.  293;  Malcolm, 
Hist,  of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p.  100. 


140 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  VII. 


In  the  East  the  oppression  of  the  weak  by  the  power- 
ful is  the  most  inveterate  and  universal  of  all  evils,  and 
the  one  that  well-intentioned  monarchs  have  to  be  most 
careful  in  checking  and  repressing.  Hormisdas,  in  his 
anxiety  to  root  out  this  evil,  is  said  to  have  set  up  a 
court  expressly  for  the  hearing  of  causes  where  com- 
plaint was  made  by  the  poor  of  wrongs  done  to  them 
by  the  rich.1  The  duty  of  the  judges  was  at  once  to 
punish  the  oppressors,  and  to  see  that  ample  reparation 
was  made  to  those  whom  they  had  wronged.  To  in- 
crease the  authority  of  the  court,  and  to  secure  the  im- 
partiality of  its  sentences,  the  monarch  made  a  point  of 
often  presiding  over  it  himself,  of  hearing  the  causes, 
and  pronouncing  the  judgments  in  person.  The  most 
powerful  nobles  were  thus  made  to  feel  that,  if  they 
offended,  they  would  be  likely  to  receive  adequate 
punishment ;  and  the  weakest  and  poorest  of  the 
people  were  encouraged  to  come  forward  and  make 
complaint  if  they  had  suffered  injury. 

Among  his  other  wives,  Hormisdas,  we  are  told,  mar- 
ried a  daughter  of  the  king  of  Cabul.2  It  was  natural 
that,  after  the  conquest  of  Seistan  3  by  Varahran  II., 
about  a.d.  280,  the  Persian  monarchs  should  establish 
relations  with  the  chieftains  ruling  in  Affghanistan. 
That  country  seems,  from  the  first  to  the  fourth  century 
of  our  era,  to  have  been  under  the  government  of  princes 
of  Scythian  descent  and  of  considerable  wealth  and 
power.4  Kadphises,  Kanerki,  Kenorano,  Ooerki,  Bara- 
oro,  had  the  main  seat  of  their  empire  in  the  region 
about  Cabul  and  Jellalabad ;  but  from  this  centre  they 
exercised  an  extensive  sway,  which  at  times  probably 

1  D'Herbelot,  l.s.c.  3  See  above,  p.  108. 

2  Mirkhond,  p.  304;  Wilson,  4  See  Wilson,  Ariana  Antiqua, 
Ariana  Antlqua,  p.  385,  note  5.     pp.  347-381. 


Ch.  VII.]  HIS  RELATIONS  WITH  CABUL. 


141 


reached  Candahar  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Punjab 
region  on  the  other.  Their  large  gold  coinage  proves 
them  to  have  been  monarchs  of  great  wealth,  while 
their  use  of  the  Greek  letters  and  language  indicates 
a  certain  amount  of  civilisation.  The  marriage  of 
Hormisdas  with  a  princess  of  Cabul  implies  that  the 
hostile  relations  existing  under  Varahran  II.  had  been 
superseded  by  friendly  ones.1  Persian  aggression  had 
ceased  to  be  feared.  The  reigning  Indo-Scythic  mon- 
arch felt  no  reluctance  to  give  his  daughter  in  marriage 
to  his  Western  neighbour,  and  sent  her  to  his  court 
(we  are  told)  with  a  wardrobe  and  ornaments  of  the 
utmost  magnificence  and  costliness.2 

Hormisdas  II.  appears  to  have  had  a  son,  of  the 
same  name  with  himself,  who  attained  to  manhood 
while  his  father  was  still  reigniug.3  This  prince,  who 
was  generally  regarded,  and  who,  of  course,  viewed 
himself,  as  the  heir  apparent,  was  no  favourite  with  the 
Persian  nobles,  whom  he  had  perhaps  offended  by  an 
inclination  towards  the  literature  and  civilisation  of  the 
Greeks.4  It  must  have  been  upon  previous  consultation 
and  agreement  that  the  entire  body  of  the  chief  men 
resolved  to  vent  their  spite  by  insulting  the  prince  in 
the  most  open  and  public  way  at  the  table  of  his  father. 


1  The  coins  of  Hormisdas  II.  not 
unfrequently  show  signs  of  Indian 
influence.  On  the  reverses  of  some 
we  see  the  Indian  deity  Siva  and 
his  Bull  (Thomas  in  Num.  Chron. 
vol.  xv.  p.  180;  New  Series,  No. 
45,  p.  115),  as  in  the  coins  of  Kad- 
phises  (Wilson,  Ariana  Antiqua, 
pp.  350-7).  On  others  we  observe 
an  Indian  altar  (Num.  Chron.  vol. 
xv.  p.  180,  fig.  10). 

2  Mirkhond,  Hisioire  des  Sas- 
sanides,  p.  304. 

3  The  relationship  of  the  4  Prince 
Hormisdas,'  who  took  refuge  at 


the  court  of  Constantine  in  the 
year  a^d.  323,  to  Hormisdas  II. 
rests  on  the  authority  of  Zosimus, 
from  whom  all  the  details  here 
given  are  derived.  (See  Zosim. 
Hist.  Nov.  ii.  27.)  The  account 
given  by  Zonaras  (xiii.  5)  is  dif- 
ferent. 

4  The  latter  part  of  the  story  in 
Zosimus  implies  that  he  had  this 
inclination.  How  offensive  such 
tastes  might  be  to  the  Asiatics,  we 
see  from  the  history  of  Vonones  in 
Tacitus  (Ann.  ii.  2). 


142 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  VII. 


The  king  was  keeping  his  birthday,  which  was  always, 
in  Persia,  the  greatest  festival  of  the  year,1  and  so  the 
most  public  occasion  possible.  All  the  nobles  of  the 
realm  were  invited  to  the  banquet ;  and  all  came  and 
took  their  several  places.  The  prince  was  absent  at  the 
first,  but  shortly  arrived,  bringing  with  him,  as  the 
excuse  for  his  late  appearance,  a  quantity  of  game, 
the  produce  of  the  morning's  chase.  Such  an  entrance 
must  have  created  some  disturbance  and  have  drawn 
general  attention  ;  but  the  nobles,  who  were  bound 
by  etiquette  to  rise  from  their  seats,  remained  firmly 
fixed  in  them,  and  took  not  the  slightest  notice  of  the 
prince's  arrival.2  This  behaviour-  was  an  indignity 
which  naturally  aroused  his  resentment.  In  the  heat 
of  the  moment  he  exclaimed  aloud  that  '  those  who  had 
insulted  him  should  one  day  suffer  for  it  —  their  fate 
should  be  the  fate  of  Marsyas.'  At  first  the  threat  was 
not  understood ;  but  one  chieftain,  more  learned  than 
his  fellows,  explained  to  the  rest  that,  according  to  the 
Greek  myth,  Marsyas  was  flayed  alive.  Now  flaying 
alive  was  a  punishment  not  unknown  to  the  Persian 
law ; 3  and  the  nobles,  fearing  that  the  prince  really 
entertained  the  intention  which  he  had  expressed, 
became  thoroughly  alienated  from  him,  and  made  up 
their  minds  that  they  would  not  allow  him  to  reign. 
During  his  father's  lifetime,  they  could,  of  course,  do 
nothing  ;  but  they  laid  up  the  dread  threat  in  their 
memory,  and  patiently  waited  for  the  moment  when 
the  throne  would  become  vacant,  and  their  enemy 
would  assert  his  right  to  it. 


1  Herod,  i.  133.  Compare  ix. 
110. 

2  Compare  Mordecai's  treatment 


of  Haman  (Esther  iii.  2,  v.  9). 

3  See  above,  p.  103. 


Ch.  VIL] 


DEATH  OF  HORMISDAS  II. 


143 


Apparently,  their  patience  was  not  very  severely 
taxed.  Hormisdas  IT.  died  within  a  few  years ;  and 
Prince  Hormisdas,  as  the  only  son  whom  he  had  left 
behind  him,1  thought  to  succeed  as  a  matter  of  course. 
But  the  nobles  rose  in  insurrection,  seized  his  person, 
and  threw  him  into  a  dungeon,  intending  that  he  should 
remain  there  for  the  rest  of  his  life.  They  themselves 
took  the  direction  of  affairs,  and  finding  that,  though 
King  Hormisdas  had  left  behind  him  no  other  son,  yet 
one  of  his  wives  was  pregnant,  they  proclaimed  the 
unborn  infant  king,  and  even  with  the  utmost  cere- 
mony proceeded  to  crown  the  embryo  by  suspending 
the  royal  diadem  over  the  womb  of  the  mother.2  A 
real  interregnum  must  have  followed  ;  but  it  did  not 
extend  beyond  a  few  months.  The  pregnant  widow  of 
Hormisdas  fortunately  gave  birth  to  a  boy,  and  the 
difficulties  of  the  succession  were  thereby  ended.  All 
classes  acquiesced  in  the  rule  of  the  infant  monarch, 
who  received  the  name  of  Sapor  —  whether  simply 
to  mark  the  fact  that  he  was  believed  to  be  the  late 
king's  son,3  or  in  the  hope  that  he  would  rival  the 
glories  of  the  first  Sapor,  is  uncertain. 

The  reign  of  Sapor  II.  is  estimated  variously,  at  69, 
70,  71,  and  72  years; 4  but  the  balance  of  authority  is 


1  Some  writers  give  him  another 
son,  the  Artaxerxes  who  succeeded 
Sapor  II.  But  it  is  impossible  to 
accept  this  view.  See  below,  ch. 
xii. 

2  Agathias,  iv.  p.  135;  Mirkhond, 
pp.  305-6;  Tabari,  torn.  ii.  p.  91; 
Malcolm,  History  of  Persia,  vol.  i. 
p.  106.  Gibbon  suggests  that  Aga- 
thias obtained  the  history  from  the 
Persian  Chronicles  (Decline  and 
Fall,  ch.  xviii.  vol.  ii.  p.  367, 
note  54 ). 

3  Sapor   (Shah-puhr)  means 


'  King's  son,'  as  has  been  already 
noted  (see  p.  73,  note  2). 

4  Abulpharagius  in  one  place  has 
sixty-nine  years  (p.  85),  in  another 
(p.  90)  seventy.  Agathias  (p.  135,  D) 
and  Theophanes  (p.  7)  have  seventy. 
Sir  John  Malcolm,  following  Ori- 
ental authorities,  gives  seventy-one 
(Hist,  of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p.  110). 
Eutychius  (vol.  i.  p.  472),  Mir- 
khond  (Hist  des  Sassanides,  p.  306), 
Tabari  (Chronique,  torn.  ii.  p.  101), 
and  Ma^oudi  (torn.  ii.  p.  175)  say 
seventy-two. 


144 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  VIL 


in  favour  of  seventy.  He  was  born  in  the  course  of  the 
year  a.d.  309,  and  he  seems  to  have  died  in  the  year 
after  the  Roman  emperor  Valens,1  or  a.d.  379.  He 
thus  reigned  nearly  three-quarters  of  a  century,  being 
contemporary  with  the  Roman  emperors,  Galerius, 
Constantine,  Constantius  and  Constans,  Julian,  Jovian, 
Valentinian  I.,  Valens,  Gratian,  and  Valentinian  II. 

This  long  reign  is  best  divided  into  periods.  The 
first  period  of  it  extended  from  a.d.  309  to  a.d.  337,  or 
a  space  of  twenty-eight  years.  This  was  the  time  an- 
terior to  Sapor's  wars  with  the  Romans.  It  included  the 
sixteen  years  of  his  minority 2  and  a  space  of  twelve 
years  during  which  he  waged  successful  wars  with  the 
Arabs.  The  minority  of  Sapor  was  a  period  of  severe 
trial  to  Persia.  On  every  side  the  bordering  nations 
endeavoured  to  take  advantage  of  the  weakness  incident 
to  the  rule  of  a  minor,  and  attacked  and  ravaged  the 
empire  at  their  pleasure.3  The  Arabs  were  especially 
aggressive,  and  made  continual  raids  into  Babylonia, 
Khuzistan,  and  the  adjoining  regions,  which  desolated 
these  provinces  and  carried  the  horrors  of  war  into  the 
very  heart  of  the  empire.  The  tribes  of  Beni-Ayar 
and  Abdul-Kais,  which  dwelt  on  the  southern  shores 
of  the  Persian  Gulf,  took  the  lead  in  these  incursions, 
and,  though  not  attempting  any  permanent  conquests, 
inflicted  terrible  sufferings  on  the  inhabitants  of  the 
tracts  which  they  invaded.  At  the  same  time  a  Meso- 
potamian  chieftain,  called  Tayer  or  Thair,4  made  an 


1  Abulpharagius,  p.  90. 

2  Mirkhond  makes  Sapor  begin 
to  exercise  some  of  the  offices  of 
government  at  eight  years  (p.  307), 
but  admits  that  he  did  not  un- 
dertake the  direction  of  military 
expeditions   till   he   was  sixteen 


(ibid.).    So  Tabari  (torn.  ii.  p.  93). 

3  Mirkhond,  l.s.c. ;  Tabari,  vol.  ii. 
pp.  91-2;  Malcolm,  vol.  i.  p.  106. 

4  D'Herbelot,  Bibliotheque  Orien- 
tale,  torn.  v.  p.  143;  Gibbon,  De- 
cline and  Fall,  ch.  xviii.  (vol.  ii.  p. 
367).    These  writers  make  Thair 


Ch.  VII.  1 


MINORITY  OF  SAPOR  II. 


145 


attack  upon  Ctesiphon,  took  the  city  by  storm,  and 
captured  a  sister  or  aunt  of  the  Persian  monarch.  The 
nobles,  who,  during  Sapor's  minority,  guided  the  helm 
of  the  State,  were  quite  incompetent  to  make  head 
against  these  numerous  enemies.  For  sixteen  years 
the  marauding  bands  had  the  advantage,  and  Persia 
found  herself  continually  weaker,  more  impoverished, 
and  less  able  to  recover  herself.  The  young  prince  is 
said  to  have  shown  extraordinary  discretion  and  intelli- 
gence.1 He  diligently  trained  himself  in  all  manly  exer- 
cises, and  prepared  both  his  mind  and  body  for  the 
important  duties  of  his  station.  But  his  tender  years  for- 
bade his  as  yet  taking  the  field ;  and  it  is  not  unlikely 
that  his  ministers  prolonged  the  period  of  his  tutelage 
in  order  to  retain,  to  the  latest  possible  moment,  the 
power  whereto  they  had  become  accustomed.  At  any 
rate,  it  was  not  till  he  was  sixteen,  a  later  age  than 
Oriental  ideas  require,2  that  Sapor's  minority  ceased 
—  that  he  asserted  his  manhood,  and,  placing  himself 
at  the  head  of  his  army,  took  the  entire  direction  of 
affairs,  civil  and  military,  into  his  own  hands.3 

From  this  moment  the  fortunes  of  Persia  began  to 
rise.  Content  at  first  to  meet  and  chastise  the  maraud- 
ing bands  on  his  own  territory,  Sapor,  after  a  time, 
grew  bolder,  and  ventured  to  take  the  offensive.  Hav- 
ing collected  a  fleet  of  considerable  size,4  he  placed 
his  troops  on  board,  and  conveyed  them  to  the  city  of 


a  king  of  Yemen  or  Arabia  proper; 
but  Sir  J.  Malcolm  says  he  was  a 
mere  sheikh  of  some  of  the  tribes 
of  Mesopotamia  (vol.  i.  p.  107, 
note). 

1  Mirkhond,  p.  307;  Tabari, 
torn.  ii.  pp.  92-3. 

2  Fourteen  is  generally  regarded 
as  the  age  of  manhood  in  the  East 


(Layard,  Nin.  and  Babylon,  p.  295); 
and  minorities  usually  come  to  an 
end  at  this  age.  (See  Malcolm, 
Hist  of  Persia,  vol.  i.  pp.  499,  506, 
&c.) 

3  Mirkhond,  l.s.c;  Tabari,  p.  93; 
Macoudi,  p.  176. 

4  Mirkhond,  p.  308;  Tabari,  p. 
94. 


146 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  VII. 


El-Katif,  an  important  place  on  the  south  coast  of  the 
Persian  Gulf,  where  he  disembarked  and  proceeded  to 
carry  fire  and  sword  through  the  adjacent  region. 
Either  on  this  occasion,  or  more  probably  in  a  long 
series  of  expeditions,  he  ravaged  the  whole  district  of 
the  Hejer,  gaining  numerous  victories  over  the  tribes 
of  the  Temanites,  the  Beni-Waiel,  the  Abdul-Kais,  and 
others,  which  had  taken  a  leading  part  in  the  invasion 
of  Persia.  His  military  genius  and  his  valour  were 
everywhere  conspicuous ;  but  unfortunately  these  ex- 
cellent qualities  were  unaccompanied  by  the  humanity 
which  has  been  the  crowning  virtue  of  many  a  con- 
queror. Sapor,  exasperated  by  the  sufferings  of  his 
countrymen  during  so  many  years,  thought  that  he 
could  not  too  severely  punish  those  who  had  inflicted 
them.  He  put  to  the  sword  the  greater  part  of  every 
tribe  that  he  conquered  ;  and,  when  his  soldiers  were 
weary  of  slaying,  he  made  them  pierce  the  shoulders 
of  their  prisoners,  and  insert  in  the  wound  a  string  or 
thong  by  which  to  drag  them  into  captivity.1  The 
barbarity  of  the  age  and  nation  approved  these  atroci- 
ties ;  and  the  monarch  who  had  commanded  them 
was,  in  consequence,  saluted  as  Dhoidactaf,  or  cLord 
of  the  Shoulders/  by  an  admiring  people.2 

Cruelties  almost  as  great,  but  of  a  different  character, 
were  at  the  same  time  sanctioned  by  Sapor  in  regard 
to  one  class  of  his  own  subjects  —  viz.,  those  who  had 


1  This  is  Mirkhond's  account. 
Other  authorities  say  that  he  dis- 
located (Malcolm,  vol.  i.  p.  107; 
Macoudi,  vol.  ii.  p.  177)  or  broke 
(D'Herbelot,  Bibl.  Orient,  torn.  v. 
p.  141)  the  shoulders  of  his  prison- 
ers, to  disqualify  them  for  military 
service. 

2  Gibbon,  following  an  apocry- 
phal tale  related  by  D'Herbelot,  but 


not  adopted  by  him,  gives  the 
name  as  Dhoulacnaf,  and  translates 
it  4  Protector  of  the  Nation  '  (vol.  ii. 
p.  307).  The  best  authorities  are, 
however,  all  agreed  that  the  real 
epithet  was  Dhoulactaf,  not  Dhou- 
lacnaf. (See  D'Herbelot,  l.s.c. ; 
Mirkiiond,  p.  308;  Tabari,  torn.  ii. 
p.  91;  Malcolm,  vol.  i.  p.  107, 
.iote;  Macoudi,  torn.  ii.  p.  175.) 


Ch.  VII.]  SAPOK'S  PERSECUTION  OF  THE  CHRISTIANS,  147 

made  profession  of  Christianity.  The  Zoroastrian  zeal 
of  this  king  was  great,  and  he  regarded  it  as  incumbent 
on  him  to  check  the  advance  which  Christianity  was 
now  making  in  his  territories.  He  issued  severe  edicts 
against  the  Christians  soon  after  attaining  his  majority  ; 1 
and  when  they  sought  the  protection  of  the  Roman 
emperor,  he  punished  their  disloyalty  by  imposing 
upon  them  a  fresh  tax,  the  weight  of  which  was  op- 
pressive. When  Symeon,  Archbishop  of  Seleucia,  com- 
plained of  this  additional  burden  in  an  offensive  man- 
ner, Sapor  retaliated  by  closing  the  Christian  churches, 
confiscating  the  ecclesiastical  property,  and  putting  the 
complainant  to  death.  Accounts  of  these  severities 
reached  Constantine,  the  Roman  emperor,  who  had 
recently  embraced  the  new  religion  (which,  in  spite  of 
constant  persecution,  had  gradually  overspread  the  em- 
pire), and  had  assumed  the  character  of  a  sort  of  gen- 
eral protector  of  the  Christians  throughout  the  world.2 
He  remonstrated  with  Sapor,  but  to  no  purpose.3 
Sapor  had  formed  the  resolution  to  renew  the  contest 


1  Sozomen,  Hist.  Eccles.  ii.  9, 
10. 

2  Tillemont,  Hist,  des  Empereurs, 
torn.  iv.  p.  255:  4  Constantin  se 
regard  ait  comme  le  protecteur  ge- 
neral de  tous  les  serviteurs  de 
Jesus-Christ.' 

3  Eusebius  ( Vit.  Constant.  Magn. 
iv.  9  et  seqq.)  and  Theodoret  (i.  25) 
give  the  terms  of  a  letter  written 
by  Constantine  to  Sapor  at  this 
time  in  favour  of  the  Christians. 
It  is  a  verbose*  production,  and 
possesses  but  little  interest.  The 
greater  part  is  an  account  of  his 
own  religious  principles  and  feel- 
ings. The  concluding  portion, 
which  alone  ^touches  the  case  of 
the  Persian  Christians,  runs  as 
follows:  'You  can  imagine  then 
how  delighted  I  am  to  hear  that 


Persia  too,  in  some  of  its  best 
regions,  is  adorned  and  illustrated 
by  this  class  of  men,  on  whose  be- 
half I  write  to  you  —  I  mean  the 
Christians  —  a  thing  most  agreeable 
to  my  wishes.  All  prosperity  then 
be  yours,  and  all  prosperity  be 
theirs  —  may  both  flourish  alike! 
Thus  will  you  make  God  the 
Father,  the  Lord  of  all,  propitious 
and  friendly  towards  you.  These 
persons  then,  seeing  that  you  are 
so  great,  I  commend  to  you  —  I  put 
them  into  your  hand,  seeing  that  you 
are  so  conspicuous  for  your  piety. 
Love  them  with  that  iove  which 
befits  your  known  benevolence. 
For  thus  you  will  confer  both  on 
us  and  on  yourself  an  immeasura- 
ble benefit.' 


148 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


ICh.  VII. 


terminated  so  unfavourably  forty  years  earlier  by  his 
grandfather.  He  made  the  emperor's  interference  with 
Persian  affairs,  and  encouragement  of  his  Christian  sub- 
jects in  their  perversity,  a  ground  of  complaint,  and 
began  to  threaten  hostilities.1  Some  negotiations,  which 
are  not  very  clearly  narrated,2  followed.  Both  sides, 
apparently,  had  determined  on  war,  but  both  wished  to 
gain  time.  It  is  uncertain  what  would  have  been  the 
result  had  Constantine  lived.  But  the  death  of  that 
monarch  in  the  early  summer  of  a.d.  337,  on  his  way  to 
the  eastern  frontier,  dispelled  the  last  chance  of  peace, 
by  relieving  Sapor  from  the  wholesome  fear  which 
had  hitherto  restrained  his  ambition.  The  military 
fame  of  Constantine  was  great,  and  naturally  inspired 
respect ;  his  power  was  firmly  fixed,  and  he  was  without 
competitor  or  rival.  By  his  removal  the  whole  face  of 
affairs  was  changed ;  and  Sapor,  who  had  almost  brought 
himself  to  venture  on  a  rupture  with  Rome  during  Con- 
stantine*^ life,  no  longer  hesitated  on  receiving  news  of 
his  death,  but  at  once  commenced  hostilities.3 

It  is  probable  that  among  the  motives  which  deter- 
mined the  somewhat  wavering  conduct  of  Sapor  at  thU 
juncture 4  was  a  reasonable  fear  of  the  internal  troubles 
which  it  seemed  to  be  in  the  power  of  the  Romans  to 
excite  among  the  Persians,  if  from  friends  they  became 


1  Libanius,  Oral.  iii.  pp.  118, 
120;  Aurel.  Vict.  Be  Cmsaribus, 
§  41. 

2  Compare  Liban.  l.s.c.  with  Fes- 
tus  (§  26)  and  Euseb.  Vit.  Con- 
stant, iv.  8. 

3  Some  writers  make  the  hos- 
tilities commence  in  the  lifetime  of 
Constantine.  (See  Eutrop.  x.  8; 
Chronic.  Pasch.  p.  280,  C.)  But 
Ammianus,  who  is  almost  a  con- 
temporary, assigns  the  outbreak  to 


the  reign  of  Constantius  (xxv.  4). 

4  Sapor  is  said  to  have  sent  a 
friendly  embassy  to  Constantine  in 
a.d.  333  (Euseb.  Vit.  Const,  iv.  8; 
Liban.  Or.  iii.  p.  118).  In  a.d. 
337  be  suddenly  threatened  war, 
and  demanded  the  restoration  of 
the  five  provinces  ceded  by  Narses 
(Liban.  Or.  iii.  p.  120).  Having 
received  a  refusal,  he  sent  another 
embassy,  about  Easter,  to  express 
his  desire  for  peace  (Euseb.  iv.  57). 


Ch.  VII.  I    HIS  GROUNDS  OF  QUARREL  WITH  ROME.  149 

enemies.  Having  tested  his  own  military  capacity  in 
his  Arab  wars,  and  formed  an  army  on  whose  courage, 
endurance,  and  attachment  he  could  rely,  he  was  not 
afraid  of  measuring  his  strength  with  that  of  Rome  in 
the  open  field  ;  but  he  may  well  have  dreaded  the  arts 
which  the  Imperial  State  was  in  the  habit  of  em- 
ploying,1 to  supplement  her  military  shortcomings,  in 
wars  with  her  neighbours.  There  was  now  at  the 
court  of  Constantinople  a  Persian  refugee  of  such  rank 
and  importance  that  Constantine  had,  as  it  were,  a  pre- 
tender ready  made  to  his  hand,  and  could  reckon  on 
creating  dissension  among  the  Persians  whenever  he 
pleased,  by  simply  proclaiming  himself  this  person's 
ally  and  patron.  Prince  Hormisdas,  the  elder  brother 
of  Sapor,  and  rightful  king  of  Persia,  had,  after  a  long 
imprisonment,2  contrived,  by  the  help  of  his  wife,  to 
escape  from  his  dungeon,3  and  had  fled  to  the  court  of 
Constantine  as  early  as  a.d.  323.  He  had  been  received 
by  the  emperor  with  every  mark  of  honour  and  distinc- 
tion, had  been  given  a  maintenance  suited  to  his  rank, 
and  had  enjoyed  other  favours.4  Sapor  must  have  felt 
himself  deeply  aggrieved  by  the  undue  attention  paid 
to  his  rival ;  and  though  he  pretended  to  make  light  of 
the  matter,  and  even  generously  sent  Hormisdas  the 
wife  to  whom  his  escape  was  due,5  he  cannot  but  have 
been  uneasy  at  the  possession,  by  the  Roman  emperor, 
of  his  brother's  person.  In  weighing  the  reasons  for  and 
against  war,  he  cannot  but  have  assigned  considerable 
importance  to  this  circumstance.  It  did  not  ultimately 


1  See  the  Author's  Sixth  Mon- 
archy, pp.  230,  234,  256,  &c. 

2  If  Prince  Hormisdas  was  a  son 
of  Hormisdas  II.  and  thrown  into 
prison  at  his  death  (see  above, 
p.  143),  he  must  have  passed  four- 


teen years  in  confinement  before 
he  made  his  escape. 

3  Zosim.  ii.  27. 

4  Ibid.  ii.  27,  ad.  fin.;  and  iii.  13, 
ad  fin. 

5  Suidas  ad  voc.  Mapavac;. 


150 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


|Ch.  VII. 


prevent  him  from  challenging  Rome  to  the  combat ; 
but  it  may  help  to  account  for  the  hesitation,  the 
delay,  and  the  fluctuations  of  purpose,  which  we  re- 
mark in  his  conduct  during  the  four  or  five  years 1 
which  immediately  preceded  the  death  of  Constantine. 


1  From  a.d.  333  to  a.d.  337. 


Ch.  VIII.  ] 


DEATH  OF  CONSTANTINE. 


151 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

Position  of  Affairs  on  the  Death  of  Constantine.  First  War  of  Sapor 
with  Rome,  a.d.  337-350.  First  Siege  of  Nisibis.  Obscure  Interval. 
Troubles  in  Armenia,  and  Recovery  of  Armenia  by  the  Persians,  Sapor's 
Second  Siege  of  Nisibis.  Its  Failure.  Great  Battle  of  Singara.  Sapor's 
Son  made  Prisoner  and  murdered  in  cold  blood.  Third  Siege  of  Nisibis. 
Sapor  called  away  by  an  Invasion  of  the  Massagetce. 

*  Constantius  adversus  Persas  et  Saporem,  qui  Mesopotamiam  vastaverant, 
novem  prseliis  parum  prospere  decertavit.' — Orosius,  Hist.  vii.  29. 

The  death  of  Constantine  was  followed  by  the  division 
of  the  Roman  world  among  his  sons.  The  vast  empire 
with  which  Sapor  had  almost  made  up  his  mind  to  con- 
tend was  partitioned  out  into  three  moderate-sized 
kingdoms.1  In  place  of  the  late  brave  and  experienced 
emperor,  a  raw  youth,2  who  had  given  no  signs  of 
superior  ability,  had  the  government  of  the  Roman 
provinces  of  the  East,  of  Thrace,  Asia  Minor,  Syria, 
Mesopotamia,  and  Egypt.  Master  of  one-third  of  the 
empire  only,  and  of  the  least  warlike  portion,3  Constan- 
tius was  a  foe  whom  the  Persian  monarch  might  well 
despise,  and  whom  he  might  expect  to  defeat  without 
much  difficulty.  Moreover,  there  was  much  in  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  time  that  seemed  to  promise  success 


1  At  first  the  partition  was  into 
Jive  kingdoms;  but  the  dominions 
of  Dalmatius  and  Hannibalianus 
were  soon  absorbed  into  those  of 
the  sons  of  Constantine. 

2  Constantius  was  not  quite 
twenty  at  the  death  of  his  father. 


He  was  born  in  August,  a.d.  317. 
Constantine  died  May  22,  a.d.  337. 

3  The  natives  of  the  voluptuous 
East  were  never  a  match  for  those 
of  the  hardy  West.  Roman  legions 
recruited  in  Asia  Minor,  Syria,  and 
Egypt  were  always  poor  soldiers. 


152 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [Ch.  VIII. 


to  the  Persian  arms  in  a  struggle  with  Rome.  The 
removal  of  Constantine  had  been  followed  by  an  out- 
burst of  licentiousness  and  violence  among  the  Roman 
soldiery  in  the  capital ; 1  and  throughout  the  East  the 
army  had  cast  off  the  restraints  of  discipline,  and  given 
indications  of  a  turbulent  and  seditious  spirit.2  The 
condition  of  Armenia  was  also  such  as  to  encourage 
Sapor  in  his  ambitious  projects.  Tiridates,  though  a 
persecutor  of  the  Christians  in  the  early  part  of  his 
reign,  had  been  converted  by  Gregory  the  Illuminator,3 
and  had  then  enforced  Christianity  on  his  subjects  by 
fire  and  sword.  A  sanguinary  conflict  had  followed. 
A  large  portion  of  the  Armenians,  firmly  attached  to 
the  old  national  idolatry,  had  resisted  determinedly.4 
Nobles,  priests,  and  people  had  fought  desperately  in 
defence  of  their  temples,  images,  and  altars ;  and,  though 
the  persistent  will  of  the  king  overbore  all  opposition, 
yet  the  result  was  the  formation  of  a  discontented  fac- 
tion, which  rose  up  from  time  to  time  against  its  rulers, 
and  was  constantly  tempted  to  ally  itself  with  any 
foreign  power  from  which  it  could  hope  the  re-estab- 
lishment of  the  old  religion.  Armenia  had  also,  after 
the  death  of  Tiridates  (in  a.d.  314),  fallen  under  the 
government  of  weak  princes.5  Persia  had  recovered 
from  it  the  portion  of  Media  Atropatene  ceded  by  the 
treaty  between  Galerius  and  Narses. 6  Sapor,  therefore, 
had  nothing  to  fear  on  this  side ;  and  he  might  reason- 
ably expect  to  find  friends  among  the  Armenians  them- 


1  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  ch. 
xviii.  (vol.  ii.  pp.  98-100). 

2  Ibid.  p.  103. 

3  Mos.  Chor.  Hist.  Armen.  ii. 
77;  Agathangelus,  §§  110-132. 

4  See  Milman,  Hist,  of  Chris- 
tianity, vol.  ii.  p.  258,  and  the 
authorities  there  cited. 


5  Chosroes  II.,  who  was  placed 
on  the  throne  by  Rome  in  a.d. 
316,  and  Tiranus,  his  son,  who 
succeeded  Chosroes  in  a.d.  325. 

6  This  distinctly  appears  from 
Faustus,  iii.  20.  The  cession  seems 
to  have  been  made  by  Chosroes  II. 
(Mos.  Chor.  iii.  8). 


Ch.  VIII. ]       SAPOR  II.  ATTACKS  CONST ANTIUS.  153 

selves,  should  the  general  position  of  his  affairs  allow 
him  to  make  an  effort  to  extend  Persian  influence  once 
more  over  the  Armenian  highland. 

The  bands  of  Sapor  crossed  the  Roman  frontier  soon 
after,  if  not  even  before,1  the  death  of  Constantine  ;  and 
after  an  interval  of  forty  years  the  two  great  powers  of 
the  world  were  once  more  engaged  in  a  bloody  conflict. 
Constantius,  having  paid  the  last  honours  to  his  father  s 
remains,2  hastened  to  the  eastern  frontier,  where  he 
found  the  Roman  army  weak  in  numbers,  badly  armed 
and  badly  provided,  ill-disposed  towards  himself,  and 
almost  ready  to  mutiny.3  It  was  necessary,  before  any- 
thing could  be  done  to  resist  the  advance  of  Sapor,  that 
the  insubordination  of  the  troops  should  be  checked, 
their  wants  supplied,  and  their  goodwill  conciliated. 
Constantius  applied  himself  to  effect  these  changes.4 
Meanwhile  Sapor  set  the  Arabs  and  Armenians  in  mo- 
tion, inducing  the  Pagan  party  among  the  latter  to  rise 
in  insurrection,  deliver  their  king,  Tiranus,  into  his 
power,5  and  make  incursions  into  the  Roman  territory, 
while  the  latter  infested  with  their  armed  bands  the 
provinces  of  Mesopotamia  and  Syria.6  He  himself  was 
content,  during  the  first  year  of  the  war,  a.d.  337,  with 
moderate  successes,  and  appeared  to  the  Romans  to 
avoid  rather  than  seek  a  pitched  battle.7  Constantius 


1  See  above,  p.  148,  note  3 ;  and 
compare  Liban.  Orat.  iii.  p.  117,  B. 

2  Liban.  Orat.  iii.  p.  121,  B. 

3  Julian.  Orat.  i.  pp.  33  and  36. 

4  Ibid.  pp.  36-38.  Among  other 
improvements  introduced  by  Con- 
stantius at  this  time  was  the 
equipment  of  a  portion  of  the 
Roman  cavalry  after  the  fashion 
of  the  Persian  cataphracti,  or  mailed 
horsemen. 

5  Ibid.  pp.  33  and  37.  Compare 
St.  Martin's  additions  to  Le  Beau, 


B as-Empire,  vol.  i.  pp.  406  et  seqq. 

6  Julian.  Orat.  i.  p.  37. 

7  There  must  be  some  founda- 
tion for  the  statements  of  Libanius 
and  Julian,  that  Sapor  at  first 
avoided  a  conflict,  even  though 
they  are  contained  in  panegyrics. 
(See  Liban.  p.  122,  A  :  Toif  dpiotg 
ttyzioTrjuEL  rolg  Uepoifcoic,  iindvfxtjv 
aifid^ac  rrjv  de&av  •  nai  6  rbv  Ovubv 
dei;ap,evog  ovk  rjv  '  uXX  oi  rbv  iroTiepov 
tiaayovreg  kv  (pvyy  rbv  noXefiov 
dteoepov,  k.t.1.     Julian.  Orat.  i.  p. 


154 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  VIII. 


was  able,  under  these  circumstances,  not  only  to  main- 
tain his  ground,  but  to  gain  certain  advantages.  He 
restored  the  direction  of  affairs  in  Armenia  to  the 
Roman  party,1  detached  some  of  the  Mesopotamian 
Arabs  from  the  side  of  his  adversary,  and  attached  them 
to  his  own,2  and  even  built  forts  in  the  Persian  terri- 
tory on  the  further  side  of  the  Tigris.3  But  the  gains 
made  were  slight;  and  in  the  ensuing  year  (a.d.  338) 
Sapor  took  the  field  in  greater  force  than  before,  and 
addressed  himself  to  an  important  enterprise.  He 
aimed,  it  is  evident,  from  the  first,  at  the  recovery  of 
Mesopotamia,  and  at  thrusting  back  the  Romans  from 
the  Tigris  to  the  Euphrates.  He  found  it  easy  to  over- 
run the  open  country,  to  ravage  the  crops,  drive  off  the 
cattle,  and  burn  the  villages  and  homesteads.  But  the 
region  could  not  be  regarded  as  conquered,  it  could 
not  be  permanently  held,  unless  the  strongly  fortified 
posts  which  commanded  it,  and  which  were  in  the  hands 
of  Rome,  could  be  captured.4  Of  all  these  the  most 
important  was  Nisibis.  This  ancient  town,  known  to 
the  Assyrians  as  Nazibina,5  was,  at  any  rate  from  the 
time  of  Lucullus,6  the  most  important  city  of  Mesopo- 
tamia. It  was  situated  at  the  distance  of  about  sixty 
miles  from-  the  Tigris,  at  the  edge  of  the  Mons  Masius, 
in  a  broad  and  fertile  plain,  watered  by  one  of  the 
affluents7  of  the  river  Khabour,  or  Aborrhas.  The 


39:  Tcjv  7vo?.€/ll'kjv  oviklc  kro'XfirjGev 
ufivvac  Tij  xupa  TcopOov/Ltevrj  •  ixavra 
6e  nap'  ijfidg  r/yero  tukelvuv  uyaOa ' 
tlov  uev  ovdi  etc  xeLPa£  isvai  toTi/liuv- 

TUV.) 

1  Julian.  Orat.  i.  p.  37. 

2  Ibid.  p.  38. 

3  Ibid.  p.  39. 

4  This  is  well  urged  by  Gibbon 
(Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  ii.  p.  372). 

5  See  the  Assyrian  Canon,  pas- 


sim ;  and  compare  Ancient  Mon- 
archies, vol.  i.  p.  258. 

6  Plutarch,  Lucull.  §  32. 

7  This  river,  now  called  the 
Jerujer,  anciently  the  Mygdonius 
(liver  of  Gozan?),  joins  the  main 
stream  of  the  Khabour  in  lat. 
36°  20',  near  the  volcanic  hill  of 
Koukab.  (Layard,  Nin.  and  Bab. 
pp.  309,  322,  &c.) 


Cii.  VIII.] 


FIRST  SIEGE  OF  NISIBIS. 


155 


Romans,  after  their  occupation  of  Mesopotamia,  had 
raised  it  to  the  rank  of  a  colony  ; 1  and  its  defences, 
which  were  of  great  strength,  had  always  been  main- 
tained by  the  emperors  in  a  state  of  efficiency.  Sapor 
regarded  it  as  the  key  of  the  Roman  position  in  the 
tract  between  the  rivers,2  and,  as  early  as  a.d.  338, 
sought  to  make  himself  master  of  it.3 

The  first  siege  of  Nisibis  by  Sapor  lasted,  we  are  told, 
sixty- three  days.4  Few  particulars  of  it  have  come 
down  to  us.  Sapor  had  attacked  the  city,  apparently, 
in  the  absence  of  Constantius,5  who  had  been  called  off 
to  Pannonia  to  hold  a  conference  with  his  brothers.  It 
was  defended,  not  only  by  its  garrison  and  inhabitants, 
but  by  the  prayers  and  exhortations  of  its  bishop,6  St. 
James,  who,  if  he  did  not  work  miracles  for  the  deliv- 
erance of  his  countrymen,  at  any  rate  sustained  and 
animated  their  resistance.  The  result  was  that  the 
bands  of  Sapor  were  repelled  with  loss,  and  he  was 
forced,  after  wasting  two  months  before  the  walls,  to 
raise  the  siege  and  own  himself  baffled.7 

After  this,  for  some  years  the  Persian  war  with  Rome 
languished.  It  is  difficult  to  extract  from  the  brief 
statements  of  epitomisers,8  and  the  loose  invectives  or 
panegyrics  of  orators,9  the  real  circumstances  of  the 


1  As  appears  from  the  coins  of 
Nisibis  (Mionnet,  Description  des 
Medailles,  torn.  v.  pp.  625-8). 

2  This  is  evident  from  the  per- 
sistency of  his  attacks.  Ammianus 
says  (xxv.  8):  '  Constabat  orbem 
Eonm  in  ditionem  potuisse  transire 
Persidis,  nisi  heec  civitas  (sc.  Nisi- 
bis) habili  sitn  et  magnitudine 
moenium  restitisset.' 

3  On  the  date  of  the  first  siege 
of  Nisibis,  see  Tillemont,  Hist,  des 
Empereurs,  torn.  iv.  p.  668;  Clin- 
ton, F.  R.  vol.  i.  p.  396. 


4  Chron.  Pasch.  p.  287,  B;  Theo- 
phanes,  p.  28,  D. 

5  So  Tillemont,  torn.  iv.  p.  319. 

6  Theodoret,  ii.  30.  The  mira- 
cles ascribed  by  this  writer  to  St. 
James  are  justly  ridiculed  by  Gib- 
bon (vol.  ii.  p.  372,  note  65). 

7  Chron.  Pasch.  l.s.c. ;  Hieronym. 
Chron.  anno  2354. 

8  Eutropius,  Festus,  Zosimus, 
Zonaras. 

9  The  first  and  second  speeches 
of  Julian  and  the  third  of  Libanius 
belong    to   the   latter  class;  the 


156 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


|Ch.  VIII. 


struggle ;  but  apparently  the  general  condition  of 
things  was  this.  The  Persians  were  constantly  victo- 
rious in  the  open  field ;  Constantius  was  again  and  again 
defeated ; 1  but  no  permanent  gain  was  effected  by 
these  successes.  A  weakness  inherited  by  the  Persians 
from  the  Parthians 2  —  an  inability  to  conduct  sieges  to 
a  prosperous  issue  —  showed  itself ;  and  their  failures 
against  the  fortified  posts  which  Rome  had  taken  care 
to  establish  in  the  disputed  regions  were  continual. 
Up  to  the  close  of  a.d.  340,  Sapor  had  made  no  impor- 
tant gain,  had  struck  no  decisive  blow,  but  stood  nearly 
in  the  same  position  which  he  had  occupied  at  the 
commencement  of  the  conflict. 

But  the  year  a.d.  341  saw  a  change.  Sapor,  after 
obtaining  possession  of  the  person  of  Tiranus,  had 
sought  to  make  himself  master  of  Armenia,  and  had 
even  attempted  to  set  up  one  of  his  own  relatives  as 
king.3  But  the  indomitable  spirit  of  the  inhabitants, 
and  their  firm  attachment  to  their  Arsacid  princes, 
caused  his  attempts  to  fail  of  any  good  result,  and 
tended  on  the  whole  to  throw  Armenia  into  the  arms 
of  Rome.  Sapor,  after  a  while,  became  convinced  of 
the  folly  of  his  proceedings,  and  resolved  on  the  adop- 
tion of  a  wholly  new  policy.  He  would  relinquish  the 
idea  of  conquering,  and  would  endeavour  instead  to  con- 
ciliate the  Armenians,  in  the  hope  of  obtaining  from 


Epistle  of  Julian  to  the  Athenian 
Senate  and  People,  and  the  tenth 
oration  of  Libanius,  belong  (so  far 
as  Constantius  is  concerned)  to  the 
former.  The  later  writings  of  these 
two  authors  to  a  great  extent  in- 
validate the  earlier. 

1  Nine  times,  according  to  Festus 
(§  27);  frequently,  according  to 
Eutropius  (x.  10);  whenever  he 
engaged  the  Persians,  according  to 


Ammianus  (xx.  11,  ad  Jin.)  and 
Socrates  (Hist  Eccles.  ii.  25). 

2  See  the  Author's  Sixth  Mon- 
arch!/, p.  406. 

3  Mos.  Chor.  Hist.  Armen.  iii. 
10;  Faustus,  iii.  21.  The  Persian 
prince  seems  to  have  been  named 
Narses.  Moses  calls  him  Sapor's 
brother;  but  this  is  very  improba- 
ble. 


Ch.  VIII.  I 


SETTLEMENT  OF  ARMENIA. 


157 


their  gratitude  what  he  had  been  unable  to  extort  from 
their  fears.  Tiranus  was  still  living ;  and  Sapor,  we 
are  told,  offered  to  replace  him  upon  the  Armenian 
throne ; 1  but,  as  he  had  been  blinded  by  his  captors, 
and  as  Oriental  notions  did  not  allow  a  person  thus 
mutilated  to  exercise  royal  power,2  Tiranus  declined 
the  offer  made  him,  and  suggested  the  substitution  of 
his  son,  Arsaces,  who  was,  like  himself,  a  prisoner  in 
Persia.  Sapor  readily  consented ;  and  the  young  prince, 
released  from  captivity,  returned  to  his  country,  and 
was  installed  as  king  by  the  Persians,3  with  the  good- 
will of  the  natives,  who  were  satisfied  so  long  as  they 
could  feel  that  they  had  at  their  head  a  monarch  of  the 
ancient  stock.  The  arrangement,  of  course,  placed 
Armenia  on  the  Persian  side,  and  gave  Sapor  for  many 
years  a  powerful  ally  in  his  struggle  with  Rome.4 

Thus  Sapor  had,  by  the  year  a.d.  341,  made  a  very 
considerable  gain.  He  had  placed  a  friendly  sovereign 
on  the  Armenian  throne,  had  bound  him  to  his  cause 
by  oaths,  and  had  thereby  established  his  influence, 
not  only  over  Armenia  itself,  but  over  the  whole  tract 
which  lay  between  Armenia  and  the  Caucasus.  But  he 
was  far  from  content  with  these  successes.  It  was  still 
his  great  object  to  drive  the  Romans  from  Mesopota- 
mia ;  and  with  that  object  in  view  it  continued  to  be  his 
first  wish  to  obtain  possession  of  Nisi  bis.  Accordingly, 
having  settled  Armenian  affairs  to  his  liking,  he  made, 
in  a.d.  346,  a  second  attack  on  the  great  city  of  Northern 
Mesopotamia,  again  investing  it  with  a  large  body  of 


1  Faustus,  l.s.c. 

2  Hence  the  practice  of  blinding 
their  near  relatives  upon  their  ac- 
cession which  the  Shahs  of  Persia 
regularly  pursued  till  within  the 
present  century. 


3  Faustus,  iv.  1. 

4  On  the  friendly  relations  which 
subsisted  at  this  time  between 
Persia  and  Armenia,  see  Faustus, 
iv.  16. 


158 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  VIII. 


troops,  and  this  time  pressing  the  siege  during  the  space 
of  nearly  three  months.1  Again,  however,  the  strength  of 
the  walls  and  the  endurance  of  the  garrison  baffled  him. 
Sapor  was  once  more  obliged  to  withdraw  from  before 
the  place,  having  suffered  greater  loss  than  those  whom 
he  had  assailed,  and  forfeited  much  of  the  prestige 
which  he  had  acquired  by  his  many  victories. 

It  was,  perhaps,  on  account  of  the  repulse  from  Nisi- 
bis,  and  in  the  hope  of  recovering  his  lost  laurels,  that 
Sapor,  in  the  next  year  but  one,  a.d.  348,  made  an  un- 
usual effort.  Calling  out  the  entire  military  force  of 
the  empire,  and  augmenting  it  by  large  bodies  of  allies 
and  mercenaries,2  the  Persian  king,  towards  the  middle 
of  summer,  crossed  the  Tigris  by  three  bridges,3  and 
with  a  numerous  and  well-appointed  army  invaded  Cen- 
tral Mesopotamia,  probably  from  Adiabene,  or  the  region 
near  and  a  little  south  of  Nineveh.  Constantius,  with 
the  Roman  army,  was  posted  on  and  about  the  Sinjar 
range  of  hills,  in  the  vicinity  of  the  town  of  Singara,  which 
is  represented  by  the  modern  village  of  Sinjar.4  The 
Roman  emperor  did  not  venture  to  dispute  the  passage 
of  the  river,  or  to  meet  his  adversary  in  the  broad  plain 
which  intervenes  between  the  Tigris  and  the  mountain 
range,  but  clung  to  the  skirts  of  the  hills,  and  com- 
manded his  troops  to  remain  wholly  on  the  defensive.5 


1  Jerome  says :  '  Sapor  tribus  men- 
sibus  obsedit  Nisibin  ; 9  but  Theo- 
phanes  gives  the  exact  duration  of 
the  siege  as  seventy-eight  days 
(p.  31  D). 

2  Liban.  Orat.  iii.  p.  129,  A,  B. 

3  Ibid.  p.  180,  A. 

4  On  the  position  of  Sinjar  and 
the  character  of  the  surrounding 
country,  see  Layard  (Nin.  and  Bab. 
pp.  246-249). 

5  Liban.  p.  129,  D.  This  writer 
pretends  that  it  was  not  through 


fear  of  meeting  the  enemy  in  the 
open  that  Constantius  held  back, 
but  because  he  wanted  to  draw  his 
adversary  on  and  prevent  him  from 
recrossing  the  Tigris  without  fight- 
ing. Perhaps  it  is  most  probable 
that  the  passage  of  the  river  took 
Constantius  by  surprise,  that  he 
was  too  weak  to  prevent  it,  and 
was  obliged  to  remain  on  the  de- 
fensive until  his  troops  could  be 
concentrated. 


Cn.  VIII.  ] 


BATTLE  OF  SINGAKA. 


159 


Sapor  was  thus  enabled  to  choose  his  position,  to  estab- 
lish a  fortified  camp  at  a  convenient  distance  from  the 
enemy,  and  to  occupy  the  hills  in  its  vicinity  —  some 
portion  of  the  Sinjar  range  —  with  his  archers.  It 
is  uncertain  whether,  in  making  these  dispositions, 
he  was  merely  providing  for  his  own  safety,  or  whether 
he  was  laying  a  trap  into  which  he  hoped  to  entice  the 
Roman  army.1  Perhaps  his  mind  was  wide  enough  to 
embrace  both  contingencies.  At  any  rate,  having  thus 
established  a  point  d^appui  in  his  rear,  he  advanced 
boldly  and  challenged  the  legions  to  an  encounter.  The 
challenge  was  at  once  accepted,  and  the  battle  com- 
menced about  midday  ;  2  but  now  the  Persians,  having 
just  crossed  swords  with  the  enemy,  almost  immediately 
began  to  give  ground,  and  retreating  hastily  drew  their 
adversaries  along,  across  the  thirsty  plain,  to  the  vicinity 
of  their  fortified  camp,  where  a  strong  body  of  horse 
and  the  flower  of  the  Persian  archers  were  posted. 
The  horse  charged,  but  the  legionaries  easily  defeated 
them,3  and  elated  with  their  success  burst  into  the 
camp,  despite  the  warnings  of  their  leader,  who  strove 
vainly  to  check  their  ardour  and  to  induce  them  to  put 
off  the  completion  of  their  victory  till  the  next  day.4 
A  small  detachment  found  within  the  ramparts  was 
put  to  the  sword  ;  and  the  soldiers  scattered  themselves 
among  the  tents,  some  in  quest  of  booty,  others  only 
anxious  for  some  means  of  quenching  their  raging 


1  Libanius  represents  the  entire 
arrangement  as  a  plan  carefully 
laid  (Or at.  iii.  p.  130,  C);  Julian, 
on  the  contrary,  regards  the  flight 
of  the  Persians  as  a  real  panic,  and 
their  victory  at  the  camp  as  a  mere 
piece  of  good  fortune  (Orat.  i.  pp. 
42-44). 

2  Liban.  Orat.  iii.  p.  131,  A. 


3  Ibid.  p.  131,  D,  and  p.  132,  A. 
Each  legionary,  we  are  told,  stepped 
aside  out  of  the  way  of  the  horse- 
man who  bore  down  upon  him,  and 
then  struck  him,  as  he  passed,  with 
a  club. 

4  Julian.  Orat.  i.  pp.  42-3  ; 
Liban.  p.  130,  D. 


160 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


ICh.  VIII. 


thirst.1  Meantime  the  sun  had  gone  down,  and  the 
shades  of  night  fell  rapidly.  Regarding  the  battle  as 
over,  and  the  victory  as  assured,  the  Romans  gave 
themselves  up  to  sleep  or  feasting.  But  now  Sapor  saw 
his  opportunity —  the  opportunity  for  which  he  had 
perhaps  planned  and  waited.  His  light  troops  on  the 
adjacent  hills  commanded  the  camp,  and,  advancing  on 
every  side,  surrounded  it.  They  were  fresh  and  eager 
for  the  fray ;  they  fought  in  the  security  afforded  by 
the  darkness  ;  while  the  fires  of  the  camp  showed  them 
their  enemies,  worn  out  with  fatigue,  sleepy,  or  drunk- 
en.2 The  result,  as  might  have  been  expected,  was 
a  terrible  carnage.3  The  Persians  overwhelmed  the 
legionaries  with  showers  of  darts  and  arrows ;  flight, 
under  the  circumstances,  was  impossible  ;  and  the 
Roman  soldiers  mostly  perished  where  they  stood. 
They  took,  however,  ere  they  died,  an  atrocious  re- 
venge. Sapor's  son  had  been  made  prisoner  in  the 
course  of  the  day ;  in  their  desperation  the  legionaries 
turned  their  fury  against  this  innocent  youth  ;  they 
beat  him  with  whips,  wounded  him  with  the  points  of 
their  weapons,  and  finally  rushed  upon  him  and  killed 
him  with  a  hundred  blows.4 


1  Liban.  p.  132,  B ;  Julian,  p.  44. 
The  latter  writer  appears  to  ascribe 
the  Roman  disaster  mainly  to 
the  troops  exposing  themevsels  as 
they  drank  at  the  Persian  cisterns 
(kaKKOig  vAaTog  h(hv  evtvxovtec,  rrjv 
liaTCkiarrjv  vIktjv  ddcpdeipav). 

2  The  Roman  writers  touch 
lightly  the  condition  of  the  Roman 
troops  when  the  Persians  fell  upon 
them.  I  follow  probability  when 
I  describe  them  as  '  sleepy  or 
drunken.' 

3  See  Amm.  Marc,  xviii.  5  : 
"  Apud  Singaram  .  .  .  acerrime 
nocturna  concertatione  pugnatum 


est,  nostrorum  copiis  ingenti  strage 
confossis.'  Compare  Hieronym. 
anno  2364;  and  Liban.  Oral.  iii. 
p.  132,  C.  Even  Julian  admits 
that  the  battle  was  commonly  re- 
garded as  the  greatest  victory 
gained  by  the  Persians  during  the 
war  (Or at.  i.  p.  41). 

4  Liban.  p.  133,  D  :  'Eirtidov 
\oi  He  pom]  rbv  rov  fiaoikEug  Tralda, 
rbv  rrjg   upxVQ  du'uhxov,  E&yprjfiEvov, 

KCli  /LKlGTiyoV/lEVOV,  KOl  KEVTOVjUEVOV , 
KCIL     fillKpUV      VOTEpOV  KCLTCLKOTTTOflEVOV. 

Tillemont  has  seen  that  this  treat- 
ment could  not  have  been  possible 
till  the  troops  were  half -maddened 


Ch.  VIII.  ]  THIRD  SIEGE  OF  NISIBIS.  161 


The  battle  of  Singara,  though  thus  disastrous  to  the 
Romans,  had  not  any  great  effect  in  determining  the 
course  or  issue  of  the  war.  Sapor  did  not  take  advan- 
tage of  his  victory  to  attack  the  rest  of  the  Roman 
forces  in  Mesopotamia,  or  even  to  attempt  the  siege 
of  any  large  town.1  Perhaps  he  had  really  suffered 
large  losses  in  the  earlier  part  of  the  day  ;  2  perhaps  he 
was  too  much  affected  by  the  miserable  death  of  his 
son  to  care,  till  time  had  dulled  the  edge  of  his  grief, 
for  military  glory.3  At  any  rate,  we  hear  of  his 
undertaking  no  further  enterprise  till  the  second  year 
after  the  battle,4  a.d.  350,  when  he  made  his  third 
and  most  desperate  attempt  to  capture  Nisibis. 

The  rise  of  a  civil  war  in  the  West,  and  the  departure 
of  Constantius  for  Europe  with  the  flower  of  his  troops 
early  in  the  year,5  no  doubt  encouraged  the  Persian 
monarch  to  make  one  more  effort  against  the  place 
which  had  twice  repulsed  him  with  ignominy.6  He  col- 
lected a  numerous  native  army,  and  strengthened  it  by 
the  addition  of  a  body  of  Indian  allies,7  who  brought  a 
large  troop  of  elephants  into  the  field.8  With  this 
force  he  crossed  the  Tigris  in  the  early  summer,  and, 
after  taking  several  fortified  posts,  marched  northwards 


with  despair  and  fury.  {Histoire 
des  Empereurs,  torn.  iv.  p.  347. ) 

1  So  much  we  may  accept  from 
the  boasts  of  Julian  (Orat.  i.  p.  45) 
and  Libanius  (Orat.  in.  p.  133,  A), 
corroborated  as  they  are  by  the 
testimony  of  Ammianus,  who  says 
(l.s.c.)  that  the  Persians  made  no 
use  of  their  victory  at  Singara; 
but  it  is  impossible  to  believe  the 
statement  of  Libanius,  that  the 
whole  Persian  army  fled  in  dis- 
order from  Singara  and  hastily 
recrossed  the  Tigris  (p.  133,  D). 

2  Julian  maintains  that  both 
sides  suffered  equally  in  the  battle 


(p.  41). 

3  Compare  the  grief  of  Orodes 
on  the  death  of  Pacorus  (Sixth 
Monarchy,  p.  195). 

4  Jerome's  statement  that  Amida 
and  Bezabde  were  taken  by  Sapor 
shortly  after  the  battle  of  Singara 
arises  apparently  from  some  con- 
fusion between  the  events  of  the 
year  a.d.  349  and  those  of  a.d.  359. 

5  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall, 
vol.  ii.  p.  377. 

6  Julian.  Orat.  i.  p.  48. 

7  Ibid.  ii.  p.  115. 

8  Ibid.  p.  116. 


162 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  YIIL 


and  invested  Nisibis.  The  Roman  commander  in  the 
place  was  the  Count  Lucilianus,  afterwards  the  father- 
in-law  of  Jovian,  a  man  of  resource  and  determination. 
He  is  said  to  have  taken  the  best  advantage  of  every 
favourable  turn  of  fortune  in  the  course  of  the  siege, 
and  to  have  prolonged  the  resistance  by  various  subtle 
stratagems.1  But  the  real  animating  spirit  of  the  de- 
fence was  once  more  the  bishop,  St.  James,  who  roused 
the  enthusiasm  of  the  inhabitants  to  the  highest  pitch 
by  his  exhortations,  guided  them  by  his  counsels,  and 
was  thought  to  work  miracles  for  them  by  his  prayers.2 
Sapor  tried  at  first  the  ordinary  methods  of  attack ;  he 
battered  the  walls  with  his  rams,  and  sapped  them  with 
mines.  But  finding  that  by  these  means  he  made  no 
satisfactory  progress,  he  had  recourse  shortly  to  wholly 
novel  proceedings.  The  river  Mygdonius  (now  the  Je- 
rujer),  swollen  by  the  melting  of  the  snows  in  the 
Mons  Masius,  had  overflowed  its  banks  and  covered 
with  an  inundation  the  plain  in  which  Nisibis  stands. 
Sapor  saw  that  the  forces  of  nature  might  be  employed 
to  advance  his  ends,  and  so  embanked  the  lower  part  of 
the  plain  that  the  water  could  not  run  off,  but  formed 
a  deep  lake  round  the  town,  gradually  creeping  up  the 
walls  till  it  had  almost  reached  the  battlements.3  Hav- 
ing thus  created  an  artificial  sea,  the  energetic  monarch 
rapidly  collected,  or  constructed,4  a  fleet  of  vessels,  and, 
placing  his  military  engines  on  board,  launched  the  ships 
upon  the  waters,  and  so  attacked  the  walls  of  the  city 


1  Zosimus,  iii.  8. 

2  Theodoret,  ii.  30. 

3  Julian.    Orat.   ii.   p.  ?  115:  'O 

TlapOvaiuv    (SaoikEvc  .  .  .  ettitelx'i&v 

T7]V     TToXeV     X^^O-GIV,     e\t(X     EIC  laVTCL 

dexofievog  rbv  Mvydoviov,  Xifivriv  citce- 
tyaivEio  to  Txepl  tCj  ugtel  xupiov,  nai 
oonep    vfjGOv    kv    avTy    ivvelxe  ttjv 


TloklV,    (XLKpOV    VTTEpeXOVOUV     KGt  V7TEp- 

XdivofiEvov  tC)v  £7tciA.£e(*)v.  Compare 
Orat.  i.  p.  49. 

4  Compare  Trajan's  construction 
of  a  fleet  in  this  same  region  in  the 
winter  of  a.d.  115-116.  (Sixth 
Monarchy,  p.  310. ) 


Ch.  VIII.] 


THIRD  SIEGE  OF  NISIBIS. 


163 


at  great  advantage.  But  the  defenders  resisted  stoutly, 
setting  the  engines  on  fire  with  torches,  and  either 
lifting  the  ships  from  the  water  by  means  of  cranes,  or 
else  shattering  them  with  the  huge  stones  which  they 
could  discharge  from  their  balistce.1  Still,  therefore, 
no  impression  was  made  ;  but  at  last  an  unforeseen  cir- 
cumstance brought  the  besieged  into  the  greatest  peril, 
and  almost  gave  Nisibis  into  the  enemy's  hands.  The 
inundation,  confined  by  the  mounds  of  the  Persians, 
which  prevented  it  from  running  off,  pressed  with  con- 
tinually increasing  force  against  the  defences  of  the 
city,  till  at  last  the  wall,  in  one  part,  proved  too  weak 
to  withstand  the  tremendous  weight  which  bore  upon 
it,  and  gave  way  suddenly  for  the  space  of  a  hundred 
and  fifty  feet.2  What  further  damage  was  done  to  the 
town  we  know  not ;  but  a  breach  was  opened  through 
which  the  Persians  at  once  made  ready  to  pour  into  the 
place,  regarding  it  as  impossible  that  so  huge  a  gap 
should  be  either  repaired  or  effectually  defended.  Sapor 
took  up  his  position  on  an  artificial  eminence,  while  his 
troops  rushed  to  the  assault.3  First  of  all  marched  the 
heavy  cavalry,  accompanied  by  the  horse-archers ;  next 
came  the  elephants,  bearing  iron  towers  upon  their 
backs,  and  in  each  tower  a  number  of  bowmen  ;  inter- 
mixed with  the  elephants  were  a  certain  amount  of 
heavy-armed  foot.4  It  was  a  strange  column  with 
which  to  attack  a  breach  ;  and  its  composition  does  not 


1  Julian,  l.s  c.  Gibbon  appears 
to  have  understood  Julian  to  state 
that  the  balistce  discharging  these 
huge  stones  (stones  weighing  more 
than  five  hundred- weight)  were 
carried  by  the  ships  (Decline  and 
Fall,  vol.  ii.  p.  108).  But  Julian's 
meaning  is  clearly  that  stated  above 
in  the  text. 

2  A  similar  danger  not  unfre- 


quently  threatens  Baghdad  from 
the  swell  of  the  Euphrates,  which 
is  brought  to  its  walls  through  the 
Saklawiyeh  canal.  Mr.  Loftus  gives 
a  graphic  account  of  the  risk  run 
in  May  1849  (Chaldwa  and  Susiana, 
pp.  7-8). 

3  Julian,  p.  116. 

4  Ibid.  p.  120. 


164 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  VIII. 


say  much  for  Persian  siege  tactics,  which  were  always 
poor  and  ineffective,1  and  which  now,  as  usually,  resulted 
in  failure.  The  horses  became  quickly  entangled  in  the 
ooze  and  mud  which  the  waters  had  left  behind  them 
as  they  subsided  ;  the  elephants  were  even  less  able  to 
overcome  these  difficulties,  and  as  soon  as  they  received 
;i  wound  sank  down  —  never  to  rise  again  —  in  the 
swamp.2  Sapor  hastily  gave  orders  for  the  assailing 
column  to  retreat  and  seek  the  friendly  shelter  of  the 
Persian  camp,  while  he  essayed  to  maintain  his  advan- 
tage in  a  different  way.  His  light  archers  were  ordered 
to  the  front,  and,  being  formed  into  divisions  which 
were  to  act  as  reliefs,  received  orders  to  prevent  the 
restoration  of  the  ruined  wall  by  directing  an  incessant 
storm  of  arrows  into  the  gap  made  by  the  waters.  But 
the  firmness  and  activity  of  the  garrison  and  inhabitants 
defeated  this  well-iftiagined  proceeding.  While  the 
heavy-armed  troops  stood  in  the  gap  receiving  the 
flights  of  arrows  and  defending  themselves  as  they  best 
could,  the  unarmed  multitude  raised  a  new  wall  in  their 
rear,  which,  by  the  morning  of  the  next  day,  was  six 
feet  in  height,3  This  last  proof  of  his  enemies'  resolu- 
tion and  resource  seems  to  have  finally  convinced  Sapor 
of  the  hopelessness  of  his  enterprise.  Though  he  still 
continued  the  siege  for  a  while,  he  made  no  other 
grand  attack,  and  at  length  drew  off  his  forces,  hav- 
ing lost  twenty  thousand  men  before  the  walls,4  and 
wasted  a  hundred  days,  or  more  than  three  months.5 


1  See  above,  p.  156,  The  weak- 
ness here  spoken  of  did  not  extend 
to  the  ancient  Persians,  who  were 
fairly  successful  in  their  sieges 
{Ancient  Monarchies,  vol.  iv.  p. 
130). 

2  Ammianus  tells  ns  that,  either 
now  or  at  some  other  time  in  the 


siege,  the  Persians  suffered  much 
by  the  elephants  turning  against 
their  own  side  and  trampling  the 
footmen  under  their  feet  (xxv.  1). 
:5  Julian,  p.  122. 

4  Zonaras,  xiii. 

5  Chron.  Pasch.  p.  290,  A.  Julian 
exaggerates  when  he.  says  the  time 


Ch.  VIII.  ]       INVASION  OF  THE  MASSAGETJE. 


165 


Perhaps  be  would  not  have  departed  so  sOon,  but 
would  have  turned  the  siege  into  a  blockade,  and  en- 
deavoured to  starve  the  garrison  into  submission,  had 
not  alarming  tidings  reached  him  from  his  north-eastern 
frontier.  Then,  as  now,  the  low  flat  sandy  region  east 
of  the  Caspian  was  in  the  possession  of  nomadic  hordes, 
whose  whole  life  was  spent  in  war  and  plunder.  The 
Oxus  might  be  nominally  the  boundary  of  the  empire 
in  this  quarter ;  but  the  nomads  were  really  dominant 
over  the  entire  desert  to  the  foot  of  the  Hyrcanian  and 
Parthian  hills.1  Petty  plundering  forays  into  the  fertile 
region  south  and  east  of  the  desert  were  no  doubt  con- 
stant, and  were  not  greatly  regarded ;  but  from  time  to 
time  some  tribe  or  chieftain  bolder  than  the  rest  made 
a  deeper  inroad  and  a  more  sustained  attack  than 
usual,  spreading  consternation  around,  and  terrifying 
the  court  for  its  safety.  Such  an  attack  seems  to  have 
occurred  towards  the  autumn  of  a.d.  350.  The  in- 
vading horde  is  said  to  have  consisted  of  Massagetae  ; 2 
but  we  can  hardly  be  mistaken  in  regarding  them  as, 
in  the  main,  of  Tatar  or  Turkoman  blood,  akin  to  the 
Usbegs  and  other  Turanian  tribes  which  still  inhabit  the 
sandy  steppe.  Sapor  considered  the  crisis  such  as  to  re- 
quire his  own  presence  ;  and  thus,  while  civil  war  sum- 
moned one  of  the  two  rivals  from  Mesopotamia  to  the 
far  West,  where  he  had  to  contend  with  the  self-styled 
emperors,  Magnentius  and  Vetranio,  the  other  was 
called  away  to  the  extreme  East  to  repel  a  Tatar  inva- 


wasted  was  '  four  months  '  (Orat.  i. 
p.  51). 

1  See  Wilson,  Ariana  Antiqua, 
p.  386. 

2  Zonaras,  xiii.  7.  The  original 
ethnic  character  of  the  Massagetae 
is  perhaps   doubtful.     They  may 


have  been  degenerated  Arians; 
but  in  their  habits  they  are,  even 
from  the  first,  scarcely  to  be  distin- 
guished from  the  Tatar  or  Tura- 
nian hordes.  By  Sapors  time  they 
had  probably  intermixed  largely 
with  Tatars. 


166 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.     %       [Ch.  VIII. 


sion.  A  tacit  truce  was.  thus  established  between  the 
great  belligerents 1  —  a  truce  which  lasted  for  seven  or 
eight  years.  The  unfortunate  Mesopotamians,  harassed 
by  constant  war  for  above  twenty  years,  had  now  a 
breathing-space  during  which  to  recover  from  the  ruin 
and  desolation  that  had  overwhelmed  them.  Rome 
and  Persia  for  a  time  suspended  their  conflict.  Rivalry, 
indeed,  did  not  cease ;  but  it  was  transferred  from  the 
battlefield  to  the  cabinet,  and  the  Roman  emperor 
sought  and  found  in  diplomatic  triumphs  a  compensa- 
tion for  the  ill-success  which  had  attended  his  efforts 
in  the  field. 


1  Julian.  Orat.  i.  p.  51 ;  Orat.  ii.  I  tovtov,  kcu  ovte  opicuv  ovre  GvvdrjKdv 
p.  123.     (uyei  npbQ  rmuq  eiprjvnv  en  \  kdirjoev  *  ayana  de  oltcoc  juwuv,  kt.%.) 


Ch.  IX.  I 


REVOLT  OF  ARMENIA. 


167 


CHAPTER  IX. 

Revolt  of  Armenia  and  Acceptance  by  Arsaces  of  the  Position  of  a  Roman 
Feudatory.  Character  and  Issue  of  Sapor's  EasternWars.  His  nego- 
tiations with  Constantius.  His  Extreme  Demands.  Circumstances  under 
which  he  determines  to  renew  the  War.  His  Preparations.  Deser- 
tion to  Mm  of  Antoninus.  Great  Invasion  of  Sapor.  Siege  of  Amida. 
Sapor's  Severities.  Siege  and  Capture  of  Singara  ;  of  Bezabde.  At- 
tack on  Virta  fails.  Aggressive  Movement  of  Constantius.  He  attacks 
Bezabde^  but  fails.    Campaign  of  a.d.  361.    Death  of  Constantius. 

Evenerat  .  .  .  quasi  fatali  constellatione  .  .  .  ut  Constantium  dirnicantem 
cum  Persis  fortuna  semper  sequeretur  afflictior.  — Amm.  Marc.  xx.  9,  ad  fin. 

It  seems  to  have  been  soon  after  the  close  of  Sapor  s 
first  war  with  Constantius  that  events  took  place  in 
Armenia  which  once  more  replaced  that  country  under 
Roman  influence.  Arsaces,  the  son  of  Tiranus,  had 
been,  as  we  have  seen,1  established  as  monarch,  by 
Sapor,  in  the  year  a.d.  341,  under  the  notion  that,  in 
return  for  the  favour  shown  him,  he  would  administer 
Armenia  in  the  Persian  interest.  But  gratitude  is  an 
unsafe  basis  for  the  friendships  of  monarchs.  Arsaces, 
after  a  time,  began  to  chafe  against  the  obligations  under 
which  Sapor  had  laid  him,  and  to  wish,  by  taking  inde- 
pendent action,  to  show  himself  a  real  king,  and  not  a 
mere  feudatory.  He  was  also,  perhaps,  tired  of  aiding 
Sapor  in  his  Roman  war,  and  may  have  found  that  he 
suffered  more  than  he  gained  by  having  Rome  for  an 
enemy.  At  any  rate,  in  the  interval 2  between  a.d.  351 


1  Supra,  p.  157.  I  Rome  is  misdated  both  by  Faustus 

2  The  alliance  of  Arsaces  with  '  and  by  Moses  of  Chorene.  The 


168 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


|Ch.  IX. 


and  359,  probably  while  Sapor  was  engaged  in  the  far 
East,1  Arsaces  sent  envoys  to  Constantinople  with  a  re- 
quest to  Constantius  that  he  would  give  him  in  marriage 
a  member  of  the  Imperial  house.2  Constantius  was 
charmed  with  the  application  made  to  him,  and  at  once 
accepted  the  proposal.  He  selected  for  the  proffered 
honour  a  certain  Olympias,  the  daughter  of  Ablabius,  a 
Praetorian  prefect,  and  lately  the  betrothed  bride  of  his 
own  brother,  Constans;  and  sent  her  to  Armenia,3 
where  Arsaces  welcomed  her,  and  made  her  (as  it 
would  seem)  his  chief  wife,  provoking  thereby  the 
jealousy  and  aversion  of  his  previous  sultana,  a  native 
Armenian,  named  Pharandzem.4  The  engagement 
thus  entered  into  led  on,  naturally,  to  the  conclusion 
of  a  formal  alliance  between  Rome  and  Armenia  —  an 
alliance  which  Sapor  made  fruitless  efforts  to  disturb,5 
and  which  continued  unimpaired  down  to  the  time 
(a.d.  359)  when  hostilities  once  more  broke  out  be- 
tween Rome  and  Persia. 

Of  Sapor's  Eastern  wars  we  have  no  detailed  account. 
They  seem  to  have  occupied  him  from  a.d.  350  to  a.d. 
357,  and  to  have  been,  on  the  whole,  successful.  They 


former  places  it  in  the  reign  of 
Valens,  a.d.  364-379  (Biblioiheque, 
iv.  5),  the  latter  in  that  of  Valen- 
tinian  L,  a.d.  364-375  (Hist.  Armen. 
iii.  21).  But  it  is  clear  from  Am- 
mianus  (xx.  11),  whose  authority 
exceeds  that  of  all  the  Armenian 
historians  united,  that  the  alliance 
was  made  with  Constantius.  It 
could  not  have  been  earlier  than 
a.d.  351,  since  Constans  did  not 
die  till  a.d.  350;  and  it  could  not 
have  been  later  than  a.d.  359,  since 
it  is  spoken  of  as  existing  in  that 
year  (Aram.  Marc.  xvii.  14). 

1  That  is  between  a.d.  350  and 
357. 

2  Faustus,  iv.  15. 


3  Amm.  Marc.  xx.  11;  Athanas. 
Ep.  ad  Solitar.  p.  856;  Mos.  Chor. 
iii.  21. 

4  Pharandzem  was  the  daughter 
of  a  certain  Antor,  prince  of  Siunia, 
and  was  first  married  to  Gnel  or 
Knel,  a  nephew  of  Arsaces,  whom 
he  put  to  death.  Her  jealousy 
impelled  her  to  contrive  the  mur- 
der  of  Olympias,  who  is  said  to  have 
been  killed  by  poison  introduced 
into  the  sacred  elements  at  the 
Eucharist.  (See  Faustus,  l.s.c. ; 
Mos.  Chor.  iii.  23,  24.) 

5  Amm.  Marc.  xx.  11:  'Audie- 
bat  saspius  eum  tentatum  a  rege  Per- 
sarum  fallaciis,  et  minis,  et  dolis.' 
Compare  Faustus,  iv.  16,  20. 


Ch.  IX.] 


EASTERN  WARS  OF  SAPOR  II. 


169 


were  certainly  terminated  by  a  peace  in  the  last-named 
year 1  —  a  peace  of  which  it  must  have  been  a  condition 
that  his  late  enemies  should  lend  him  aid  in  the  strug- 
gle which  he  was  about  to  renew  with  Rome.  Who 
these  enemies  exactly  were,  and  what  exact  region 
they  inhabited,  is  doubtful.  They  comprised  certainly 
the  Chionites  and  Gelani,  probably  the  Euseni  and  the 
Vertas.2  The  Chionites  are  thought  to  have  been  Hiong- 
nu  or  Huns  ;3  and  the  Euseni  are  probably  the  U-siun, 
who,  as  early  as  B.C.  200,  are  found  among  the  nomadic 
hordes  pressing  towards  the  Oxus.4  The  Vertse  are 
wholly  unknown.  The  Gelani  should,  by  their  name, 
be  the  inhabitants  of  Ghilan,  or  the  coast  tract  south- 
Avest  of  the  Caspian  ;  but  this  locality  seems  too  remote 
from  the  probable  seats  of  the  Chionites  and  Euseni  to 
be  the  one  intended.  The  general  scene  of  the  wars 
was  undoubtedly  east  of  the  Caspian,  either  in  the 
Oxus  region,  or  still  further  eastward,  on  the  confines 
of  India  and  Scythia.5  The  result  of  the  wars,  though 
not  a  conquest,  was  an  extension  of  Persian  influence 
and  power.  Troublesome  enemies  were  converted  into 
friends  and  allies.  The  loss  of  a  predominating  in- 
fluence over  Armenia  was  thus  compensated,  or  more 
than  compensated,  within  a  few  years,  by  a  gain  of  a 
similar  kind  in  another  quarter. 

While  Sapor  was  thus  engaged  in  the  far  East,  he 


1  Amm.  Marc.  xVii.  5,  §'  1 :  '  Rex 
Persarum,  in  confirms  agens  adhuc 
gentium  extimarum,  jamque  cum 
Chionitis  et  Gelanis,  omnium  acer- 
rimis  bellatoribus,  pignore  iclo  so- 
cietatis,'  &c. 

2  The  Chionites  are  mentioned 
repeatedly  (Amm.  Marc.  xvi.  9; 
xvii.  5;  xviii.  6;  xix.  1,  2,  &c); 
the  Vertfe  twice  (xix.  2  and  5); 


the  Euseni  and  Gelani  once  each 
(xvi.  9,  and  xvii.  5).  It  is  not 
distinctly  safd  that  the  Euseni  or 
VertiE  had  fought  against  Sapor. 

3  Wilson,  Ariana  Antiqua,  p. 
3S6. 

4  Ibid.  p.  30?>.  Compare  the 
Author's  Sixth  Monarch]/,  p.  115. 

5  So  Gibbon  (Decline  and  Fall, 
vol.  ii.  p.  408,  note  58 ). 


170 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


LCh.  IX. 


received  letters  from  the  officer  whom  he  had  left  in 
charge  of  his  western  frontier,1  informing  him  that  the 
Romans  were  anxious  to  exchange  the  precarious  truce 
which  Mesopotamia  had  been  allowed  to  enjoy  during 
the  last  five  or  six  years  for  a  more  settled  and  formal 
peace.  Two  great  Roman  officials,  Cassianus,  duke  of 
Mesopotamia,  and  Musonianus,  Praetorian  prefect,  un- 
derstanding that  Sapor  was  entangled  in  a  bloody  and 
difficult  war  at  the  eastern  extremity  of  his  empire,  and 
knowing  that  Constantius  was  fully  occupied  with  the 
troubles  caused  by  the  inroads  of  the  barbarians  into 
the  more  western  of  the  Roman  provinces,  had  thought 
that  the  time  was  favourable  for  terminating  the  provis- 
ional state  of  affairs  in  the  Mesopotamian  region  by  an 
actual  treaty.2  They  had  accordingly  opened  negotia- 
tions with  Tamsapor,  satrap  of  Adiabene,  and  suggested 
to  him  that  he  should  sound  his  master  on  the  subject 
of  making  peace  with  Rome.  Tamsapor  appears  to  have 
misunderstood  the  character  of  these  overtures,  or  to 
have  misrepresented  them  to  Sapor ;  in  his  despatch  he 
made  Constantius  himself  the  mover  in  the  matter,  and 
spoke  of  him  as  humbly  supplicating  the  great  king  to 
grant  him  conditions.3  It  happened  that  the  message 
reached  Sapor  just  as  he  had  come  to  terms  with  his 
eastern  enemies,  and  had  succeeded  in  inducing  them 
to  become  his  allies.  He  was  naturally  elated  at  his 
success,  and  regarded  the  Roman  overture  as  a  simple 
acknowledgment  of  weakness.  Accordingly  he  an- 
swered in  the  most  haughty  style.  His  letter,  which 
was  conveyed  to  the  Roman  emperor  at  Sirmium  by 


1  Amm.  Marc.  xvii.  5. 

2  Ibid.  xvi.  8. 

8  Ibid. :  '  Tamsapor  .  .  .  refert  ad 


regem,  quod  acerrimis  bellis  Con- 
stantius implicatus  pacem  postulat 
precativam.'    Compare  xvii.  5. 


Ch.  IX.]      LETTER  OF  SAPOR  TO  CONSTANTIUS.  171 

an  ambassador  named  Narses,1  was  conceived  in  the 
following  terms  : 2  — 

4  Sapor,  king  of  kings,  brother  of  the  sun  and  moon, 
and  companion  of  the  stars,  sends  salutation  to  his  bro- 
ther, Constantius  Cassar.  It  glads  me  to  see  that  thou 
art  at  last  returned  to  the  right  way,  and  art  ready  to 
do  what  is  just  and  fair,  having  learned  by  experience 
that  inordinate  greed  is  ofttimes  punished  by  defeat  and 
disaster.  As  then  the  voice  of  truth  ought  to  speak 
with  all  openness,  and  the  more  illustrious  of  mankind 
should  make  their  words  mirror  their  thoughts,  I  will 
briefly  declare  to  thee  what  I  propose,  not  forgetting 
that  I  have  often  said  the  same  things  before.  Your 
own  authors  are  witness  that  the  entire  tract  within  the 
river  Strymon  and  the  borders  of  Macedon  was  once 
held  by  my  ancestors ;  if  I  required  you  to  restore  all 
this,  it  would  not  ill  become  me  (excuse  the  boast),  in- 
asmuch as  I  excel  in  virtue  and  in  the  splendour  of  my 
achievements  the  whole  line  of  our  ancient  monarchs. 
But  as  moderation  delights  me,  and  has  always  been  the 
rule  of  my  conduct  —  wherefore  from  my  youth  up  I 
have  had  no  occasion  to  repent  of  any  action  —  I  will 
be  content  to  receive  Mesopotamia  and  Armenia,  which 
was  fraudulently  extorted  from  my  grandfather.  We 
Persians  have  never  admitted  the  principle,  which  you 
proclaim  with  such  affrontery,  that  success  in  war  is 
always  glorious,  whether  it  be  the  fruit  of  courage  or 
trickery.  In  conclusion,  if  you  will  take  the  advice  of 
one  who  speaks  for  your  good,  sacrifice  a  small  tract  of 
territory,  one  always  in  dispute  and  causing  continual 
bloodshed,  in  order  than  you  may  rule  the  remainder 
securely.    Physicians,  remember,  often  cut  and  burn, 


1  Pet.  Patric.  Fr.  17.  Ammia- 
dus  calls  the  ambassador  Narseus. 


The  Persian  name  was  Narsehi. 
2  See  Amm.  Marc.  xvii.  5. 


172 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCH  V. 


[Cu.  IX. 


and  even  amputate  portions  of  the  body,  that  the  pa- 
tient may  have  the  healthy  use  of  what  is  left  to  him  ; 
and  there  are  animals  which,  understanding  why  the 
hunters  chase  them,  deprive  themselves  of  the  thing 
coveted,  to  live  thenceforth  without  fear.  I  warn  you, 
that,  if  my  ambassador  returns  in  vain,  I  will  take  the 
field  against  you,  so  soon  as  the  winter  is  past,  with  all 
my  forces,  confiding  in  my  good  fortune  and  in  the 
fairness  of  the  conditions  w^hich  I  have  now  offered.' 

It  must  have  been  a  severe  blow  to  Imperial  pride 
to  receive  such  a  letter ;  and  the  sense  of  insult  can 
scarcely  have  been  much  mitigated  by  the  fact  that  the 
missive  was  enveloped  in  a  silken  covering,1  or  by  the 
circumstance  that  the  bearer,  Narses,  endeavoured  by 
his  conciliating  manners  to  atone  for  his  master's  rude- 
ness,2 Constantius  replied,  however,  in  a  dignified  and 
calm  tone.3  4  The  Roman  emperor,'  he  said,  1  victorious 
by  land  and  sea,  saluted  his  brother,  King  Sapor.  His 
lieutenant  in  Mesopotamia  had  meant  well  in  opening  a 
negotiation  with  a  Persian  governor ;  but  he  had  acted 
without  orders,  and  could  not  bind  his  master.  Never- 
theless, he  (Constantius)  would  not  disclaim  what  had 
been  done,  since  he  did  not  object  to  a  peace,  provided 
it  were  fair  and  honourable.  But  to  ask  the  master  of 
the  whole  Roman  world  to  surrender  territories  which 
he  had  successfully  defended  when  he  ruled  only  over 
the  provinces  of  the  East  was  plainly  indecent  and 
absurd.  He  must  add  that  the  employment  of  threats 
was  futile,  and  too  common  an  artifice ;  more  especially 
as  the  Persians  themselves  must  know  that  Rome  always 

1  Themistius,  Orat.  iv.  in  laudem  somewhat  abbreviated  the  reply  of 
Constanta,  p.  57,  B.  Constantius,  but  have  endeavoured 

2  Pet.  Patric.  l.s.c.  to  preserve  all  the  points  which 

3  A  mm.    Marc,    l.s.c.     I    have  are  of  any  importance. 


Ch.  IX.  I 


REPLY  OF  CONSTANTIUS. 


173 


defended  herself  when  attacked,  and  that,  if  occasion- 
ally she  was  vanquished  in  a  battle,  yet  she  never  failed 
to  have  the  advantage  in  the  event  of  every  war.' 
Three  envoys  were  entrusted  with  the  delivery  of  this 
reply  1  —  Prosper,  a  count  of  the  empire  ;  Spectatus,  a 
tribune  and  notary  ;  and  Eustathius,  an  orator  and  phi- 
losopher, a  pupil  of  the  celebrated  Neo-Platonist,  Jam- 
blichus,2  and  a  friend  of  St.  Basil.3  Constantius  was 
most  anxious  for  peace,  as  a  dangerous  war  threatened 
with  the  Alemanni,  one  of  the  most  powerful  tribes 
of  Germany.4  He  seems  to  have  hoped  that,  if  the 
unadorned  language  of  the  two  statesmen  failed  to 
move  Sapor,  he  might  be  won  over  by  the  persuasive 
eloquence  of  the  professor  of  rhetoric. 

But  Sapor  was  bent  on  war.  He  had  concluded  ar- 
rangements with  the  natives  so  long  his  adversaries  in 
the  East,  by  which  they  had  pledged  themselves  to  join 
his  standard  with  all  their  forces  in  the  ensuing  spring.5 
He  was  well  aware  of  the  position  of  Constantius  in  the 
West,  of  the  internal  corruption  of  his  court,  and  of 
the  perils  constantly  threatening  him  from  external 
enemies.  A  Roman  official  of  importance,  bearing  the 
once  honoured  name  of  Antoninus,  had  recently  taken 
refuge  with  him  from  the  claims  of  pretended  creditors, 
and  had  been  received  into  high  favour  on  account  of 
the  information  which  he  was  able  to  communicate 
with  respect  to  the  disposition  of  the  Roman  forces  and 
the  condition  of  their  magazines.6  This  individual,  en- 
nobled by  the  royal  authority,  and  given  a  place  at  the 
royal  table,  gained  great  influence  over  his  new  master, 

1  Amm.  Marc.  xvii.  5,  sub  Jin.       j  Ammianus  (xvii.  6-10)  and  Gibbon 

2  Eunap.  Vit.  Jamblich.  p.  23.      j  (Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  ii.  pp.  412- 

3  Basil.  Ep.  i.  (Opera,  vol.  iii.  j  418). 

pp.  69,  70).  5  Amm.  Marc.  xvii.  5,  and  xviii.  4. 

4  See  the  history  of  the  war  in      0  Ibid,  xviii.  5. 


174  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [Ch.  IX. 

whom  he  stimulated  by  alternately  reproaching  him  with 
his  backwardness  in  the  past,  and  putting  before  him  the 
prospect  of  easy  triumphs  over  Rome  in  the  future.  He 
pointed  out  that  the  emperor,  with  the  bulk  of  his  troops 
and  treasures,  was  detained  in  the  regions  adjoining  the 
Danube,  and  that  the  East  was  left  almost  undefended ; 
he  magnified  the  services  which  he  was  himself  com- 
petent to  render ; 1  he  exhorted  Sapor  to  bestir  himself, 
and  to  put  confidence  in  his  good  fortune.  He  recom- 
mended that  the  old  plan  of  sitting  down  before  walled 
towns  should  be  given  up,  and  that  the  Persian  monarch, 
leaving  the  strongholds  of  Mesopotamia  in  his  rear, 
should  press  forward  to  the  Euphrates,2  pour  his  troops 
across  it,  and  overrun  the  rich  province  of  Syria,  which 
he  would  find  unguarded,  and  which  had  not  been  in- 
vaded by  an  enemy  for  nearly  a  century.  The  views  of 
Antoninus  were  adopted ;  but,  in  practice,  they  were 
overruled  by  the  exigencies  of  the  situation.  A  Roman 
army  occupied  Mesopotamia,  and  advanced  to  the  banks 
of  the  Tigris.  When  the  Persians  in  full  force  crossed 
the  river,  accompanied  by  Chionite  and  Albanian  allies,3 
they  found  a  considerable  body  of  troops  prepared  to 
resist  them.  Their  opponents  did  not,  indeed,  offer 
battle,  but  they  laid  waste  the  country  as  the  Persians 
took  possession  of  it ;  they  destroyed  the  forage,  evacu- 
ated the  indefensible  towns4  (which  fell,  of  course,  into 
the  enemy's  hands),  and  fortified  the  line  of  the  Eu- 
phrates with  castles,  military  engines,  and  palisades.5 
Still  the  programme  of  Antoninus  Avould  probably  have 
been  carried  out,  had  not  the  swell  of  the  Euphrates 


1  4  Ipse  quoque  in  multis  ac  ne- 
cessariis  operam  suam  fideiiter  pro- 
mittens.'  (Amra,  Marc,  xviii.  5, 
ad  fin. ) 

2  Ibid,  xviii.  6. 


3  Ibid.  Ammianus  himself  wit- 
nessed the  passage  of  the  river. 

4  Carrhae  alone  is  expressly  men- 
tioned. 

r°  Aram.  Marc,  xviii.  7. 


Ch.  IX.  1 


GREAT  INVASION  OF  SAPOR. 


175 


exceeded  the  average,  and  rendered  it  impossible  for 
the  Persian  troops  to  ford  the  river  at  the  usual  point 
of  passage  into  Syria.  On  discovering  this  obstacle, 
Antoninus  suggested  that,  by  a  march  to  the  north-east 
through  a  fertile  country,  the  Upper  Euphrates  might 
be  reached,  and  easily  crossed,  before  its  waters  had 
attained  any  considerable  volume.  Sapor  agreed  to 
adopt  this  suggestion.  He  marched  from  Zeugma 
across  the  Mons  Masius  towards  the  Upper  Euphrates, 
defeated  the  Romans  in  an  important  battle  near 
Amida,1  took,  by  a  sudden  assault,  two  castles  which 
defended  the  town,2  and  then  somewhat  hastily  re- 
solved that  he  would  attack  the  place,  which  he  did 
not  imagine  capable  of  making  much  resistance. 

Amida,  now  Diarbekr,  was  situated  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Upper  Tigris,  in  a  fertile  plain,  and  was 
washed  along  the  whole  of  its  western  side  by  a  semi- 
circular bend  of  the  river.3  It  had  been  a  place  of 
considerable  importance  from  a  very  ancient  date,4  and 
had  recently  been  much  strengthened  by  Constantius, 
who  had  made  it  an  arsenal  for  military  engines,  and 
had  repaired  its  towers  and  walls.5  The  town  contained 
within  it  a  copious  fountain  of  water,  which  was  liable, 
however,  to  acquire  a  disagreeable  odour  in  the  sum- 
mer-time. Seven  legions,  of  the  moderate  strength  to 
which  legions  had  been  reduced  by  Constantine,6  de- 
fended it ;  and  the  garrison  included  also  a  body  of 


1  Amm.  Marc,  xviii.  8. 

2  Ibid,  xviii.  10. 

3  '  A  latere  austral  i,  geniculate) 
Tigridis  meatu  subluitur'  (ibid, 
xviii.  9).  The  plan  given  by  the 
elder  Niebuhr  in  his  Voyaqe  en 
Arable  (torn.  ii.  pi.  xlviii.)  shows 
tli is  bend  very  clearly.  The  modern 
town,  however,  is  not  washed  by 
the  river. 


4  It  is  often  mentioned  in  the 
Assyrian  inscriptions.  (Ancient 
Monarchies,  vol.  ii.  pp.  345,  371, 
&c. )  Its  prefect  appears  as  eponym 
in  the  Assyrian  Canon  frequently. 

5  Amm.  Marc,  l.s.c. 

6  The  legion  of  Constantine  con- 
tained from  1,000  to  1,500  men. 
Seven  legions  would  therefore  give 
a  force  of  from  8,000  to  9,000. 


176 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


|Cn.  IX. 


horse-archers,  composed  chiefly  or  entirely  of  noble 
foreigners.1  Sapor  hoped  in  the  first  instance  to  terrify 
it  into  submission  by  his  mere  appearance,  and  boldly 
rode  up  to  the  gates  with  a  small  body  of  his  followers, 
expecting  that  they  would  be  opened  to  him.  But  the 
defenders  were  more  courageous  than  he  had  imagined. 
They  received  him  with  a  shower  of  darts  and  arrows, 
that  were  directed  specially  against  his  person,  which 
was  conspicuous  from  its  ornaments  ;  and  they  aimed 
their  weapons  so  well  that  one  of  them  passed  through 
a  portion  of  his  dress  and  was  nearly  wounding  him.2 
Persuaded  by  his  followers,  Sapor  upon  this  withdrew, 
and  committed  the  further  prosecution  of  the  attack  to 
Grumbates,  the  king  of  the  Chionites,  who  assaulted 
the  walls  on  the  next  day  with  a  body  of  picked  troops, 
but  was  repulsed  with  great  loss,  his  only  son,  a  youth 
of  great  promise,  being  killed  at  his  side  by  a  dart  from 
a  balista?  The  death  of  this  prince  spread  dismay 
through  the  camp,  and  was  followed  by  a  general 
mourning ;  but  it  now  became  a  point  of  honour  to  take 
the  town  which  had  so  injured  one  of  the  great  king's 
royal  allies  ;  and  Grumbates  was  promised  that  Amida 
should  become  the  funeral  pile  of  his  lost  darling.4 

The  town  was  now  regularly  invested.  Each  nation 
was  assigned  its  place.  The  Chionites,  burning  with  the 
desire  to  avenge  their  late  defeat,  were  on  the  east ; 
the  Vertae  on  the  south  ;  the  Albanians,  warriors  from 
the  Caspian  region,  on  the  north  ;  the  Segestans,5  who 


1  Amm.  Marc,  xviii.  9,  sub  fin. 

2  '  Parte  indumenti  tragnlae  ictu 
discissa '  (ib.  xix.  1).  I  do  not 
know  why  Gibbon  speaks  of  the 
dart  as  4  glancing  against  the  royal 
tiara'  (Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  ii.  p. 
407). 

;{  Amm.  Marc.  xix.  1. 


4  Ibid.  xix.  2  :  '  Agitata  gumma 
consiliorum  placuerat,  busto  urbis 
subversae  expiare  perempti  juvenis 
manes.' 

5  Inhabitants  of  Seistan,  proba- 
bly of  Scythie  origin.  (See  above, 
p.' 108.) 


Ch.  IX.  1 


SIEGE  OF  AMIDA. 


177 


were  reckoned  the  bravest  soldiers  of  all,  and  who 
brought  into  the  field  a  large  body  of  elephants,  held 
the  west.  A  continuous  line  of  Persians,  five  ranks 
deep,  surrounded  the  entire  city,  and  supported  the 
auxiliary  detachments.  The  entire  besieging  army  was 
estimated  at  a  hundred  thousand  men  j1  the  besieged, 
including  the  unarmed  multitude,  were  under  30, 000. 2 
After  the  pause  of  an  entire  day,  the  first  general 
attack  was  made.  Grumbates  gave  the  signal  for  the 
assault  by  hurling  a  bloody  spear  into  the  space  before 
the  walls,  after  the  fashion  of  a  Roman  fetialis?  A  cloud 
of  darts  and  arrows  from  every  side  followed  the  flight 
of  this  weapon,  and  did  severe  damage  to  the  besieged, 
who  were  at  the  same  time  galled  with  discharges 
from  Roman  military  engines,  taken  by  the  Persians 
in  some  capture  of  Singara,  and  now  employed  against 
their  former  owners.4  Still  a  vigorous  resistance  con- 
tinued to  be  made,  and  the  besiegers,  in  their  exposed 
positions,  suffered  even  more  than  the  garrison  ;  so  that 
after  two  days  the  attempt  to  carry  the  city  by  general 
assault  was  abandoned,  and  the  slow  process  of  a  regu- 
lar siege  was  adopted.  Trenches  were  opened  at  the 
usual  distance  from  the  walls,  along  which  the  troops 
advanced  under  the  cover  of  hurdles  towards  the  ditch, 
which  they  proceeded  to  fill  up  in  places.  Mounds 
were  then  thrown  up  against  the  walls  ;  and  moveable 
towers  were  constructed  and  brought  into  play,  guarded 


1  Amm.  Marc.  xix.  6. 

2  Ibid.  xix.  2,  sub  Jin.  The 
legionaries  were  about  8,000  or 
9,000  (see  above,  p.  175,  note  6)  ; 
the  other  soldiers  and  the  unarmed 
multitude  were  reckoned  at  20,000. 

3  The  comparison  is  made  by 
Ammianus :  *  Ubi  Grumbates  has- 


tam  infectam  sanguine  ritu  patrio 
nostrique  more  conjecerat  fetialis.'9 
(xix.  2.) 

4  Ibid,  l.s.c.  It  is  not  clear 
when  this  capture  took  place;  but 
it  can  scarcely  have  been  in  this 
vear,  since  Rome  holds  Singara  in 
A.D.  300. 


178 


THE  SEVENTH  MONAKCHY. 


[Ch.  IX. 


externally  with  iron,  and  each  mounting  a  balista.1  It 
was  impossible  long  to  withstand  these  various  weapons 
of  attack.  The  hopes  of  the  besieged  lay,  primarily,  in 
their  receiving  relief  from  without  by  the  advance  of 
an  army  capable  of  engaging  their  assailants  and  har- 
assing them  or  driving  them  off ;  secondarily,  in  suc- 
cessful sallies,  by  means  of  which  they  might  destroy 
the  enemy's  works  and  induce  him  to  retire  from 
before  the  place. 

There  existed,  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Amida,  the 
elements  of  a  relieving  army,  under  the  command  of 
the  new  prefect  of  the  East,  Sabinianus.  Had  this  officer 
possessed  an  energetic  and  enterprising  character,  he 
might,  without  much  difficulty,  have  collected  a  force 
of  light  and  active  soldiers,  which  might  have  hung 
upon  the  rear  of  the  Persians,  intercepted  their  convoys, 
cut  off  their  stragglers,  and  have  even  made  an  occa- 
sional dash  upon  their  lines.  Such  was  the  course  of 
conduct  recommended  by  Ursicinus,  the  second  in 
command,  whom  Sabinianus  had  recently  superseded ; 
but  the  latter  was  jealous  of  his  subordinate,  and  had 
orders  from  the  Byzantine  court  to  keep  him  unem- 
ployed.2 He  was  himself  old  and  rich,  alike  disinclined 
to  and  unfit  for  military  enterprise  ;3  he  therefore  abso- 
lutely rejected  the  advice  of  Ursicinus,  and  determined 
on  making  no  effort.  He  had  positive  orders,  he  said, 
from  the  court  to  keep  on  the  defensive,  and  not  en- 
danger his  troops  by  engaging  them  in  hazardous  ad- 
ventures. Amida  must  protect  itself,  or  at  any  rate  not 
look  to  him  for  succour.  Ursicinus  chafed  terribly,  it 
is  said,  against  this  decision,4  but  was  forced  to  submit 


1  Amm.  Marc.  xix.  5,  ad  init. 

2  Ibid.  xix.  3. 

3  Ibid,  xviii.  5. 


4  '  Visebatur  ut  leo  magnitudine 
corporis  et  torvitate  terribilis,  in- 
clusos  inter  retia  catulos  periculo 


Ch.  IX.] 


INACTION  OF  SABINIANUS. 


179 


to  it.  His  messengers  conveyed  the  dispiriting  intel- 
ligence to  the  devoted  city,  which  learned  thereby 
that  it  must  rely  wholly  upon  its  own  exertions. 

Nothing  now  remained  but  to  organise  sallies  on  a 
large  scale  and  attack  the  besieger's  works.  Such  at- 
tempts were  made  from  time  to  time  with  some  success ; 
and  on  one  occasion  two  Gaulish  legions,  banished  to 
the  East  for  their  adherence  to  the  cause  of  Magnentius, 
penetrated,  by  night,  into  the  heart  of  the  besieging 
camp,  and  brought  the  person  of  the  monarch  into 
danger.  This  peril  was,  however,  escaped;  the  legions 
were  repulsed  with  the  loss  of  a  sixth  of  their  num- 
ber ; 1  and  nothing  was  gained  by  the  audacious  enter- 
prise beyond  a  truce  of  three  days,  during  which  each 
side  mourned  its  dead,  and  sought  to  repair  its  losses. 

The  fate  of  the  doomed  city  drew  on.  Pestilence  was 
added  to  the  calamities  which  the  besieged  had  to  en- 
dure.2 Desertion  and  treachery  were  arrayed  against 
them.  One  of  the  natives  of  Amida,  going  over  to  the 
Persians,  informed  them  that  on  the  southern  side  of  the 
city  a  neglected  staircase  led  up  from  the  margin  of 
the  Tigris  through  underground  corridors  to  one  of  the 
principal  bastions ;  and  under  his  guidance  seventy 
archers  of  the  Persian  guard,  picked  men,  ascended  the 
dark  passage  at  dead  of  night,  occupied  the  tower,  and 
when  morning  broke  displayed  from  it  a  scarlet  flag,  as 
a  sign  to  their  countrymen  that  a  portion  of  the  wall 
was  taken.  The  Persians  were  upon  the  alert,  and  an 
instant  assault  was  made,  But  the  garrison,  by  extra- 
ordinary efforts,  succeeded  in  recapturing  the  tower 


ereptum  ire  non  audens,  unguibus 
ademptis  et  dentibus.'  (Amm. 
Marc.  xix.  3,  ad  Jin.) 
1  Four  hundred  were  killed  out 


of  probably  about  2,500.  (Ibid, 
xix.  6.) 
2  Ibid.  xix.  4. 


180 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  IX. 


before  any  support  reached  its  occupants ;  and  then, 
directing  their  artillery  and  missiles  against  the  assailing 
columns,  inflicted  on  them  tremendous  losses,  and  soon 
compelled  them  to  return  hastily  to  the  shelter  of  their 
camp.  The  Vertae,  who  maintained  the  siege  on  the 
south  side  of  the  city,  were  the  chief  sufferers  in  this 
abortive  attempt.1 

Sapor  had  now  spent  seventy  days  before  the  place, 
and  had  made  no  perceptible  impression.  Autumn  was 
already  far  advanced,2  and  the  season  for  military  oper- 
ations would  soon  be  over.  It  was  necessary,  therefore, 
either  to  take  the  city  speedily  or  to  give  up  the  siege 
and  retire.  Under  these  circumstances  Sapor  resolved 
on  a  last  effort.  He  had  constructed  towers  of  such  a 
height  that  they  overtopped  the  wall,  and  poured  their 
discharges  on  the  defenders  from  a  superior  elevation. 
He  had  brought  his  mounds  in  places  to  a  level  with 
the  ramparts,  and  had  compelled  the  garrison  to  raise 
countermounds  within  the  walls  for  their  protection. 
He  now  determined  on  pressing  the  assault  day  after 
day,  until  he  either  carried  the  town  or  found  all  his 
resources  exhausted.  His  artillery,  his  foot,  and  his 
elephants  were  all  employed  in  turn  or  together ;  he 
allowed  the  garrison  no  rest,3  Not  content  with  di- 
recting the  operations,  he  himself  took  part  in  the 
supreme  struggle,  exposing  his  own  person  freely  to 
the  enemy's  weapons,  and  losing  many  of  his  attend- 
ants.4 After  the  contest  had  lasted  three  continuous 
days  from  morn  to  night,  fortune  at  last  favoured  him. 
One  of  the  inner  mounds,  raised  by  the  besieged  behind 
their  wall,  suddenly  gave  way,  involving  its  defenders 

1  Aram.  Marc.  xix.  5,  ad  Jin.        I  (Ibid.  xix.  7.) 

2  Ibid.  xix.  9,  ad  init.  4  Ibid,  sub  Jin. 
*  *  Nulla  quies  certaminibus  data/ 


Ch.  IX.] 


FALL  OF  AM1DA. 


181 


in  its  fall,  and  at  the  same  time  filling  up  the  entire 
space  between  the  wall  and  the  mound  raised  outside 
by  the  Persians.  A  way  into  the  town  was  thus  laid 
open,1  and  the  besiegers  instantly  occupied  it.  It  was 
in  vain  that  the  flower  of  the  garrison  threw  itself 
across  the  path  of  the  entering  columns  —  nothing  could 
withstand  the  ardour  of  the  Persian  troops.  In  a  little 
time  all  resistance  was  at  an  end ;  those  who  could 
quitted  the  city  and  fled  —  the  remainder,  whatever 
their  sex,  age,  or  calling,  whether  armed  or  unarmed, 
were  slaughtered  like  sheep  by  the  conquerors.2 

Thus  fell  Amida  after  a  siege  of  seventy-three  days.3 
Sapor,  who  on  other  occasions  showed  himself  not  defi- 
cient in  clemency,4  was  exasperated  by  the  prolonged 
resistance  and  the  losses  which  he  had  sustained  in  the 
course  of  it.  Thirty  thousand  of  his  best  soldiers  had 
fallen ; 5  the  son  of  his  chief  ally  had  perished ; 6  he 
himself  had  been  brought  into  imminent  danger.  Such 
audacity  on  the  part  of  a  petty  town  seemed  no  doubt 
to  him  to  deserve  a  severe  retribution.  The  place  was 
therefore  given  over  to  the  infuriated  soldiery,  who 
were  allowed  to  slay  and  plunder  at  their  pleasure.  Of 
the  captives  taken,  all  belonging  to  the  five  provinces 
across  the  Tigris,  claimed  as  his  own  by  Sapor,  though 


1  Gibbon  says  '  a  largo  breach 
was  made  by  the  battering-ram ' 
{Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  ii.  p.  409); 
but  he  has  apparently  confused  the 
capture  of  Singara,  related  by  Ara- 
mianus  (xx.  6),  with  that  of  Amida, 
which  is  expressly  ascribed  to  the 
spontaneous  crumbling  of  a  mound 
in  bk.  xix.  ch.  viii.  ('diu  laborata 
moles  ilia  nostrorum,  velut  terrae 
quodam  tremore  quassata,  procu- 
buit'). 

2  '  Pecorum  ritu  armati  et  im- 
belles  sine  sexus  discrimine  truci- 


dabantur.'    (Amm.  Marc,  l.s.cj 

3  Ibid.  xix.  9,  sub  fin. 

4  As  when,  on  the  capture  of 
one  of  the  fortified  posts  outside 
Amida,  he  sent  the  wife  of  Crau- 
gasius  unharmed  to  her  husband, 
and  at  the  same  time  ordered  a 
number  of  Christian  virgins,  found 

j  among  the  captives,  to  be  protected 
I  from  insult  and  allowed  the  free 
|  exercise  of  their  religion.  (Ibid 
xix.  10,  sub  fin. ) 

5  Ibid.  xix.  9. 

6  See  above,  p.  176. 


182 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  IX. 


ceded  to  Rome  by  his  grandfather,  were  massacred  in 
cold  blood.  The  Count  JElian,  and  the  commanders  of 
the  legions  who  had  conducted  the  gallant  defence, 
were  barbarously  crucified.  Many  other  Romans  of 
high  rank  were  subjected  to  the  indignity  of  being 
manacled,  and  were  dragged  into  Persia  as  slaves 
rather  than  as  prisoners.1 

The  campaign  of  a.d.  359  terminated  with  this  dearly 
bought  victory.  The  season  was  too  far  advanced  for 
any  fresh  enterprise  of  importance ;  and  Sapor  was 
probably  glad  to  give  his  army  a  rest  after  the  toils 
and  perils  of  the  last  three  months.  Accordingly  he 
retired  across  the  Tigris,  without  leaving  (so  far  as 
appears)  any  garrisons  in  Mesopotamia,  and  began  pre- 
parations for  the  campaign  of  a.d.  360.  Stores  of  all 
kinds  were  accumulated  during  the  winter ;  and,  when 
the  spring  came,  the  indefatigable  monarch  once  more 
invaded  the  enemy's  country,  pouring  into  Mesopotamia 
an  army  even  more  numerous  and  better  appointed 
than  that  which  he  had  led  against  Amida  in  the  pre- 
ceding year.2  His  first  object  now  was  to  capture  Sin- 
gara,  a  town  of  some  consequence,  which  was,  however, 
defended  by  only  two  Roman  legions  and  a  certain 
number  of  native  soldiers.  After  a  vain  attempt  to 
persuade  the  garrison  to  a  surrender,  the  attack  was 
made  in  the  usual  way,  chiefly  by  scaling  parties  with 
ladders,  and  by  battering  parties  which  shook  the  walls 
with  the  ram.  The  defenders  kept  the  scalers  at  bay 
by  a  constant  discharge  of  stones  and  darts  from  their 

1  Amm,  Marc.  xix.  9,  mb  init.      |  equal  to  the  unbounded  views  of 

2  Gibbon  conjectures  that  Sapor's  j  his  ambition  ; '  but  Ammianus  tells 
allies  now  deserted  him  (l.s.c),  |  us  that  he  crossed  the  Tigris  in 
and  says  4  the  spirit  as  well  as  the  I  A.D.  360  '  armis  multiplicatis  et 
strength  of  the  army  with  which  j  viribus  '  (xx.  6,  ad  init. ). 

he  took  the  field  was  no   longer  i 


Ch.  IX.J 


CAPTURE  OF  SINGARA. 


183 


artillery,  arrows  from  their  bows,  and  leaden  bullets 1 
from  their  slings.  They  met  the  assaults  of  the  ram  by 
attempts  to  fire  the  wooden  covering  which  protected 
it  and  those  who  worked  it.  For  some  days  these 
efforts  sufficed ;  but  after  a  while  the  besiegers  found  a 
weak  point  in  the  defences  of  the  place  —  a  tower  so 
recently  built  that  the  mortar  in  which  the  stones  were 
laid  was  still  moist,  and  which  consequently  crumbled 
rapidly  before  the  blows  of  a  strong  and  heavy  batter- 
ing-ram, and  in  a  short  time  fell  to  the  ground.  The 
Persians  poured  in  through  the  gap,  and  were  at  once 
masters  of  the  entire  town,  which  ceased  to  resist  after 
the  catastrophe.  This  easy  victory  allowed  Sapor  to 
exhibit  the  better  side  of  his  character ;  he  forbade  the 
further  shedding  of  blood,  and  ordered  that  as  many  as 
possible  of  the  garrison  and  citizens  should  be  taken 
alive.  Reviving  a  favourite  policy  of  Oriental  rulers 
from  very  remote  times,2  he  transported  these  captives 
to  the  extreme  eastern  parts  of  his  empire,3  where  they 
might  be  of  the  greatest  service  to  him  in  defending 
his  frontier  against  the  Scythians  and  Indians. 

It  is  not  really  surprising,  though  the  historian  of 
the  war  regards  it  as  needing  explanation,4  that  no 
attempt  was  made  to  relieve  Singara  by  the  Romans. 
The  siege  was  short ;  the  place  was  considered  strong ; 
the  nearest  point  held  by  a  powerful  Roman  force  was 
Nisibis,  which  was  at  least  sixty  miles  distant  from  Sin- 
gara.   The  neighbourhood  of  Singara  was,  moreover, 


1  'Glandes.'  (See  Amra.  Marc, 
xx.  6.) 

2  See  Ancient  Monarchies,  vol.  ii. 
pp.  397,  410,  423,  528;  vol.  iii.  pp. 
496,  497 ;  vol.  iv.  pp.  440,  448,  &c. 
The  practice  was  common  to  the 
Assyrians,  the  Babylonians,  and 
the  Achaemenian  Persians. 


3  '  Ad  regiones  Persidis  ultimas 
sunt  asportati.'  (Amm.  Marc,  l.s.c.) 
The  regions  '  furthest '  from  Mes- 
opotamia would  be  those  of  the 
extreme  East. 

4  See  the  remarks  of  Ammianus 
at  the  close  of  bk.  xx.  ch.  6. 


184 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  IX. 


ill  supplied  with  water  ;  and  a  relieving  army  would 
probably  have  soon  found  itself  in  difficulties.  Singara, 
on  the  verge  of  the  desert,  was  always  perilously  sit- 
uated. Rome  valued  it  as  an  outpost  from  which  her 
enemy  might  be  watched,  and  which  might  advertise 
her  of  a  sudden  danger,  but  could  not  venture  to  under- 
take its  defence  in  case  of  an  attack  in  force,  and  was 
prepared  to  hear  of  its  capture  with  equanimity. 

From  Singara,  Sapor  directed  his  march  almost  due 
northwards,  and,  leaving  Nisibis  unassailed  upon  his 
left,  proceeded  to  attack  the  strong  fort  known  indif- 
ferently as  Phoenica  or  Bezabde.1  This  was  a  position 
on  the  east  bank  of  the  Tigris,  near  the  point  where 
that  river  quits  the  mountains  and  debouches  upon  the 
plain  ; 2  though  not  on  the  site,3  it  may  be  considered  the 
representative  of  the  modern  Jezireh,  which  commands 
the  passes  from  the  low  country  into  the  Kurdish  moun- 
tains. Bezabde  was  the  chief  city  of  the  province, 
called  after  it  Zabdicene,  one  of  the  five  ceded  by  Narses 
and  greatly  coveted  by  his  grandson.  It  was  much 
valued  by  Rome,  was  fortified  in  places  with  a  double 
wall,  and  was  guarded  by  three  legions  and  a  large 
body  of  Kurdish  archers.4  Sapor,  having  reconnoitred 
the  place,  and,  with  his  usual  hardihood,  exposed  him- 
self to  danger  in  doing  so,  sent  a  flag  of  truce  to  demand 
a  surrender,  joining  with  the  messengers  some  prisoners 
of  high  rank  taken  at  Singara,  lest  the  enemy  should 
open  fire  upon  his  envoys.  The  device  was  successful ; 
but  the  garrison  proved  staunch,  and  determined  on 


1  Amm.  Marc.  xx.  7.  Compare 
ch.  11. 

2  See  above,  p.  130. 

3  Some  geographers  identify  Be- 
zabde with  Jezireh  (Diet,  of  Gk. 
and  Roman  Geography,  sub  voc. 


Bezabda);  but  the  name  Fynyk  is 
almost  certain  evidence  of  the  real 
site.     Fynyk   is   about  ten  miles 
from  Jezireh  to  the  north-west. 
4  Amm.  Marc.  xx.  7. 


Ch.  IX.] 


FALL  OF  BEZABDE. 


185 


resisting  to  the  last.  Once  more  all  the  known  resources 
of  attack  and  defence  were  brought  into  play  ;  and 
after  a  long  siege,  of  which  the  most  important  incident 
was  an  attempt  made  by  the  bishop  of  the  place  to  in- 
duce Sapor  to  withdraw,1  the  wall  was  at  last  breached, 
the  city  taken,  and  its  defenders  indiscriminately  mas- 
sacred. Regarding  the  position  as  one  of  first-rate  im- 
portance, Sapor,  who  had  destroyed  Singara,  carefully 
repaired  the  defences  of  Bezabde,  provisioned  it  abun- 
dantly, and  garrisoned  it  with  some  of  his  best  troops. 
He  was  well  aware  that  the  Romans  would  feel  keenly 
the  loss  of  so  important  a  post,  and  expected  that  it 
would  not  be  long  before  they  made  an  effort  to  re- 
cover possession  of  it. 

The  winter  was  now  approaching,  but  the  Persian 
monarch  still  kept  the  field.  The  capture  of  Bezabde 
was  followed  by  that  of  many  other  less  important 
strongholds,2  which  offered  little  resistance.  At  last, 
towards  the  close  of  the  year,  an  attack  was  made 
upon  a  place  called  Virta,  said  to  have  been  a  fortress 
of  great  strength,  and  by  some  moderns  3  identified 
with  Tekrit,  an  important  city  upon  the  Tigris  between 
Mosul  and  Baghdad.  Here  the  career  of  the  conqueror 
was  at  last  arrested.  Persuasion  and  force  proved  alike 
unavailing  to  induce  or  compel  a  surrender ;  and,  after 


1  '  Christians  legis  antistes  exire 
se  velle  gestibus  ostentabat  et  nutu, 
&c.'  Ammianus  afterwards  calls 
him  '  episcopum,'  and  says  that 
his  intercession  brought  on  him  an 
unjust  suspicion  of  collusion  with 
the  enemy,    (l.s.c. ) 

2  6  Interceptis  aliis  castellis  vilio- 
ribus.'  (Anim.  Marc.  xx.  7,  sub  Jin.) 

3  As  D'Anville  {Geor/raphie  An- 
cienne,  torn.  ii.  p.  201),  Gibbon 
{Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  ii.  p.  410, 
note  61 J7  and   Mr.   E.   B.  James 


{Diet,  of  Gk.  and  E.  Geoaraphy, 
ad  voc.  Biktha).  It  is  difficult, 
however,  to  suppose  that  a  position 
so  low  down  the  Tigris  as  Tekrit 
was  held  by  the  Romans.  I  am 
almost  inclined  to  suspect  that  the 
Virta  of  Ammianus  is  Bir  on  the 
Euphrates  (lat.  37°  57,  long. 
38°  5'),  and  that,  when  he  speaks 
of  it  as  situated  in  the  remotest 
part  of  Mesopotamia,  he  means  the 
part  most  remote  from  Persia. 


186 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  IX. 


wasting  the  small  remainder  of  the  year,  and  suffering 
considerable  loss,  the  Persian  monarch  reluctantly  gave 
up  the  siege,  and  returned  to  his  own  country.1 

Meanwhile  the  movements  of  the  Roman  emperor 
had  been  slow  and  uncertain.  Distracted  between  a 
jealous  fear  of  his  cousin  Julian's  proceedings  in  the 
West,  and  a  desire  of  checking  the  advance  of  his  rival 
Sapor  in  the  East,  he  had  left  Constantinople  in  the 
early  spring,2  but  had  journeyed  leisurely  through  Cap- 
padocia  and  Armenia  Minor  to  Samosata,  whence,  after 
crossing  the  Euphrates,  he  had  proceeded  to  Edessa, 
and  there  fixed  himself.3  While  in  Cappadocia,  he  had 
summoned  to  his  presence  Arsaces,  the  tributary  king 
of  Armenia,  had  reminded  him  of  his  engagements,  and 
had  endeavoured  to  quicken  his  gratitude  by  bestowing 
on  him  liberal  presents.4  At  Edessa  he  employed  him- 
self during  the  whole  of  the  summer  in  collecting  troops 
and  stores ;  nor  was  it  till  the  autumnal  equinox  was 
past 5  that  he  took  the  field,  and,  after  weeping  over  the 
smoking  ruins  of  Amida,  marched  to  Bezabde,  and, 
when  the  defenders  rejected  his  overtures  of  peace, 
formed  the  siege  of  the  place.  Sapor  was,  we  must 
suppose,  now  engaged  before  Virta,  and  it  is  probable 
that  he  thought  Bezabde  strong  enough  to  defend  itself. 
At  any  rate,  he  made  no  effort  to  afford  it  any  relief ; 
and  the  Roman  emperor  was  allowed  to  employ  all  the 
resources  at  his  disposal  in  reiterated  assaults  upon  the 
walls.  The  defence,  however,  proved  stronger  than 
the  attack.    Time  after  time  the  bold  sallies  of  the  be- 


1  Amm.  Marc.  xx.  7,  ad  Jin. 

2  Ibid.  xx.  8. 

3  We  find  him  at  Csesarea  Ma- 
zaca  about  the  middle  of  the  year 
(ib.  xx.  9),  then  at  Melitina  {Mala- 
tiyeh),    Lacotina,    and  Samosata 


(ib.  xx.  11);  finally  at  Edessa 
(ibid.). 

4  Ibid.  xx.  11,  ad  but. 

5  '  Post  equinoctium  egreditur 
autumnale.'  (Ibid.) 


Ch.  IX.]      ROMAN  ATTACK  ON  BEZABDE  FAILS.  187 

sieged  destroyed  the  Roman  works.  At  last  the  rainy 
season  set  in,  and  the  low  ground  outside  the  town 
became  a  glutinous  and  adhesive  marsh.1  It  was  no 
longer  possible  to  continue  the  siege  ;  and  the  disap- 
pointed emperor  reluctantly  drew  off  his  troops,  re- 
crossed  the  Euphrates,  and  retired  into  winter  quarters 
at  Antioch. 

The  successes  of  Sapor  in  the  campaigns  of  a.d.  359 
and  360,  his  captures  of  Amida,  Singara,  and  Bezabde, 
together  with  the  unfortunate  issue  of  the  expedition 
made  by  Constantius  against  the  last-named  place,  had 
a  tendency  to  shake  the  fidelity  of  the  Roman  vassal- 
kings,  Arsaces 2  of  Armenia,  and  Meribanes  of  Iberia. 
Constantius,  therefore,  during  the  winter  of  a.d.  360-1, 
which  he  passed  at  Antioch,  sent  emissaries  to  the 
courts  of  these  monarchs,  and  endeavoured  to  secure 
their  fidelity  by  loading  them  with  costly  presents,3 
His  policy  seems  to  have  been  so  far  successful  that  no 
revolt  of  these  kingdoms  took  place  ;  they  did  not  as 
yet  desert  the  Romans  or  make  their  submission  to 
Sapor.  Their  monarchs  seem  to  have  simply  watched 
events,  prepared  to  declare  themselves  distinctly  on  the 
winning  side  so  soon  as  fortune  should  incline  unmis- 
takably to  one  or  the  other  combatant.  Meanwhile 
they  maintained  the  fiction  of  a  nominal  dependence 
upon  Rome,4 


1  '  Assiduis  imbribus  ita  imraa- 
duerat  solum,  ut  luti  glutinosa 
mollities  per  eas  regiones  pinguis- 
simi  csespitis  omnia  perturbaret.' 
(Amm.  Marc.  xx.  11.) 

2  According  to  Moses  of  Chorene, 
Tiranus  was  still  king  at  the  time 
of  the  invasion  of  Julian  (Hist. 
Armen.  iii.  15),  and  Arsaces  (Ard- 
shag)  did  not  succeed  him  till  after 
the  death  of  Jovian  (iii.  17).  But 


Amm i anus  calls  the  king  contem- 
porary with  the  later  years  of  Con- 
stantius, Arsaces  (xx.  11;  xxi.  6). 
So  also  Sozomen  (Hist,  Eccles. 
vi.  1). 

3  Amm.  Marc.  xxi.  6. 

4  Faustus  makes  Arsaces  lend 
aid  to  Sapor  in  one  of  his  attacks 
on  Nisibis  (iv.  20),  and  declares 
that  he  completely  defeated  a  large 
Roman   army  in    the  immediate 


188 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  IX. 


It  might  have  been  expected  that  the  year  a.d.  361 
would  have  been  a  turning-point  in  the  war,  and  that, 
if  Rome  did  not  by  a  great  effort  assert  herself  and  re- 
cover her  prestige,  the  advance  of  Persia  would  have 
been  marked  and  rapid.  But  the  actual  course  of 
events  was  far  different.  Hesitation  and  diffidence  char- 
acterise the  movements  of  both  parties  to  the  contest, 
and  the  year  is  signalised  by  no  important  enterprise 
on  the  part  of  either  monarch.  Constantius  reoccupied 
Edessa,1  and  had  (we  are  told)2  some  thoughts  of  re- 
newing the  siege  of  Bezabde ;  actually,  however,  he 
did  not  advance  further,  but  contented  himself  with 
sending  a  part  of  his  army  to  watch  Sapor,  giving  them 
strict  orders  not  to  risk  an  engagement.3  Sapor,  on  his 
side,  began  the  year  with  demonstrations  which  were 
taken  to  mean  that  he  was  about  to  pass  the  Euphra- 
tes ; 4  but  in  reality  he  never  even  brought  his  troops 
across  the  Tigris,  or  once  set  foot  in  Mesopotamia. 
After  wasting  weeks  or  months  in  a  futile  display  of 
his  armed  strength  upon  the  eastern  bank  of  the  river, 
and  violently  alarming  the  officers  sent  by  Constantius 
to  observe  his  movements,5  he  suddenly,  towards 
autumn,  withdrew  his  troops,  having  attempted 
nothing,  and  quietly  returned  to  his  capital ! 

It  is  by  no  means  difficult  to  understand  the  motives 
which  actuated  Constantius.  He  was,  month  after 
month,  receiving  intelligence  from  the  West  of  steps 
taken  by  Julian  which  amounted  to  open  rebellion,  and 
challenged  him  to  engage  in  civil  war.6  So  long  as 
Sapor  threatened  invasion,  he  did  not  like  to  quit  Mes- 


vicinity  of  the  place.  But  the 
entire  silence  of  Ammianus  renders 
his  narrative  incredible. 

1  Amm.  Marc.  xxi.  7,  ad  Jin. 

2  Ibid.  xxi.  13. 


3  Ibid. 

4  Ibid.  xxi.  7,  ad  init. 

5  Ibid.  xxi.  13. 

G  See  Gibbon  (Decline  and  Fall, 
vol.  iii.  pp.  102-118). 


Ch.  IX.  1         INACTION  OF  SAPOR  IN  A.D.  361.  189 


opotamia,  lest  he  might  appear  to  have  sacrificed  the 
interests  of  his  country  to  his  own  private  quarrels ;  but 
he  must  have  been  anxious  to  return  to  the  seat  of  em- 
pire from  the  first  moment  that  intelligence  reached 
him  of  Julian's  assumption  of  the  imperial  name  and 
dignity  ;  and  when  Sapors  retreat  was  announced  he 
naturally  made  all  haste  to  reach  his  capital.  Mean- 
while the  desire  of  keeping  his  army  intact  caused  him 
to  refrain  from  anv  movement  which  involved  the 
slightest  risk  of  bringing  on  a  battle,  and,  in  fact,  re- 
duced him  to  inaction.  So  much  is  readily  intelligible. 
But  what  at  this  time  withheld  Sapor,  when  he  had  so 
grand  an  opportunity  of  making  an  impression  upon 
Rome  —  what  paralysed  his  arm  when  it  might  have 
struck  with  such  effect — it  is  far  from  easy  to  understand, 
though  perhaps  not  impossible  to  conjecture.  The  his- 
torian of  the  war  ascribes  his  abstinence  to  a  religious 
motive,  telling  us  that  the  auguries  were  not  favourable 
for  the  Persians  crossing  the  Tigris.1  But  there  is  no 
other  evidence  that  the  Persians  of  this  period  were 
the  slaves  of  any  such  superstition  as  that  noted  by 
Ammianus,  nor  any  probability  that  a  monarch  of 
Sapor's  force  of  character  would  have  suffered  his  mili- 
tary policy  to  be  affected  by  omens.  We  must  there- 
fore ascribe  the  conduct  of  the  Persian  king  to  some 
cause  not  recorded  by  the  historian  —  some  failure  of 
health,  or  some  peril  from  internal  or  external  enemies 
which  called  him  away  from  the  scene  of  his  recent 

1  Amm.  Marc.  xxi.  13  :  '  Tar-  |  divination  —  that  by  means  of  the 
dante  trans  Tigridem  rege  dam  \  barsom  or  divining-rod  (Ancient 
moveri  permitterent  sacra;'  and  Monarchies,  vol.  iii.  pp.  130-1); 
again,  further  on  in  the  same  chap-  j  but  on  no  other  occasion  do  we 
ter:  'Kuntiatur  regem  ad  propria  ;  find  it  even  said  that  their  military 
revertisse,  auspiciis  dirimentibusS  operations  were  dependent  on  i  aus- 
It  must  be  admitted  that  the  Per-  pices.' 
sians  were  believers  in  a  sort  of  , 


190 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  IX. 


exploits,  just  at  the  time  when  his  continued  presence 
there  was  most  important.  Once  before  in  his  lifetime, 
an  invasion  of  his  eastern  provinces  had  required  his 
immediate  presence,  and  allowed  his  adversary  to  quit 
Mesopotamia  and  march  against  Magnentius.1  It  is  not 
improbable  that  a  fresh  attack  of  the  same  or  some 
other  barbarians  now  again  happened  opportunely  for 
the  Romans,  calling  Sapor  away,  and  thus  enabling 
Constantius  to  turn  his  back  upon  the  East,  and  set  out 
for  Europe  in  order  to  meet  Julian. 

The  meeting,  however,  was  not  destined  to  take 
place.  On  his  way  from  Antioch  to  Constantinople, 
the  unfortunate  Constantius,  anxious  and  perhaps  over- 
fatigued,  fell  sick  at  Mopsucrene,  in  Cilicia,  and  died 
there,  after  a  short  illness,2  towards  the  close  of  a.d. 
361.  Julian  the  Apostate  succeeded  peacefully  to  the 
empire  whereto  he  was  about  to  assert  his  right  by 
force  of  arms  ;  and  Sapor  found  that  the  war  which  he 
had  provoked  with  Rome,  in  reliance  upon  his  adver- 
sary's weakness  and  incapacity,  had  to  be  carried  on 
with  a  prince  of  far  greater  natural  powers  and  of 
much  superior  military  training. 


1  See  above,  p.  165. 

2  Amm.  Marc.  xxi.  15  ;  Aurel. 
Vict.  Epit.  §  42.  Some  writers 
substitute  Mopsuestia  for  Mopsu- 


crene (Mos.  Chor.  iii.  12  ;  Johann. 
Mai.  ii.  p.  14  ;  Patkanian  in  the 
Journal  Asiatique  for  1866,  p.  151). 


Ch.  X-l         JULIAN  SUCCEEDS  CONSTANTIUS. 


191 


CHAPTER  X. 

Julian  becomes  Emperor  of  Rome.  His  Resolution  to  invade  Persia. 
His  Views  and  Motives.  His  Proceedings.  Proposals  of  Sapor  re- 
jected. Other  Embassies.  Relations  of  Julian  with  Armenia.  Strength 
of  his  Army.  His  Invasion  of  Mesopotamia.  His  Line  of  March. 
Siege  of  Perisabor ;  of  Maogamalcha.  Battle  of  the  Tigris.  Further 
Progress  of  Julian  checked  by  his  Inability  to  invest  Ctesiphon.  His 
Retreat.  His  Death.  Retreat  continued  by  Jovian.  Sapor  offers  Terms 
of  Peace.  Peace  made  by  Jovian.  Its  Conditions.  Reflections  on  the 
Peace  and  on  the  Termination  of  the  Second  Period  of  Struggle  between 
Rome  and  Persia. 

*  Julianus,  redacta  ad  unum  se  orbis  Roraani  curatione,  gloriae  nimis 
cupidus,  in  Persas  proficiscitur.'  —  Aurel.  Yict.  Epit.  §  43. 

The  prince  on  whom  the  government  of  the  Roman 
empire,  and  consequently  the  direction  of  the  Persian 
war,  devolved  by  the  death  of  Constantius,  was  in  the 
flower  of  his  age,1  proud,  self-confident,  and  full  of 
energy.  He  had  been  engaged  for  a  period  of  four 
years 2  in  a  struggle  with  the  rude  and  warlike  tribes  of 
Germany,  had  freed  the  whole  country  west  of  the 
Rhine  from  the  presence  of  those  terrible  warriors,  and 
had  even  carried  fire  and  sword  far  into  the  wild  and 
savage  districts  on  the  right  bank  of  the  river,  and  com- 
pelled the  Alemanni  and  other  powerful  German  tribes 
to  make  their  submission  to  the  majesty  of  Rome.  Per- 
sonally brave,  by  temperament  restless,  and  inspired 


1  Julian  was  born  in  the  latter 
half  of  the  year  a.d.  331,  and  was 
therefore  under  thirty  at  his  acces- 
sion in  a.d.  360.  (See  Tillemont, 
Hist,  des  Empereurs,  torn.  iv.  p.  198; 


and  Clinton,  F.  R.  vol.  i.  p.  386.) 

2  From  a.d.  356  to  359.  (Gib- 
bon, Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  ii.  pp. 
414-421.) 


192 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


ICh.  X. 


with  an  ardent  desire  to  rival  or  eclipse  the  glorious 
deeds  of  those  heroes  of  former  times  who  had  made 
themselves  a  name  in  history,  he  viewed  the  disturbed 
condition  of  the  East  at  the  time  of  his  accession,  not 
as  a  trouble,  not  as  a  drawback  upon  the  delights 
of  empire,  but  as  a  happy  circumstance,  a  fortunate 
opportunity  for  distinguishing  himself  by  some  great 
achievement.  Of  all  the  Greeks,  Alexander  appeared 
to  him  the  most  illustrious ; 1  of  all  his  predecessors  on 
the  imperial  throne,  Trajan  and  Marcus  Aurelius  were 
those  whom  he  most  wished  to  emulate.2  But  all  these 
princes  had  either  led  or  sent 3  expeditions  into  the  far 
East,  and  had  aimed  at  uniting  in  one  the  fairest  prov- 
inces of  Europe  and  Asia.  Julian  appears,  from  the 
first  moment  that  he  found  himself  peaceably  estab- 
lished upon  the  throne,4  to  have  resolved  on  under- 
taking in  person  a  great  expedition  against  Sapor,  with 
the  object  of  avenging  upon  Persia  the  ravages  and 
defeats  of  the  last  sixty  years,  or  at  any  rate  of  ob- 
taining such  successes  as  might  justify  his  assuming 
the  title  of  1  Persicus.' 5  Whether  he  really  entertained 
any  hope  of  rivalling  Alexander,  or  supposed  it  possible 
that  he  should  effect  4  the  final  conquest  of  Persia,' 6 
may  be  doubted.    Acquainted,  as  he  must  have  been,7 


1  See  his  Ccesares,  passim.  But 
compare  the  Or  at.  ad  Themlst., 
where  the  palm  is  assigned  to 
Socrates  over  Alexander  (Op.  p. 
264). 

2  This  appears  from  the  position 
assigned  to  these  two  emperors  in 
the  '  Caesars.' 

3  The  expedition  of  L.  Verus 
(a.d.  162-164)  was  sent  out  by  M. 
Aurelius.  (See  the  Author's  Sixth 
Monarchy,  p.  325.) 

4  Ammianus  tells  us  that  soon 
after  his  arrival  at  Constantinople, 
on  being  asked  to  lead  an  expe- 


dition against  the  Goths,  Julian 
replied  '  hostes  quserere  se  me- 
liores '  (xxii.  7)  —  an  expression 
which  clearly  points  at  the  Persians. 

5  Ammianus  says  '  Parthicus  ' 
(xxii.  12).  But  Julian  himself 
would  scarcely  have  made  this 
confusion. 

6  See  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall, 
vol.  iii.  181. 

7  Compare  the  Ccesares,  p.  324, 
C,  where  Alexander  is  made  to  ob- 
serve that  the  Romans,  in  a  war  of 
300  years,  had  not  subdued  the 
single  province  of  Mesopotamia. 


Ch.  X.J         HE  PREPARES  TO  IKVADE  PERSIA.  193 


with  the  entire  course  of  Roman  warfare  in  these  parts 
from  the  attack  of  Crassus  to  the  last  defeat  of  his  own 
immediate  predecessor,  he  can  scarcely  have  regarded 
the  subjugation  of  Persia  as  an  easy  matter,  or  have 
expected  to  do  much  more  than  strike  terror  into  the 
'  barbarians '  of  the  East,  or  perhaps  obtain  from  them 
the  cession  of  another  province.  The  sensible  officer, 
who,  after  accompanying  him  in  his  expedition,  wrote 
the  history  of  the  campaign,  regarded  his  actuating 
motives  as  the  delight  that  he  took  in  war,  and  the 
desire  of  a  new  title.1  Confident  in  his  own  military 
talent,  in  his  training,  and  in  his  power  to  inspire  en- 
thusiasm in  an  army,  he  no  doubt  looked  to  reap  laurels 
sufficient  to  justify  him  in  making  his  attack ;  but  the 
wild  schemes  ascribed  to  him,  the  conquest  of  the  Sas- 
sanian  kingdom,  and  the  subjugation  of  Hyrcania  and 
India,2  are  figments  (probably)  of  the  imagination  of 
his  historians. 

Julian  entered  Constantinople  on  the  11th  of  Decem- 
ber, a.d.  361  ;  he  quitted  it  towards  the  end  of  May,3 
a.d.  362,  after  residing  there  less  than  six  months. 
During  this  period,  notwithstanding  the  various  impor- 
tant matters  in  which  he  was  engaged,  the  purifying  of 
the  court,  the  depression  of  the  Christians,  the  restora- 
tion and  revivification  of  Paganism,  he  found  time  to 
form  plans  and  make  preparations  for  his  intended 
eastern  expedition,  in  which  he  was  anxious  to  engage 
as  soon  as  possible.    Having  designated  for  the  war 


1  Ammianus  says:  '  Urebatur 
bellandi  gemino  desiderio:  primo, 
quod  impatiens  otii  lituos  somnia- 
bat  et  proelia:  dein,  quod  .  .  .  . 
ornamentis  illustrium  gloriarura 
inserere  Parthici  cognomentum  ar- 


debat '  (xxii.  12). 

2  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol. 
iii.  p.  209. 

3  Tillemont,  Hist,  des  Empereurs, 
torn.  iv.  p.  213.  'After  May  12' 
(Clinton,  F.  R.  vol.  i.  p.  448). 


194 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  X. 


such  troops  as  could  be  spared  from  the  West,  he  com- 
mitted them  and  their  officers  to  the  charge  of  two 
generals,  carefully  chosen,  Victor,  a  Roman  of  distinc- 
tion, and  the  Persian  refugee,  Prince  Hormisdas,1  who 
conducted  the  legions  without  difficulty  to  Antioch. 
There  Julian  himself  arrived  in  June  or  July,2  after 
having  made  a  stately  progress  through  Asia  Minor ; 
and  it  would  seem  that  he  would  at  once  have  marched 
against  the  enemy,  had  not  his  counsellors  strongly 
urged  the  necessity  of  a  short  delay,3  during  which  the 
European  troops  might  be  rested,  and  adequate  prepa- 
rations made  for  the  intended  invasion.  It  was  espe- 
cially necessary  to  provide  stores  and  ships,4  since  the 
new  emperor  had  resolved  not  to  content  himself  with 
an  ordinary  campaign  upon  the  frontier,  but  rather  to 
imitate  the  examples  of  Trajan  and  Severus,  who  had 
carried  the  Roman  eagles  to  the  extreme  south  of 
Mesopotamia.5  Ships,  accordingly,  were  collected,  and 
probably  built,6  during  the  winter  of  a.d.  362-3  ;  pro- 
visions were  laid  in ;  warlike  stores,  military  engines, 
and  the  like  accumulated;  while  the  impatient  monarch, 
galled  by  the  wit  and  raillery  of  the  gay  Antiochenes,7 
chafed  at  his  compelled  inaction,  and  longed  to  exchange 
the  war  of  words  in  which  he  was  engaged  with  his 


1  See  Zosimus,  iii.  11;  and,  on 
the  subject  of  Prince  Hormisclas, 
compare  above,  p.  149. 

2  Gibbon  places  his  arrival  in 
August  (Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  iii. 
p.  1S1);  but  Tillemont  argues 
strongly  in  favour  of  July  (Hist, 
des  Empereurs,  torn.  iv.  p.  297, 
note  vi.  upon  the  reign  of  Julian). 
Clinton  shows  that  he  was  certainly 
at  Antioch  before  August  1  (F.  B. 
vol.  i.  p.  448).  He  concludes,  as 
most  probable,  that  he  arrived  at 
Antioch  4  about  Midsummer. ' 


3  Amm.  Marc.  xxii.  12. 

4  Zosim.  iii.  12,  ad  init.,  and  13. 

5  See  the  Author's  Sixth  Mon- 
archy, pp.  311-4  and  339-344. 

G  Both  Trajan  and  Severus  had 
had  to  build  ships.  (Dio  Cass, 
lxviii.  26;  lxxv.  9.)  It  seems 
scarcely  possible  that  Julian  should 
have  collected  the  number  that  he 
did  (at  least  1,100)  without  build- 
ing. (See  Zosim.  iii.  13;  and 
Amm.  Marc,  xxiii.  3,  ad  fin.) 

7  Amm.  Marc.  xxii.  14;  Zosim. 
iii.  11 ;  Libanius,  Orat.  x.  p.  307,  B. 


Ch.  X.] 


PROPOSALS  MADE  BY  SAPOR. 


195 


subjects  for  the  ruder  contests  of  arms  wherewith  use 
had  made  him  more  familiar. 

It  must  have  been  during  the  emperor's  stay  at  An- 
tioch  that  he  received  an  embassy  from  the  court  of 
Persia,  commissioned  to  sound  his  inclinations  with 
regard  to  the  conclusion  of  a  peace.  Sapor  had  seen, 
with  some  disquiet,  the  sceptre  of  the  Roman  world 
assumed  by  an  enterprising  and  courageous  youtl^ 
inured  to  warfare  and  ambitious  of  military  glory.  He 
was  probably  very  well  informed  as  to  the  general 
condition  of  the  Roman  State1  and  the  personal  charac- 
ter of  its  administrator  ;  and  the  tidings  which  he  re- 
ceived concerning  the  intentions  and  preparations  of  the 
new  prince  were  such  as  caused  him  some  apprehen- 
sion, if  not  actual  alarm.  Under  these  circumstances, 
he  sent  an  embassy  with  overtures,  the  exact  nature  of 
which  is  not  known,  but  which,  it  is  probable,  took  for 
their  basis  the  existing  territorial  limits  of  the  two 
countries.  At  least,  we  hear  of  no  offer  of  surrender  or 
submission  on  Sapor's  part ;  and  we  can  scarcely  sup- 
pose that,  had  such  offers  been  made,  the  Roman  writers 
would  have  passed  them  over  in  silence.  It  is  not  sur- 
prising that  Julian  lent  no  favourable  ear  to  the  envoys, 
if  these  were  their  instructions ;  but  it  would  have  been 
better  for  his  reputation  had  he  replied  to  them  with 
less  of  haughtiness  and  rudeness.  According  to  one 
authority,2  he  tore  up  before  their  faces  the  autograph 
letter  of  their  master  ;  while,  according  to  another,3  he 
responded,  with  a  contemptuous  smile,  that  4  there  was 


1  The  employment  of  spies  by 
the  Persians  is  often  noticed  by  the 
Oriental  historians  (Tabari,  torn.  ii. 
p.  96;  Mirkhond,  p.  311).  The 
tale  that  Sapor  disguised  himself 
and  visited  Constantinople  in  per- 
son (Tabari,  ii.  p.  99  ;  Macoudi,  ii. 


p.  181)  is,  of  course,  not  true;  but 
we  may  well  believe  that  his  emis- 
saries went  as  far  as  that  city. 

2  Libanius,  Or  at.  viii.  p.  245,  A. 

3  Socrat.  Hist.  Eccles.  iii.  19, 
ad  fin. 


196 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  X. 


no  occasion  for  an  exchange  of  thought  between  him  and 
the  Persian  king  by  messengers,  since  he  intended  very 
shortly  to  treat  with  him  in  person.'  Having  received 
this  rebuff,  the  envoys  of  Sapor  took  their  departure, 
and  conveyed  to  their  sovereign  the  intelligence  that 
he  must  prepare  himself  to  resist  a  serious  invasion. 

About  the  same  time  various  offers  of  assistance 
reached  the  Roman  emperor  from  the  independent  or 
semi-independent  princes  and  chieftains  of  the  regions 
adjacent  to  Mesopotamia.1  Such  overtures  were  sure 
to  be  made  by  the  heads  of  the  plundering  desert 
tribes  to  any  powerful  invader,  since  it  would  be  hoped 
that  a  share  in  the  booty  might  be  obtained  without 
much  participation  in  the  danger.  We  are  told  that 
Julian  promptly  rejected  these  offers,  grandly  saying 
that  it  was  for  Rome  rather  to  give  aid  to  her  allies 
than  to  receive  assistance  from  them.2  It  appears,  how- 
ever, that  at  least  two  exceptions  were  made  to  the 
general  principle  thus  magniloquently  asserted.  Julian 
had  taken  into  his  service,  ere  he  quitted  Europe,  a 
strong  body  of  Gothic  auxiliaries  ;3  and,  while  at  An- 
tioch,  he  sent  to  the  Saracens,  reminding  them  of  their 
promise  to  lend  him  troops,  and  calling  upon  them  to 
fulfil  it.4  If  the  advance  on  Persia  was  to  be  made  by 
the  line  of  the  Euphrates,  an  alliance  with  these  agile 
sons  of  the  desert  was  of  first-rate  importance,  since 
the  assistance  which  they  could  render  as  friends  was 
considerable,  and  the  injury  which  they  could  inflict  as 
enemies  was  almost  beyond  calculation.    It  is  among 


1  Amm.  Marc.  xxii.  2,  ad  init. 

2  Ibid.:  4  Principe  respondente, 
Nequaqnam  decere  adventiciis  ad- 
jumentis  rein  yindicari  Roman  am, 
cujns  opibns  foveri  eonveniat  ami- 
cos  et  soeios,  si  auxilium  eos  ade- 


gerit  necessitas  implorare.' 

3  Ibid,  xxiii.  2  ;  Zosim.  iii.  25. 
Tabari  calls  these  auxiliaries  Kha- 
zars  (vol.  ii.  pp.  95-97). 

4  Amm.  Marc,  xxiii.  5,  ad  init.  ; 
Julian,  Ep.  ad  Liban.  p.  401,  D. 


Ch.  X.J 


JULIAN  OFFENDS  ARSACES. 


197 


the  faults  of  Julian  in  this  campaign  that  he  did  not  set 
more  store  by  the  Saracen  alliance,  and  make  greater 
efforts  to  maintain  it ;  we  shall  find  that  after  a  while 
he  allowed  the  brave  nomads  to  become  disaffected, 
and  to  exchange  their  friendship  with  him  for  hostility.1 
Had  he  taken  more  care  to  attach  them  cordially  to  the 
side  of  Rome,  it  is  quite  possible  that  his  expedition 
might  have  had  a  prosperous  issue. 

There  was  another  ally,  whose  services  Julian  re- 
garded himself  as  entitled  not  to  request,  but  to  com- 
mand. Arsaces,  king  of  Armenia,  though  placed  on 
his  throne  by  Sapor,  had  (as  we  have  seen)  transferred 
his  allegiance  to  Constantius,  and  voluntarily  taken  up 
the  position  of  a  Roman  feudatory.2  Constantius  had 
of  late  suspected  his  fidelity  ;  but  Arsaces  had  not  as 
yet,  by  any  overt  act,  justified  these  suspicions,  and 
Julian  seems  to  have  regarded  him  as  an  assured  friend 
and  ally.  Early  in  a.d.  363  he  addressed  a  letter  to 
the  Armenian  monarch,  requiring  him  to  levy  a  con- 
siderable force,  and  hold  himself  in  readiness  to  execute 
such  <3rders  as  he  would  receive  within  a  short  time.3 
The  style,  address,  and  purport  of  this  letter  were 
equally  distasteful  to  Arsaces,  whose  pride  was  out- 
raged, and  whose  indolence  was  disturbed,  by  the  call 
thus  suddenly  made  upon  him.  His  own  desire  was 
probably  to  remain  neutral ;  he  felt  no  interest  in  the 
standing  quarrel  between  his  two  powerful  neighbours  ; 
he  was  under  obligations  to  both  of  them  ;  and  it  was 
for  his  advantage  that  they  should  remain  evenly 
balanced.    We  cannot  ascribe  to  him  any  earnest  reli- 


1  See  below,  p.  231. 

2  Supra,  p.  168. 

3  Amm,  Marc,  xxiii.  2  :  i  Solum 
Arsacem  monuerat,  Armenia?  re- 


gem,  ut  collectis  copiis  validis  ju- 
benda  opperiretur,  quo.tendere,  quid 
deberet  urgere,  propere  cogniturus.' 


198 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


|Ch.  X. 


gious  feeling  ;x  but,  as  one  who  kept  up  the  profession 
of  Christianity,  he  could  not  but  regard  with  aversion 
the  Apostate,  who  had  given  no  obscure  intimation  of 
his  intention  to  use  his  power  to  the  utmost  in  order 
to  sweep  the  Christian  religion  from  the  face  of  the 
earth.  The  disinclination  of  their  monarch  to  subserve 
the  designs  of  Julian  was  shared,  or  rather  surpassed, 
by  his  people,  the  more  educated  portion  of  whom  were 
strongly  attached  to  the  new  faith  and  worship.2  If  the 
great  historian  of  Armenia  is  right  in  stating  that  Julian 
at  this  time  offered  an  open  insult  to  the  Armenian 
religion,3  we  must  pronounce  him  strangely  imprudent. 
The  alliance  of  Armenia  was  always  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance to  Rome  in  any  attack  upon  the  East.  Julian 
seems  to  have  gone  out  of  his  way  to  create  offence  in 
this  quarter,4  where  his  interests  required  that  he 
should  exercise  all  his  powers  of  conciliation. 

The  forces  which  the  emperor  regarded  as  at  his  dis- 
posal, and  with  which  he  expected  to  take  the  field, 
were  the  following.  His  own  troops  amounted  to 
83,000  or  (according  to  another  account)  to  95,000 
men.5  They  consisted  chiefly  of  Roman  legionaries, 
horse  and  foot,  but  included  a  strong  body  of  Gothic 


1  According  to  the  Armenian 
historians,  Arsaces  was  cruel  and 
profligate.  He  put  to  death,  with- 
out reason,  his  relations  and  satraps, 
persecuted  the  ecclesiastics  who 
reproved  him,  and  established  an 
asylum  for  criminals.  (Mos.  Chor. 
iii.  20-32;  Faustus,  iv.  13-50.) 

2  Faustus,  iii.  13. 

8  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  13.  Moses 
says  that  Julian  required  the  Ar- 
menian monarch  to  hang  up  in  the 
chancel  of  the  metropolitan  church 
a  portrait,  which  he  sent  him,  of 
himself,  containing  also  4  repre- 
sentations of  devils' — i.e.  of  the 


heathen  gods.  It  was  pointed  out 
by  the  Armenian  patriarch  that 
this  was  an  insult  to  Christianity 
(iii.  14). 

4  The  letter  ascribed  to  Julian 
on  this  occasion  (Fabric.  Bibliothec 
Grwc.  vol.  vii.  p.  86)  may  not  be 
genuine,  although  it  is  accepted  by 
St.  Martin  (Notes  on  Le  Beau, 
vol.  iii.  p.  37).  But,  even  apart 
from  this,  the  insolent  tone  of 
Julian  towards  the  Armenian  king 
is  sufficiently  apparent. 

5  Zosimus  is  the  only  writer  who 
gives  an  estimate  of  the  whole 
force,  which  he  makes  to  consist 


Ch.  X.]       HE  MARCHES  THROUGH  MESOPOTAMIA.  199 

auxiliaries.  Armenia  was  expected  to  furnish  a  con- 
siderable force,  probably  not  less  than  20,000  men;1 
and  the  light  horse  of  the  Saracens  would,  it  was 
thought,  be  tolerably  numerous.  Altogether,  an  army 
of  above  a  hundred  thousand  men  was  about  to  be 
launched  on  the  devoted  Persia,  which  was  believed 
unlikely  to  offer  any  effectual,  if  even  any  serious, 
resistance, 

The  impatience  of  Julian  scarcely  allowed  him  to 
aw&it  the  conclusion  of  the  winter.  With  the  first 
breath  of  spring  he  put  his  forces  in  motion,2  and,  quit- 
ting Antioch,  marched  with  all  speed  to  the  Euphrates. 
Passing  Litarbi,  and  then  Hierapolis,  he  crossed  the 
river  by  a  bridge  of  boats  in  the  vicinity  of  that  place, 
and  proceeded  by  Batnae  to  the  important  city  of 
Carrhae,3  once  the  home  of  Abraham.4  Here  he  halted 
for  a  few  days  and  finally  fixed  his  plans.  It  was 
by  this  time  well  known  to  the  Romans  that  there 
were  two,  and  two  only,  convenient  roads  whereby 
Southern  Mesopotamia  was  to  be  reached,  one  along 
the  line  of  the  Mons  Masius  to  the  Tigris,  and  then 
along  the  banks  of  that  stream,  the  other  down  the 


of      65,000  taken  with  him  by 
Julian, 

18,000  detached  to  act  under 

■   Procopius. 

Total  83,000 

Sozomen  raises  the  number  of  the 
forces  under  Procopius  to  4  about 
20,000'  (Hist.  Eccles.  vi.  1),  and 
Ammianus  to  30,000  (xxiii.  3). 
Libanius  says  20,000  (Orat.  x.  p. 
312),  John  of  Malala  16,000  (p. 
328).  If  we  add  the  30,000  of 
Am  in  i  anus  to  the  65,000  who  ac- 
companied Julian,  we  get  a  total 
of  95,000,  which  is  Gibbon's  esti- 
mate (Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  iii. 
pp.  189,  190). 


1  Armenia  furnished  7,000  foot 
and  6,000  horse  to  Antony  (Plut. 
Anton.  §  37).  It  was  calculated 
that  the  horse  might  have  been 
increased  to  16,000  (ibid.  §  50). 

2  Julian  left  Antioch  on  March  5, 
a.d.  363.  (See  Ammianus,  xxiii.  2: 
4  Tertio  Nonas  Martias  profectus.') 

3  Ainm.  Marc,  xxiii.  2,  3.  Zosi- 
mus  makes  him  visit  Edessa  from 
Batnge  (iii.  12);  but  the  expression 
used  by  Ammianus  ('venit  cursu 
propero  Carrhas')  conradicts  this. 

4  The  identity  of  Carrhse  with 
the  Haran  of  Genesis  is  allowed  by 
almost  all  critics. 


I 

200  THE  SEVENTH  MONAKCHY.  [Ch.  X. 


valley  of  the  Euphrates  to  the  great  alluvial  plain  on  the 
lower  course  of  the  rivers.  Julian  had,  perhaps,  hitherto 
doubted  which  line  he  should  follow  in  person.1  The 
first  had  been  preferred  by  Alexander  and  by  Trajan, 
the  second  by  the  younger  Cyrus,  by  Avidius  Cassius, 
and  by  Severus.  Both  lines  were  fairly  practicable  ; 
but  that  of  the  Tigris  was  circuitous,  and  its  free  em- 
ployment was  only  possible  under  the  condition  of  Ar- 
menia being  certainly  friendly.  If  Julian  had  cause  to 
suspect,  as  it  is  probable  that  he  had,  the  fidelity  of  the 
Armenians,  he  may  have  felt  that  there  was  one  line 
only  which  he  could  with  prudence  pursue.  He  might 
send  a  subsidiary  force  by  the  doubtful  route,  which 
could  advance  to  his  aid  if  matters  went  favourably,  or 
remain  on  the  defensive  if  they  assumed  a  threatening 
aspect ;  but  his  own  grand  attack  must  be  by  the  other. 
Accordingly  he  divided  his  forces.  Committing  a  body 
of  troops,  which  is  variously  estimated  at  from  18,000  to 
30,000, 2  into  the  hands  of  Procopius,  a  connection  of  his 
own,  and  Sebastian,  Duke  of  Egypt,  with  orders  that 
they  should  proceed  by  way  of  the  Mons  Masius  to  Ar- 
menia, and,  uniting  themselves  with  the  forces  of  Arsa- 
ces,  invade  Northern  Media,  ravage  it,  and  then  join  him 
before  Ctesiphon  by  the  line  of  the  Tigris,3  he  reserved 
for  himself  and  for  his  main  army  the  shorter  and  more 
open  route  down  the  valley  of  the  Euphrates.  Leaving 
Carrhse  on  the  26th  of  March,  after  about  a  week's 


1  Ammianus  says  that  he  had 
carefully  provisioned  the  line  of 
the  Tigris  in  order  to  make  the 
Persians  think  that  it  was  the  line 
which  he  intended  to  follow  (xxiii. 
3);  but  it  is  perhaps  as  probable 
that  he  wished  to  be  able  to  pursue 
the  Tigris  line  if  circumstances 
proved  favourable. 


2  Zosimus  says  18,000  (iii.  12); 
Sozomen  (vi.  1)  and  Libanius  (Orat. 
Funebr.  p.  312,  A)  say  20,000; 
Ammianus  says  30,000  (l.s.c. ). 

3  See  Amm.  Marc,  l.s.c.  Zosi- 
mus regards  the  force  as  left  merely 
for  the  protection  of  Koman  Meso- 
potamia. 


Ch.  X.  J 


JULIAN  AT  CIKCES1UM. 


201 


stay,  he  marched  southward,  at  the  head  of  65,000  men, 
by  Davana  and  along  the  course  of  the  Belik,  to  Calli- 
nicus  or  Nicephorium,  near  the  junction  of  the  Belik 
with  the  Euphrates.  Here  the  Saracen  chiefs  came  and 
made  their  submission,  and  were  graciously  received 
by  the  emperor,  to  whom  they  presented  a  crown  of 
gold.1  At  the  same  time  the  fleet  made  its  appear- 
ance, numbering  at  least  1,100  vessels,2  of  which  fifty 
were  ships  of  war,  fifty  prepared  to  serve  as  pontoons, 
and  the  remaining  thousand  transports  laden  with 
provisions,  weapons,  and  military  engines. 

From  Callinicus  the  emperor  marched  along  the 
course  of  the  Euphrates  to  Circusium,  or  Circesium,3  at 
the  junction  of  the  Khabour  with  the  Euphrates,  ar- 
riving at  this  place  early  in  April.4  Thus  far  he  had 
been  marching  through  his  own  dominions,  and  had 
had  no  hostility  to  dread.  Being  now  about  to  enter  the 
.enemy's  country,  he  made  arrangements  for  the  march 
which  seem  to  have  been  extremely  judicious.  The 
cavalry  was  placed  under  the  command  of  Arinthaeus 
and  Prince  Hormisdas,  and  was  stationed  at  the  extreme 
left,  with  orders  to  advance  on  a  line  parallel  with  the 
general  course  of  the  river.  Some  picked  legions  under 
the  command  of  Nevitta  formed  the  right  wing,  and, 
resting  on  the  Euphrates,  maintained  communication 
with  the  fleet.  Julian,  with  the  main  part  of  his  troops, 
occupied  the  space  intermediate  between  these  two 
extremes,  marching  in  a  loose  column  which  from  front 
to  rear  covered  a  distance  of  above  nine  miles.    A  fly- 


1  Amm.  Marc,  l.s.c. 

2  This  is  the  estimate  of  Am- 
miaims.  Zosimus  makes  the  num- 
ber considerably  exceed  1,150  (iii. 
13). 

'6  Circesium  is  the  ordinary  form. 


and  is  that  given  by  Zosimus;  but 
xVmmianus  has  'Circusium'  (xxiii. 
5) ;  and  so  the  Nubian  Geography. 

4  6  Principio  meiisis  Aprilis.' 
(Amm.  Marc,  l.s.c.) 


202 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


ICh.  X. 


ing  corps  of  fifteen  hundred  men  acted  as  an  avant- 
guard  under  Count  Lucilianus,  and  explored  the 
country  in  advance,  feeling  on  all  sides  for  the  enemy. 
The  rear  was  covered  by  a  detachment  under  Secundi- 
nus,  Duke  of  Osrhoene,  Dagalaiphus,  and  Victor.1 

Having  made  his  dispositions,  and  crossed  the  broad 
stream  of  the  Khabour,  on  the  7th  of  April,  by  a  bridge 
of  boats,  which  he  immediately  broke  up,2  Julian  con- 
tinued his  advance  along  the  course  of  the  Euphrates, 
supported  by  his  fleet,  which  was  not  allowed  either  to 
outstrip  or  to  lag  behind  the  army.3  The  first  halt  was 
at  Zaitha,4  famous  as  the  scene  of  the  murder  of  Gor- 
dian,  whose  tomb  was  in  its  vicinity.5  Here  Julian  en- 
couraged his  soldiers  by  an  eloquent  speech,6  in  which 
he  recounted  the  past  successes  of  the  Roman  arms,  and 
promised  them  an  easy  victory  over  their  present 
adversary.  He  then,  in  a  two  days'  march,  reached 
Dura,7  a  ruined  city,  destitute  of  inhabitants,  on  the 
banks  of  the  river ;  from  which  a  march  of  four  days 
more  brought  him  to  Anathan,8  the  modern  Anah,  a 
strong  fortress  on  an  island  in  the  mid-stream,  which 


1  Amm.  Marc.  xxiv.  1.  Com- 
pare Zosim.  iii.  14. 

2  Amm.  Marc,  xxiii.  5:  'Pontem 
avelli  jussit,  ne  cui  militum  ab  ag- 
minibus  propriis  revertendi  fiducia 
remaneret.' 

3  i  Classis,  licet  per  flumen  fere- 
batur  assiduis  flexibus  tortuosum, 
nec  residere,  nee  praecurrere  sine- 
batur.'    (Ibid.  xxvi.  1.) 

4  Called  Zautha  by  Zosimus 
(iii.  14),  perhaps  the  Asicha  of 
Isidore  (Mans.  Part//.  §  1). 

5  Zosimus  places  the  tomb  at 
Dura,  two  days'  march  from  Zaitha 
(Amm.  Marc.  xxiv.  1);  but  Am- 
miauus,  who  accompanied  the  army, 
can  scarcely  have  been  mistaken  in 
the  fact  that  the  tomb  was  at  any 


rate  distinctly  visible  from  Zaitha. 

6  Gibbon  supposes  the  speech  to 
have  been  made  as  soon  as  the 
Khabour  was  crossed  (Decline  and 
Fall,  vol.  iii.  p.  191);  but  Am- 
mianus  makes  Zaitha  the  scene  of 
it.  In  the  course  of  it  Julian  used 
the  expression:  '  Gordianus,  cujus 
monumentum  nunc  vidimus  '(Amm. 
Marc,  xxiii.  5). 

7  '  Emenso  itinere  bidui  civita- 
tem  venimus  Duram '  (ib.  xxiv.  1). 

8  '  Dierum  quatuor  itinere  levi 
peracto.'  (Ibid.)  Anathan  was 
known  to  the  Assyrians  as  Anat, 
to  the  Greeks  of  Augustus's  time 
as  Anatho  (see  Isid.  Char.  Mans. 
Forth.  §  1).  It  is  perhaps  the 
<Hena'  of  Isaiah  (xxxvii.  13). 


Ch.  X.j 


SURRENDER  OF  ANATHAIST. 


203 


was  held  by  a  Persian  garrison.  An  attempt  to  sur- 
prise the  place  by  a  night  attack  having  failed,  Julian 
had  recourse  to  persuasion,  and  by  the  representations 
of  Prince  Hormisdas  induced  its  defenders  to  surrender 
the  fort  and  place  themselves  at  his  mercy.1  It  was, 
perhaps,  to  gall  the  Antiochenes  with  an  indication  of 
his  victorious  progress  that  he  sent  his  prisoners  under 
escort  into  Syria,  and  settled  them  in  the  territory  of 
Chalcis,  at  no  great  distance  from  the  city  of  his  aver- 
sion. Unwilling  further  to  weaken  his  army  by  de- 
taching a  garrison  to  hold  his  conquest,  he  committed 
Anathan  to  the  flames  before  proceeding  further  down 
the  river.2 

About  eight  miles  below  Anathan,  another  island  and 
another  fortress  were  held  by  the  enemy.  Thilutha  is 
described  as  stronger  than  Anathan,  and  indeed  as 
almost  impregnable.3  Julian  felt  that  he  could  not 
attack  it  with  any  hope  of  success,  and  therefore  once 
more  submitted  to  use  persuasion.  But  the  garrison, 
feeling  themselves  secure,  rejected  his  overtures ;  they 
would  wait,  they  said,  and  see  which  party  was  superior 
in  the  approaching  conflict,  and  would  then  attach 
themselves  to  the  victors.  Meanwhile,  if  unmolested 
by  the  invader,  they  would  not  interfere  with  his 
advance,  but  would  maintain  a  neutral  attitude.  Julian 
had  to  determine  whether  he  would  act  in  the  spirit  of 
an  Alexander,4  and,  rejecting  with  disdain  all  compro- 
mise, compel  by  force  of  arms  an  entire  submission,  or 
whether  he  would  take  lower  ground,  accept  the  offer 
made  to  him,  and  be  content  to  leave  in  his  rear  a  cer- 

iii.  15:  <ppovpiov  oxvpcoTarov. 

4  See  Arrian,  Exp.  Alex.  iv.  21, 
26,  29,  &c. 


1  Amm.  Marc.  xxiv.  1;  Zosim. 
iii.  14,  ad  fin. 

2  Amm.  Marc,  l.s.c. 

3  Ibid.  xxiv.  2,  ad  init.:  Zosim. 


204 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  X, 


tain  number  of  unconqnered  fortresses.  He  decided 
that  prudence  required  him  to  take  the  latter  course, 
and  left  Thilutha  unassailed.  It  is  not  surprising  that, 
having  admitted  the  assumption  of  a  neutral  position 
by  one  town,  he  was  forced  to  extend  the  permission 
to  others,1  and  so  to  allow  the  Euphrates  route  to 
remain,  practically,  in  the  hands  of  the  Persians. 

A  five  days'  march  from  Thilutha  brought  the  army 
to  a  point  opposite  Diacira,  or  Hit,2  a  town  of  ancient 
repute,3  and  one  which  happened  to  be  well  provided 
with  stores  and  provisions.  Though  the  place  lay  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  river,  it  was  still  exposed  to 
attack,  as  the  fleet  could  convey  any  number  of  troops 
from  one  shore  to  the  other.  Being  considered  un- 
tenable, it  was  deserted  by  the  male  inhabitants,  who, 
however,  left  some  of  their  women  behind  them.  We 
obtain  an  unpleasant  idea  of  the  state  of  discipline  which 
the  philosophic  emperor  allowed  to  prevail,  when  we 
find  that  his  soldiers,  1  without  remorse  and  without 
punishment,  massacred  these  defenceless  persons.'4 
The  historian  of  the  war  records  this  act  without  any 
appearance  of  shame,  as  if  it  were  a  usual  occurrence, 
and  no  more  important  than  the  burning  of  the  plun- 
dered city  which  followed.5 

From  Hit  the  army  pursued  its  march,  through 


1  Ammianus  mentions  only  one 
other,  Achaiachala;  but  Zosinms 
speaks  of  erepa  ypovpia  (l.s.c.). 

2  This  site  is  certainly  identified 
by  the  mention  of  bitumen  springs 
in  its  neighbourhood  (Zosim.  iii.  15; 
Amm.  Marc.  xxiv.  2).  There  are 
no  bitumen  springs  in  this  part  of 
Mesopotamia  except  those  of  Hit. 

■  Hit  is  thought  to  be  mentioned 
under  the  name  of  1st  in  a  hiero- 
glyphical    inscription    set  up  by 


Thothmes  III.  about  B.C.  1450. 
It  is  probably  the  Ahava  of  Ezra 
(viii.  15,  21). 

4  The  words  used  are  Gibbon's 
{Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  iii.  p.  193). 
The  fact  is  recorded  both  by  Zosi- 
mus  and  Ammianus. 

5  'Qua'  (i.e.  Diacira)  'incensa, 
coasisque  mulieribus  paucis  quae 
reperta3  sunt,  Ozogardana  occu- 
pavimus'  (Amm.  Marc.  xxiv.  2). 


Ch.  X.J  THE  ROMANS  ENTER  BABYLONIA.  205 

Sitha  and  Megia,1  to  Zaragardia  or  Ozogardana,  where 
the  memory  of  Trajan's  expedition  still  lingered,  a  cer- 
tain pedestal  or  pulpit  of  stone  being  known  to  the 
natives  as  4  Trajan's  tribunal.''  Up  to  this  time  nothing 
had  been  seen  or  heard  of  any  Persian  opposing  army  ; 2 
one  man  only  on  the  Roman  side,  so  far  as  we  hear, 
had  been  killed.3  No  systematic  method  of  checking  the 
advance  had  been  adopted ;  the  corn  was  everywhere 
found  standing ;  forage  was  plentiful ;  and  there  were 
magazines  of  grain  in  the  towns.  No  difficulties  had 
delayed  the  invaders  but  such  as  Nature  had  interposed 
to  thwart  them,  as  when  a  violent  storm  on  one  occa- 
sion shattered  the  tents,  and  on  another  a  sudden  swell 
of  the  Euphrates  wrecked  some  of  the  corn  transports, 
and  interrupted  the  right  wing's  line  of  march.4  But 
this  pleasant  condition  of  things  was  not  to  continue. 
At  Hit  the  rolling  Assyrian  plain  had  come  to  an  end, 
and  the  invading  army  had  entered  upon  the  low  allu- 
vium of  Babylonia,5  a  region  of  great  fertility,  inter- 
sected by  numerous  canals,  which  in  some  places  were 
carried  the  entire  distance  from  the  one  river  to  the 
other.6  The  change  in  the  character  of  the  country 
encouraged  the  Persians  to  make  a  change  in  their  tac- 


1  These  places  are  only  men- 
tioned by  Zosimns  (iii.  15). 

2  Gibbon  implies  the  contrary  of 
this,  when  he  says  in  the  most 
general  way,  i  During  the  march 
the  Snrenas,  or  Persian  general, 
and  Malik  Rodosaces  incessantly 
hovered  round  the  army;  every 
straggler  was  intercepted ;  every 
detachment  was  attacked,'  &c. 
(Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  iii.  p.  194.) 
But  Zosimus  strongly  notes  the 
absence  of  any  Persian  army  up  to 
this  point:  dav/Ltaoac;  6*  6  (Saai'Aevt; 
on  ToanvTTjP  tov  GTpaiov  diafipafiovTOc; 
oddv  ovdeic  e/c  Ylepocov  ovtc  'hoxoq  e| 


evedpac,  ovre  e/c  rov  Trpo(pavovc  uiX7]v- 

TTjai  TL  7T02.€/LtL0V,  K.T.Tl.  (I.S.C.). 

3  See  Amm.  Marc.  xxiv.  1,  ad 
fin. 

4  Ibid.  Compare  Liban.  Or  at. 
Funebr.  p.  313,  D. 

5  Gibbon,  following  Herodotus 
(i.  192),  calls  this  tract  Assyria 
(Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  iii.  pp.  194- 
199) ;  but,  strictly  speaking,  it  is 
only  the  upper,  rolling,  slightly 
elevated  plain  to  which  that  name 
belongs.  The  alluvial  plain  is 
properly  Babylonia. 

6  Amm.  Marc.  xxiv.  2;  Zosim. 
iii.  .16,  ad  init. 


206  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [Oh.  X. 


tics.  Hitherto  they  had  been  absolutely  passive  ;  now 
at  last  they  showed  themselves,  and  commenced  the 
active  system  of  perpetual  harassing  warfare  in  which 
they  were  adepts.  A  surena,  or  general  of  the  first 
rank,1  appeared  in  the  field,  at  the  head  of  a  strong 
body  of  Persian  horse,  and  accompanied  by  a  sheikh  of 
the  Saracenic  Arabs,2  known  as  Malik  (or  L  King ') 
Rodosaces.  Retreating  as  Julian  advanced,  but  continu- 
ally delaying  his  progress,  hanging  on  the  skirts  of  his 
army,  cutting  off  his  stragglers,  and  threatening  every 
unsupported  detachment,  this  active  force  changed  all 
the  conditions  of  the  march,  rendering  it  slo  w  and  pain- 
ful, and  sometimes  stopping  it  altogether.  We  are  told 
that  on  one  occasion  PrinceHormisdas narrowly  escaped 
falling  into  the  surena's  hands.3  On  another,  the  Per- 
sian force,  having  allowed  the  Roman  vanguard  to 
proceed  unmolested,  suddenly  showed  itself  on  the 
southern  bank  of  one  of  the  great  canals  connecting 
the  Euphrates  with  the  Tigris,  and  forbade  the  passage 
of  Julian's  main  army.4  It  was  only  after  a  day  and  a 
night's  delay  that  the  emperor,  by  detaching  troops 
under  Victor  to  make  a  long  circuit,  cross  the  canal  far 
to  the  east,  recall  Lucilianus  with  the  vanguard,  and 
then  attack  the  surena's  troops  in  the  rear,  was  able  to 


1  It  has  been  argued  by  some 
that  Surena  is  not  a  name  of  office, 
but  a  Persian  family  appellation. 
(St.  Martin,  Notes  on  Le  Beau,  vol. 
iii.  p.  79;  Patkanian  in  the  Journal 
Asiatique  for  180(5,  p.  130.)  There 
was  certainly  a  family  called  Suren- 
P ah  lav  at  the  close  of  the  Parthian 
and  beginning  of  the  Neo-Persian 
period  (Mos.  Chor.  ii.  65,  67). 
But  we  find  the  word  surena  in 
the  classical  writers  before  the 
time  when  the  Suren-Pahlav  family 


is  said  to  have  originated.  (See 
the  historians  of  Crassus,  passim.) 

2  Gibbon  calls  him  '  the  re- 
nowned emir  of  the  tribe  of  Gas- 
san '  (vol.  iii.  p.  194).  But  it  is 
questionable  whether  this  tribe 
had  settlements  on  the  Euphrates. 
Moreover,  the  tribe  name  in  Am- 
mianus  is  not  Gassan,  but  Assart. 

3  Zosimus,  iii.  15;  Amm.  Marc, 
xxiv.  2. 

4  Zosim.  iii.  16. 


Ch.  X.| 


SIEGE  OF  PERISABOR. 


207 


overcome  the  resistance  in  his  front,  and  carry  his 
army  across  the  cutting. 

Having  in  this  way  effected  the  passage,  Julian  con- 
tinued his  march  along  the  Euphrates,  and  in  a  short 
time  came  to  the  city  of  Perisabor 1  (Firuz-Shapur),  the 
most  important  that  he  had  yet  reached,  and  reckoned 
not  much  inferior  to  Ctesiphon.2  As  the  inhabitants 
steadily  refused  all  accommodation,  and  insulted  Hor- 
misdas,  who  was  sent  to  treat  with  them,  by  the 
reproach  that  he  was  a  deserter  and  a  traitor,  the 
emperor  determined  to  form  the  siege  of  the  place  and 
see  if  he  could  not  compel  it  to  a  surrender.  Situated 
between  the  Euphrates  and  one  of  the  numerous  canals 
derived  from  it,  and  further  protected  by  a  trench 
drawn  across  from  the  canal  to  the  river,  Perisabor 
occupied  a  sort  of  island,  while  at  the  same  time  it  was 
completely  surrounded  with  a  double  wall.  The  cita- 
del, which  lay  towards  the  north,  and  overhung  the 
Euphrates,  was  especially  strong  ;  and  the  garrison  was 
brave,  numerous,  and  full  of  confidence.  The  walls, 
however,  composed  in  part  of  brick  laid  in  bitumen, 
were  not  of  much  strength ; 3  and  the  Roman  soldiers 
found  little  difficulty  in  shattering  with  the  ram  one  of 
the  corner  towers,  and  so  making  an  entrance  into  the 
place.  But  the  real  struggle  now  began.  The  brave 
defenders  retreated  into  the  citadel,  which  was  of  im- 
posing height,  and  from  this  vantage-ground  galled  the 


1  So  Ammianus  (l.s.c. ).  Zosi- 
mus  (Hi.  17)  gives  the  name  as 
Beersabora  (Rripaaptipa).  Libanius 
says  it  was  named  after  the  reign- 
ing monarch  (tov  tote  (3(ioi?ievovtos 
kiruvvfioQ.    Or  at.  Funebr.  p.  315,  A). 

2  Zosim.  iii.  IS:    ttoTieljc,  (leyaTirj^ 

KOl   TGJV   EV    'AOOVPLGL   flETU  KTyOKpUVTU 


3  Ammianns  speaks  of  this 
method  of  construction  as  especially 
strong  ('quo  icdificii  genere  nihil 
esse  tutius  constat ' ).  But  the  speedy 
fall  of  the  corner  tower  should 
have  taught  him  better.  Bitumen, 
though  useful  in  keeping  out  damp, 
is  not  really  a  good  cement. 


208 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


|Ch.  X. 


Romans  in  the  town  with  an  incessant  shower  of  arrows, 
darts,  and  stones.  The  ordinary  catapults  and  balistae 
of  the  Romans  were  no  match  for  such  a  storm  de- 
scending from  such  a  height ;  and  it  was  plainly  neces- 
sary, if  the  place  was  to  be  taken,  to  have  recourse  to 
some  other  device.  Julian,  therefore,  who  was  never 
sparing  of  his  own  person,  took  the  resolution,  on  the 
second  day  of  the  siege,  of  attempting  to  burst  open  one 
of  the  gates.  Accompanied  by  a  small  band,  who 
formed  a  roof  over  his  head  with  their  shields,  and  by 
a  few  sappers  with  their  tools,  he  approached  the  gate- 
tower,  and  made  his  men  commence  their  operations. 
The  doors,  however,  were  found  to  be  protected  with 
iron,  and  the  fastenings  to  be  so  strong  that  no  imme- 
diate impression  could  be  made  ;  while  the  alarmed 
garrison,  concentrating  its  attention  on  the  threatened 
spot,  kept  up  a  furious  discharge  of  missiles  on  their 
daring  assailants.  Prudence  counselled  retreat  from  the 
dangerous  position  which  had  been  taken  up  ;  and  the 
emperor,  though  he  felt  acutely  the  shame  of  having 
failed,1  retired.  But  his  mind,  fertile  in  resource,  soon 
formed  a  new  plan.  He  remembered  that  Demetrius 
Poliorcetes  had  acquired  his  surname  by  the  invention 
and  use  of  the  'Helepolis,'  a  moveable  tower  of  vast 
height,  which  placed  the  assailants  on  a  level  with  the 
defenders  even  of  the  loftiest  ramparts.  He  at  once 
ordered  the  construction  of  such  a  machine  ;  and,  the 
ability  of  his  engineers  being  equal  to  the  task,  it  rapidly 
grew  before  his  eyes.  The  garrison  saw  its  growth  with 
feelings  very  opposite  to  those  of  their  assailant ;  they 
felt  that  they  could  not  resist  the  new  creation,  and 
anticipated  its  employment  by  a  surrender.2  Julian 


1  £  Evasit  .  .  .  verecundo  rubore  |  2  So  Aramianus.  Zosini us  speaks 
suffusus.'    (Armn.  Marc,  l.s.c.)         of  the  terrible  engine  having  been 


Ch.  X.]        MARCH  ALONG  THE  N AHK-M ALCH A .  209 

agreed  to  spare  their  lives,  and  allowed  them  to  with- 
draw and  join  their  countrymen,  each  man  taking  with 
him  a  spare  garment  and  a  certain  sum  of  money.  The 
other  stores  contained  within  the  walls  fell  to  the  con- 
querors, who  found  them  to  comprise  a  vast  quantity 
of  corn,  arms,  and  other  valuables.  Julian  distributed 
among  his  troops  whatever  was  likely  to  be  serviceable ; 
the  remainder,  of  which  he  could  make  no  use,  was 
either  burned  or  thrown  into  the  Euphrates. 

The  latitude  of  Ctesiphon  was  now  nearly  reached, 
but  Julian  still  continued  to  descend  the  Euphrates, 
while  the  Persian  cavalry  made  occasional  dashes  upon 
his  extended  line,  and  sometimes  caused  him  a  sensible 
loss.1  At  length  he  came  to  the  point  where  the 
Nahr-Malcha,  or  L  Royal  river,'  the  chief  of  the  canals 
connecting  the  Euphrates  with  the  Tigris,  branched  off 
from  the  more  western  stream,  and  ran  nearly  due  east 
to  the  vicinity  of  the  capital.  The  canal  was  navigable 
by  his  ships,  and  he  therefore  at  this  point  quitted  the 
Euphrates,  and  directed  his  march  eastward  along  the 
course  of  the  cutting,  following  in  the  footsteps  of  Seve- 
rus,  and  no  doubt  expecting,  like  him,  to  capture  easily 
the  great  metropolitan  city.  But  his  advance  across  the 
neck  of  land  which  here  separates  the  Tigris  from  the 
Euphrates 2  was  painful  and  difficult,  since  the  enemy 
laid  the  country  under  water,  and  at  every  favourable 
point  disputed  his  progress.  Julian,  however,  still 
pressed  forward,  and  advanced,  though  slowly.  By  fell- 
ing the  palms  which  grew  abundantly  in  this  region,  and 
forming  with  them  rafts  supported  by  inflated  skins,  he 


brought  into  operation  (iii.  18;  pp. 
149-150). 

1  Zosimus,  iii.  19;  Amm.  Marc, 
xxiv.  3. 


2  The  distance  across  is  not 
more  than  about  15  miles  a  little 
below  Babylon;  in  the  latitude  of 
Ctesiphon  it  is  about  20  miles. 


210 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  X. 


was  able  to  pass  the  inundated  district,  and  to  approach 
within  about  eleven  miles  of  Ctesiphon.  Here  his  further 
march  was  obstructed  by  a  fortress,  built  (as  it  would 
seem)  to  defend  the  capital,  and  fortified  with  especial 
care.  Ammianus  calls  this  place  Maogamalcha,1  while 
Zosimus  gives  it  the  name  of  Besuchis ;  2  but  both 
agree  that  it  was  a  large  town,  commanded  by  a  strong 
citadel,  and  held  by  a  brave  and  numerous  garrison. 
Julian  might  perhaps  have  left  it  unassailed,  as  he  had 
left  already  several  towns  upon  his  line  of  march  ;  but 
a  daring  attempt  made  against  himself  by  a  portion  of 
the  garrison  caused  him  to  feel  his  honour  concerned  in 
taking  the  place  ;  and  the  result  was  that  he  once  more 
arrested  his  steps,  and,  sitting  down  before  the  walls, 
commenced  a  formal  siege.  All  the  usual  arts  of  attack 
and  defence  were  employed  on  either  side  for  several 
days,  the  chief  novel  feature  in  the  warfare  being 
the  use  by  the  besieged  of  blazing  balls  of  bitumen,3 
which  they  shot  from  their  lofty  towers  against  the  be- 
siegers' works  and  persons.  Julian,  however,  met  this 
novelty  by  a  device  on  his  side  which  was  uncommon  ; 
he  continued  openly  to  assault  the  walls  and  gates  with 
his  battering  rams,  but  he  secretly  gave  orders  that  the 
chief  efforts  of  his  men  should  be  directed  to  the  for- 
mation of  a  mine,4  which  should  be  carried  under  both 
the  walls  that  defended  the  place,  and  enable  him  to 
introduce  suddenly  a  body  of  troops  into  the  very  heart 
of  the  city.  His  orders  were  successfully  executed  ; 
and  while  a  general  attack  upon  the  defences  occupied 
the  attention  of  the  besieged,  three  corps5  introduced 


1  Aram.  Marc.  xxiv.  4. 

2  Zosim.  iii.  20;  p.  153. 

3  Ibid.  p.  154:  Oi  h  t£>  (ppovpiu 
noXopKOv/ievoL  .  .   .  ug&uTitl)  [julovg 

TTLTTVpu/ieVOVC  Yj KOVT l(0V . 

4  Liban.  Orat.  Funebr.  p.  317,  D; 


Amm.  Marc.  xxiv.  4;  Zosim.  iii. 
21 ;  p.  155. 

5  The  Mattiarii,  the  Laccinarii, 
and  the  Victores.  (Zosim.  iii.  22; 
p.  156.) 


Ch.  X.1 


FALL  OF  M AO G AM ALCH A. 


211 


through  the  mine  suddenly  showed  themselves  in  the 
town  itself,  and  rendered  further  resistance  hopeless. 
Maogamalcha,  which  a  little  before  had  boasted  of 
being  impregnable,  and  had  laughed  to  scorn  the  vain 
efforts  of  the  emperor,1  suddenly  found  itself  taken  by 
assault  and  undergoing  the  extremities  of  sack  and  pil- 
lage. Julian  made  no  efforts  to  prevent  a  general  mas- 
sacre,2 and  the  entire  population,  without  distinction  of 
age  or  sex,  seems  to  have  been  put  to  the  sword.3  The 
commandant  of  the  fortress,  though  he  was  at  first 
spared,  suffered  death  shortly  after  on  a  frivolous 
charge.4  Even  a  miserable  remnant,  which  had  con- 
cealed itself  in  caves  and  cellars,  was  hunted  out,  smoke 
and  fire  being  used  to  force  the  fugitives  from  their 
hiding-places,  or  else  cause  them  to  perish  in  the  dark- 
some dens  by  suffocation.5  Thus  there  was  no  extrem- 
ity of  savage  warfare  which  was  not  used,  the  fourth 
century  anticipating  some  of  the  horrors  which  have 
most  disgraced  the  nineteenth.6 

Nothing  now  but  the  river  Tigris  intervened  between 
Julian  and  the  great  city  of  Ctesiphon,  which  was 
plainly  the  special  object  of  the  expedition.  Ctesiphon, 
indeed,  was  not  to  Persia  what  it  had  been  to  Parthia ; 
but  still  it  might  fairly  be  looked  upon  as  a  prize  of 


1  Liban.  p.  317,  B;  Zosim.  l.s.c. 

2  The  Sophist  of  Antioch  en- 
deavours to  defend  his  hero  from 
the  charge  of  cruelty  by  taxing 
the  soldiers  with  disobedience  to 
their  general's  orders  (Or.  Funebr. 
p.  318,  C);  but  the  narratives  of 
Ammianus  and  Zosimus  contradict 
him. 

3  '  Sine  sexus  discrimine  vel 
setatis,  quidquid  impetus  reperit, 
potestas  iratorum  absumpsit'(Amm. 
Marc,  l.s.c).  Tovg  kv  xePGLV  <IVV- 
povv,     ovre     yvvaincbv     ovre  naiduv 


avexoftevoL  (Zosim.  iii.  22;  p.  157). 

4  Nabdates  was  accused  of  hav- 
ing defended  Maogamalcha  to  the 
last,  after  having  promised  to  sur- 
render it.  He  had  also  called 
Hormisdas  a  traitor.  For  these 
crimes  (?)  he  was  burned  alive! 
(Amm.  Marc.  xxiv.  5.) 

5  Ibid.  xxiv.  4,  sub  Jin. 

6  The  similar  measures  adopted 
by  Marshal  Bugeaud  against  the 
Arabs  of  Algeria  some  thirty  years 
ago  were  generally  reprobated. 


212 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


ICh.  X. 


considerable  importance.  Of  Parthia  it  had  been  the 
main,  in  later  times  perhaps  the  sole,  capital ;  to  Per- 
sia it  was  a  secondary  rather  than  a  primary  city,  the 
ordinary  residence  of  the  court  being  Istakr,  or  Persep- 
olis.  Still  the  Persian  kings  seem  occasionally  to  have 
resided  at  Ctesiphon ;  and  among  the  secondary  cities 
of  the  empire  it  undoubtedly  held  a  high  rank.  In  the 
neighbourhood  were  various  royal  hunting-seats,  sur- 
rounded by  shady  gardens,  and  adorned  with  paintings 
or  bas-reliefs ; 1  while  near  them  were  parks,  or  4  para- 
dises,' containing  the  game  kept  for  the  prince's  sport, 
which  included  lions,  wild  boars,  and  bears  of  remarka- 
ble fierceness.2  As  Julian  advanced,  these  pleasaunces 
fell,  one  after  another,  into  his  hands,  and  were  de- 
livered over  to  the  rude  soldiery,  who  trampled  the 
flowers  and  shrubs  under  foot,  destroyed  the  wild 
beasts,  and  burned  the  residences.  No  serious  re- 
sistance was  as  yet  made  by  any  Persian  force  to  the 
progress  of  the  Romans,  who  pressed  steadily  forward, 
occasionally  losing  a  few  men  or  a  few  baggage  ani- 
mals,3 but  drawing  daily  nearer  to  the  great  city,  and 
on  their  way  spreading  ruin  and  desolation  over  a  most 
fertile  district,  from  which  they  drew  abundant  supplies 
as  they  passed  through  it,  while  they  left  it  behind  them 
blackened,  wasted,  and  almost  without  inhabitant.  The 
Persians  seem  to  have  had  orders  not  to  make,  as  yet, 
any  firm  stand.  One  of  the  sons  of  Sapor  was  now  at 
their  head,  but  no  change  of  tactics  occurred.  As 
Julian  drew  near,  this  prince  indeed  quitted  the  shelter 


1  Ammianus  speaks  of  6  pictures ' 
('  diversorium  opacum  et  amcenum, 
gentiles  picturas  per  oranes  aedium 
partes  ostendens,'  xxiv.  5).  But 
the  wall  decoration  of  the  Sas- 
sanians  was  ordinarily  effected  by 


bas-reliefs. 

2  '  Ursos  (ut  sunt  Persici)  ultra 
omnem  rabiem  ssevientes.'  (Aram, 
Marc.  xxiv.  5,  sub  init.) 

3  Zosim.  xxiii.  24;  Anim.  Marc, 
l.s.c. 


Ch.  X.] 


JULIAN  REACHES  COCHE. 


213 


of  Ctesiphon,  and  made  a  reconnaissance  in  force.;  but 
when  he  fell  in  with  the  Roman  advanced  guard  under 
Victor,  andsaw  its  strength,he  declined  an  engagement, 
and  retired  without  coming  to  blows.1 

Julian  had  now  reached  the  western  suburb  of  Cte- 
siphon, which  had  lost  its  old  name  of  Seleucia  and  was 
known  as  Coche.2  The  capture  of  this  place  would, 
perhaps,  not  have  been  difficult ;  but,  as  the  broad  and 
deep  stream  of  the  Tigris  flowed  between  it  and  the 
main  town,  little  would  have  been  gained  by  the  occu- 
pation. Julian  felt  that,  to  attack  Ctesiphon  with  suc- 
cess, he  must,  like  Trajan  and  Severus,  transport  his 
army  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Tigris,  and  deliver  his 
assault  upon  the  defences  that  lay  beyond  that  river. 
For  the  safe  transport  of  his  army  he  trusted  to  his 
fleet,  which  he  had  therefore  caused  to  enter  the  Nahr- 
Malcha,  and  to  accompany  his  troops  thus  far.  But  at 
Coche  he  found  that  the  Nahr-Malcha,  instead  of  join- 
ing the  Tigris,  as  he  had  expected,  above  Ctesiphon, 
ran  into  it  at  some  distance  below.3  To  have  pursued 
this  line  with  both  fleet  and  army  would  have  carried 
him  too  far  into  the  enemy's  country,  have  endangered 
his  communications,  and  especially  have  cut  him  off 
from  the  Armenian  army  under  Procopius  and  Sebas- 
tian, with  which  he  was  at  this  time  looking  to  effect  a 
junction.  To  have  sent  the  fleet  into  the  Tigris  below 
Coche,  while  the  army  occupied  the  right  bank  of  the 
river  above  it,  would,  in  the  first  place,  have  separated 


1  Amm.  Marc.  xxiv.  4,  ad  fin. 

2  So  Ammianus  (xxiv.  5).  Zosi- 
mus  calls  the  suburb  Zochase  (iii. 
23).  Originally  Coche  and  Seleucia 
had  been  distinct  towns  (Arrian, 
Fr.  8);  but  it  would  seem  that 
they  had,  by  this  time,  grown  into 
one. 


3  Libanius  gives  the  best  account 
of  Julian's  difficulty  with  respect 
to  his  fleet  and  his  mode  of  meet- 
ing it.  {Orat.  Funebr.  p.  319,  D, 
ami  p.  320,  A,  B.)  Gibbon  has, 
I  think,  rightly  apprehended  his 
meaning. 


4 


214  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [Ch.  X. 

the  two,  and  would  further  have  been  useless,  unless 
the  fleet  could  force  its  way  against  the  strong  current 
through  the  whole  length  of  the  hostile  city.  In  this 
difficulty  Julian's  book-knowledge  was  found  of  service. 
He  had  studied  with  care  the  campaigns  of  his  prede- 
cessors in  these  regions,  and  recollected  that  one  of 
them 1  at  any  rate  had  made  a  cutting  from  the  Nahr- 
Malcha,  by  which  he  had  brought  his  fleet  into  the 
Tigris  above  Ctesiphon.  If  this  work  could  be  dis- 
covered, it  might,  he  thought,  in  all  probability  be 
restored.  Some  of  the  country  people  were  therefore 
seized,  and,  inquiry  being  made  of  them,  the  line  of  the 
canal  was  pointed  out,  and  the  place  shown  at  which  it 
had  been  derived  from  the  Nahr-Malcha.  Here  the 
Persians  had  erected  a  strong  dam,  with  sluices,  by 
means  of  which  a  portion  of  the  water  could  occasion- 
ally be  turned  into  the  Roman  cutting.2  Julian  had 
the  cutting  cleared  out,  and  the  dam  torn  down;  where- 
upon the  main  portion  of  the  stream  rushed  at  once  into 
the  old  channel,  which  rapidly  filled,  and  was  found  to 
be  navigable  by  the  Roman  vessels.  The  fleet  was  thus 
brought  into  the  Tigris  above  Coche;  and  the  army 
advancing  with  it  encamped  upon  the  right  bank  of 
the  river. 

The  Persians  now  for  the  first  time  appeared  in 
force.3  As  Julian  drew  near  the  great  stream,  he  per- 
ceived that  his  passage  of  it  would  not  be  unopposed. 


1  Gibbon  supposes  Trajan  to  be 
meant  {Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  iii. 
p.  202);  and  so  Zosimus  (iii.  24). 
Ammianus  mentions  both  Trajan 
and  Severus  (xxiv.  0,  ad  init.)\ 
but  it  seems  clear  from  Dio  that 
the  former  monarch  at  any  rate 
conveyed  his  ships  from  the  Eu- 
phrates to  the  Tigris,  by  means  of 
rollers,  across  the  land.    (Dio  Cass. 


lxviii.  28.) 

2  The  i  catarractae '  of  Ammianus 
('  avulsis  catarractis  undarum  mag- 
nitudme  classissecura  . .  .  inalveimi 
ejecta  est  Tigridis '  l.s.c. ),  are 
clearly  sluices,  which  can  only  have 
had  this  object. 

8  The  troops  under  Rodosaces 
and  the  Surena  (supra,  p.  200)  had 
been  a  mere  detachment,  consisting 


Ch.  X.J 


PASSAGE  OF  THE  TIGRIS. 


215 


Along  the  left  bank,  which  was  at  this  point  naturally 
higher  than  the  right,  and  which  was  further  crowned 
by  a  wall  built  originally  to  fence  in  one  of  the  royal 
parks,1  could  be  seen  the  dense  masses  of  the  enemy's 
horse  and  foot,  stretching  away  to  right  and  left,  the 
former  encased  in  glittering  armour,2  the  latter  pro- 
tected by  huge  wattled  shields.3  Behind  these  troops 
were  discernible  the  vast  forms  of  elephants,  looking 
(says  the  historian)  like  moving  mountains,4  and  re- 
garded by  the  legionaries  with  extreme  dread.  Julian 
felt  that  he  could  not  ask  his  army  to  cross  the  stream 
openly  in  the  face  of  a  foe  thus  advantageously  posted. 
He  therefore  waited  the  approach  of  night.  When  dark- 
ness had  closed  in,  he  made  his  dispositions  ;  divided  his 
fleet  into  portions  ;  embarked  a  number  of  his  troops ; 
and,  despite  the  dissuasions  of  his  officers,5  gave  the 
signal  for  the  passage  to  commence.  Five  ships,  each 
of  them  conveying  eighty  soldiers,  led  the  way,  and 
reached  the  opposite  shore  without  accident.  Here, 
however,  the  enemy  received  them  with  a  sharp  fire  of 
burning  darts,  and  the  two  foremast  were  soon  in 
flames."*  At  the  ominous  sight  the  rest  of  the  fleet 
wavered,  and  might  have  refused  to  proceed  further, 


entirely  of  horse,  and  had  been 
intended  merely  to  harass  the 
Romans,  not  to  engage  them. 

1  Zosimus,  iii.  25:  Trjv  uvTmepac; 
oXdr]v  deupovvreq  m}jr]?^0T£pav,  ml  ufia 
6  piynov  tlv  a  ovfinapaTeivofie- 
v  o  v ,    etc   tpv/ia  fikv   napadsLOOv  j3a- 

OL?ilK0V   TTjV   UpXtfV  (l)K060tU7}fJ,iv0P. 

2  '  Turma3  sic  confer  toe,  ut  lam  in  is 
coaptati  corporum  flexus  splendore 
praistringerent  occnrsantes  obtu- 
tns.'    (Ami.  Marc.  xxiv.  6.) 

3  'Contecti  scutis  oblongis  et 
curvis,  qiue  texta  vimine  et  coriis 
crudis  gestantes   densius  se  com- 


movebant.'  (Ibid.) 

4  '  Gradientium  collium  specie.' 
(Ibid,  l.s.c.)  Compare  Libanius,  p. 
320,  B:  Kareixov  tt)v  hx®vv  .  .  . 
[ityedzoLv  e?iE(j)uvTG)v,  olg  laov  epyov 
due  oraxvuv  kTidelv  nal  (pu?Myyog. 

5  Ammianus  says  they  all  op- 
posed him  ('duces  concordi  precatu 
fieri  prohibere  tentabant').  Liba- 
nius speaks  of  one  in  particular  as 
remonstrating  (p.  321,  A:  vfy'  tL>  6' 
rjv  Trig  dvvdfx?G)g  to  ix\tov,  avTeAeye). 

0  Compare  Zosim.  iii.  25  with 
Amm.  Marc.  xxiv.  0. 


216 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  X. 


had  not  Julian,  with  admirable  presence  of  mind,  ex- 
claimed aloud  — 1  Our  men  have  crossed  and  are  masters 
of  the  bank  —  that  fire  is  the  signal  which  I  bade  them 
make  if  they  were  victorious.'  Thus  encouraged,  the 
crews  plied  their  oars  with  vigour,  and  impelled  the 
remaining  vessels  rapidly  across  the  stream.  At  the 
same  time,  some  of  the  soldiers  who  had  not  been  put 
on  board,  impatient  to  assist  their  comrades,  plunged 
into  the  stream,  and  swam  across  supported  by  their 
shields.1  Though  a  stout  resistance  was  offered  by  the 
Persians,  it  was  found  impossible  to  withstand  the  im- 
petuosity of  the  Roman  attack.  Not  only  were  the 
half-burned  vessels  saved,  the  flames  extinguished,  and 
the  men  on  board  rescued  from  their  perilous  position, 
but  everywhere  the  Roman  troops  made  good  their 
landing,  fought  their  way  up  the  bank  against  a  storm 
of  missile  weapons,  and  drew  up  in  good  order  upon 
its  summit.  A  pause  probably  now  occurred,  as  the 
armies  could  not  see  each  other  in  the  darkness; 
but,  at  dawn  of  day,2  Julian,  having  made  a  fresh  ar- 
rangement of  his  troops,  led  them  against  the  dense 
array  of  the  enemy,  and  engaged  in  a  hand-to-hand 
combat,  which  lasted  from  morning  to  midday,  when 
it  was  terminated  by  the  flight  of  the  Persians.  Their 
leaders,  Tigranes,  Narseus,  and  the  Siirena,3  are  said 4  to 


1  Ammiaims  alone  (l.s.c.)  men- 
tions this  fact,  which  he  compares 
with  the  swimming  of  the  Rhone 
by  Sertorius. 

2  Ammiaims  makes  the  battle 
begin  with  the  dawn  and  last  all 
the  day.  Zosimns  says  it  lasted 
from  midnight  to  midday.  We 
may  best  reconcile  the  two  by  sup- 
posing that  the  passage  of  the 
Tigris  and  the  landing  were  at 
midnight  —  that  then  there  was  a 


pause — that  the  battle  recommenced 
at  dawn  —  that  at  midday  the  Per- 
sians were  beaten  and  took  to 
flight  —  and  that  then  the  pursuit 
lasted  almost  to  nightfall. 

3  The  names  are  uncertain.  In- 
stead of  Tigranes  and  Xarseus, 
Zosimus  has  Pigraxesand  Anareus. 
Some  MSS.  of  Ammianus  have 
Pigranes. 

4  Zosim.  ii.  25:  Tr/g  (pvyrjg 
yyijGauivDV  rC)v  orpaTTjyCjv. 


Ch.  X.]  DEFEAT  OF  THE  PERSIANS. 


217 


have  been  the  first  to  quit  the  field  and  take  refuge 
within  the  defences  of  Ctesiphon.  The  example  thus 
set  was  universally  followed ;  and  the  entire  Persian 
army,  abandoning  its  camp  and  baggage,  rushed  in  the 
wildest  confusion  across  the  plain  to  the  nearest  of  the 
city  gates,  closely  pursued  by  its  active  foe  up  to 
the  very  foot  of  the  walls.  The  Roman  writers  assert 
that  Ctesiphon  might  have  been  entered  and  taken, 
had  not  the  general,  Victor,  who  was  wounded  by  a 
dart  from  a  catapult,  recalled  his  men  as  they  were  about 
to  rush  in  through  the  open  gateway.1  It  is  perhaps 
doubtful  whether  success  would  really  have  crowned 
such  audacity.  At  any  rate,  the  opportunity  passed 
—  the  runaways  entered  the  town  —  the  gate  closed 
upon  them ;  and  Ctesiphon  was  safe  unless  it  were 
reduced  by  the  operations  of  a  regular  siege. 

But  the  fruits  of  the  victory  were  still  considerable. 
The  entire  Persian  army  collected  hitherto  for  the 
defence  of  Ctesiphon  had  been  defeated  by  one-third  of 
the  Roman  force  under  Julian.2  The  vanquished  had 
left  2,500  men  dead  upon  the  field,  while  the  victors 
had  lost  no  more  than  seventy-five.3  A  rich  spoil  had 
fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  Romans,  who  found  in  the 
abandoned  camp  couches  and  tables  of  massive  silver, 
and  on  the  bodies  of  the  slain,  both  men  and  horses,  a 
profusion  of  gold  and  silver  ornaments,  besides  trap- 
pings and  apparel  of  great  magnificence.4  A  welcome 
supply  of  provisions  was  also  furnished  by  the  lands 


1  Amm.  Marc.  xxiv.  6:  Rufus,  § 
28;  Li  ban  ins,  Or.  Funebr.  p.  822,  A. 

2  The  fleet  was  formed  in  three 
divisions,  and  only  one  had  crossed. 
The  rest  of  the  army  passed  the 
river  on  the  day  after  the  battle 
and  the  day  following  (Zosim.  iii. 
26). 


3  These  are  the  numbers  of  Zosi- 
mus  (iii.  25.  sub  Jin).  Ammianus 
agrees  as  to  the  Persians,  but  makes 
the  Roman  loss  only  seventy  (i.s.c. ). 
Libanius  raises  the  loss  on  the 
Persian  side  to  6,000  (Oral.  Funebr. 
p.  322,  A). 

4  Zosim.  I.s.c. 


218 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  X. 


and  houses  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Ctesiphon ;  and 
the  troops  passed  from  a  state  of  privation  to  one  of 
extreme  abundance,  so  that  it  was  feared  lest  they 
might  suffer  from  excess.1 

Affairs  had  now  reached  a  point  when  it  was  neces- 
sary to  form  a  definite  resolution  as  to  what  should  be 
the  further  aim  and  course  of  the  expedition.  Hitherto 
all  had  indicated  an  intention  on  the  part  of  Julian  to 
occupy  Ctesiphon,  and  thence  dictate  a  peace.  His 
long  march,  his  toilsome  canal-cutting,  his  orders  to  his 
second  army,2  his  crossing  of  the  Tigris,  his  engage- 
ment with  the  Persians  in  the  plain  before  Ctesiphon, 
were  the  natural  steps  conducting  to  such  a  result,  and 
are  explicable  on  one  hypothesis  and  one  hypothesis 
only.  He  must  up  to  this  time  have  designed  to  make 
himself  master  of  the  great  city,  which  had  been  the 
goal  of  so  many  previous  invasions,  and  had  always 
fallen  whenever  Rome  attacked  it.  But,  having  over- 
come all  the  obstacles  in  his  path,  and  having  it  in  his 
power  at  once  to  commence  the  siege,  a  sudden  doubt 
appears  to  have  assailed  him  as  to  the  practicability  of 
the  undertaking.  It  can  scarcely  be  supposed  that  the 
city  was  really  stronger  now  than  it  had  been  under 
the  Parthians  ;3  much  less  can  it  be  argued  that  Julian's 
army  was  insufficient  for  the  investment  of  such  a  place. 
It  was  probably  the  most  powerful  army  with  which 
the  Romans  had  as  yet  invaded  Southern  Mesopotamia; 


1  Eimapius,  p.  OS,  ed.  Niebuhr. 

2  Supra,  p.  200. 

3  Ammianus  speaks  of  Ctesiphon 
as  6  situ  ipso  inexpugnabilis '  (xxiv. 
7,  ad  init.)  ;  but  it  occupied  a  piece 
of  alluvial  plain,  and  had  been 
taken  three  times  by  the  Romans. 
Gibbon  says:  '  It  is  not  easy  for  us 
to  conceive  by  what  arts  of  fortifi- 


cation a  city  thrice  besieged  and 
taken  by  the  predecessors  of  Julian 
could  be  rendered  impregnable 
against  an  army  of  60,000  Romans  ' 
(Decline  end  Fall.  vol.  iii.  p.  205). 
1  should  doubt  if  any  special  pains 
had  been  taken  by  the  Persians  to 
strengthen  the  defences. 


Ch.  X.]  JULIAN  DECLINES  TO  BESIEGE  CTESIPHON.  219 

and  it  was  amply  provided  with  all  the  appurtenances 
of  war.  If  Julian  did  not  venture  to  attempt  what 
Trajan  and  Avidius  Cassius  and  Septimius  Severus 
had  achieved  without  difficulty,  it  must  have  been 
because  the  circumstances  under  which  he  would  have 
had  to  make  the  attack  were  different  from  those  under 
which  they  had  ventured  and  succeeded.  And  the 
difference  —  a  most  momentous  one  —  was  this.  They 
besieged  and  captured  the  place  after  defeating  the 
greatest  force  that  Parthia  could  bring  into  the  field 
against  them.  Julian  found  himself  in  front  of  Ctesi- 
phon  before  he  had  crossed  swords  with  the  Persian 
king,  or  so  much  as  set  eyes  on  the  grand  army  which 
Sapor  was  known  to  have  collected.  To  have  sat  down 
before  Ctesiphon  under  such  circumstances  would  have 
been  to  expose  himself  to  great  peril ;  while  he  was 
intent  upon  the  siege,  he  might  at  any  time  have  been 
attacked  by  a  relieving  army  under  the  Great  King, 
have  been  placed  between  two  fires,  and  compelled  to 
engage  at  extreme  disadvantage.1  It  was  a  considera- 
tion of  this  danger  that  impelled  the  council  of  war, 
whereto  he  submitted  the  question,  to  pronounce  the 
siege  of  Ctesiphon  too  hazardous  an  operation,  and  to 
dissuade  the  emperor  from  attempting  it. 

But,  if  the  city  were  not  to  be  besieged,  what  course 
could  with  any  prudence  be  adopted  ?  It  would  have 
been  madness  to  leave  Ctesiphon  unassailed,  and  to 
press  forward  against  Susa  and  Persepolis.  It  would 
have  been  futile  to  remain  encamped  before  the  walls 
without  commencing  a  siege.    The  heats  of  summer 


1  That  it  was  the  fear  of  attack 
from  Sapor's  army  which  caused 
the  retreat  of  Julian  is  confessed 
by  Ammianus.  ( 4  Itum  est  in  sen- 
tential! quorundam,  f acinus  audax 


et  importunum  noscentium  id  ag- 
gredi,  quod  et  civitas  situ  ipso  in- 
expugnabilis  defendebatur,  et  cum 
metuenda  multitudine  protinus  rex 
affore  credebatur,1  l.s.c.) 


220  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [Ch.  X. 


had  arrived,1  and  the  malaria  of  autumn  was  not  far 
off.  The  stores  brought  by  the  fleet  were  exhausted  ;2 
and  there  was  a  great  risk  in  the  army's  depending 
wholly  for  its  subsistence  on  the  supplies  that  it  might 
be  able  to  obtain  from  the  enemy's  country.  Julian 
and  his  advisers  must  have  seen  at  a  glance  that  if  the 
Romans  were  not  to  attack  Ctesiphon,  they  must  re- 
treat. And  accordingly  retreat  seems  to  have  been  at 
once  determined  on.  As  a  first  step,  the  whole  fleet, 
except  some  dozen  vessels,3  was  burned,  since  twelve 
was  a  sufficient  number  to  serve  as  pontoons,  and  it 
was  not  worth  the  army's  while  to  encumber  itself  with 
the  remainder.  They  could  only  have  been  tracked 
up  the  strong  stream  of  the  Tigris  by  devoting  to  the 
work  some  20,000  men  ;4  thus  greatly  weakening  the 
strength  of  the  armed  force,  and  at  the  same  time  ham- 
pering its  movements.  Julian,  in  sacrificing  his  ships, 
suffered  simply  a  pecuniary  loss  —  they  could  not  pos- 
sibly have  been  of  any  further  service  to  him  in  the 
campaign. 

Retreat  being  resolved  upon,  it  only  remained  to 
determine  what  route  should  be  followed,  and  on  what 
portion  of  the  Roman  territory  the  march  should  be 
directed.  The  soldiers  clamoured  for  a  return  by  the 
way  whereby  they  had  come  ;5  but  many  valid  objec- 
tions to  this  course  presented  themselves  to  their  com- 
manders. The  country  along  the  line  of  the  Euphrates 
had  been  exhausted  of  its  stores  by  the  troops  in  their 


1  It  was  already  the  month  of 
June  (Clinton,  F.  B.  vol.  i.  p.  450). 

2  Libanius  confesses  the  want  of 
provisions  (Orat.  Funebr.  p.  320, 
C).  Ammianus  does  not  distinctly 
mentionit  ;  but  his  narrative  shows 
that,  from  the  time  of  the  passage  4  Amm,  Marc.  xxiv.  7 
of  the  Tigris,   Julian's  army  de-  '    5  Ibid.  xxiv.  8. 


pended  mainly  on  the  food  which 
it  took  from  the  enemy.  (Amm. 
Marc.  xxiv.  7.) 

3  Twenty-two,  according  to  Zosi- 
mus  (iii.  26) ;  but  Ammianus  twice 
sives  the  number  as  twelve. 


Ch.  X.]  HE  DETERMINES  ON  RETREAT.  221 

advance ;  the  forage  had  been  consumed,  the  towns 
and  villages  desolated.  There  would  be  neither  food 
nor  shelter  for  the  men  along  this  route  ;  the  season 
was  also  unsuitable  for  it,  since  the  Euphrates  was  in 
full  flood,  and  the  moist  atmosphere  would  be  sure  to 
breed  swarms  of  flies  and  mosquitoes.  Julian  saw  that 
by  far  the  best  line  of  retreat  was  along  the  Tigris, 
which  had  higher  banks  than  the  Euphrates,  which  was 
no  longer  in  flood,1  and  which  ran  through  a  tract  that 
was  highly  productive  and  that  had  for  many  years  not 
been  visited  by  an  enemy.  The  army,  therefore,  was 
ordered  to  commence  its  retreat  through  the  country 
lying  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Tigris,  and  to  spread  itself 
over  the  fertile  region,  in  the  hope  of  obtaining  ample 
supplies.  The  march  was  understood  to  be  directed 
on  Cordyene  (Kurdistan),  a  province  now  in  the  pos- 
session of  Rome,  a  rich  tract,  and  not  more  than 
about  250  miles  distant  from  Ctesiphon.2 

Before,  however,  the  retreat  commenced,  while 
Julian  and  his  victorious  army  were  still  encamped  in 
sight  of  Ctesiphon,  the  Persian  king,  according  to  some 
writers,3  sent  an  embassy  proposing  terms  of  peace. 
Julian's  successes  are  represented  as  having  driven  Sa- 
por to  despair — c  the  pride  of  his  royalty  was  humbled 
in  the  dust ;  he  took  his  repasts  on  the  ground ;  and  the 
grief  and  anxiety  of  his  mind  were  expressed  by  the 


1  Gibbon  overstates  the  case 
when  he  says  6  The  Tigris  over- 
flows in  March,  the  Euphrates  in 
July  '  (Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  iii.  p. 
208,  note  84).  The  Tigris  flood  does 
indeed  begin  in  March,  but  it  is 
greatest  in  May ;  and  the  river  only 
returns  to  its  natural  level  about  the 
middle  of  June.  The  Euphrates  is 
in  full  flood  from  the  middle  of 
June  to  the  middle  of  July,  but 


begins  to  swell  before  the  end  of 
March.  (See  the  Author's  Ancient 
Monarchies,  vol.  i.  p.  12.) 

2  This  is  allowing  Cordyene  to 
have  extended  southwards  as  far 
as  the  point  where  the  Greater 
Zab  issues  from  the  mountains. 

3  Libanius,  Orat.  Funebr.  p.  301, 
A,  B;  p.  322,  D;  Socrates,  Hist. 
Eccles.  iii.  21. 


222 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


ICh.  X. 


disorder  of  his  hair.' 1  He  would,  it  is  suggested,  have 
been  willing  c  to  purchase,  with  one  half  of  his  kingdom, 
the  safety  of  the  remainder,  and  would  have  gladly 
subscribed  himself,  in  a  treaty  of  peace,  the  faithful  and 
dependent  ally  of  the  Roman  conqueror.' 2  Such  are 
the  pleasing  fictions  wherewith  the  rhetorician  of  Anti- 
och,  faithful  to  the  memory  of  his  friend  and  master, 
consoled  himself  and  his  readers  after  Julian's  death. 
It  is  difficult  to  decide  whether  there  underlies  them 
any  substratum  of  truth.  Neither  Ammianus  nor 
Zosimus  makes  the  slightest  allusion  to  any  negotia- 
tions at  all  at  this  period;  and  it  is  thus  open  to  doubt 
whether  the  entire  story  told  by  Libanius  is  not  the 
product  of  his  imagination.  But  at  any  rate  it  is  quite 
impossible  that  the  Persian  king  can  have  made  any 
abject  offers  of  submission,  or  have  been  in  a  state  of 
mind  at  all  akin  to  despair.  His  great  army,  collected 
from  all  quarters,3  was  intact ;  he  had  not  yet  con- 
descended to  take  the  field  in  person  ;  he  had  lost  no 
important  town,  and  his  adversary  had  tacitly  confessed 
his  inability  to  form  the  siege  of  a  city  which  was  far 
from  being  the  greatest  in  the  empire.  If  Sapor,  there- 
fore, really  made  at  this  time  overtures  of  peace,  it  must 
have  been  either  with  the  intention  of  amusing  Julian, 
and  increasing  his  difficulties  by  delaying  his  retreat,  or 
because  he  thought  that  Julian's  consciousness  of  his 
difficulties  would  induce  him  to  offer  terms  which  he 
might  accept. 

The  retreat  commenced  on  June  16.4   Scarcely  were 


1  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol. 
iii.  p.  206. 

2  Ibid. 

3  Tabari  says  it  was  gathered 
from  all  parts  of  Irak,  Persia,  and 
Khorassan  {Chroriique,  vol.  ii.  p.  97). 


Gibbon  tells  us  that  6  the  satraps, 
as  far  as  the  confines  of  India  and 
Scythia,  had  been  ordered  to  as- 
semble their  troops'  (vol.  iii.  p. 
205). 

4  Amm.  Mare.  xxiv.  8.  Some 


Ch.  X.] 


JULIAN  IN  DIFFICULTIES. 


223 


the  troops  set  in  motion,  when  an  ominous  cloud  of  dust 
appeared  on  the  southern  horizon,  which  grew  larger 
as  the  day  advanced  ;  and,  though  some  suggested  that 
the  appearance  was  produced  by  a  herd  of  wild  asses, 
and  others  ventured  the  conjecture  that  it  was  caused  by 
the  approach  of  a  body  of  Julian's  Saracenic  allies,  the 
emperor  himself  was  not  deceived,  but,  understanding 
that  the  Persians  had  set  out  in  pursuit,  he  called  in  his 
stragglers,  massed  his  troops,  and  pitched  his  camp  in 
a  strong  position.1  Day-dawn  showed  that  he  had 
judged  aright,  for  the  earliest  rays  of  the  sun  were  re- 
flected from  the  polished  breastplates  and  cuirasses  of 
the  Persians,  who  had  drawn  up  at  no  great  distance 
during  the  night.2  A  combat  followed  in  which  the 
Persian  and  Saracenic  horse  attacked  the  Romans 
vigorously,  and  especially  threatened  the  baggage,  but 
were  repulsed  by  the  firmness  and  valour  of  the  Roman 
foot.  Julian  was  able  to  continue  his  retreat  after  a 
while,  but  found  himself  surrounded  by  enemies,  some 
of  whom,  keeping  in  advance  of  his  troops,  or  hanging 
upon  his  flanks,  destroyed  the  corn  and  forage  that  his 
men  so  much  needed ;  while  others,  pressing  upon  his 
rear,  retarded  his  march,  and  caused  him  from  time  to 


writers,  as  Tillemont  (Hist,  des 
Emperears,  torn.  iv.  p.  543)  and 
Gibbon  (Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  iii. 
p.  206),  interpose  at  this  point  an 
expedition  on  the  part  of  Julian 
into  the  interior  provinces  of  Persia, 
with  the  object  of  meeting  Sapor 
and  forcing  him  to  an  engagement, 
which  they  consider  to  have  been 
frustrated  by  the  treachery  of  his 
guides.  No  doubt  there  are  in 
Libanius,  Gregory  of  Nazianzen, 
and  Sozomen,  statements  on  which 
such  a  view  may  be  based  —  and  we 
cannot  but  suppose  some  founda- 
tion for  the  story  of  the  treacherous 


guides  —  but  the  plain  narratives 
of  Ammianus  and  Zosimus,  and 
considerations  of  time,  preclude 
the  possibility  of  anything  im- 
portant having  been  undertaken 
between  the  battle  of  the  Tigris 
and  the  commencement  of  the  re- 
treat. Some  raids  into  the  rich 
country  on  either  side  of  the 
Diyaleh,  with  the  object  of  obtain- 
ing provisions,  seem  to  have  been 
all  that  Julian  really  attempted  in 
this  short  interval. 

1  Amm.  Marc,  l.s.c. 

2  Ibid.  xxv.  1. 


224 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  X. 


time  no  inconsiderable  losses.1  The  retreat  under  these 
circumstances  was  slow  ;  the  army  had  to  be  rested 
and  recruited  when  it  fell  in  with  any  accumulation  of 
provisions ;  and  the  average  progress  made  seems  to 
have  been  not  much  more  than  ten  miles  a  day.2  This 
tardy  advance  allowed  the  more  slow-moving  portion  of 
the  Persian  army  to  close  in  upon  the  retiring  Romans ; 
and  Julian  soon  found  himself  closely  followed  by  dense 
masses  of  the  enemy's  troops,  by  the  heavy  cavalry 
clad  in  steel  panoplies,  and  armed  with  long  spears,  by 
large  bodies  of  archers,  and  even  by  a  powerful  corps 
of  elephants.3  This  grand  army  was  under  the  com- 
mand of  a  general  whom  the  Roman  writers  call  Me- 
ranes,4  and  of  two  sons  of  Sapor.  It  pressed  heavily 
upon  the  Roman  rearguard  ;  and  Julian,  after  a  little 
while,  found  it  necessary  to  stop  his  march,  confront 
his  pursuers,  and  offer  them  battle.  The  offer  was  ac- 
cepted, and  an  engagement  took  place  in  a  tract  called 
Maranga.5  The  enemy  advanced  in  two  lines  —  the  first 
composed  of  the  mailed  horsemen  and  the  archers  inter- 
mixed, the  second  of  the  elephants.  Julian  prepared 
his  army  to  receive  the  attack  by  .disposing  it  in  the  form 
of  a  crescent,  with  the  centre  drawn  back  considerably  ; 
but  as  the  Persians  advanced  into  the  hollow  space,  he 
suddenly  led  his  troops  forward  at  speed,  allowing  the 


1  Zosiinus,  iii.  26-7;  Amni. 
Marc,  l.s.c. ;  Greg.  Naz.  p.  154,  B. 

2  The  distance  from  Ctesiphon 
to  Samarah,  a  little  south  of  which 
Julian  died,  is,  by  the  shortest 
route  upon  the  eastern  side  of  the 
Tigris,  about  100  miles.  The  route 
followed  was  probably  somewhat 
longer;  and  the  march  appears  to 
have  occupied  exactly  ten  days. 

3  Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  1. 

4  Ibid.    Some  suppose  Meranes 


not  to  be  a  name,  but  (like  Surena) 
a  title.  See  Dr.  W.  Smith's  note 
in  his  edition  of  Gibbon's  Decline 
and  Fall,  vol.  iii.  p.  210,  and  com- 
pare Procop.  Be  Bell.  Pers.  i.  13; 
p.  62. 

5  '  Cum  ad  tractum  Maranga  no- 
minatum  omnis  venisset  exerci- 
tus.'  (Amm.  Marc,  l.s.c.)  Zosimus 
changes  the  '  tract  called  Maranga ' 
into  a  4  village  called  Maronsa' 
(iii.  28). 


Ch.  X.J 


BATTLE  OF  MARANGA 


225 


archers  scarcely  time  to  discharge  their  arrows  before 
he  engaged  them  and  the  horse  in  close  combat.  A 
long  and  bloody  struggle  followed  ;  but  the  Persians 
were  unaccustomed  to  hand-to-hand  fighting  and  dis- 
liked it ;  they  gradually  gave  ground,  and  at  last  broke 
up  and  fled,  covering  their  retreat,  however,  with  the 
clouds  of  arrows  which  they  knew  well  how  to  dis- 
charge as  they  retired.  The  weight  of  their  arms,  and 
the  fiery  heat  of  the  summer  sun,  prevented  the  Romans 
from  carrying  the  pursuit  very  far.  Julian  recalled 
them  quickly  to  the  protection  of  the  camp,  and  sus- 
pended his  march  for  some  days1  while  the  wounded 
had  their  hurts  attended  to. 

The  Persian  troops,  having  suffered  heavily  in  the 
battle,  made  no  attempt  to  storm  the  Roman  camp. 
They  were  content  to  spread  themselves  on  all  sides,  to 
destroy  or  carry  off  all  the  forage  and  provisions,  and 
to  make  the  country,  through  which  the  Roman  army 
must  retire,  a  desert.  Julian's  forces  were  already  suf- 
fering severely  from  scarcity  of  food ;  and  the  general 
want  was  but  very  slightly  relieved  by  a  distribution 
of  the  stores  set  apart  for  the  officers  and  for  the 
members  of  the  imperial  household.  Under  these  cir- 
cumstances it  is  not  surprising  that  Julian's  firmness 
deserted  him,  and  that  he  began  to  give  way  to  melan- 
choly forebodings,  and  to  see  visions  and  omens  which 
portended  disaster  and  death.  In  the  silence  of  his 
tent,  as  he  studied  a  favourite  philosopher  during  the 
dead  of  night,  he  thought  he  saw  the  Genius  of  the 
State,  with  veiled  head  and  cornucopia,  stealing  away 
through  the  hangings  slowly  and  sadly.2  Soon  after- 
wards, when  he  had  just  gone  forth  into  the  open  air 


1  '  Triduo  indutiis  destinato,  dum  suo  quisque  vulneri  medetur  vel 
proximi.1    (Airmi.  Marc.  xxv.  2,  adinit.)  2  Ibid. 


226 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  X. 


to  perform  averting  sacrifices,  the  fall  of  a  shooting  star 
seemed  to  him  a  direct  threat  from  Mars,  with  whom 
he  had  recently  quarrelled.1  The  soothsayers  were  con- 
sulted, and  counselled  abstinence  from  all  military 
movement ;  but  the  exigencies  of  the  situation  caused 
their  advice  to  be  for  once  contemned.  It  was  only  by 
change  of  place  that  there  was  any  chance  of  obtain- 
ing supplies  of  food ;  and  ultimate  extrication  from 
the  perils  that  surrounded  the  army  depended  on  a 
steady  persistence  in  retreat. 

At  dawn  of  day,2  therefore,  on  the  memorable  26th  of 
June,  a.d.  363,  the  tents  were  struck,  and  the  Roman 
army  continued  its  march  across  the  wasted  plain, 
having  the  Tigris  at  some  little  distance  on  its  left,  and 
some  low  hills  upon  its  right.3  The  enemy  did  not 
anywhere  appear ;  and  the  troops  advanced  for  a  time 
without  encountering  opposition.  But,  as  they  drew 
near  the  skirts  of  the  hills,  not  far  from  Samarah, 
suddenly  an  attack  was  made  upon  them.  The  rear- 
guard found  itself  violently  assailed ;  and  when  Julian 
hastened  to  its  relief,  news  came  that  the  van  was  also 
engaged  with  the  enemy,  and  was  already  in  difficulties. 
The  active  commander  now  hurried  towards  the  front, 
and  had  accomplished  half  the  distance,  when  the  main 
Persian  attack  was  delivered  upon  his  right  centre,4 
and  to  his  dismay  he  found  himself  entangled  amid 


1  Amm.  Marc.  xxiv.  6,  ad  fin. 
On  account  of  unpropitious  omens 
Julian  had  sworn  that  he  would 
never  sacrifice  to  Mars  again. 

2  'Exorto  jam  die.'  (Ibid.  xxv. 
2,  ad  fin. ) 

3  Ammianus  calls  them  '  lofty 
hills'  ('celsos  colles');  but  there 
are  none  such  in  the  vicinity  of 
Samarah. 

4  Ammianus  is  confused  on  this 


point,  in  one  place  making  it  the 
right,  in  another  the  left  wing  that 
suffered  (xxv.  3:  'sinistro  cornu 
inclinato  .  .  .  exercitus  cornu 
clextero  defatigato ' ).  I  conceive 
that  the  entire  attack  was  made 
from  a  line  of  low  hills,  perhaps 
the  embankment  of  an  old  canal, 
on  Julian's  right,  and  that  it  was 
therefore  on  this  side  that  his 
army  suffered  its  main  losses. 


Ch.  X.j  BATTLE  OF  SAMARAH.    DEATH  OF  JULIAN.  227 

the  masses  of  heavy  horse  and  elephants,  which  had 
thrown  his  columns  into  confusion.  The  suddenness  of 
the  enemy's  appearance  had  prevented  him  from  don- 
ning his  complete  armour  ;  and  as  he  fought  without  a 
breastplate,  and  with  the  aid  of  his  light-armed  troops 
restored  the  day,  falling  on  the  foe  from  behind  and 
striking  the  backs  and  houghs  of  the  horses  and  ele- 
phants, the  javelin  of  a  horseman,  after  grazing  the 
flesh  of  his  arm,  fixed  itself  in  his  right  side,  pene- 
trating through  the  ribs  to  the  liver.1  Julian,  grasping 
the  head  of  the  weapon,  attempted  to  draw  it  forth,  but 
in  vain  —  the  sharp  steel  cut  his  fingers,  and  the  pain 
and  loss  of  blood  caused  him  to  fall  fainting  from  his 
steed.  His  guards,  who  had  closed  around  him,  care- 
fully raised  him  up,  and  conveyed  him  to  the  camp, 
where  the  surgeons  at  once  declared  the  wound  mortal. 
The  sad  news  spread  rapidly  among  the  soldiery,  and 
nerved  them  to  desperate  efforts  —  if  they  must  lose 
their  general,  he  should,  they  determined,  be  avenged. 
Striking  their  shields  with  their  spears,2  they  every- 
where rushed  upon  the  enemy  with  incredible  ardour, 
careless  whether  they  lived  or  died,  and  only  seeking 
to  inflict  the  greatest  possible  loss  on  those  opposed  to 
them.  But  the  Persians,  who  had  regarded  the  day  as 
theirs,  resisted  strenuously,  and  maintained  the  fight 
with  obstinacy  till  evening  closed  in  and  darkness  put 
a  stop  to  the  engagement.  The  losses  were  large  on 
both  sides;  the  Roman  right  wing  had  suffered  greatly; 


1  Libanius,  Orat.  Funebr.  pp. 
303-4;  Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  3.  It 
is  curious  what  different  accounts 
are  given  of  Julian's  wound.  Zosi- 
mus  says,  n'ArjTreTaL  ij'i&ei  (iii.  29); 
Aurelius  Victor,  '  conto  percuti- 
tur '  (Epit.  43).  Libanius  in  one 
place  declares  that  the  blow  was 


not  dealt  by  one  of  the  enemy,  but 
by  a  Christian  of  Julian's  army 
(Orat.  Funebr.  p.  324).  But  this 
is  a  manifest  calumny. 

2  Amm.  Marc,  l.s.c. :  '  Hast  as  ad 
scuta  concrepans,  miles  ad  vindic- 
tam  .  .  .  involabat.' 


228 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  X. 


its  commander,  Anatolius,  master  of  the  offices,  was 
among  the  slain,  and  the  prefect  Sallust  was  with  dif- 
ficulty saved  by  an  attendant.1  The  Persians,  too,  lost 
their  generals  Meranes  and  Nohodares ;  and  with  them 
no  fewer  than  fifty  satraps  and  great  nobles  are  said  to 
have  perished.2  The  rank  and  file  no  doubt  suffered 
in  proportion  ;  and  the  Romans  were  perhaps  justified 
in  claiming  that  the  balance  of  advantage  upon  the 
day  rested  with  them. 

But  such  advantage  as  they  could  reasonably  assert 
was  far  more  than  counterbalanced  by  the  loss  of  their 
commander,  who  died  in  his  tent  towards  midnight  on 
the  day  of  the  battle.3  Whatever  we  may  think  of  the 
general  character  of  Julian,  or  of  the  degree  of  his 
intellectual  capacity,  there  can  be  no  question  as  to  his 
excellence  as  a  soldier,  or  his  ability  as  a  commander 
in  the  field.  If  the  expedition  which  he  had  led  into 
Persia  was  to  some  extent  rash  —  if  his  preparations  for 
it  had  been  insufficient,  and  his  conduct  of  it  not  wholly 
faultless  —  if  consequently  he  had  brought  the  army  of 
the  East  into  a  situation  of  great  peril  and  difficulty  — 
yet  candour  requires  us  to  acknowledge  that  of  all  the 
men  collected  in  the  Roman  camp  he  was  the  fittest  to 
have  extricated  the  army  from  its  embarrassments,  and 
have  conducted  it,  without  serious  disaster  or  loss  of 
honour,  into  a  position  of  safety.  No  one,  like  Julian, 
possessed  the  confidence  of  the  troops ;  no  one  so  com- 
bined experience  in  command  with  the  personal  activity 
and  vigour  that  was  needed  under  the  circumstances. 
When  the  leaders  met  to  consult  about  the  appointment 
of  a  successor  to  the  dead  prince,  it  was  at  once  appar- 

1  Zosim.  iii.  29-30;  Aniin.  Marc.  I  8  Mexpi  vvktos  /lieotic  aptdoag 
xxv.  3.  unedavev.    (Zos.  iii.  29.) 

2  Anmi.  Marc,  l.s.c.  I 


On.  X.] 


JOVIAN  MADE  EMPEROR. 


229 


ent  how  irreparable  was  their  loss.  The  prefect  Sal- 
lust,  whose  superior  rank  and  length  of  service  pointed 
him  out  for  promotion  to  the  vacant  post,  excused 
himself  on  account  of  his  age  and  infirmities.1  The 
generals  of  the  second  grade  —  Arinthasus,  Victor,  Ne- 
vitta,  Dagalaiphus  —  had  each  their  party  among  the 
soldiers,  but  were  unacceptable  to  the  army  generally. 
None  could  claim  any  superior  merit  which  might 
clearly  place  him  above  the  rest ;  and  a  discord  that 
might  have  led  to  open  strife  seemed  impending,  when 
a  casual  voice  pronounced  the  name  of  Jovian,  and, 
some  applause  following  the  suggestion,  the  rival  gen- 
erals acquiesced  in  the  choice  ;  and  this  hitherto  insig- 
nificant officer  was  suddenly  invested  with  the  purple 
and  saluted  as  c  Augustus '  and  '  Emperor.1 2  Had  there 
been  any  one  really  fit  to  take  the  command,  such  an 
appointment  could  not  have  been  made;  but,  in  the 
evident  dearth  of  warlike  genius,  it  was  thought  best 
that  one  whose  rank  was  civil  rather  than  military  3 
should  be  preferred,  for  the  avoidance  of  jealousies  and 
contentions.  A  deserter  carried  the  news  to  Sapor,  who 
was  now  not  very  far  distant,  and  described  the  new 
emperor  to  him  as  effeminate  and  slothful.4  A  fresh 
impulse  was  given  to  the  pursuit  by  the  intelligence 
thus  conveyed ;  the  army  engaged  in  disputing  the 
Roman  retreat  was  reinforced  by  a  strong  body  of 
cavalry  ;  and  Sapor  himself  pressed  forward  with  all 
haste,  resolved  to  hurl  his  main  force  on  the  rear  of  the 
retreating  columns  5 


1  Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  5. 

2  Ibid,  l.s.c.  Zosimus  gives  no 
details,  but  simply  says  that  the 
council  by  common  consent  elected 
Jovian  (iii.  30). 

3  Jovian  was  '  first  of  the  domes- 
tics,' or  Comptroller  of  the  Royal 


Household.  His  military  rank  was 
perhaps  that  of  tribune.  ^  (See 
Zonaras,  xiii.  p.  29:  'lo(3iavdg  ek  ttjv 
avrapKtav  TTpOKEKpirai,  tote  xL^taP- 
X  u  v  •  ) 

4  *  Inertem  et  mollem.'  (Amm. 
Marc-,  l.s.c.  mb  Jin.)         5  Ibid. 


230 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  X. 


It  was  with  reluctance  that  Jovian,  on  the  day  of 
his  elevation  to  the  supreme  power  (June  27,  a.d.  363), 
quitted  the  protection  of  the  camp,1  and  proceeded  to 
conduct  his  army  over  the  open  plain,  where  the  Per- 
sians were  now  collected  in  great  force,  prepared  to  dis- 
pute the  ground  with  him  inch  by  inch.  Their  horse  and 
elephants  again  fell  upon  the  right  wing  of  the  Romans, 
where  the  Jovians  and  Herculians  were  now  posted, 
and,  throwing  those  renowned  corps2  into  disorder, 
pressed  on,  driving  them  across  the  plain  in  headlong 
flight  and  slaying  vast  numbers  of  them.  The  corps 
would  probably  have  been  annihilated,  had  they  not  in 
their  flight  reached  a  hill  occupied  by  the  baggage 
train,  which  gallantly  came  to  their  aid,  and,  attacking 
the  horse  and  elephants  from  higher  ground,  gained  a 
signal  success.3  The  elephants,  wounded  by  the  jave- 
lins hurled  down  upon  them  from  above,  and  maddened 
with  the  pain,  turned  upon  their  own  side,  and,  roaring 
frightfully,4  carried  confusion  among  the  ranks  of  the 
horse,  which  broke  up  and  fled.  Many  of  the  frantic 
animals  were  killed  by  their  own  riders  or  by  the  Per- 
sians on  whom  they  were  trampling,  while  others  suc- 
cumbed to  the  blows  dealt  them  by  the  enemy.  There 
was  a  frightful  carnage,  ending  in  the  repulse  of  the 
Persians  and  the  resumption  of  the  Roman  march. 
Shortly  before  night  fell,  Jovian  and  his  army  reached 
Samarah,5  then  a  fort  of  no  great  size  upon  the  Tigris,6 


1  Aram,  Marc.  xxv.  6,  ad  init. 

2  The  'Jovians'  and  *  Herculians' 
had  been  instituted  by  Diocletian, 
and  received  their  names  from  the 
titles  4  Jovius  '  and  '  Herculius  ' 
assumed  by  that  emperor  and  his 
son-in-law,  Galerius. 

3  Zosimus  (iii.  30)  is  here  fuller 
and  more  exact  than  Ammiamis. 
His  narrative  has  all  the  appearance 


of  truth. 

4  MetcI  (3pvxv0uoi\    (Zosim.  l.s.c.) 

5  Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  6:  '  Prope 
confinia  noctis,  cum  ad  castelluni 
Sumere  nomine  citis  passibus  ten- 
deremus.'  Zosinius  seems  to  intend 
the  same  place  by  his  Zovpa  to 
(ppovpiov,  which,  however,  lie  makes 
the  Romans  pass  early  in  the  day. 

6  Samarah  became  a  flourishing 


Ch.  X.]    DIFFICULTIES  OF  THE  ROMAN  RETREAT.  231 

and,  encamping  in  its  vicinity,  passed  the  hours  of 
rest  unmolested. 

The  retreat  now  continued  for  four  days  along  the 
left  bank  of  the  Tigris,1  the  progress  made  each  day 
being  small,2  since  the  enemy  incessantly  obstructed 
the  march,  pressing  on  the  columns  as  they  retired, 
but  when  they  stopped  drawing  off,  and  declining  an 
engagement  at  close  quarters.  On  one  occasion  they 
even  attacked  the  Roman  camp,  and,  after  insulting  the 
legions  with  their  cries,  forced  their  way  through  the 
prsetorian  gate,  and  had  nearly  penetrated  to  the  royal 
tent,  when  they  were  met  and  defeated  by  the  legion- 
aries.3 The  Saracenic  Arabs  were  especially  trouble- 
some. Offended  by  the  refusal  of  Julian  to  continue  their 
subsidies,4  they  had  transferred  their  services  wholly 
to  the  other  side,  and  pursued  the  Romans  with  a  hos- 
tility that  was  sharpened  by  indignation  and  resent- 
ment. It  was  with  difficulty  that  the  Roman  army,  at 
the  close  of  the  fourth  day,  reached  Dura,  a  small  place 
upon  the  Tigris,  about  eighteen  miles  north  of  Sa- 
marah.5  Here  a  new  idea  seized  the  soldiers.  As  the 
Persian  forces  were  massed  chiefly  on  the  left  bank  of 


and  important  city  under  the 
Caliphs  of  the  Abasside  dynasty. 
The  8th  Caliph  of  this  line,  Al- 
Motassem-Billah,  made  it  his 
capital.  It  is  now  once  more  re- 
duced to  insignificance. 

1  Zosim.  iii.  30:  '  H/uipag  reaaepaq 
TrpoE'AOovreg. 

2  As  Dura  (Bur)  is  but  eighteen 
miles  above  Samarah,  the  average 
progress  per  day  must  have  been 
under  five  miles.  Ammianus  gives 
the  last  day's  march  as  thirty 
stades,  or  little  more  than  three 
miles  (xxv.  6). 

3  Amm.  Marc,  l.s.c. 

4  Julian    had    subsidised  them 


for  a  time,  but,  finding  that  his 
supply  of  cash  was  becoming  ex- 
hausted, stopped  the  customary 
payment.  The  Saracens  complained, 
whereupon  he  replied  that  he  had 
no  more  gold,  but  plenty  of  steel, 
at  their  service. 

5  There  can  be  no  doubt  of  the 
identity  of  Dura  (Aoupa)  with  the 
modern  Dur,  a  small  place  on  the 
Tigris  between  Tekrit  and  Sama- 
rah.  (Rich,  Kurdistan,  vol.  ii.  ch 
xviii. ;  Layard,  Nineveh  and  Baby- 
lon, p.  469.)  It  was  a  town  of 
some  importance  in  the  wars  of 
the  successors  of  Alexander  (Polyb. 
v.  48  and  52). 


232 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  X. 


the  Tigris,  and  might  find  it  difficult  to  transfer  them- 
selves to  the  other  side,  it  seemed  to  the  legionaries 
that  they  would  escape  half  their  difficulties  if  they 
could  themselves  cross  the  river,  and  place  it  between 
them  and  their  foes.  They  had  also  a  notion  that  on 
the  west  side  of  the  stream  the  Roman  frontier  was  not 
far  distant,  but  might  be  reached  by  forced  marches  in 
a  few  days.1  They  therefore  begged  Jovian  to  allow 
them  to  swim  the  stream.  It  was  in  vain  that  he  and 
his  officers  opposed  the  project;  mutinous  cries  arose; 
and,  to  avoid  worse  evils,  he  was  compelled  to  consent 
that  five  hundred  Gauls  and  Sarmatians,  known  to  be 
expert  swimmers,  should  make  the  attempt.  It  suc- 
ceeded beyond  his  hopes.  The  corps  crossed  at  night, 
surprised  the  Persians  who  held  the  opposite  bank,  and 
established  themselves  in  a  safe  position  before  the 
dawn  of  day.  By  this  bold  exploit  the  passage  of  the 
other  troops,  many  of  whom  could  not  swim,  was  ren- 
dered feasible,  and  Jovian  proceeded  to  collect  timber, 
brushwood,  and  skins  for  the  formation  of  large  rafts 
on  which  he  might  transport  the  rest  of  his  army.2 

These  movements  were  seen  with  no  small  disquie- 
tude by  the  Persian  king.  The  army  which  he.  had 
regarded  as  almost  a  certain  prey  seemed  about  to 
escape  him.  He  knew  that  his  troops  could  not  pass 
the  Tigris  by  swimming ;  he  had,  it  is  probable,  brought 
with  him  no  boats,  and  the  country  about  Dura  could 
not  supply  many  ;  to  follow  the  Romans,  if  they  crossed 
the  stream,  he  must  construct  a  bridge,  and  the  con- 


1  Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  6:  'Fama 
circumlata,  fines  baud  procul  limi- 
tum  esse  nostrorum.' 

2  Ibid.  Rafts  of  tliis  description 
bad  been  nsed  on  tbe  Mesopotamia!) 
rivers  from  very  early  times.  They 


are  represented  frequently  in  the 
Assyrian  sculptures.  (See  Layard, 
Monuments  of  Nineveh,  Second 
Series,  pi.  13;  Nineveh  and  Baby- 
lon, p.  231;  &c.) 


Ch.  X.] 


NEGOTIATIONS  COMMENCE. 


233 


struction  of  a  bridge  was,  to  such  unskilful  engineers  as 
the  Persians,  a  work  of  time.  Before  it  was  finished 
the  legions  might  be  beyond  his  reach,  and  so  the 
campaign  would  end,  and  he  would  have  gained  no 
advantage  from  it.  Under  these  circumstances  he  de- 
termined to  open  negotiations  with  the  Romans,  and  to 
see  if  he  could  not  extract  from  their  fears  some  im- 
portant concessions.  They  were  still  in  a  position  of 
great  peril,  since  they  could  not  expect  to  embark  and 
cross  the  stream  without  suffering  tremendous  loss  from 
the  enemy  before  whom  they  would  be  flying.  And 
it  wTas  uncertain  what  perils  they  might  not  encounter 
beyond  the  river  in  traversing  the  two  hundred  miles 
that  still  separated  them  from  Roman  territory.1  The 
Saracenic  allies  of  Persia  were  in  force  on  the  further 
side  of  the  stream ; 2  and  a  portion  of  Sapor's  army 
might  be  conveyed  across  in  time  to  hang  on  the  rear 
of  the  legions  and  add  largely  to  their  difficulties.  At 
any  rate,  it  was  worth  while  to  make  overtures  and  see 
what  answer  would  be  returned.  If  the  idea  of  nego- 
tiating were  entertained  at  all,  something  would  be 
gained ;  for  each  additional  day  of  suffering  and  pri- 
vation diminished  the  Roman  strength,  and  brought 
nearer  the  moment  of  absolute  and  complete  exhaus- 
tion. Moreover,  a  bridge  might  be  at  once  commenced 
at  some  little  distance,3  and  might  be  pushed  forward, 


1  The  distance  from  Dur  to  Sin- 
jar  (Singara),  the  nearest  Roman 
post,  is,  as  the  crow  flies,  about 
175  miles.  Slight  deflections  from 
the  straight  line,  necessitated  by 
the  position  of  the  wells  upon  the 
route,  would  raise  the  distance  to 
200  miles. 

2  Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  8,  ad  in  it. 

3  This  is  not  stated  by  the  au- 
thorities; but,  after  the  peace  was 
made,  we  hear  of  a  bridge  which 


the  Persians  were  accused  of  con- 
structing in  order  to  pursue  Jovian 
and  break  the  terms  of  the  treaty. 
(See  Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  8.)  As 
Sapor,  if  wicked  enough,  can 
scarcely  have  been  foolish  enough, 
to  contemplate  breaking  the  very 
advantageous  treaty  which  he  had 
just  concluded,  I  suspect  that  the 
bridge  was  begun  while  the  nego- 
tiations were  in  progress,  to  be 
used  if  they  failed. 


234 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  X. 


so  that,  if  the  negotiations  failed,  there  should  be  no 
great  delay  in  following  the  Romans  across  the  river. 

Such  were  probably  the  considerations1  which  led 
Sapor  to  send  as  envoys  to  the  Roman  camp  at  Dura 
the  Surena  and  another  great  noble,  who  announced 
that  they  came  to  offer  terms  of  Peace.2  The  great 
king,  they  said,  having  respect  to  the  mutability  of 
human  affairs,  was  desirous  of  dealing  mercifully  with 
the  Romans,  and  would  allow  the  escape  of  the  rem- 
nant which  was  left  of  their  army,  if  the  Caesar  and 
his  advisers  accepted  the  conditions  that  he  required.3 
These  conditions  would  be  explained  to  any  envoys 
whom  Jovian  might  empower  to  discuss  them  with  the 
Persian  plenipotentiaries.  The  Roman  emperor  and 
his  council  gladly  caught  at  the  offer ;  and  two  officers 
of  high  rank,  the  general  Arinthaeus  and  the  prefect 
Sallust,  were  at  once  appointed  to  confer  with  Sapor's 
envoys,  and  ascertain  the  terms  on  which  peace  would 
be  granted.  They  proved  to  be  such  as  Roman  pride 
felt  to  be  almost  intolerable  ;  and  great  efforts  were 
made  to  induce  Sapor  to  be  content  with  less.  The 
negotiations  lasted  for  four  days ; 4  but  the  Persian 
monarch  was  inexorable ;  each  day  diminished  his 
adversary's  strength  and  bettered  his  own  position  ; 


1  I  have  given  the  considerations 
which,  it  seems  to  me,  must  have 
weighed  with  Sapor.  Ammianus 
represents  him  as  impelled  to  desire 
peace:  1,  by  the  losses  that  he  had 
sustained;  2,  by  fear  of  what  the 
Roman  army  might  do  if  driven  to 
desperation;  and  3,  by  a  general 
dread  of  the  Roman  power  and  a 
special  fear  of  the  army  of  Meso- 
potamia under  Procopius.  He  ad- 
mits, however,  that  the  successful 
passage  of  the  river  by  the  500 
Gauls    and    Sarmatians  was  the 


circumstance  which  principally 
moved  him:  *  Super  omnia  hebe- 
tarunt  ejus  anxiam  mentem  .  .  . 
quingenti  viri  transgressi  tumidum 
flumen  incolumes,'  &c.  (Amm. 
Marc.  xxv.  7.) 

2  Ibid,  l.s.c. ;  Zosim.  iii.  31. 

3  '  Humanorum  respectu  reliquias 
exercitus  redire  sinere  clemen- 
tissimum  regem,  qua?  jubet  si  im- 
pleverit  cum  primatibus  Caesar.' 
(Amm.  Marc,  l.s.c. \ 

*  Ibid,  l.s.c. 


Ch.  X.] 


THE  TERMS  OF  PEACE, 


235 


there  was  no  reason  why  he  should  make  any  conces- 
sion at  all ;  and  he  seems,  in  fact,  to  have  yielded  nothing 
of  his  original  demands,  except  points  of  such  exceed- 
ingly slight  moment  that  to  insist  on  them  would  have 
been  folly.1 

The  following  were  the  terms  of  peace  to  which 
Jovian  consented.  First,  the  five  provinces  east  of  the 
Tigris,  which  had  been  ceded  to  Rome  by  Narses,  the 
grandfather  of  Sapor,  after  his  defeat  by  Galerius,2  were 
to  be  given  back  to  Persia,  with  their  fortifications, 
their  inhabitants,  and  all  that  they  contained  of  value. 
The  Romans  in  the  territory  were,  however,  to  be 
allowed  to  withdraw  and  join  their  countrymen.  Sec- 
ondly, three  places  in  Eastern  Mesopotamia,  Nisibis, 
Singara,  and  a  fort  called  1  the  Camp  of  the  Moors,' 
were  to  be  surrendered,  but  with  the  condition  that 
not  only  the  Romans,  but  the  inhabitants  generally, 
might  retire  ere  the  Persians  took  possession,  and  carry 
with  them  such  of  their  effects  as  were  movable.3  The 
surrender  of  these  places  necessarily  involved  that  of 
the  country  which  they  commanded,  and  can  scarcely 
imply  less  than  the  withdrawal  of  Rome  from  any  claim 
to  dominion  over  the  region  between  the  Tigris  and 
the  Khabour.4  Thirdly,  all  connection  between  Ar- 
menia and  Rome  was  to  be  broken  off ;  Arsaces  was 
to  be  left  to  his  own  resources  ;  and  in  any  quarrel 
between  him  and  Persia  Rome  was  precluded  from 
lending  him  aid.    On  these  conditions  a  peace  was 


1  The  only  concessions  made 
were  the  permission  of  withdrawal 
given  to  all  the  inhabitants  of 
Nisibis  and  Singara,  and  the  allow- 
ance of  a  similar  right  to  Roman 
citizens  located  in  any  part  of  the 
ceded  territories. 

2  See  above,  pp.  129-132 


3  This  is  not  distinctly  stated  as 
a  condition,  but  appears  from  what 
is  related  of  the  actual  evacuation 
(Amra.  Marc.  xxv.  9). 

4  Orosius  sees  this,  and  therefore 
says:  'Nisibin  oppidum,  et  partem 
superioris  Me  sop  ot amice,  Persis  con- 
cessit '  (vii.  31 ). 


236 


THE  SEVENTH  M0NAKCHY. 


[Ch.  X. 


concluded  for  thirty  years  ;*  oaths  to  observe  it  faith- 
fully were  interchanged  ;  and  hostages  were  given  and 
received  on  either  side,  to  be  retained  until  the  stipu- 
lations of  the  treaty  were  executed. 

The  Roman  historian  who  exclaims  that  it  would  have 
been  better  to  have  fought  ten  battles  than  to  have  con- 
ceded a  single  one  of  these  shameful  terms,2  commands 
the  sympathy  of  every  reader,  who  cannot  fail  to  rec- 
ognise in  his  utterance  the  natural  feeling  of  a  patriot. 
And  it  is  possible  that  Julian,  had  he  lived,  would  have 
rejected  so  inglorious  a  peace,  and  have  preferred  to 
run  all  risks  rather  than  sign  it.  But  in  that  case 
there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  army  would 
have  been  absolutely  destroyed,  and  a  few  stragglers 
only  have  returned  to  tell  the  tale  of  disaster.3  The 
alternative  which  Ammianus  suggests — that  Jovian, 
instead  of  negotiating,  should  have  pushed  on  to  Cor- 
dyene,  which  he  might  have  reached  in  four  days  —  is 
absurd ; 4  for  Cordyene  was  at  least  a  hundred  and  fifty 
miles  distant  from  Dura,  and,  at  the  rate  of  retreat 
which  Jovian  had  found  possible  (four  and  a  half  miles 
a  day),  would  have  been  reached  in  three  days  over  a 
month  !  The  judgment  of  Eutropius,  who,  like  Am- 
mianus, shared  in  the  expedition,  is  probably  correct  — 
that  the  peace,  though  disgraceful,  was  necessary.5 
Unless  Jovian  was  prepared  to  risk  not  only  his  own 


1  Aram.  Marc.  xxv.  7,  ad  fin.; 
Zosim.  iii.  31. 

2  i  Cum  pugnari  decies  expediret, 
ne  horum  quidquam  dederetur.' 
(A mm.  Marc.  xxv.  7.) 

3  This  point  is  well  argued  by 
Tillemont  (Hist,  des  Empereurs, 
torn.  iv.  p.  583).  It  is  slurred 
over  by  Gibbon,  who  blames  Jovian, 
but  leaves  it  doubtful  what  he 
would  have  had  him  do  (Decline 


and  Fall,  vol.  iii.  p.  219). 

4  Gibbon  admits  as  much  in  a 
note  (note  no),  but  in  his  text  re- 
produces the  absurdity  of  Ammia- 
nus. 

5  Eutrop.  Breviar.  x.  17,  §  9  : 
'  Pacem  fecit  necessarian!  quidem, 
sed  ignobilem.'  Compare  Orosius, 
vii.  31 :  '  Fcedus,  etsi  parum  putaret 
dignum,  satis  tamen  necessarium, 
pepigit.' 


Cu.  X.|         TIIE  TERMS  OF  PEACE  EXECUTED.  237 

life,  but  the  lives  of  all  his  soldiers,  it  was  essential 
that  he  should  come  to  terms;  and  the  best  terms 
that  he  could  obtain  were  those  which  he  has  been 
blamed  for  accepting. 

It  is  creditable  to  both  parties  that  the  peace,  once 
made,  was  faithfully  observed,  all  its  stipulations  being 
honestly  and  speedily  executed.  The  Romans  were 
allowed  to  pass  the  river  without  molestation  from 
Sapor's  army,1  and,  though  they  suffered  some  what  from 
the  Saracens  when  landing  on  the  other  side,2  were  un- 
pursued  in  their  retreat,3  and  were  perhaps  even,  at 
first,  supplied  to  some  extent  with  provisions.4  After- 
wards, no  doubt,  they  endured  for  some  days  great 
privations ;  but  a  convoy  with  stores  was  allowed  to  ad- 
vance from  Roman  Mesopotamia  into  Persian  territory,5 
which  met  the  famished  soldiers  at  a  Persian  military 
post,  called  Ur  or  Adur,6  and  relieved  their  most  press- 
ing necessities.  On  the  Roman  side,  the  ceded  prov- 
inces and  towns  were  quietly  surrendered ;  offers  on 
the  part  of  the  inhabitants  to  hold  their  own  against 
the  Persians  without  Roman  aid  were  refused  ; 7  the 
Roman  troops  were  withdrawn  from  the  fortresses ; 
and  the  Armenians  were  told  that  they  must  henceforth 
rely  upon  themselves,  and  not  look  to  Rome  for  help  or 


1  Ammianus  graphically  describes 
the  passage  (xxv.  8).  Its  difficul- 
ties showed  that,  had  the  Persians 
been  hostile,  it  would  have  been 
impossible. 

2  Ammianus  says  4  a  Saracenis 
vel  Persia  caedebantur ; '  but  it  is 
not  clear  that  there  were  really 
any  Persians  on  the  right  bank  of 
the  river. 

3  Zosim.  iii.  33;  Amm.  Marc, 
l.s.c. 

4  Gibbon  denies  this  (p.  221, 
note116);  but  it  seems  to  me  that 
the  statements  of  Rufinus  (ii.  1  ; 


p.  177)  and  Theodoret  (iv.  2  ;  p. 
661,  B)  have  some  weight. 

5  Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  8.  The  im- 
portant words  6  Persicum  castellum ' 
have  not  generally  been  noticed. 
A  reader  of  Gibbon  would  suppose 
4  the  castle  of  Ur '  to  be  a  Roman 
post. 

6  The  MSS.  vary  between  4  ad  Ur 
nomine  Persicum  venere  castellum ' 
and  4  Adur  nomine  Persicum  v. 
cast.'  Ammianus  commonly  omits 
4  ad  '  after  4  venio.' 

7  Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  9;  Zosim.  iii. 
33,  sub  Jin. 


238  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  |Ch.  X. 


protection.  Thus  Jovian,  though  strongly  urged  to  fol- 
low ancient  precedent,1  and  refuse  to  fulfil  the  engage- 
ments contracted  under  the  pressure  of  imminent  peril, 
stood  firm,  and  honourably  performed  all  the  conditions 
of  the  treaty. 

The  second  period  of  struggle  between  Rome  and 
Persia  had  thus  a  termination  exactly  the  reverse  of 
the  first.  Rome  ended  the  first  period  by  a  great  vic- 
tory and  a  great  diplomatic  success.2  At  the  close  of 
the  second  she  had  to  relinquish  all  her  gains,  and  to 
draw  back  even  behind  the  line  which  she  occupied 
when  hostilities  first  broke  out.  Nisibis,  the  great 
stronghold  of  Eastern  Mesopotamia,  had  been  in  her 
possession  ever  since  the  time  of  Verus.3  Repeatedly 
attacked  by  Parthia  and  Persia,  it  had  never  fallen ;  but 
once,  after  which  it  had  been  soon  recovered ;  and 
now  for  many  years  it  had  come  to  be  regarded  as 
the  bulwark  of  the  Roman  power  in  the  East,  and  as 
carrying  with  it  the  dominion  of  Western  Asia.4  A 
fatal  blow  was  dealt  to  Roman  prestige  when  a  city 
held  for  near  two  hundred  years,  and  one  honoured 
with  the  name  of '  colony,'  was  wrested  from  the  empire 
and  occupied  by  the  most  powerful  of  its  adversaries. 
Not  only  Amida  and  Carrhse,  but  Antioch  itself,  trem- 


1  The  reproach  addressed  by  the 
Parthian  chief  to  Crass  us,  4  You 
Romans  are  not  very  apt  to  re- 
member your  engagements'  (Plut. 
Crass.  §  31),  was  well  deserved, 
and  is  echoed  by  the  general  voice 
of  history.  It  is  saddening  to  find 
a  modern  writer  and  an  Englishman 
approving  the  ordinary  Roman 
practice,  and  suggesting  that  Jovian 
ought  to  have  '  redeemed  his 
pusillanimous  behaviour  by  a  splen- 
did act  of  patriotic  perfidy'  (Gib- 
bon, Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  iii.  p. 
223). 


2  See  above,  p.  135. 

3  Zosimus  maintains  (iii.  32) 
that  Rome  never  gave  up  Nisibis 
from  the  time  of  its  capture  by 
Lucullus  (B.C.  68).  And  it  may 
be  true  that  she  never  relinquished 
it  by  treaty.  But  Nisibis  and 
Mesopotamia  generally  were  Par- 
thian until  the'great  expedition  of 
Avid  ins  Cass i us  (a.d.  165). 

4  '  Constabat  orbem  Eoum  in 
ditionem  potuisse  transire  Persidis, 
nisi  luec  civitas  habili  situ  et 
moe nium  magnitudine  restitisset.' 
(Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  8.) 


Ch.  X.|       general  results  of  the  war.  239 

bled  at  a  loss  which  was  felt  to  lay  open  the  whole 
eastern  frontier  to  attack,1  and  which  seemed  ominous 
of  further  retrogression.  Although  the  fear  generally 
felt  proved  to  be  groundless,  and  the  Roman  posses- 
sions in  the  East  were  not,  for  200  years,  further  cur- 
tailed by  the  Persians,  yet  Roman  influence  in  Western 
Asia  from  this  time  steadily  declined,  and  Persia  came 
to  be  regarded  as  the  first  power  in  these  regions. 
Much  credit  is  due  to  Sapor  II.  for  his  entire  conduct 
of  the  war  with  Constantius,  Julian,  and  Jovian.  He 
knew  when  to  attack  and  when  to  remain  upon  the 
defensive,  when  to  press  on  the  enemy  and  when  to 
hold  himself  in  reserve  and  let  the  enemy  follow  his 
own  devices.  He  rightly  conceived  from  the  first  the 
importance  of  Nisibis,  and  resolutely  persisted  in  his 
determination  to  acquire  possession  of  it,  until  at  last 
he  succeeded.  When,  in  B.C.  337,  he  challenged 
Rome  to  a  trial  of  strength,  he  might  have  seemed 
rash  and  presumptuous.  But  the  event  justified  him. 
In  a  war  which  lasted  twenty-seven  years,  he  fought 
numerous  pitched  battles  with  the  Romans,  and  was 
never  once  defeated.  He  proved  himself  greatly 
superior  as  a  general  to  Constantius  and  Jovian,  and 
not  unequal  to  Julian.  By  a  combination  of  courage, 
perseverance,  and  promptness,  he  brought  the  entire 
contest  to  a  favourable  issue,  and  restored  Persia,  in 
a.d.  363,  to  a  higher  position  than  that  from  which 
she  had  descended  two  generations  earlier.  If  he  had 
done  nothing  more  than  has  already  come  under  our 
notice,  he  would  still  have  amply  deserved  that  epi- 
thet of  1  Great '  which,  by  the  general  consent  of  histo- 


Zosini.  iii.  34,  sub  init.  ;  Johann.  Ant.  Fr.  181. 


240 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


LCH.  N. 


rians,  has  been  assigned  to  him.  He  was  undoubtedly 
among  the  greatest  of  the  Sassanian  monarchs,  and 
may  properly  be  placed  above  all  his  predecessors,  and 
above  all  but  one 1  of  those  who  succeeded  him. 

1  Chosroes  Anushirwan,  who  reigned  from  A.D.  531  to  a.d.  579. 


Oh.  XL] 


AFFAIRS  OF  ARMENIA. 


241 


CHAPTER  XI. 

Attitude  of  Armenia  during  the  War  between  Sapor  and  Julian.  Sapor's 

Treacher?/  towards  Arsaces.  Sapor  conquers  Armenia.  He  attacks 
Iberia,  deposes  Sauromaces,  and  sets  up  a  new  King.  Resistance  and 
Capture  of  Artogerassa.  Difficulties  of  Sapor.  Division  of  Iberia 
between  the  Roman  and  Persian  Pretenders.  Renewal  of  Hostilities 
between  Rome  and  Persia.  Peace  made  ivith  Valens.  Death  of  Sapor. 
His  Coins. 

4  Rex  Persidis,  longaevus  ille  Sapor,  post  imperatoris  Juliani  excessum  et 
pudendae  pacis  icta  foedera  .  .  .  injectabat  Arinenige  man  urn.' 

Amm.  Marc,  xxvii.  12. 

The  successful  issue  of  Sapor's  war  with  Julian  and 
Jovian  resulted  in  no  small  degree  from  the  attitude 
which  was  assumed  by  Armenia  soon  after  Julian  com- 
menced his  invasion.  We  have  seen  that  the  emperor, 
when  he  set  out  upon  his  expedition,  regarded  Arme- 
nia as  an  ally,  and  in  forming  his  plans  placed  consider- 
able dependence  on  the  contingent  which  he  expected 
from  Arsaces,  the  Armenian  monarch.1  It  was  his  in- 
tention to  attack  Ctesiphon  with  two  separate  armies, 
acting  upon  two  converging  lines.  While  he  himself 
advanced  with  his  main  force  by  way  of  the  Euphrates 
valley  and  the  Nahr-Malcha,  he  had  arranged  that  his 
two  generals,  Procopius  and  Sebastian,  should  unite 
their  troops  with  those  of  the  Armenian  king,  and,  after 
ravaging  a  fertile  district  of  Media,  make  their  way 
towards  the  great  city,  through  Assyria  and  Adiabene,2 
along  the  left  bank  of  the  Tigris.     It  was  a  bitter  dis- 

1  See  above,  p.  200.  2  Zosim.  iv.  4. 


242  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [Ch.  XI. 


appointment  to  him  when,  on  nearing  Ctesiphon,  he 
could  see  no  signs  and  hear  no  tidings  of  the  northern 
army,  from  which  he  had  looked  for  effectual  aid  at 
this  crisis  of  the  campaign.1  We  have  now  to  consider 
how  this  failure  came  about,  what  circumstances  in- 
duced that  hesitation  and  delay  on  the  part  of  Sebas- 
tian and  Procopius  which  had  at  any  rate  a  large  share 
in  frustrating  Julian's  plans  and  causing  the  ill-success 
of  his  expedition. 

It  appears  that  the  Roman  generals,  in  pursuance  of 
the  orders  given  them,  marched  across  Northern  Meso- 
potamia to  the  Armenian  borders,  and  were  there  joined 
by  an  Armenian  contingent  which  Arsaces  sent  to  their 
assistance.2  The  allies  marched  together  into  Media, 
and  carried  fire  and  sword  through  the  fruitful  district 
known  as  Chiliacomus,  or  4  the  district  of  the  Thousand 
Villages.' 3  They  might  easily  have  advanced  further; 
but  the  Armenians  suddenly  and  without  warning  drew 
off  and  fell  back  towards  their  own  country.  According 
to  Moses  of  Chorine,  their  general,  Zurseus,  was  actu- 
ated by  a  religious  motive ;  it  seemed  to  him  monstrous 
that  Armenia,  a  Christian  country,  should  embrace  the 
cause  of  an  apostate,  and  he  was  prepared  to  risk 
offending  his  own  sovereign  rather  than  lend  help  to 
one  whom  he  regarded  as  the  enemy  of  his  faith.4  The 
Roman  generals,  thus  deserted  by  their  allies,  differed 
as  to  the  proper  course  to  pursue.  While  one  was  still 
desirous  of  descending  the  course  of  the  Tigris,  and 
making  at  least  an  attempt  to  effect  a  junction  with 
Julian,  the  other  forbade  his  soldiers  ,to  join  in  the 

1  Amm.  Marc.  xxiv.  7,  ad  fin,  original  plan.     (See  Anim.  Marc. 

2  Mos.  Chor.  Hist.  Armen.  iii.  15;  xxiii.  3.)  That  it  was  executed  ap- 
Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  7.  pears  from  the  same  writer  (xxv.  7). 

3  This    was    part    of    Julian's  4  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  15. 


Ch.  XL]   SAPOR'S  PROCEEDINGS  AGAINST  ARSACES.  243 


march,  and  insisted  on  falling  back  and  re-entering 
Mesopotamia.1  As  usual  in  such  cases,  the  difference 
of  opinion  resulted  in  a  policy  of  inaction.  The  attempt 
to  join  Julian  was  given  up ;  and  the  second  army, 
from  which  he  had  hoped  so  much,  played  no  further 
part  in  the  campaign  of  a.d.  363. 

We  are  told 2  that  Julian  heard  of  the  defection  of 
'  the  Armenians  while  he  was  still  on  his  way  to  Ctesi- 
phon,  and  immediately  sent  a  letter  to  Arsaces,  com- 
plaining of  his  general's  conduct,  and  threatening  to 
exact  a  heavy  retribution  on  his  return  from  the  Per- 
sian war,  if  the  offence  of  Zurseus  were  not  visited  at 
once  with  condign  punishment.  Arsaces  was  greatly 
alarmed  at  the  message  ;  and,  though  he  made  no  ef- 
fort to  supply  the  shortcomings  of  his  officer  by  leading 
or  sending  fresh  troops  to  Julian's  assistance,  yet  he 
hastened  to  acquit  himself  of  complicity  in  the  mis- 
conduct of  Zurseus  by  executing  him,  together  with 
his  whole  family.3  Having  thus,  as  he  supposed,  se- 
cured himself  against  Julian's  anger,  he  took  no  fur- 
ther steps,  but  indulged  his  love  of  ease  and  his  distaste 
for  the  Roman  alliance  by  remaining  wholly  passive 
during  the  rest  of  the  year. 

But  though  the  attitude  taken  by  Armenia  was  thus, 
on  the  whole,  favourable  to  the  Persians,  and  undoubt- 
edly contributed  to  Sapor's  success,  he  was  himself  so 
far  from  satisfied  with  the  conduct  of  Arsaces  that  he 
resolved  at  once  to  invade  his  country  and  endeavour 
to  strip  him  of  his  crown.  As  Rome  had  by  the  recent 
treaty  relinquished  her  protectorate  over  Armenia,  and 
bound  herself  not  to  interfere  in  any  quarrel  between 

1  Liban.  Oral.  Funehr.  p.  301,  D.  pins  and  Sebastian. 
The  passage  is  obscure,  but  appears      2  Mos.  Chor.  l.s.c. 
to  refer  to  the  troops  under  Proco-      3  Ibid. 


244 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  XL 


the  Armenians  and  the  Persians,  an  opportunity  was 
afforded  for  bringing  Armenia  into  subjection  which 
an  ambitious  monarch  like  Sapor  was  not  likely  to  let 
slip.  He  had  only  to  consider  whether  he  would  em- 
ploy art  or  violence,  or  whether  he  would  rather  pre- 
fer a  judicious  admixture  of  the  two.  Adopting  the 
last-named  course  as  the  most  prudent,  he  proceeded 
to  intrigue  with  a  portion  of  the  Armenian  satraps, 
while  he  made  armed  incursions  on  the  territories  of 
others,  and  so  harassed  the  country  that  after  a  while 
the  satraps  generally  went  over  to  his  side,  and  repre- 
sented to  Arsaces  that  no  course  was  open  to  him  but 
to  make  his  submission.  Having  brought  matters  to 
this  point,  Sapor  had  only  further  to  persuade  Arsaces 
to  surrender  himself,  in  order  to  obtain  the  province 
which  he  coveted,  almost  without  striking  a  blow.  He 
therefore  addressed  Arsaces  a  letter,  which,  according 
to  the  only  writer  who  professes  to  give  its  terms,1 
was  expressed  as  follows:  — 

1  Sapor,  the  offspring  of  Orrnazd,  comrade  of  the  sun, 
king  of  kings,  sends  greeting  to  his  dear  brother,  Arsa- 
ces, king  of  Armenia,  whom  he  holds  in  affectionate 
remembrance.  It  has  come  to  our  knowledge  that 
thou  hast  approved  thyself  our  faithful  friend,  since  not 
only  didst  thou  decline  to  invade  Persia  with  Csesar, 
but  when  he  took  a  contingent  from  thee  thou  didst 
send  messengers  and  withdraw  it.2  Moreover,  we  have 
not  forgotten  how  thou  actedst  at  the  first,  when  thou 
didst  prevent  him  from  passing  through  thy  territories, 
as  he  wished.    Our  soldiers,  indeed,  who  quitted  their 

1  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  17.  Moses  makes  !  Arsaces  ordered  his  genera]  to  with* 
the  letter  to  be  addressed  toTiranus;  \  draw  the  troops,  but,  that  he  might 
but  lie  ceased  to  reign  a.d.  341.       I  not  be  compromised,  made  him  pre- 

2  Some  think  that  this  is  the  I  tend  to  act  on  his  own  authority, 
true  account  of  the  matter  —  that  I  * 


Ch.  XL]  ARSACES  SEIZED  AND  BLINDED.  245 

post,  sought  to  cast  on  thee  the  blame  due  to  their  own 
cowardice.  But  we  have  not  listened  to  them :  their 
leader  we  punished  with  death,  and  to  thy  realm,  I 
swear  by  Mithra,  we  have  done  no  hurt.  Arrange 
matters  then  so  that  thou  mayest  come  to  us  with  all 
speed,  and  consult  with  us  concerning  our  common 
advantage.    Then  thou  canst  return  home.' 

Arsaces,  on  receiving  this  missive,  whatever  suspi- 
cions he  may  have  felt,  saw  no  course  open  to  him 
but  to  accept  the  invitation.  He  accordingly  quitted 
Armenia  and  made  his  way  to  the  court  of  Sapor, 
where  he  was  immediately  seized  and  blinded.1  He 
was  then  fettered  with  chains  of  silver,  according  to  a 
common  practice  of  the  Persians  with  prisoners  of  dis- 
tinction,2 and  was  placed  in  strict  confinement  in  a 
place  called  1  the  Castle  of  Oblivion.' 3 

But  the  removal  of  their  head  did  not  at  once  pro- 
duce the  submission  of  the  people.  A  national  party 
declared  itself  under  Pharandzem,  the  wife,  and  Bab 
(or  Para),  the  son  of  Arsaces,  who  threw  themselves 
into  the  strong  fortress  of  Artogerassa  (Ardakers),  and 
there  offered  to  Sapor  a  determined  resistance.4  Sapor 
committed  the  siege  of  this  place  to  two  renegade  Ar- 
menians, Cylaces  and  Artabannes,  while  at  the  same 
time  he  proceeded  to  extend  his  influence  beyond  the 
limits  of  Armenia  into  the  neighbouring  country  of 
Iberia,  which  was  closely  connected  with  Armenia, 
and  for  the  most  part  followed  its  fortunes. 


1  Aram.  Marc,  xxvii.  12.  The 
seizure  is  also  recorded  by  the 
Armenian  historians,  Faustns  (iv. 
54)  and  Moses  (iii.  34);  and  also 
by  Procopius  '{Bell.  Pers.  i.  5). 

2  '  Vincttim  catenis  argenteis, 
quod  apud  eos  honoratis  vanum 
suppliciorum  sestimatur  esse  sola- 


tium.' (Aram.  Marc.  I.s  c. )  Moses, 
however,  gives  him  fetters  of  iron 

(iii:  35). 

3  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  35;  Faustns, 
iv.  54;  Procop.  7?.  P.  i.  6,  p.  29. 

4  Mos.  Chor.  l.s.c. ;  Aram.  Marc, 
xxvii.  12;  Faustns,  iv.  55. 


246 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  XL 


Iberia  was  at  this  time  tinder  the  government  of 
a  king  bearing  the  name  of  Sauromaces,  who  had 
received  his  investiture  from  Rome,  and  was  conse- 
quently likely  to  uphold  Roman  interests.  Sappr  in- 
vaded Iberia,  drove  Sauromaces  from  his  kingdom, 
and  set  up  a  new  monarch  in  the  person  of  a  certain 
Aspacures,  on  whose  brow  he  placed  the  coveted  dia- 
dem.1 He  then  withdrew  to  his  own  country,  leaving 
the  complete  subjection  of  Armenia  to  be  accom- 
plished by  his  officers,  Cylaces  and  Artabannes,  or,  as 
the  Armenian  historians  call  them,  Zig  and  Gar  en. 2 

Cylaces  and  Artabannes  commenced  the  siege  of  Ar- 
togerassa,  and  for  a  time  pressed  it  with  vigour,  while 
they  strongly  urged  the  garrison  to  make  their  sub- 
mission. But,  having  entered  within  the  walls  to  ne- 
gotiate, they  were  won  over  by  the  opposite  side,  and 
joined  in  planning  a  treacherous  attack  on  the  besieging 
force,  which  was  surprised  at  night  and  compelled  to 
retire.  Para  took  advantage  of  their  retreat  to  quit 
the  town  and  throw  himself  on  the  protection  of  Valens, 
the  Roman  emperor,  who  permitted  him  to  reside  in 
regal  state  at  Neocaesarea.  Shortly  afterwards,  however, 
by  the  advice  of  Cylaces  and  Artabannes,  he  returned 
into  Armenia,  and  was  accepted  by  the  patriotic  party 
as  their  king,  Rome  secretly  countenancing  his  proceed- 
ings.3 Under  these  circumstances  the  Persian  monarch 
once  more  took  the  field,  and,  entering  Armenia  at  the 
head  of  a  large  army,  drove  Para,  with  his  counsellors 
Cylaces  and  Artabannes,  to  the  mountains,  renewed  the 
siege  of  Artogerassa,  and  forced  it  to  submit,  captured 
the  queen  Pharandzem,  together  with  the  treasure  of 


1  Amm.  Marc,  xxvii.  12. 

2  Faustus,  iv.  55. 

5  '  Per  Terentium  ducezn  Para 


reducitur  in  Armeniam.'  (Amm. 
Marc,  l.s.c.  Compare  Faustus,  v.  1.) 


Ch.  XL] 


SUBMISSION  OF  PARA. 


247 


Arsaces,1  and  finally  induced  Para  to  come  to  terms, 
and  to  send  him  the  heads  of  the  two  arch- traitors. 
The  resistance  of  Armenia  would  probably  now  have 
ceased,  had  Rome  been  content  to  see  her  old  enemy 
so  aggrandised,  or  felt  her  hands  absolutely  tied  by  the 
terms  of  the  treaty  of  Dura. 

But  the  success  of  Sapor  thus  far  only  brought  him 
into  greater  difficulties.  The  Armenians  and  Iberians, 
who  desired  above  all  things  liberty  and  independence, 
were  always  especially  hostile  to  the  power  from  which 
they  felt  that  they  had  for  the  time  being  most  to  fear. 
As  Christian  nations,  they  had  also  at  this  period  an 
additional  ground  of  sympathy  with  Rome,  and  of 
aversion  from  the  Persians,  who  were  at  once  heathens 
and  intolerant.2  The  patriotic  party  in  both  countries 
was  thus  violently  opposed  to  the  establishment  of 
Sapor's  authority  over  them,  and  cared  little  for  the 
artifices  by  which  he  sought  to  make  it  appear  that 
they  still  enjoyed  freedom  and  autonomy.  Above  all, 
Rome,  being  ruled  by  monarchs 3  who  had  had  no  hand 
in  making  the  disgraceful  peace  of  a.d.  363,  and  who 
had  no  strong  feeling  of  honour  or  religious  obligation 
in  the  matter  of  treaties  with  barbarians,  was  preparing 
herself  to  fly  in  the  face  of  her  engagements,  and,  re- 
garding her  own  interest  as  her  highest  law,  to  inter- 
fere effectually  in  order  to  check  the  progress  of  Persia 
in  North- Western  Asia. 

Rome's  first  open  interference  was  in  Iberia.  Iberia 
had  perhaps  not  been  expressly  named  in  the  treaty, 


1  Amin.  Marc,  xxvii.  12;  Faus- 
tus,  iv.  55;  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  35. 

2  See  above,  p.  147. 

8  Valentinian  and  Valens.  Jovian 
had  died  in  a.d.  364,  after  a  reign 
of  little  more  than  eight  months. 


Valentinian  had  been  elected  his 
successor,  and  had  associated  his 
brother  Valens  in  the  empire. 
To  Valens  had  been  assigned  the 
government  of  the  eastern  prov- 
inces. 


t 


248 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  XL 


and  support  might  consequently  be  given  to  the  ex- 
pelled Sauromaces  without  any  clear  infraction  of  its 
conditions.  The  duke  Terentius  was  ordered,  therefore, 
towards  the  close  of  a.d.  370,  to  enter  Iberia  with  twelve 
legions  and  replace  upon  his  throne  the  old  Roman 
feudatory.1  Accordingly  he  invaded  the  country  from 
Lazica,  which  bordered  it  upon  the  north,  and  found 
no  difficulty  in  conquering  it  as  far  as  the  river  Cyrus. 
On  the  Cyrus,  however,  he  was  met  by  Aspacures,  the 
king  of  Sapor's  choice,  who  made  proposals  for  an 
accommodation.  Representing  himself  as  really  well- 
inclined  to  Rome,  and  only  prevented  from  declaring 
himself  by  the  fact  that  Sapor  held  his  son  as  a  hostage, 
he  asked  Terentius'  consent  to  a  division  of  Iberia  be- 
tween himself  and  his  rival,  the  tract  north  of  the  Cyrus 
being  assigned  to  the  Roman  claimant,  and  that  south 
of  the  river  remaining  under  his  own  government. 
Terentius,  to  escape  further  trouble,  consented  to  the 
arrangement;  and  the  double  kingdom  was  established. 
The  northern  and  western  portions  of  Iberia  were  made 
over  to  Sauromaces ;  the  southern  and  eastern  contin- 
ued to  be  ruled  by  Aspacures. 

When  the  Persian  king  received  intelligence  of  these 
transactions,  he  was  greatly  excited.2  To  him  it  ap- 
peared clear  that  by  the  spirit,  if  not  by  the  letter,  of  the 
treaty  of  Dura,  Rome  had  relinquished  Iberia  equally 
with  Armenia ; 3  and  he  complained  bitterly  of  the 
division  which  had  been  made  of  the  Iberian  territory, 

1  Aram.  Marc,  xxvii.  12:  *  Sau- 1  included  in  Armenia.  When  Rome 
romaces,  pulsus  .  .  .  Hiheriae  reg- j  replaced  Sauromaces  upon  the  Ibe- 


no,  cum  duodecim  legionibus  et 
Terentio  rem  i  Hit  nr.' 

2  4  His  percitus  Sapor,  pali  se 
indigna  clamans,'  &c.   {Ibid,  l.s.c.) 

3  Sapor  seems  to  have  considered 
that,  in  a  certain  sense,  Iberia  was 


rian  throne,  he  complained  that 
'  the  At men  las  were  assisted  against 
the  text  of  the  treaty.'  (Ibid, 
l.s.c.)  Rome,  no  doubt,  contested 
this  interpretation. 


Ch.  XI.  1      WAR  BETWEEN  SAPOR  AND  VALENS.  249 


not  only  without  his  consent,  but  without  his  knowl- 
edge. He  was  no  doubt  aware  that  Rome  had  not 
really  confined  her  interference  to  the  region  with 
which  she  had  some  excuse  for  intermeddling,  but  had 
already  secretly  intervened  in  Armenia,  and  was  intend- 
ing further  intervention.  The  count  Arinthseus  had 
been  sent  with  an  army  to  the  Armenian  frontier  about 
the  same  time  that  Terentius  had  invaded  Iberia,  and 
had  received  positive  instructions  to  help  the  Armenians 
if  Sapor  molested  them.  It  was  in  vain  that  the  Per- 
sian monarch  appealed  to  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of 
Dura  —  Rome  dismissed  his  ambassadors  with  con- 
tempt, and  made  no  change  in  her  line  of  procedure. 
Upon  this  Sapor  saw  that  war  was  unavoidable  ;  and 
accordingly  he  wasted  no  more  time  in  embassies,  but 
employed  himself  during  the  winter,  which  had  now 
begun,  in  collecting  as  large  a  force  as  he  could,  in 
part  from  his  allies,  in  part  from  his  own  subjects,  re- 
solving to  take  the  field  in  the  spring,  and  to  do  his 
best  to  punish  Rome  for  her  faithlessness.1 

Rome  on  her  part  made  ready  to  resist  the  invasion 
which  she  knew  to  be  impending.  A  powerful  army 
was  sent  to  guard  the  East  under  count  Trajan,  and 
Vadomair,  ex-king  of  the  Alemanni ; 2  but  so  much 
regard  for  the  terms  of  the  recent  treaty  was  still  felt, 
or  pretended,  that  the  generals  received  orders  to  be 
careful  not  to  commence  hostilities,  but  to  wait  till  an 
attack  was  made  on  them.  They  were  not  kept  long  in 
expectation.  As  soon  as  winter  was  over,  Sapor  crossed 
the  frontier  (a.d.  371)  with  a  large  force  of  native 
cavalry  and  archers,  supported  by  numerous  auxiliaries,3 
and  attacked  the  Romans  near  a  place  called  Vaga- 

1  Arum.  Marc,  xxvii.  12,  ad  Jin.        2  Tbitl.  xxix.  1.        3  Ibid. 


250  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [Ch.  XL 


banta.  The  Roman  commander  gave  his  troops  the 
order  to  retire  ;  and  accordingly  they  fell  back  under  a 
shower  of  Persian  arrows,  until,  several  having  been 
wounded,  they  felt  that  they  could  with  a  good  face  de- 
clare that  the  rupture  of  the  peace  was  the  act  of  the 
Persians.  The  retreat  was  then  exchanged  for  an  ad- 
vance, and  after  a  brief  engagement  the  Romans  were 
victorious,  and  inflicted  a  severe  loss  upon  their  adver- 
saries.1 But  the  success  was  not  followed  by  results  of 
any  importance.  Neither  side  seems  to  have  been 
anxious  for  another  general  encounter  ;  and  the  season 
for  hostilities  was  occupied  by  a  sort  of  guerilla  war- 
fare, in  which  the  advantage  rested  alternately  with 
the  Persians  and  the  Romans.2  At  length,  when  the 
summer  was  ended,  the  commanders  on  either  side 
entered  into  negotiations ;  and  a  truce  was  made  which 
allowed  Sapor  to  retire  to  Ctesiphon,  and  the  Roman 
emperor,  who  was  now  personally  directing  the  war,  to 
go  into  winter  quarters  at  Antioch.3 

After  this  the  war  languished  for  two  or  three  years.4 
Valens  was  wholly  deficient  in  military  genius,  and  was 
quite  content  if  he  could  maintain  a  certain  amount  of 
Roman  influence  in  Armenia  and  Iberia,  while  at  the 
same  time  he  protected  the  Roman  frontier  against  Per- 
sian invasion.  Sapor  was  advanced  in  years,  and  might 
naturally  desire  repose,  having  been  almost  constantly 
engaged  in  military  expeditions  since  he  reached  the 
age  of  sixteen.    Negotiations  seem  to  have  alternated 


1  See  Amm.  Mare.  xxx.  2  :  '  Sa- 
por vero,  post  suorum  pristinam 
cladem.' 

2  '  Tentatis  aliquoties  levibus  prse- 
1  iis,  varioque  finilis  eventu.'  (Ibid, 
xxix.  1.) 


3  Ibid.    Compare  Zosiui.  iv.  13. 

4  Into  this  interval  fell  the  death 
of  Para,  whom  the  Persians  en- 
trapped and  murdered  (Amm. 
Marc.  xxx.  1  *  Faustus,  v.  32). 


Ch.  XL] 


PEACE  MADE  :  ITS  TERMS. 


251 


with  hostilities1  during  the  interval  between  a.d.  371 
and  376  ;  but  they  resulted  in  nothing,  until,  in  this 
last-named  year,  a  peace  was  made,2  which  gave  tran- 
quillity to  the  East  during  the  remainder  of  the  reign 
of  Sapor. 

The  terms  upon  which  this  peace  was  concluded  are 
obscure.  It  is  perhaps  most  probable  that  the  two 
contracting  powers  agreed  to  abstain  from  further  in- 
terference with  Iberia  and  Armenia,  and  to  leave  those 
countries  to  follow  their  own  inclinations.  Armenia 
seems  by  the  native  accounts  to  have  gravitated  towards 
Rome  under  these  circumstances,3  and  Iberia  is  likely 
to  have  followed  her  example.  The  tie  of  Christianity 
attached  these  countries  to  the  great  power  of  the 
West ;  and,  except  under  compulsion,  they  were  not 
likely  at  this  time  to  tolerate  the  yoke  of  Persia  for  a 
day.  When  Jovian  withdrew  the  Roman  protection 
from  them,  they  were  forced  for  a  while  to  submit  to 
the  power  which  they  disliked ;  but  no  sooner  did  his 
successors  reverse  his  policy,  and  show  themselves 
ready  to  uphold  the  Armenians  and  Iberians  against 
Persia,  than  they  naturally  reverted  to  the  Roman  side, 
and  formed  an  important  support  to  the  empire  against 
its  Eastern  rival. 

The  death  of  Sapor  followed  the  peace  of  a.d.  376 
within  a  few  years.  He  died4  a.d.  379  or  380,  after 
having  reigned  seventy  years.  It  is  curious  that, 
although  possessing  the  crown  for  so  long  a  term,  and 
enjoying  a  more  brilliant  reign  than  any  preceding 


1  Amm.  Marc.  xxx.  2. 

2  Zosim.  iv.  21,  sub  init.  Com- 
pare Amm.  Marc.  xxxi.  7. 

3  Mos.  Choi*,  iii.  40;  Faustus,  v. 
34. 

4  Clinton  places  his  death  in  a.d. 


379  (F.  R.  vol.  i.  p.  356)  ;  but 
Patkanian  (Journal  Asiatique  for 
1866,  p.  234)  and  Thomas  (Num. 
Chron.  for  1872,  p.  45)  prefer  the 
date  a.d.  380. 


252 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  XI. 


monarch,  he  neither  left  behind  him  any  inscriptions,  nor 
any  sculpturedmemorials.  The  only  material  evidences 
that  we  possess  of  his  reign  are  his  coins,  which  are 
exceedingly  numerous.  According  to  Mordtmann,1 
they  may  be  divided  into  three  classes,  corresponding 
to  three  periods  in  his  life.  The  earliest  have  on  the 
reverse  the  fire-altar,  with  two  priests,  or  guards,  looking 
towards  the  altar,  and  with  the  flame  rising  from  the 
altar  in  the  usual  way.  The  head  on  the  obverse  is 
archaic  in  type,  and  very  much  resembles  that  of 
Sapor  I.  The  crown  has  attached  to  it,  in  many  cases, 
that  c  cheek-piece  '  which  is  otherwise  confined  to  the 
first  three  monarchs  of  the  line.  These  coins  are  the 
best  from  an  artistic  point  of  view ;  they  greatly  re- 
semble those  of  the  first  Sapor,  but  are  distinguishable 
from  them,  first,  by  the  guards  looking  towards  the  altar 
instead  of  away  from  it ;  and,  secondly,  by  a  greater 
profusion  of  pearls  about  the  king's  person.  The  coins 
of  the  second  period  lack  the  L  cheek-piece,'  and  have 
on  the  reverse  the  fire-altar  without  supporters  ;  they 
are  inferior  as  works  of  art  to  those  of  the  first  period, 
but  much  superior  to  those  of  the  third.  These  last, 
which  exhibit  a  marked  degeneracy,2  are  especially  dis- 
tinguished by  having  a  human  head  in  the  middle  of  the 
flames  that  rise  from  the  altar.  Otherwise  they  much 
resemble  in  their  emblems  the  early  coins,  only  differ- 
ing from  them  in  being  artistically  inferior.  The  ordi- 
nary legends  upon  the  coins  are  in  no  respect  remark- 
able ; 3  but  occasionally  we  find  the  monarch  taking 


1  Zeitschrift  d.  deutsckes  more/ en- 
land.  Gesellschafti  vol.  viii.  pp.  46-7. 

2  M.  Longperier  agrees  with 
Mordtmann  on  this  point.  (See 
his  Medailles  des  Sassanides,  p.  42.) 


3  They  are  commonly  either 
*  Mazdisn  bag  Shapuhri  malkan 
malkaS  or  '  Mazdisn  hag  Shapuhri 
malkan  malka  Airan  ve  Aniran.' 


Ch.  XL  I 


COINS  OF  SAPOR  IL 


253 


the  new  and  expressive  epithet  of  Toham,  1  the 
Strong.71 


COINS  OF  SAPOR  II. 


1  Mordtmann  in  the  Zeitschrift, 
vol.  viii.  p.  47.  Toham  is  the 
Sassanian  equivalent  of  the  Zend 


takhma,  *  strong/  which  is  found 
also  in  Achaemenian  Persian. 


254 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


ICh.  XIL 


CHAPTER  XIL 

Short  Reigns  of  Artaxerxes  II.  and  Sapor  III.  Obscurity  of  their  His- 
tory. Their  Relations  with  Armenia.  Monument  of  Sapor  III.  at 
Taklit-i-Bostan.  Coins  of  Artaxerxes  II.  and  Sapor  III.  Reign  of 
Varahran  IV.    His  Signets.    His  dealings  with  Armenia.   His  Death. 

'ApTa&p  h?]  6'  ■  2a/?wp,  vibg  'ApTa^p,  irrj  i  •  Ovapapavrjg  hi]  id. 

Syncellus,  Chronographia,  p.  360,  C. 

The  glorious  reign  of  Sapor  II.,  which  carried  the  New 
Persian  Empire  to  the  highest  point  whereto  it  had 
yet  attained,  is  followed  by  a  time  which  offers  to  that 
remarkable  reign  a  most  complete  contrast.  Sapor 
had  occupied  the  Persian  throne  for  a  space  ap- 
proaching nearly  to  three-quarters  of  a  century  ;  the 
reigns  of  his  next  three  successors  amounted  to  no 
more  than  twenty  years  in  the  aggregate.1  Sapor  had 
been  engaged  in  perpetual  wars,  had  spread  the  terror 
of  the  Persian  arms  on  all  sides,  and  ruled  more  glori- 
ously than  any  of  his  predecessors.  The  kings  who 
followed  him  were  pacific  and  unenterprising  ;  they 
were  almost  unknown  to  their  neighbours,2  and  are 
anions:  the  least  distin  crushed  of  the  Sassanian  monarchs. 
More  especially  does  this  character  attach  to  the  two 


1  See  the  passage  of  Syncellns 
at  the  head  of  the  chapter.  Aga- 
thias  agrees  (iv.  26),  as  do  Tabari 
{Chronique,  vol.  ii.  pp.  102-3), 
Macoudi  (Prairies  J)' Or,  vol.  ii.  pp. 
189-190)  and  the  Motljmel-al- 
Tewarikh.  (See  the  Journal  Asia- 
tique  for  1841,  p.  513.) 


2  Faustus  does  not  mention  any 
Persian  king  by  name  after  Sapor  II. 
The  Roman  writers  do  not  seem 
even  to  know  the  name  of  the 
prince  who  sent  the  embassy  of 
a.d.  384.  (See  Oros.  vii.  34; 
Pacat.  Paneq.  xxii.  §  4;  Socrat. 
//.  E.  v.  12;  &c) 


Ch.  XII.  ] 


REIGN  OF  ARTAXERXES  II. 


255 


immediate  successors  of  Sapor  II. ,  viz.  Artaxerxes  II. 
and  Sapor  III.  They  reigned  respectively  four  and  five 
years ; 1  and  their  annals  during  this  period  are  almost 
a  blank.  Artaxerxes  II.,  who  is  called  by  some  the 
brother  of  Sapor  II.,  was  more  probably  his  son.2  He 
succeeded  his  father  in  a.d.  379,  and  died  at  Ctesiphon 3 
in  a.d.  383.  He  left  a  character  for  kindness  and 
amiability  behind  him,  and  is  known  to  the  Persians 
as  Nikoukarf  or  1  the  Beneficent,'  and  to  the  Arabs  as 
Al  Djemil?  'the  Virtuous.'  According  to  the  lModj- 
mel-al-Tewarikh,'  he  took  no  taxes  from  his  subjects 
during  the  four  years  of  his  reign,  and  thereby  secured 
to  himself  their  affection  and  gratitude.  He  seems  to 
have  received  overtures  from  the  Armenians  soon  after 
his  accession, 6and  for  a  time  to  have  been  acknowledged 
by  the  turbulent  mountaineers  as  their  sovereign.  After 
the  murder  of  Bab,  or  Para,  the  Romans  had  set  up,  as 
king  over  Armenia,  a  certain  Varaztad  (Pharasdates),  a 
member  of  the  Arsacid  family,  but  no  near  relation  of 


1  All  the  authorities  assign  four 
years  to  Artaxerxes  II.,  except  the 
Modjmel-al-Tewarikh,  which  gives 
*  four  or  live,  or  twelve '  {Journ. 
Asiat.  for  1S41,  p.  513).  Some  of 
the  Armenian  writers  give  Sapor 
III.  no  more  than  two  years  (Pat- 
kanian  in  the  Journ.  Asiat.  for 
I860,  p.  157). 

2  Artaxerxes  is  made  to  be  Sapor's 
brother  by  Agathias  (iv.  26),  Mir- 
khond  (Hist,  des  Sassanidcs,  p.  318), 
Tabari  (Chronique,  ii.  p.  102),  Ma- 
coudi  {Prairies  cTOr,  ii.  p.  189),  and 
the  Modjmel-al-Tewarikh  (p.  513). 
The  Armenian  writers  alone  make 
him  Sapor  s  son.  (See  Mos.  Chor. 
iii.  51,  and  compare  Patkanian  in 
Journ.  As.  for  1866,  p.  155.)  The 
history  of  the  mode  in  which 
Sapor  II.  became  king  (supra,  p. 
143),  and  the  great  length  of  his 
reign,  make  it  very  improbable  that 


he  was  succeeded  by  a  brother.  Add 
to  this  that  the  coins  of  Artaxerxes 
II.  bear  the  head  of  a  youngish  man. 

3  Modjmel-al-Tewarikh,  l.s.c. 

4  Ibid. 

5  Mirkhond,  Hist,  des  Sassanides, 
p.  317,  note.  Malcolm  has,  by  mis- 
take, transferred  these  qualities  to 
his  successor  (Hist,  of  Persia,  vol. 
i.  p.  112). 

b  The  Armenian  synchronisms 
are  exceedingly  doubtful;  but,  on 
the  whole,  it  seems  to  me  that  the 
expulsion  of  Varaztad  by  Manuel 
must  have  happened  about  five  years 
after  the  death  of  Para.  If  that 
event  occurred,  as  Ammianus 
(xxx.  1)  places  it,  in  a.d.  374, 
the  revolution  effected  by  Manuel 
(Faustus,  v.  37)  must  belong  to  the 
year  a.d.  379,  which  is  the  year  of 
Artaxerxes'  accession,  probably. 


256 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Cii.  XII. 


the  recent  monarchs,  assigning  at  the  same  time  the 
real  direction  of  affairs  to  an  Armenian  noble  named 
Moushegh,  who  belonged  to  the  illustrious  family  of  the 
Mamigonians.1  Moushegh  ruled  Armenia  with  vigour, 
but  was  suspected  of  maintaining  over-friendly  relations 
with  the  Roman  emperor,  Valens,  and  of  designing  to 
undermine  and  supplant  his  master.  Varaztad,  after  a 
while,  having  been  worked  on  by  his  counsellors,  grew 
suspicious  of  him,  and  caused  him  to  be  executed  at  a 
banquet.2  This  treachery  roused  the  indignation  of 
Moushegh's  brother  Manuel,  who  raised  a  rebellion 
against  Varaztad,  defeated  him  in  open  fight,  and  drove 
him  from  his  kingdom.3  Manuel  then  brought  forward 
the  princess  Zermanducht,  widow  of  the  late  king  Para, 
together  with  her  two  young  sons,  Arsaces  and  Valar- 
saces,  and,  surrounding  all  three  with  royal  pomp,  gave 
to  the  two  princes  the  name  of  king,  while  he  took  care 
to  retain  in  his  own  hands  the  real  government  of 
the  country.  Under  these  circumstances  he  naturally 
dreaded  the  hostility  of  the  Roman  emperor,  who  was 
not  likely  to  see  with  patience  a  monarch,  whom  he 
had  set  upon  the  throne,  deprived  of  his  kingdom  by 
a  subject.  To  maintain  the  position  which  he  had 
assumed,  it  was  necessary  that  he  should  contract  some 
important  alliance ;  and  the  alliance  always  open  to 
Armenia  when  she  had  quarrelled  with  Rome  was 
with  the  Persians.  It  seems  to  have  been  soon  after 
Artaxerxes  II.  succeeded  his  father,  that  Manuel  sent 
an  embassy  to  him,  with  letters  and  rich  gifts,  offering, 
in  return  for  his  protection,  to  acknowledge  him  as 
lord-paramount  of  Armenia,  and  promising  him  un- 


1  Faustus,  v.  34.  2  Ibid.  c.  35.  3  Ibid.  c.  37. 


Ch.  XII. I         FRESH  TROUBLES  IN  ARMENIA.  257 


shakable  fidelity.1  The  offer  was,  of  course,  received 
with  extreme  satisfaction ;  and  terms  were  speedily 
arranged.  Armenia  was  to  pay  a  fixed  tribute,  to  re- 
ceive a  garrison  of  ten  thousand  Persians  and  to  pro- 
vide adequately  for  their  support,  to  allow  a  Persian 
satrap  to  divide  with  Manuel  the  actual  government  of 
the  country,  and  to  furnish  him  with  all  that  was 
necessary  for  his  court  and  table.  On  the  other  hand, 
Arsaces  and  Valarsaces,  together  (apparently)  with 
their  mother,  Zermanducht,  were  to  be  allowed  the 
royal  title  and  honours ;  Armenia  was  to  be  protected  in 
case  of  invasion  ;  and  Manuel  was  to  be  maintained  in 
his  office  of  Sparapet  or  generalissimo  of  the  Armenian 
forces.2  We  cannot  say  with  certainty  how  long  this 
arrangement  remained  undisturbed  ;  most  probably, 
however,  it  did  not  continue  in  force  more  than  a 
few  years.3  It  was  most  likely  while  Artaxerxes  still 
ruled  Persia,  that  the  rupture  described  by  Faustus 
occurred.4  A  certain  Meroujan,  an  Armenian  noble, 
jealous  of  the  power  and  prosperity  of  Manuel,  per- 
suaded him  that  the  Persian  commandant  in  Armenia 
was  about  to  seize  his  person,  and  either  to  send  him  a 
prisoner  to  Artaxerxes,  or  else  to  put  him  to  death. 
Manuel,  who  was  so  credulous  as  to  believe  the  infor- 
mation, thought  it  necessary  for  his  own  safety  to  an- 
ticipate the  designs  of  his  enemies,  and,  falling  upon  the 
ten  thousand  Persians  with  the  whole  of  the  Armenian 


1  Faustus,  c.  38. 

2  Ibid,  l.s.c. 

8  The  death  of  Para  (a.d.  374) 
and  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty 
with  Rome  (a.d.  384)  are  two 
fixed  dates  known  positively  from 
the  Roman  writers.  Into  the  ten 
years  between  these  events  must 
fall  the  entire  reign  of  Varaztad 
(four  years  according  to  Moses  of 


Chorene,  iii.  40),  the  revolt  of 
Manuel,  the  joint  reign  of  Arsaces 
and  Valarsacesfone  year,  Mos.  Chor. 
iii.  41),  and  the  sole  reign  of  Arsaces 
from  his  brother's  death  to  the 
partition  of  Armenia  (five  years, 
Mos.  Chor.  iii.  46). 

4  I.e.  between  a.d.  379  and  a.d. 
383. 


258  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [Ch.  XII. 


army,  succeeded  in  putting  them  all  to  the  sword,  except 
their  commander,  whom  he  allowed  to  escape.1  War 
followed  between  Persia  and  Armenia  with  varied  suc- 
cess, but  on  the  whole  Manuel  had  the  advantage ;  he 
repulsed  several  Persian  invasions,  and  maintained  the 
independence  and  integrity  of  Armenia  till  his  death, 
without  calling  in  the  aid  of  Rome.2  When,  however, 
Manuel  died,  about  a.d.  383,  Armenian  affairs  fell  into 
confusion;  the  Romans  were  summoned  to  give  help 
to  one  party,  the  Persians  to  render  assistance  to  the 
other ; 3  Armenia  became  once  more  the  battle-ground 
between  the  two  great  powers,  and  it  seemed  as  if  the 
old  contest,  fraught  with  so  many  calamities,  was  to  be 
at  once  renewed.  But  the  circumstances  of  the  time 
were  such  that  neither  Rome  nor  Persia  now  desired  to 
reopen  the  contest.  Persia  was  in  the  hands  of  weak 
and  unwarlike  sovereigns,  and  was  perhaps  already 
threatened  by  Scythic  hordes  upon  the  east.4  Rome 
was  in  the  agonies  of  a  struggle  with  the  ever-increas- 
ing power  of  the  Goths ;  and  though,  in  the  course  of 
the  years  a.d.  379-382,  the  Great  Theodosius  had  estab- 
lished peace  in  the  tract  under  his  rule,  and  delivered 
the  central  provinces  of  Macedonia  and  Thrace  from  the 
intolerable  ravages  of  the  barbaric  invaders,5  yet  the 
deliverance  had  been  effected  at  the  cost  of  introducing 
large  bodies  of  Goths  into  the  heart  of  the  empire,6 
while  still  along  the  northern  frontier  lay  a  threatening 
cloud,  from  which  devastation  and  ruin  might  at  any 


1  Faustus,  v.  38. 

2  Ibid.  v.  39-43. 

3  Ibid.  vi.  1.  Compare  Mos. 
Chor.  iii.  42. 

4  Faustus,  v.  37.  The  *  Kou- 
shans  '  of  this  passage  are  probably 
Scyths  or  Tatars  of  the  Oxianian 


or  Transoxianian  country.  (See 
M.  Vivien  St.  Martin's  essay,  en- 
titled Les  Huns  Blancs  ou  Eph- 
thalites,  pp.  48-52.) 

5  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol. 
iii.  pp.  346-350. 

6  Ibid.  pp.  352-5. 


Ch.  XII.]  ARMENIA  DIVIDED  BY  ROME  AND  PERSIA.  259 

time  burst  forth  and  overspread  the  provinces  upon  the 
Lower  Danube.  Thus  both  the  Roman  emperor  and 
the  Persian  king  were  well  disposed  towards  peace. 
An  arrangement  was  consequently  made,  and  in  a.d. 
384,  five  years  after  he  had  ascended  the  throne,  Theo- 
dosius  gave  audience  in  Constantinople1  to  envoys  from 
the  court  of  Persepolis,  and  concluded  with  them  a 
treaty  whereby  matters  in  Armenia  were  placed  on  a 
footing  which  fairly  satisfied  both  sides,  and  the  tran- 
quillity of  the  East  was  assured.2  The  high  contracting 
powers  agreed  that  Armenia  should  be  partitioned  be- 
tween them.  After  detaching  from  the  kingdom  various 
outlying  districts,  which  could  be  conveniently  absorbed 
into  their  own  territories,  they  divided  the  rest  of  the 
country  into  two  unequal  portions.  The  smaller  of 
these,  which  comprised  the  more  western  districts,  was 
placed  under  the  protection  of  Rome,  and  was  com- 
mitted by  Theodosius  to  the  Arsaces  who  had  been 
made  king  by  Manuel,  the  son  of  the  unfortunate  Bab, 
or  Para,  and  the  grandson  of  the  Arsaces  contemporary 
with  Julian.  The  larger  portion,  which  consisted  of 
the  regions  lying  towards  the  east,  passed  under  the 
suzerainty  of  Persia,  and  was  confided  by  Sapor  III, 
who  had  succeeded  Artaxerxes  II. ,  to  an  Arsacid, 
named  Chosroes,  a  Christian,  who  was  given  the  title 
of  king,  and  received  in  marriage  at  the  same  time  one 
of  Sapor's  sisters.  Such  were  the  terms  on  which  Rome 
and  Persia  brought  their  contention  respecting  Armenia 


1  See  the  Chronicles  of  Matins 
and  Marcellinus,  and  compare 
Chron.  Pasch.  p.  304,  D;  Socrat. 
IL  E.  v.  12:  Oros.  vii.  34;  and 
Pacat.  Paneg.  xxii.  3-5. 

2  The  terms  of  the  treaty  are 
given  with  unusual  accord  by  Moses 
(in.  42)  and  Faustus  (vi.  1).  The 


latter  writer  is  somewhat  the  fuller 
and  more  exact  of  the  two.  Pro- 
copius  {Be  ^Ed  Justinian,  iii.  1)  has 
quite  a  different  account  of  the 
matter;  but,  as  he  writes  a  century 
and  a  half  after  Faustus,  we  can- 
not accept  his  narrative  against 
that  of  the  earlier  writer. 


2G0 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  XII. 


to  a  conclusion.  Friendly  relations  were  in  this  way 
established  between  the  two  crowns,  which  continued 
undisturbed  for  the  long  space  of  thirty-six  years  (a.d. 
384-420).1 

Sapor  III.  appears  to  have  succeeded  his  brother 
Artaxerxes  in  a.d.  383,  the  year  before  the  conclusion 
of  the  treaty.  It  is  uncertain  whether  Artaxerxes 
vacated  the  throne  by  death,  or  was  deposed  in  conse- 
quence of  cruelties  whereof  he  was  guilty  towards  the 
priests  and  nobles.  Tabari  and  Magoudi,  who  relate 
his  deposition,2  are  authors  on  whom  much  reliance 
cannot  be  placed  ;  and  the  cruelties  reported  accord 
but  ill  with  the  epithets  of  '  the  Beneficent '  and  4  the 
Virtuous,'  assigned  to  this  monarch  by  others.3  Per- 
haps it  is  most  probable  that  he  held  the  throne  till  his 
death,  according  to  the  statements  of  Agathias  and 
Eutychius.4  Of  Sapor  III.,  his  brother  and  successor, 
two  facts  only  are  recorded  —  his  conclusion  of  the 
treaty  with  the  Romans  in  B.C.  384,  and  his  war  with  the 
Arabs  of  the  tribe  of  Yad,5  which  must  have  followed 
shortly  afterwards.  It  must  have  been  in  consequence 
of  his  contest  with  the  latter,  whom  he  attacked  in  their 
own  country,  that  he  received  from  his  countrymen  the 
appellation  of  'the  Warlike,'6  an  appellation  better 
deserved  by  either  of  the  other  monarchs  who  had 
borne  the  same  name. 

Sapor  III.  left  behind  him  a  sculptured  memorial, 


1  Orosius,  writing  in  a.d.  417, 
says :  *  Ictum  tunc  foedus  est,  quo 
universns  Oriens  usque  ad  nunc 
tranquillissime  fruitur.'  (l.s.c.) 
The  peace  lasted  only  three  years 
longer.  (See  Clinton,  F.  R.  vol.  i. 
p.  590. ) 


3  See  above,  p.  255. 

4  Agath.  iv.  26,  ad  init.;  Eutych. 
vol.  i.  p.  399:  '  Regnavit  post  ip- 
sum  in  Persas  Alius  ipsius  Ardshir 
Saporis  filius  annos  quatuor  ;  dein 
mortmis  est.' 

5  Macoudi,  vol.  ii.  p.  189. 


2  Tabari,  Chronique,  ii.  p.  102  ;  |  6  Mirkhond,  Histoire  des  Sas- 
Macoudi,  Prairies  d'Or,  ii.  p.  189.    I  sanities,  p.  319. 


Ch.  XII. ]  INSCRIPTIONS  OF  SAPOR  III. 


261 


which  is  still  to  be  seen  in  the  vicinity  of  Kermanshah. 
It  consists  of  two  very  similar  figures,  looking  towards 
each  other,  and  standing  in  an  arched  frame.  On 
either  side  of  the  figures  are  inscriptions  in  the  Old 
Pehlevi  character,  whereby  we  are  enabled  to  identify 
the  individuals  represented  with  the  second  and  the 
third  Sapor.1  The  inscriptions  run  thus :  —  1  Pathkeli 
zan%  mazdisn  shahia  Shahpnhri,  malkan  malka  A  llan 
ve  Anilan,  minuchitli  min  yazdan,  bari  mazdisn  shahia 
Auhrmazdi,  malkan  malka  Allan  ve  Anilan,  minuchitli 
min  yazdan,  napi  shahia  Narshehi  malkan  malka  ;  1 2 
and  4  Pathkeli  mazdisn  shahia  Shahpuhri,  malkan  malka 
Ailan  ve  Anilan,  minuchitli  min  yazdan,  ban  mazdisn 
shahia  Shahpuhri,  malkan  malka  Allan  ve  Anilan, 
minuchitli  min  yazdan,  napi  shahia  Auhrmazdi,  mal- 
kan malka.1  They  are,  it  will  be  seen,  identical  in 
form,  with  the  exception  that  the  names  in  the  right- 
hand  inscription  are  L  Sapor,  Hormisdas,  N  arses,'  while 
those  in  the  left-hand  one  are  '  Sapor,  Sapor,  Hor- 
misdas.' It  has  been  supposed3  that  the  right-hand 
figure  was  erected  by  Sapor  II.,  and  the  other  after- 
wards added  by  Sapor  III. ;  but  the  unity  of  the  whole 


1  De  Sacy  read  Varahran  for 
Shahpuhri  in  the  third  line  of  the 
right-hand  inscription,  and  con- 
cluded that  the  right-hand  figure 
was  that  of  Varahran  IV.  (Memoir e, 
p.  263).  Many  writers  have  copied 
this  mistake.  (Malcolm,  Hist,  of 
Persia,  vol.  i.  p.  258;  Clinton,  F.  li. 
vol.  ii.  p.  260,  note  12 ;  Patkanian 
in  the  Journal  Asiatique  for  1S66, 
p.  159,  note  K) 

2  See  Thomas  in  the  Journal  of 
the  li.  Asiatic  Society,  New  Series, 
vol.  iii.  p.  343.  The  meaning  is  — 
*  This  is  the  image  of  the  Ormazd- 
worshipping  kingly  Sapor,  king  of 
the  kings  of  Iran  and  Turan, 
heaven-descended  of  the  race  of  the 


gods,  son  of  the  Ormazd-worship- 
ping  kingly  Hormisdas,  king  of  the 
kings  of  Iran  and  Turan,  heaven- 
descended  of  the  race  of  the  gods, 
grandson  of  the  kingly  Narses,  king 
of  kings.'  The  other  inscription  is 
identical  except  in  the  names,  and 
the  omission  of  the  second  word. 
zani,  4  this.' 

3  So  Thomas  in  the  number  of 
the  Journal  of  the  E.  Asiatic  Society, 
quoted  above  (p.  346).  Ker  Porter 
ascribed  the  erection  of  the  monu- 
ment to  Varahran  IV.  (Travels. 
vol.  ii.  p.  190).  But  the  only  basis 
of  this  is  the  local  tradition,  a  very 
insecure  foundation. 


262 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  XII. 


sculpture,  and  its  inclusion  under  a  single  arch,  seem 
to  indicate  that  it  was  set  up  by  a  single  sovereign,  and 
was  the  fruit  of  a  single  conception.  If  this  be  so,  we 
must  necessarily  ascribe  it  to  the  later  of  the  two  mon- 
archs  commemorated,  i.e.  to  Sapor  III.,  who  must  be 
supposed  to  have  possessed  more  than  usual  filial  piety, 
since  the  commemoration  of  their  predecessors  upon 
the  throne  is  very  rare  among  the  Sassanians. 

The  taste  of  the  monument  is  questionable.  An 
elaborate  finish  of  all  the  details  of  the  costume  com- 
pensates but  ill  for  a  clumsiness  of  contour  and  a  want 
of  contrast  and  variety,  which  indicate  a  low  condition 
of  art,  and  compare  unfavourably  with  the  earlier  per- 
formances of  the  Neo-Persian  sculptors.  It  may  be 
doubted  whether,  among  all  the  reliefs  of  the  Sassa- 
nians, there  is  one  which  is  so  entirely  devoid  of  artistic 
merit  as  this  coarse  and  dull  production. 

The  coins  of  Sapor  III.  and  his  predecessor,  Arta- 
xerxes  II.,  have  little  about  them  that  is  remarkable. 
Those  of  Artaxerxes  bear  a  head  which  is  surmounted 
with  the  usual  inflated  ball,  and  has  the  diadem,  but  is 
without  a  crown  —  a  deficiency  in  which  some  see  an 
indication  that  the  prince  thus  represented  was  regent 
rather  than  monarch  of  Persia.1    The  legends  upon  the 

coins  are,  however,  in  the  usual  style 
of  royal  epigraphs,  running  com- 
monly 2  —  L  Mazdisn  bag  Artahshetri 
malkan  malka  Airan  ve  AniranJ 
or  '  the  Ormazd-worshipping  divine 
Artaxerxes,  king  of  the  kings  of  Iran 
-:siIand  Turan.'  They  are  easily  dis- 
tinguishable   from    those  of  Arta- 


COIN  OF  AKTAXEKXE 


1  Mordtmann  in  the  Zeitschrift,  vol.  viii.  p.  51.    2  Ibid.  pp.  51-2. 


Ch.  XII.  1    COINS  OF  ARTAXERXES  II.  AND  SAPOR  III.  263 


xerxes  I.,  both  by  the  profile,  which  is  far  less  marked, 
and  by  the  fire-altar  on  the  reverse,  which  has  always 
two  supporters,  looking  towards  the  altar.  The  coins 
of  Sapor  III.  present  some  unusual  types.  On  some 
of  them  the  king  has  his  hair  bound  with  a  simple  dia- 
dem, without  crown  or  cap  of  any  kind.1  On  others 
he  wears  a  cap  of  a  very  peculiar 
character,  which  has  been  compared 
to  a  biretta,2  but  is  really  altogether 
sui  generis.  The  cap  is  surmounted 
by  the  ordinary  inflated  ball,  is  orna- 
mented with  jewels,  and  is  bound 
round  at  bottom  with  the  usual  dia- 
dem.3 The  legend  upon  the  obverse 
of  Sapor's  coins  is  of  the  customary 
character ;  but  the  reverse  bears 
usually,  besides  the  name  of  the  king, 
the  word  atm\  which  has  been  sup- 
posed to  stand  for  Aturia  or  Assyria ; 4  this  explana- 
tion, however,  is  very  doubtful.5 

The  coins  of  both  kings  exhibit  marks  of  decline, 
especially  on  the  reverse,  where  the  drawing  of  the 
figures  that  support  the  altar  is  very  inferior  to  that 
which  we  observe  on  the  coins  of  the  kings  fropi 
Sapor  I.  to  Sapor  II.  The  characters  on  both  obverse 
and  reverse  are  also  carelessly  rendered,  and  can  only 
with  much  difficulty  be  deciphered. 


COINS  OF   SAPOR  III. 


1  Longperier,  Medailles  ties  Sas- 
sanides,  pi.  7,  fig.  4. 

2  Mordtmann,  ZeitscJirift,  vol. 
viii.  p.  52. 

a  Longperier,  pi.  7,  fig.  5;  Mordt- 
mann, pp.  52-7. 

4  Mordtmann,  p.  53.  The  old 
Persian  name  for  Assyria  was 
Athura,  whence  probably  the 
Aturia  {'Arovpta)  of  the  Greeks 
(Strab.  xvi.  1,  §  2  ;  Steph.  Byz. 
ad  voc.  N/7'oc,-  &q. ). 


5  The  term  atur,  or  aturi,  is  found 
occasionally  in  combination  with 
decided  mint-marks,  denoting 
places,  as  Baba,  'The  Porte,'  i.e. 
Ctesiphon  (Mordtmann  in  the 
Zeitschrift  Nos.  108  and  134)  ; 
Kir,  for  Kirman  (ibid.  No.  114)  ; 
and  As,  which  is  probably  for 
Aspadan  or  Ispahan  (Nos.  101,  110, 
and  144).  And  these  places  are 
not  in  Assyria. 


264 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  xir. 


Sapor  III.  died  a.d.  388,  after  reigning  a  little  more 
than  five  years.1  He  was  a  man  of  simple  tastes,2  and 
is  said  to  have  been  fond  of  exchanging  the  magnifi- 
cence and  dreary  etiquette  of  the  court  for  the  free- 
dom and  ease  of  a  life  under  tents.  On  an  occasion 
when  he  was  thus  enjoying  himself,  it  happened  that 
one  of  those  violent  hurricanes,  to  which  Persia  is  sub- 
ject, arose,  and,  falling  in  full  force  on  the  royal  en- 
campment, blew  down  the  tent  wherein  he  was  sitting. 
It  happened  unfortunately  that  the  main  tent-pole  struck 
him,  as  it  fell,  in  a  vital  part,  and  Sapor  died  from  the 
blow.3  Such  at  least  was  the  account  given  by  those 
who  had  accompanied  him,  and  generally  believed  by 
his  subjects.  There  were  not,  however,  wanting  per- 
sons to  whisper  that  the  story  was  untrue  —  that  the 
real  cause  of  the  catastrophe  which  had  overtaken  the 
unhappy  monarch  was  a  conspiracy  of  his  nobles,  or 
his  guards,  who  had  overthrown  his  tent  purposely, 
and  murdered  him  ere  he  could  escape  from  them. 

The  successor  of  Sapor  III.  was  Varahran  IV.,  whom 
some  authorities  call  his  brother  and  others  his  son.4 
This  prince  is  known  to  the  oriental  writers  as  '  Varah- 
ran Kerman-shah,'  or  4  Varahran,  king  of  Carmania.1 
Agathias  tells  us5  that  during  the  lifetime  of  his 
father  he  was  established  as  governor  over  Kerman 


1  Five  years,  according  to  Aga- 
thias (iv.  26)  and  Mirldiond  (p. 
319);  four  years  and  Jive  months, 
according  to  Eutycliius  (vol.  i. 
p.  472),  Tabari  (vol.  ii.  p.  102), 
and  Macoudi  (vol.  ii.  p.  189). 

2  Mirkhond  (p.  820):  '  Schapour 
etait  un  roi  d'une  simplicite  ex- 
treme.' 

3  So  Macoudi  (l.s.c. ).  Tabari 
assigns  his  death  to  a  revolt  of  his 
troops;  Mirkhond  to  accident,  or 


to  a  conspiracy  among  his  chief 
officers  (p.  319). 

4  Varahran  is  made  the  son  of 
Sapor  III.  by  Agathias  (l.s.c),  the 
son  of  Sapor  II.  and  brother  of 
Sapor  III.  by  Tabari  and  Mirkhond. 
Eutycliius  and  Macoudi  leave  the 
point  doubtful.  Patkanian  {Journal 
Asiatiqae  for  I860,  p.  158),  follow- 
ing Armenian  authorities,  mentions 
both  views,  but  inclines  to  believe 
him  Sapor  III.'s  brother. 

5  Agathias,   iv.    26;   p.    136,  C. 


Ch.  XII.  ] 


SEALS  OF  VARAHRAN  IV. 


265 


or  Carmania,  and  thus  obtained  the  appellation  which 
pertinaciously  adhered  to  him.  A  curious  relic  of 
antiquity,  fortunately  preserved  to  modern  times  amid 
so  much  that  has  been  lost,  confirms  this  statement. 
It  is  the  seal  of  Varahran  before  he  ascended  the 
Persian  throne,  and  contains,  besides  his  portrait. 


portrait  of  varahran  iv.  (from  a  seal). 


beautifully  cut,  an  inscription,  which  is  read  as  fol- 
lows : 1  —  '  Varahran  Kermaii  malka,  bari  mazdisn  bag 
Shahpiihri  malkan  malka  Air  an  ve 
Aniran,  minuchitri  mm  yazdanj  or 
L  Varahran,  king  of  Kerman,  son 
of  the  Ormazd-worshipping  divine 
Sapor,  king  of  the  kings  of  Iran 
and  Turan,  heaven-descended  of 
the  race  of  the  gods.7  Another  seal, 
belonging  to  him  probably  after 
he  had  become  monarch  of  Per- 
contains    his  full-length 


sia 


por 


LATER  SEAL 
OF  VARAHRAN  IV. 


Compare  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  103; 
Mirkhond,  p.  320;  and  the  Modj- 
mel-al-Tewarikh  (Journ.  As.  1841, 
p.  513).  Varahran,  we  are  told, 
gave  his  name  of  Kerman-shah  to 
a  town  which  he  built  in  Media, 


and  which  still  bears  the  appellation 
(Malcolm,  Hist  of  Persia,  vol.  i. 
p.  113;  Ker  Porter,  Travels,  vol.  ii. 
p.  190). 

1  Thomas  in  Journal  of  B.  As. 
Society,  New  Series,  vol.  hi.  p.  350. 


266 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  XII. 


trait,1  and  exhibits  him  as  trampling  under  foot  a  pros- 
trate figure,  supposed  to  represent  a  Roman,2  by  which 
it  would  appear  that  he  claimed  to  have  gained  vic- 
tories or  advantages  over  Rome.  It  is  not  altogether 
easy  to  understand  how  this  could  have  been.  Not 
only  do  the  Roman  writers  mention  no  war  between 
the  Romans  and  Persians  at  this  time,  but  they  ex- 
pressly declare  that  the  East  remained  in  profound  re- 
pose during  the  entire  reign  of  Varahran,  and  that 
Rome  and  Persia  continued  to  be  friends.3  The  diffi- 
culty may,  however,  be  perhaps  explained  by  a  con- 
sideration of  the  condition  of  affairs  in  Armenia  at  this 
time ;  for  in  Armenia  Rome  and  Persia  had  still  con- 
flicting interests,  and,  without  having  recourse  to  arms, 
triumphs  might  be  obtained  in  this  quarter  by  the  one 
over  the  other. 

On  the  division  of  Armenia  between  Arsaces  and 
Chosroes,  a  really  good  understanding  had  been  estab- 
lished, which  had  lasted  for  about  six  years.  Arsaces 
had  died  two  years  after  he  became  a  Roman  feuda- 
tory ; 4  and,  at  his  death,  Rome  had  absorbed  his  terri- 
tories into  her  empire,  and  placed  the  new  province 
under  the  government  of  a  count.5  No  objection  to 
the  arrangement  had  been  made  by  Persia,  and  the 


1  This  seal  is  without  inscription, 
but  is  identified  by  the  headdress, 
which  is  the  same  as  that  upon 
Varahran' s  coins. 


COIN  OF  VARAHRAN  IV. 


2  Thomas  in  R.  As.  Soc.  J.  p. 
352. 

3  Oros.  vii.  34.  Compare  Mos. 
Choren.  Hist.  Arm.  iii.  51:  'Pax 
fuit  inter  Veramum  (qui  Cermanus 
appellatus  est)  et  Arcadium.' 

4  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  46. 

5  Ibid. ;  and  compare  Procop.  I)e 
A<Jd.  Justinian,  iii.  1;  p.  53,  B:  To 
"kontbv  6  'PcjfMiluv  paoCkevg  upxovra 
roic    'Ap/iev'ioig    act    KaOlcrrj,  ovnva 

TTOTE  Kdl   OnrjVLKa    UV    aVTG)  (30V?iOfiEV(j) 

eh/  '  k  6  iir}  to.  re  ttjc,  '  Ap/xevia^  eKakovv 
kclI  uq  c(te  tov  upxovra  tovtov. 


Ch.  XIL]  his  peaceful  TRIUMPH  OYER  ROME.  267 

whole  of  Armenia  had  remained  for  four  years  tranquil 
and  without  disturbance.  But,  about  a.d.  390,  Chos- 
roes became  dissatisfied  with  his  position,  and  entered 
into  relations  with  Rome  which  greatly  displeased  the 
Armenian  monarch.1  Chosroes  obtained  from  Theo- 
dosius  his  own  appointment  to  the  Armenian  countship, 
and  thus  succeeded  in  uniting  both  Roman  and  Persian 
Armenia  under  his  government.  Elated  with  this  suc- 
cess, he  proceeded  further  to  venture  on  administrative 
acts  which  trenched,  according  to  Persian  views,  on 
the  rights  of  the  lord  paramount.2  Finally,  when  Va- 
rahran  addressed  to  him  a  remonstrance,  he  replied  in 
insulting  terms,  and,  renouncing  his  authority,  placed 
the  whole  Armenian  kingdom  under  the  suzerainty  and 
protection  of  Rome.3  War  between  the  two  great 
powers  must  now  have  seemed  imminent,  and  could 
indeed  only  have  been  avoided  by  great  moderation 
and  self-restraint  on  the  one  side  or  the  other.  Under 
these  circumstances  it  was  Rome  that  drew  back. 
Theodosius  declined  to  receive  the  submission  which 
Chosroes  tendered,  and  refused  to  lift  a  finger  in  his 
defence.  The  unfortunate  prince  was  forced  to  give 
himself  up  to  Varahran,  who  consigned  him  to  the 
Castle  of  Oblivion,  and  placed  his  brother,  Varahran- 
Sapor,  upon  the  Armenian  throne.4  These  events  seem 
to  have  fallen  into  the  year  a.d.  391,  the  third  year  of 
Varahran,5  who  may  well  have  felt  proud  of  them,  and 


1  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  49.  This  writer 
calls  the  Roman  emperor  of  the 
time  Arcadius,  and  the  Persian 
monarch  Sapor;  but,  if  he  is  right 
in  assigning  to  Chosroes  a  reign  of 
five  years  only  (iii.  50),  they  must 
have  been,  as  represented  in  the 
text,  Theodosius  the  Great  and 
Varahran  IV. 


2  The  Armenian  patriarch,  As- 
pnraces  (Asbonrag)  having  died, 
Chosroes  appointed  his  successor 
without  consulting  Varahran. 

3  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  50. 

4  Ibid. 

5  If  the  6  five  years  '  of  Chosroes 
are  counted  from  the  division  of 
Armenia,  a.d.  884,  his  revolt  and 


268 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  XIL 


have  thought  that  they  formed  a  triumph  over  Rome 
which  deserved  to  be  commemorated. 

The  character  of  Varahran  IV.  is  represented  va- 
riously by  the  native  authorities.  According  to  some 
of  them,  his  temper  was  mild,  and  his  conduct  irre- 
proachable.1 Others  say  that  he  was  a  hard  man,  and 
so  neglected  the  duties  of  his  station  that  he  would  not 
even  read  the  petitions  or  complaints  which  were  ad- 
dressed to  him.2  It  would  seem  that  there  must  have 
been  some  ground  for  these  latter  representations, 
since  it  is  generally  agreed 3  that  the  cause  of  his  death 
was  a  revolt  of  his  troops,  who  surrounded  him  and 
shot  at  him  with  arrows.  One  shaft,  better  directed 
than  the  rest,  struck  him  in  a  vital  part,  and  he  fell 
and  instantly  expired.  Thus  perished,  in  a.d.  399,  the 
third  son  of  the  Great  Sapor,  after  a  reign  of  eleven 
years. 


deposition  would  fall  into  the  year 
a.d.  389,  the  year  after  the  acces- 
sion of  Varahran.  But  it  is  more 
probable  that  they  date  from  the 
commencement  of  his  sole  reign, 
which  was  two  years  later,  a.d.  386. 
1  Mirkhond,  Hist,  des  Sassanides, 


p.  320. 

2  Modjmel-al-Tewarikh,  as  trans- 
lated by  M.  Mohl  in  the  Journal 
Asiatique  for  1841,  p.  513. 

3  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  103;  Mir- 
khond,  l.s.c. ;  Malcolm,  Hist  of 
Persia,  vol.  i.  p.  113. 


Ch.  XIII.] 


ACCESSION  OF  ISDIGERD  1. 


269 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

Accession  of  Isdigerd  I.  Peaceful  Character  of  his  Reign.  His  Alleged 
Guardianship  of  Theodosius  II.  His  Leaning  towards  Christianity,  and 
consequent  Unpopularity  with  his  Subjects.  His  Change  of  View  and 
Persecution  of  the  Christians.  His  Relations  with  Armenia.  His 
Coins.    His  Personal  Character.    His  Death. 

'Eni  tovtolc  'lodiyepdrjc  .  .  .  tt/v  UepaiKTjv  rjyeuoviav  irapa?iau(3uv£t}  6  nohve 
napa  'Pofiaioig  ml  Tzepifai/irjToc.  — Agathias,  iv.  26;  p.  136,  C. 

Varahran  IV.  was  succeeded  (a.d.  399)  by  his  son, 
Izdikerti,1  or  Isdigerd  I.,2  whom  the  soldiers,  though 
they  had  murdered  his  father,3  permitted  to  ascend  the 
throne  without  difficulty.  He  is  said,  at  his  accession, 
to  have  borne  a  good  character  for  prudence  and  mod- 
eration,4 a  character  which  he  sought  to  confirm  by 
the  utterance  on  various  occasions  of  high-sounding 
moral  sentiments.5    The  general  tenor  of  his  reign 


1  The  name  upon  his  coins  is 
read  as  'mDTV.  The  Greek  writers 
call  him  '  Isdigerdes,'  the  Arme- 
nian 'Yazgerd.'  Eutychius  (vol.  i. 
p.  548;  vol.  ii.  p.  79)  uses  the  form 
k  Yasdejerd.' 

2  Mordtmann  interpolates  after 
Varahran  IV.  a  monarch  whom  he 
calls  4  Isdigerd  I.'  to  whom  he  as- 
signs a  reign  of  a  year  over  a 
portion  of  Persia  (Zeitschrift,  vol. 
viii.  p.  63).  This  prince  he  makes 
succeeded  by  his  son,  Isdigerd  II., 
who  is  the  4  Isdigerd  I.'  of  all 
other  writers.  I  cannot  find  any 
sufficient  reason  for  this  interpola- 
tion. (The  numismatic  evidence 
does,  perhaps,  show  that  an  Is- 
digerd,   distinct    from   the  three 


known  Persian  monarchs,  once 
reigned  in  Seistan;  but  there  is 
nothing  to  fix  the  time  of  this 
reign.) 

3  That  Varahran  IV.  was  the 
father  of  Isdigerd  is  asserted  by 
Eutychius  (vol.  i.  p.  548),  Tabari 
(ii.  p.  103),  Abu  Obeidah  (quoted 
by  Macoudi,  vol.  ii.  p.  238),  Sepeos 
(p.  20),  and  others.  Lazare  de 
Parbe  makes  him  the  brother  of 
Isdigerd'(p.  33).  Agathias  ,(iv.  26) 
is  ambiguous.  Mirkhond  (p.  321) 
and  Tabari  (l.s.c.)  mention  both 
views. 

4  Mirkhond,  l.s.c;  Tabari,  l.s.c. 

5  Several  of  these  are  given  by 
Mirkhond  (pp.  321-2).  If  authen- 
tic, they  would  be  remarkable  as 


270  THE  SEVENTH  MONAKCHY.  [Ch.  XIII. 


was  peaceful ; 1  and  we  may  conclude  therefore  that  he 
was  of  an  unwarlike  temper,  since  the  circumstances 
of  the  time  were  such  as  would  naturally  have  induced 
a  prince  of  any  military  capacity  to  resume  hostilities 
against  the  Romans.  After  the  arrangement  made 
with  Rome  by  Sapor  III.  in  a.d.  384,  a  terrible  series 
of  calamities  had  befallen  the  empire.2  Invasions  of 
Ostrogoths  and  Franks  signalised  the  years  a.d.  386 
and  388 ;  in  a.d.  387  the  revolt  of  Maximus  seriously 
endangered  the  western  moiety  of  the  Roman  state ; 
in  the  same  year  occurred  an  outburst  of  sedition  at 
Antioch,  which  was  followed  shortly  by  the  more  dan- 
gerous sedition,  and  the  terrible  massacre  of  Thessalon- 
ica ;  Argobastes  and  Eugenius  headed  a  rebellion  in 
a.d.  392  ;  Gildo  the  Moor  detached  Africa  from  the 
empire  in  a.d.  386,  and  maintained  aseparate  dominion 
on  the  southern  shores  of  the  Mediterranean  for  twelve 
years,  from  a.d.  386  to  398;  in  a.d.  395  the  Gothic 
warriors  within  and  without  the  Roman  frontier  took 
arms,  and  under  the  redoubtable  Alaric  threatened  at 
once  the  East  and  the  West,  ravaged  Greece,  captured 
Corinth,  Argos,  and  Sparta,  and  from  the  coasts  of  the 
Adriatic  already  m  arked  for  their  prey  the  smiling  fields 
of  Italy.  The  rulers  of  the  East  and  West,  Arcadius 
and  Honorius,  were  alike  weak  and  unenterprising  ; 
and  further,  they  were  not  even  on  good  terms,  nor 
was  either  likely  to  trouble  himself  very  greatly  about 
attacks  upon  the  territories  of  the  other.  Isdigerd 


indicating  a  consciousness  that 
there  lay  in  his  disposition  the 
germs  of  evil,  which  the  possession 
of  supreme  power  would  be  likely 
to  develope. 

1  ~Eip7jv?i  ucpdovG)  ^pw/zfvof  dtaye- 
yovev  kv  'Pw/uLaioig  rbv  navra  XP°V0V 
(Procop.  Be  Bell.  Pers.  i.  2).  Ovdeva 


TTUTTore  Kara  'Pcofxaitov  rjparo  noTiefiov 
.  .  .  uXku  fie/ievr)KEv  kcael  evvovc  re 
uv  aril  eiprjvcLloq  (Agath.  iv.  26;  p. 
137,  B). 

2  See  Tillemont,  Hist,  des  Em- 
pereurs,  torn.  v.  pp.  104-6,  211-221; 
Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  iii. 
pp.  351-402;  vol.  iv.  pp.  23-31. 


Ch.  XIII. ]  CONDITION  OF  EOME  AT  THIS  PERIOD.  271 

might  have  crossed  the  Euphrates,  and  overrun  or  con- 
quered the  Asiatic  provinces  of  the  Eastern  Empire, 
without  causing  Honorius  a  pang,  or  inducing  him  to 
stir  from  Milan.  It  is  true  that  Western  Rome  possessed 
at  this  time  the  rare  treasure  of  a  capable  general ;  but 
Stilicho  was  looked  upon  with  fear  and  aversion  by  the 
emperor  of  the  East,1  and  was  moreover  fully  occupied 
with  the  defence  of  his  own  master's  territories.  Had 
Isdigerd,  on  ascending  the  throne  in  a.d.  399, unsheath- 
ed the  sword  and  resumed  the  bold  designsof  his  grand- 
father, Sapor  II.,  he  could  scarcely  have  met  with  any 
serious  or  prolonged  resistance.  He  would  have  found 
the  East  governed  practically  by  the  eunuch  Eutropius, 
a  plunderer  and  oppressor,  universally  hated  and 
feared  ;2  he  would  have  had  opposed  to  him  nothing 
but  distracted  counsels  and  disorganised  forces ;  Asia 
Minor  was  in  possession  of  the  Ostrogoths,  who,  under 
the  leadership  of  Tribigild,  were  ravaging  and  destroy- 
ing far  and  wide  ;3  the  armies  of  the  State  were  com- 
manded by  Gainas,  the  Goth,  and  Leo,  the  wool-comber, 
of  whom  the  one  was  incompetent,  and  the  otherunfaith- 
ful;4  there  was  nothing,  apparently,  that  could  have 
prevented  him  from  overrunning  Roman  Armenia, 
Mesopotamia,  and  Syria,  or  even  from  extending  his 
ravages,  or  his  dominion,  to  the  shores  of  the  ^Egean. 
But  the  opportunity  was  either  not  seen,  or  was  not 
regarded  as  having  any  attractions.  Isdigerd  remained 
tranquil  and  at  rest  within  the  walls  of  his  capital. 
Assuming  as  his  special  title  the  characteristic  epithet5 


1  Gibbon,  vol.  iv.  pp.  29,  57,  &c. ; 
Tillemont,  torn.  v.  p.  193. 

2  Gibbon,  vol.  iv.  pp.  140-6. 
The  death  of  Eutropius  occurred 
in  the  same  year  with  the  accession 
of  Isdigerd  (Clinton,  F.  R.  vol.  i. 


pp.  542-6).  It  probably  fell  late 
in  the  year. 

3  Gibbon,  vol.  iv.  pp.  144-6. 

4  Ibid.  p.  145. 

5  See  Mordtniann  in  the  Zeit- 
schrift,   vol.  viii.  pp.  64-7.  The 


272  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [Ch.  XIII. 

of  c  Ramashtras,?  '  the  most  quiet/  or  L  the  most  firm/ 
he  justified  his  assumption  of  it  by  a  complete  absti- 
nence from  all  military  expeditions. 

When  Isdigerd  had  reigned  peaceably  for  the  space 
of  nine  years,  he  is  said  to  have  received  a  compliment 
of  an  unusual  character.  Arcadius,  the  emperor  of  the 
East,  finding  his  end  approaching,  and  anxious  tosecure 
a  protector  for  his  son  Theodosius,  a  boy  of  tender  age, 
instead  of  committing  him  to  the  charge  of  his  uncle 
Honorius,  or  selecting  a  guardian  for  him  from  among 
his  own  subjects,  by  a  formal  testamentary  act,  we  are 
told,1  placed  his  child  under  the  protection  of  the  Per- 
sian monarch.  He  accompanied  the  appointment  by 
a  solemn  appeal  to  the  magnanimity  of  Isdigerd,  whom 
he  exhorted  at  some  length  to  defend  with  all  his 
force,  and  guide  with  his  best  wisdom,  the  young  king 
and  his  kingdom.2  According  to  one  writer,3  he  fur- 
ther appended  to  this  trust  a  valuable  legacy  —  no  less 
than  a  thousand  pounds  weight  of  pure  gold,  which  he 
begged  his  Persian  brother  to  accept  as  a  token  of  his 
goodwill.  When  Arcadius  died,  and  the  testament  was 
opened,  information  of  its  contents  was  sent  to  Isdigerd, 
who  at  once  accepted  the  charge  assigned  to  him,  and 
addressed  a  letter  to  the  Senate  of  Constantinople,4  in 
which  he  declared  his  determination  to  punish  any  at- 
tempt against  his  ward  with  the  extrernest  severity. 
Unable  to  watch  over  his  charge  in  person,  he  selected 
for  his  guide  and  instructor  a  learned  eunuch  of  his 


title  '  Ramashtras  '  is  wholly  new 
when  Isdigerd  takes  it.  Mordt- 
mann  regards  it  as  a  superlative 
form,  equivalent  to  '  Quietissimus.' 

1  Procop.  Be  Bell  Pers.  i.  2; 
Agath.  iv.  26;  p.  136,  C,  D;  Theo- 
phan.  Chronof/raph.  p.  69,  A,  B. 


2  HoTlTlo,  ev  Talc  diadrjuaig  eneoKtye, 
Qeodoolu  tt]v  iSaatXeiav  oOevel  te  ml 
Tvpovola  iraay  ovvdiaocjaaGdcu.  (Pro- 
cop,  l.s.c.) 

:{  Cedrenus,  p.  334,  C. 

4  Theophan.  p.  69  B. 


Ch.  XIII. ] 


WILL  OF  ARCADIUS. 


273 


court,  by  name  Antiochus,  and  sent  him  to  Constanti- 
nople,1 where  for  several  years  he  was  the  young 
prince's  constant  companion.  Even  after  his  death  or 
expulsion,2  which  took  place  in  consequence  of  the 
intrigues  of  Pulcheria,  Theodosius's  elder  sister,  the 
Persian  monarch  continued  faithful  to  his  engage- 
ments. During  the  whole  of  his  reign  he  not  only 
remained  at  peace  with  the  Romans,  but  avoided 
every  act  that  they  could  have  regarded  as  in  the 
least  degree  unfriendly.3 

Such  is  the  narrative  which  has  come  down  to  us  on 
the  authority  of  historians,  the  earliest  of  whom  wrote 
a  century  and  a  half  after  Arcadius's  death.4  Modern 
criticism  has,  in  general,  rejected  the  entire  story,  on 
this  account,  regarding  the  silence  of  the  earlier  writers 
as  outweighing  the  positive  statements  of  thelater.ones.5 
It  should,  however,  be  borne  in  mind,  first,  that  the 
earlier  writers  are  few  in  number,6  and  that  their  his- 
tories are  very  meagre  and  scanty  ;  secondly,  that  the 
fact,  if  fact  it  were,  was  one  not  very  palatable  to 
Christians ;  and  thirdly,  that,  as  the  results,  so  far  as 
Rome  was  concerned,  were  negative,  the  event  might 
not  have  seemed  to  be  one  of  much  importance,  or  that 
required  notice.    The  character  of  Procopius,  with 


1  Theophan.  p.  69,  B.  Compare 
Cedrenus,  p.  335,  A. 

2  The  phrase  used  by  Theophanes 
and  Cedrenus  (ennoduv  yeyovev)  is 
ambiguous.  (See  Theophan.  p.  70, 
D ;  Cedrenus,  p.  336,  C. ) 

3  Agath.  l.s.c. :  Ovdsva  ttuttots 
rolg  'Pufialoic  rjparo  noTispov,  ov- 
6s  aXTio  t  l  icar*  avTcov  axapi 
f Spa g e . 

4  Procopius  wrote  about  a.d.  553; 
Agathias  after  a.d.  578;  Theo- 
phanes after  a.d.  812. 

5  Tillemont,  Hist,  des  Empereurs, 
torn.  vi.  p.  1,  and  note;  Gibbon, 


Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  iv.  p.  159; 
Smith's  Diet,  of  Gk.  and  Rom. 
Biography,  vol.  iii.  p.  1068,  &c. 

6  They  consist  of  Philostorgius 
(b.c.  425),  Socrates  (ab.  a.d.  440), 
Sozomen  (ab.  a.d.  445),  Theodoret 
(ab.  a.d.  450),  and  Prosper  (ab. 
a.d.  460);  all  of  whom  are  eccle- 
siastical writers,  rather  than  writers 
of  civil  history.  Zosimus  is  so 
brief  in  his  notices  of  the  Eastern 
Empire,  that  his  silence  as  to  the 
will  of  Arcadius  cannot  be  regarded 
as  of  much  consequence. 


274 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  XIII. 


whom  the  story  originates,  should  also  be  taken  into 
consideration,  and  the  special  credit  allowed  him  by 
Agathias  for  careful  and  diligent  research.1  It  may  be 
added  that,  one  of  the  main  points  of  the  narrative  — 
the  position  of  Antiochus  at  Constantinople  during  the 
early  years  of  Theodosius  —  is  corroborated  by  the 
testimony  of  a  contemporary,  the  bishop  Synesius,2  who 
speaks  of  a  man  of  this  name,  recently  in  the  service  of 
a  Persian*  as  all-powerful  with  the  Eastern  emperor. 
It  has  been  supposed  by  one  writer4  that  the  whole 
story  grew  out  of  this  fact ;  but  the  basis  scarcely  seems 
to  be  sufficient ;  and  it  is  perhaps  most  probable  that 
Arcadius  did  really  by  his  will  commend  his  son  to  the 
kind  consideration  of  the  Persian  monarch,  and  that 
that  monarch  in  consequence  sent  him  an  adviser, 
though  the  formal  character  of  the  testamentary  act, 
and  the  power  and  position  of  Antiochus  at  the  court 
of  Constantinople,  may  have  been  overstated.  Theo- 
dosius no  doubt  owed  his  quiet  possession  of  the  throne 
rather  to  the  good  disposition  towards  him  of  his  own 
subjects  than  to  the  protection  of  a  foreigner ;  and 
Isdigerd  refrained  from  all  attack  on  the  territories  of 
the  young  prince,  rather  by  reason  of  his  own  pacific 
temper  than  in  consequence  of  the  will  of  Arcadius. 

The  friendly  relations  established,  under  whatever 
circumstances,  between  Isdigerd  and  the  Roman  empire 
of  the  East,  seem  to  have  inclined  the  Persian  monarch, 
during  a  portion  of  his  reign,  to  take  the  Christians  into 
his  favour,  and  even  to  have  induced  him  to  contem- 


1  Agathias    speaks    of    him  as 

<JC  TtTiELOTd    fIE(J,ad7]K6Ta,   KCU    7T  CL  G  a  V  ? 

CdQeiirtiv,  ioropiav  av  aXe^d  fievov. 

2  Synes.  Ep.  110. 

3  The  Persian  to   whose  suite 


Antiochus  had  belonged  is  called 
Narses.  (Synes.  l.s.c.)  This  was 
the  name  of  the  favourite  minister 
of  Isdigerd  (Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  104). 
4  Tillemont,  l.s.c. 


Ch.  XIII. ]  ISDIGERD'S  PERSECUTIONS.  275 


plate  seeking  admission  into  the  Church  by  the  door  of 
baptism.1  Antiochus,  his  representative  at  the  court  of 
Arcadius,  openly  wrote  in  favour  of  the  persecuted  sect  ;2 
and  the  encouragement  received  from  this  high  quar- 
ter rapidly  increased  the  number  of  professing  Chris- 
tians in  the  Persian  territories.3  The  sectaries,  though 
oppressed,  had  long  been  allowed  to  have  their  bishops; 
and  Isdigerd  is  said  to  have  listened  with  approval  to 
the  teaching  of  two  of  them,  Marutha,  bishop  of  Meso- 
potamia, and  Abdaas,  bishop  of  Ctesiphon.4  Convinced 
of  the  truth  of  Christianity,  but  unhappily  an  alien  from 
its  spirit,  he  commenced  a  persecution  of  the  Magians 
and  their  most  powerful  adherents,5  which  caused  him 
to  be  held  in  detestation  by  his  subjects,  and  has  helped 
to  attach  to  his  name  the  epithets  of  c  Al-Khasha,'  1  the 
Harsh,'  and  1  Al-Athim,'  1  the  Wicked.' 6  But  the  per- 
secution did  not  continue  long.  The  excessive  zeal 
of  Abdaas  after  a  while  provoked  a  reaction  ;  and  Isdi- 
gerd, deserting  the  cause  which  he  had  for  a  time 
espoused,  threw  himself  (with  all  the  zeal  of  one  who, 
after  nearly  embracing  truth,  relapses  into  error)  into 
the  arms  of  the  opposite  party.  Abdaas  had  ventured 
to  burn  down  the  great  Fire-Temple  of  Ctesiphon,  and 
had  then  refused  to  rebuild  it. 7  Isdigerd  authorised  the 
Magian  hierarchy  to  retaliate  by  a  general  destruction 
of  the  Christian  churches  throughout  the  Persian  do- 
minions, and  by  the  arrest  and  punishment  of  all  those 


1  Theophan.  p.  71,  A:  Elg  anpov 
dtooefirjQ  yeyovev,  ugte  £{j,£?i?i£  cxedbv 
pairTt&odai.  Compare  Socrat.  H.  E. 
vii.  8. 

2  Theophan.  p.  69,  C;  Cedrenus, 
p.  334,  D. 

3  'Enlarvvdy  h  Uepcidi  6  xp^™- 
vicfiog.    (Theoph.  l.s.c.) 

4  Ibid.  p.  71,  A. 

5  Ibid. :  Tovg  Muyovg  ug  ajrarcti- 


vag  etiola&v.  Compare  Socrat.  Hist. 
Eccl.  vii.  8:  YYepLopyrjg  yevdfizvog  b 
j3aoi?ievg  to  tuv  Muyuv  yivog  unede- 
karuoe. 

G  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  104;  Macoudi, 
vol.  ii.  p.  190;  Mirkhond,  p.  321; 
Malcolm,  Hist,  of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p. 
113. 

7  Theophan.  p.  71,  B;Theodoret, 
v.  39. 


276  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [Ch.  XIII. 


who  acknowledged  themselves  to  believe  the  Gospel.1 
A  fearful  slaughter  of  the  Christians  in  Persia  followed 
during  five  years ; 2  some,  eager  for  the  earthly  glory 
and  the  heavenly  rewards  of  martyrdom,  were  forward 
to  proclaim  themselves  members  of  the  obnoxious  sect ; 
others,  less  courageous  or  less  inclined  to  self-assertion, 
sought  rather  to  conceal  their  creed ;  but  these  latter 
were  carefully  sought  out,  both  in  the  towns  and  in  the 
country  districts,3  and  when  convicted  were  relentlessly 
put  to  death.  Nor  was  mere  death  regarded  as  enough. 
The  victims  were  subjected,  besides,  to  cruel  sufferings 
of  various  kinds,4  and  the  greater  number  of  them 
expired  under  torture.5  Thus  Isdigerd  alternately  op- 
pressed the  two  religious  professions,  to  one  or  other  of 
which  belonged  the  great  mass  of  his  subjects ;  and, 
having  in  this  way  given  both  parties  reason  to  hate 
him,  earned  and  acquired  a  unanimity  of  execration 
which  has  but  seldom  been  the  lot  of  persecuting 
monarchs. 

At  the  same  time  that  Isdigerd  allowed  this  violent 
persecution  of  the  Christians  in  his  own  kingdom  of 
Persia,  he  also  sanctioned  an  attempt  to  extirpate 
Christianity  in  the  dependent  country  of  Armenia. 
V arahran- Sapor,  the  successor  of  Chosroes,  had  ruled 
that  territory  quietly  and  peaceably  for  twenty-one 
years.6  He  died  a.d.  412,  leaving  behind  him  a  single 
son,  Artases,  who  was  at  his  father's  death  aged  no 


1  Cyrill.  Monach.  in  the  Analecta 
Grceca,  p.  20;  Theophan.  l.s.c. ; 
Cedrenus,  p.  330,  C ;  Theodoret,  v. 
38. 

2  Theophan.  l.s.c. 

3  0/  May oi  Kara  irdTteig  koX  X^pac 
eixtfiEAC)^  kdrjOEVov  tovc  lavddvovraq. 
(Theophan.  l.s.c.)  BovTid/uevoL  oi  Muyoi 
naviaq     dqpevoai     rove  XpLoriavovc;. 


(Cyrill.  Monach.  l.s.c.) 

4  These  are  described,  with  much 
detail,  by  Theodoret  {H.  E.  v.  39); 
but  the  modern  reader  will  be  glad 
to  be  spared  all  particulars, 

5  Yl?id otol  ml  hv  avialq  raic  Bos 
gUvolq  dvrjpi Or/nav.  (Theophan.  l.S.C.) 

6  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  55,  ad  init. 


Ch.  XIII. ]   HIS  ATTEMPT  TO  CONVERT  ARMENIA.  277 

more  than  ten  years.1  Under  these  circumstances, 
Isaac,  the  Metropolitan  of  Armenia,  proceeded  to  the 
court  of  Ctesiphon,  and  petitioned  Isdigerd  to  replace 
on  the  Armenian  throne  the  prince  who  had  been 
deposed  twenty-one  years  earlier,  and  who  was  still  a 
prisoner  on  parole  2  in  the  4  Castle  of  Oblivion  '  —  viz. 
Chosroes.  Isdigerd  acceded  to  the  request ;  and 
Chosroes  was  released  from  confinement  and  restored 
to  the  throne  from  which  he  had  been  expelled  by 
Varahran  IV.  in  a.d.  391.  He,  however,  survived  his 
elevation  only  a  year.  Upon  his  decease,  a.d.  413,  Isdi- 
gerd selected  for  the  viceroyship,  not  an  Arsacid,  not 
even  an  Armenian,  but  his  own  son,  Sapor,  whom  he 
forced  upon  the  reluctant  provincials,  compelling  them 
to  acknowledge  him  as  monarch  (a.d.  413-414).  Sapor 
was  instructed  to  ingratiate  himself  with  the  Armenian 
nobles,  by  inviting  them  to  visit  him,  by  feasting  them, 
making  them  presents,  holding  friendly  converse  with 
them,  hunting  with  them  ;  and  was  bidden  to  use  such 
influence  as  he  might  obtain  to  convert  the  chiefs  from 
Christianity  to  Zoroastrianism.  The  young  prince  ap- 
pears to  have  done  his  best ;  but  the  Armenians  were 
obstinate,  resisted  his  blandishments,  and  remained 
Christians  in  spite  of  all  his  efforts.  He  reigned 3  from 
a.d.  414  to  418,  at  the  end  of  which  time,  learning  that 
his  father  had  fallen  into  ill  health,  he  quitted  Armenia 
and  returned  to  the  Persian  court,  in  order  to  press  his 
claims  to  the  succession.  Isdigerd  died  soon  afterwards 4 
(a.d.  419  or  420)  ;  and  Sapor  made  an  attempt  to  seize 
the  throne  ;  but  there  was  another  pretender  whose 

1  Mos.  Choi*,  iii.  55,  ad  inlt.  \  Isdigerd  in  a.d.  420  (F.  R.  vol.  i. 

2  'In  castello  Olivionis  libera  j  p.  590;  vol.  ii.  p.  261);  Mordtmann 
custodia  tenebatur.'  —  Ibid,  l.s.c.  j  in  the  same  year  (Zeitschrift,  vol. 
(Winston's  translation).  'viii.  p.  64);  Thomas  in  a.d.  417 

8  Mos.  Chor,  iii.  56,  ad  init.  \(Num.    Chron.   No.    xlvii.,  New 

4  Clinton   \  'aces   the   death   of  1  Series,  p.  45). 


278 


THE  SEVENTH  MONAKCHY. 


[Ch.  XIII. 


partisans  had  more  strength,  and  the  viceroy  of  Arme- 
nia was  treacherously  assassinated  in  the  palace  of  his 
father.1  Armenia  remained  for  three  years  in  a  state 
of  anarchy  ;  and  it  was  not  till  Varahran  V.  had  been 
for  some  time  established  upon  the  Persian  throne  that 
Artases  was  made  viceroy,  under  the  name  of  Artasiris 
or  Artaxerxes.2 

The  coins  of  Isdigerd  I.  are  not  remarkable  as  works 
of  art ;  but  they  possess  some  features  of  interest.  They 
are  numerous,  and  appear  to  have  been  issued  from 
various  mints,3  but  all  bear  a  head  of  the  same  type. 
It  is  that  of  a  middle-aged  man,  with  a  short  beard 
and  hair  gathered  behind  the  head  in 
a  cluster  of  curls.  The  distinguishing 
mark  is  the  head-dress,  which  has  the 
usual  inflated  ball  above  a  fragment  of 
the  old  mural  crown,  and  further  bears 
a  crescent  in  front.  The  reverse  has 
the  usual  fire-altar  with  supporters, 
and  is  for  the  most  part  very  rudely  executed.4  The 
ordinary  legend  is,  on  the  obverse,  Mazdisn  bag  ra- 
mashtras  Izdikerti,  malkan  malka  Air  an,  or  c  the  Or- 
mazd-worshipping  divine  most  peaceful  Isdigerd,  king 
of  the  kings  of  Iran  ;  '  and  on  the  reverse,  Ramashtras 
Izdikerti,  4  the  most  peaceful  Isdigerd.'  In  some  cases, 
there  is  a  second  name,  associated  with  that  of  the 
.monarch,  on  the  reverse,  a  name  which  reads  either  c  Ar- 
dashatri '  (Artaxerxes)5  or,  4  Varahran.' 6    It  has  been 


COIN  OF  ISDIGERD  I. 


1  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  56. 

2  Ibid.  iii.  58,  ad  fin. 

3  Mordtmann  gives  as  mint- 
marks  of  Isdigerd  I.  (his  Isdigerd 
II.)  Assyria,  Ctesiphon,  Ispahan, 
and  Herat  (Zeitschrift,  vol.  viii.  pp. 
65-7). 

4  See  Longperier,  Medailles  des 


Sassanides,  pi.  vii.,  Nos.  2  and  3 
(wrongly  ascribed  to  Artaxerxes 
II.)  ;  Mordtmann  in  the  Zeitschrift, 
vol.  viii.  pi.  vii.,  No.  17. 

5  Mordtmann,  Zeitschrift,  vol. 
viii.  p.  04,  No.  132;  vol.  x'ii.  p.  11, 
No.  25. 

(i  Ibid.  vol.  viii.  p.  67,  No.  139. 


Ch.  XIII.]  CHARACTER  OF  ISDIGERD  L 


279 


conjectured  that,  where  the  name  of  1  Artaxerxes ' 
occurs,  the  reference  is  to  the  founder  of  the  empire  ; 1 
while  it  is  admitted  that  the  c  Varahran  '  intended  is 
almost  certainly  Isdigerd's  son  and  successor, 2  Varahran 
V.,  the  c  Bahram-Gur '  of  the  modern  Persians.  Perhaps 
a  more  reasonable  account  of  the  matter  would  be  that 
Isdigerd  had  originally  a  son  Artaxerxes,  whom  he 
intended  to  make  his  successor,  but  that  this  son  died 
or  offended  him,  and  that  then  he  gave  his  place  to 
Varahran. 

The  character  of  Isdigerd  is  variously  represented. 
According  to  the  Oriental  writers,  he  had  by  nature  an 
excellent  disposition,  and  at  the  time  of  his  accession 
was  generally  regarded  as  eminently  sage,  prudent,  and 
virtuous ;  but  his  conduct  after  he  became  king  disap- 
pointed all  the  hopes  that  had  been  entertained  of  him. 
He  was  violent,  cruel,  and  pleasure-seeking ;  he  broke 
all  laws  human  and  divine ;  he  plundered  the  rich,  ill- 
used  the  poor,  despised  learning,  left  those  who  did 
him  a  service  unrewarded,  suspected  everybody.3  He 
wandered  continually  about  his  vast  empire,  not  to 
benefit  his  subjects,  but  to  make  them  all  suffer  equally.4 
In  curious  contrast  with  these  accounts  is  the  picture 
drawn  of  him  by  the  Western  authors,  who  celebrate 
his  magnanimity  and  his  virtue,5  his  peaceful  temper, 
his  faithful  guardianship  of  Theodosius,  and  even  his 
exemplary  piety.6    A  modern  writer7  has  suggested 


1  Mordtraann,  Zeitschrift,  vol. 
viii.  p.  65. 

2  Ibid.  p.  67. 

3  Mirkhond,  Histoire  des  Sas- 
sanides,  pp.  321-2;  Tabari,  Chro- 
nique,  vol.  ii.  p.  103. 

4  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  104. 

5  Procop.  Be  Bell.  Pers.  i.  2: 
'lodiyipdrjg,    6    Uepacov   iSaaikevc;  ,  ,  . 


CJV  KOl  TTpOTEpOV   €7TL   TpOTTOV  jLL€ya?iO- 

<p  p  ogv  v  y  6iaS6?]roc  eg  tu  [lakiOTa, 
uperrjv  kirsdet^aio  dovfiarog  re  nal 
"KoyOv  u^lav. 

0  Theophan.  Chronograph,  p.  71, 
A:  '{adiyipAris  .  .  .  elg  anpov  deo- 
a  e  ji  r/  g  yeyovsfi. 

7  Malcolm,  Hist,  of  Persia,  vol.  i. 
pp.  114-5. 


280 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


ICh.  XIII. 


that  he  was  in  fact  a  wise  and  tolerant  prince,  whose 
very  mildness  and  indulgence  offended  the  bigots  of 
his  own  country,  and  caused  them  to  represent  his 
character  in  the  most  odious  light,  and  do  their  utmost 
to  blacken  his  memory.  But  this  can  scarcely  be 
accepted  as  the  true  explanation  of  the  discrepancy.  It 
appears  from  the  ecclesiastical  historians1  that,  what- 
ever other  good  qualities  Isdigerd  may  have  possessed, 
tolerance  at  any  rate  was  not  among  his  virtues.  In- 
duced at  one  time  by  Christian  bishops  almost  to  em- 
brace Christianity,  he  violently  persecuted  the  profess- 
ors of  the  old  Persian  religion.  Alarmed  at  a  later 
period  by  the  excessive  zeal  of  his  Christian  preceptors, 
and  probably  fearful  of  provoking  rebellion  among  his 
Zoroastrian  subjects,  he  turned  around  upon  his  late 
friends,  and  treated  them  with  a  cruelty  even  exceeding 
that  previously  exhibited  towards  their  adversaries.  It 
was  probably  this  twofold  persecution  that,  offending 
both  professions,  attached  to  Isdigerd  in  his  own  coun- 
try the  character  of  a  harsh  and  bad  monarch.  For- 
eigners, who  did  not  suffer  from  his  caprices  or  his 
violence,  might  deem  him  magnanimous  and  a  model 
of  virtue.  His  own  subjects  with  reason  detested  his 
rule,  and  branded  his  memory  with  the  well-deserved 
epithet  of  Al-Athirn,  { the  Wicked.' 

A  curious  tale  is  told  as  to  the  death  of  Isdigerd.  He 
was  still  in  the  full  vigour  of  manhood  when  one  day 
a  horse  of  rare  beauty,  without  bridle  or  caparison, 
came  of  its  own  accord  and  stopped  before  the  gate  of 
his  palace.  The  news  was  told  to  the  king,  who  gave 
orders  that  the  strange  steed  should  be  saddled  and 


1  Socrat.  H.  E.  vii.  8;  Cedreims,  I  Monach.  Vit.  Euthym.  in  the 
p.  336,  C;  Theophan.  l.s.c. ;  Cyrill.  I  Analecta  Greece*,  p.  20. 


Ch.  XIII.) 


LEGEND  OF  HIS  DEATH. 


281 


bridled,  and  prepared  to  mount  it.  But  the  animal 
reared  and  kicked,  and  would  not  allow  anyone  to 
come  near,  till  the  king  himself  approached,  when  the 
creature  totally  changed  its  mood,  appeared  gentle  and 
docile,  stood  perfectly  still,  and  allowed  both  saddle 
and  bridle  to  be  put  on.  The  crupper,  however,  needed 
some  arrangement,  and  Isdigerd  in  full  confidence  pro- 
ceeded to  complete  his  task,  when  suddenly  the  horse 
lashed  out  with  one  of  his  hind  legs,  and  dealt  the  un- 
fortunate prince  a  blow  which  killed  him  on  the  spot. 
The  animal  then  set  off  at  speed,  disembarrassed  itself 
of  its  accoutrements,  and  galloping  away  was  never 
seen  any  more.1  The  modern  historian  of  Persia  com- 
presses the  tale  into  a  single  phrase,2  and  tells  us  that 
4  Isdigerd  died  from  the  kick  of  a  horse  :  '  but  the  Per- 
sians of  the  time  regarded  the  occurrence  as  an  answer 
to  their  prayers,  and  saw  in  the  wild  steed  an  angel 
sent  by  God.3 


1  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  104;  Mir- 1  2  Malcolm,  History  of  Persia, 
khond,  p.  328.  I  vol.  i.  p.  114.       3  Tabari,  l.s.c. 


282 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  XIV. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

Internal  Troubles  on  the  Death  of  Isdigerd  I.  Accession  of  Varahran  V. 
His  Persecution  of  the  Christians.  His  War  with  Rome.  His  Rela- 
tions with  Armenia  from  a.d.  422  to  a.d.  428.  His  Wars  with  the 
Scythic  Tribes  on  his  Eastern  Frontier.  His  Strange  Death.  His 
Coins.    His  Character, 

'Knel  'lodiyspdiyc  voarjaag  e|  uvdpuiruv  fyavioTO,  kizrjTidev  kg  'Pofialuv  ttjv  yrjv 
Ovapapdvrjg  6  Uepoiov  (3aoL?ievg  orparC)  (leyahu.  —  Pkocop.  De  Bell.  Pers.  i.  2. 

It  would  seem  that  at  the  death  of  Isdigerd  there  was 
some  difficulty  as  to  the  succession.  Varahran,  whom 
he  had  designated  as  his  heir,1  appears  to  have  been 
absent  from  the  capital  at  the  time  ;  while  another  son, 
Sapor,  who  had  held  the  Armenian  throne  from  a.d. 
414  to  418,  was  present  at  the  seat  of  government,  and 
bent  on  pushing  his  claims.2  Varahran,  if  we  may  be- 
lieve the  Oriental  writers,  who  are  here  unanimous,3 
had  been  educated  among  the  Arab  tribes  dependent 
on  Persia,  who  now  occupied  the  greater  portion  of 
Mesopotamia.  His  training  had  made  him  an  Arab 
rather  than  a  Persian  ;  and  he  was  believed  to  have  in- 
herited the  violence,  the  pride,  and  the  cruelty  of  his 
father.4  His  countrymen  were  therefore  resolved  that 
they  would  not  allow  him  to  be  king.  Neither  were 
they  inclined  to  admit  the  claims  of  Sapor,  whose 
government  of  Armenia  had  not  been  particularly  suc- 


1  See  above,  p.  279. 

2  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  56. 

3  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  pp.  105-112; 
Ma90udi,   vol.    ii.    p.    191;  Mir- 


khond,    pp.    323-8;  Modjmel-al- 
Tewarikh  (in  Journ.  Asiatique  for 
1841,  p.  515). 
4  Tabari,  p.  113. 


Ch.  XIV.]         VARAHRAN  V.  BECOMES  KESTG. 


283 


cessful,1  and  whose  recent  desertion  of  his  proper  post 
for  the  advancement  of  his  own  private  interests  was  a 
crime  against  his  country  which  deserved  punishment 
rather  than  reward.  Armenia  had  actually  revolted 
as  soon  as  he  quitted  it,  had  driven  out  the  Persian 
garrison,2  and  was  a  prey  to  rapine  and  disorder.  We 
cannot  be  surprised  that,  under  these  circumstances, 
Sapor's  machinations  and  hopes  were  abruptly  termi- 
nated, soon  after  his  father's  demise,  by  his  own  mur- 
der. The  nobles  and  chief  Magi  took  affairs  into  their 
own  hands.3  Instead  of  sending  for  Varahran,  or  await- 
ing his  arrival,  they  selected  for  king  a  descendant  of 
Artaxerxes  I.  only  remotely  related  to  Isdigerd  —  a 
prince  of  the  name  of  Chosroes —  and  formally  placed 
him  upon  the  throne.  But  Varahran  was  not  willing  to 
cede  his  rights.  Having  persuaded  the  Arabs  to  em- 
brace his  cause,  he  marched  upon  Ctesiphon  at  the 
head  of  a  large  force,  and  by  some  means  or  other, 
most  probably  by  the  terror  of  his  arms,4  prevailed 
upon  Chosroes,  the  nobles,  and  the  Magi,  to  submit  to 


1  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  55.  He  had 
failed  either  to  conciliate  or  over- 
awe the  great  Armenian  chiefs. 

2  Ibid.  iii.  56. 

3  Tabari,  l.s.c. ;  Mirkhond,  p.  329. 

4  In  this  part  of  the  history 
fable  has  replaced  fact.  According 
to  Tabari  and  others,  Varahran 
made  no  use  of  his  Arab  troops, 
but  effected  his  purpose  by  per- 
suading the  nobles  and  challenging 
Chosroes  to  a  trial  of  a  strange 
character.  '  Let  the  Persian  crown,' 
he  said,  '  be  placed  between  two 
hungry  lions,  chained  one  on  either 
side  of  it,  and  let  that  one  of  us 
who  dares  to  approach  the  lions 
and  take  the  crown  be  acknow- 
ledged as  king.'  The  proposal 
pleased  the  nobles  and  Magi;  and 


wThat  Varahran  had  suggested  was 
done.  Chosroes  was  asked  if  he 
would  make  the  attempt  first,  but  de- 
clined. Varahran  then  took  a  club, 
and,  approaching  the  lions,  jumped 
on  the  back  of  one,  seated  himself, 
and,  when  the  other  was  about  to 
spring  on  him,  with  two  blows 
dashed  out  the  brains  of  both !  He 
then  took  the  crown,  and  was  ac- 
knowledged king,  Chosroes  being 
the  first  to  swear  allegiance.  (See 
Tabari,  vol.  ii.  pp.  117-8;  Macoudi, 
vol.  ii.  p.  515;  Mirkhond,  pp. 
330-1;  &c. )  We  may  perhaps 
conclude  with  safety  from  the  Per- 
sian accounts  that  there  was  no 
actual  civil  war,  but  that  Varahran 
established  himself  without  having 
to  fight. 


284 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  XIV. 


him.  The  people  readily  acquiesced  in  the  change 
of  masters ;  Chosroes  descended  into  a  private  station, 
and  Varahran,  son  of  Isdigerd,  became  king. 

Varahran  seems  to  have  ascended  the  throne  in 
a.d.  420. 1  He  at  once  threw  himself  into  the  hands  of 
the  priestly  party,  and,  resuming  the  persecution  of  the 
Christians  which  his  father  had  carried  on  during  his 
later  years,  showed  himself,  to  one  moiety  of  his  sub- 
jects at  any  rate,  as  bloody  and  cruel  as  the  late 
monarch.2  Tortures  of  various  descriptions  were  em- 
ployed ; 3  and  so  grievous  was  the  pressure  put  upon 
the  followers  of  Christ,  that  in  a  short  time  large  num- 
bers of  the  persecuted  sect  quitted  the  country,  and 
placed  themselves  under  the  protection  of  the  Romans. 
Varahran  had  to  consider  whether  he  would  quietly 
allow  the  escape  of  these  criminals,  or  would  seek  to 
enforce  his  will  upon  them  at  the  risk  of  a  rupture 
with  Rome.  He  preferred  the  bolder  line  of  conduct. 
His  ambassadors  were  instructed  to  require  the  surren- 
der of  the  refugees  at  the  court  of  Constantinople  ; 4 
and  when  Theodosius,  to  his  honour,  indignantly  re- 
jected the  demand,  they  had  orders  to  protest  against 
the  emperor's  decision,  and  to  threaten  him  with  their 
master's  vengeance. 

It  happened  that  at  the  time  there  were  some  other 
outstanding  disputes,  which  caused  the  relations  of  the 
two  empires  to  be  less  amicable  than  was  to  be  desired. 
The  Persians  had  recently  begun  to  work  their  gold 


1  The  date  of  a.d.  417,  which 
Patkanian  {Journ.  As.  1866,  p.  161) 
and  Thomas  (Num.  Citron.  1872, 
p.  45)  obtain  from  the  Armenian 
writers,  is  less  probable.  It  con- 
tradicts Abulpharagius  (p.  91), 
Agathias  (iv.  26),  Theophanes  (p. 
7:>,  D),  and  others.    See  Clinton, 


F.  E.  vol.  i.  p.  546. 

2  Socrat.  H.  E.  vii.  18;  Theo- 
doret,  H.  E.  v.  39. 

3  Socrates  speaks  of  rtfiDptac  ml 
OTpcSTiag  Hepo  Ltcac  6  ca  (popovs. 
Theodore t  is  painfully  diffuse  on 
the  subject. 

4  Socrat.  H.  E.  l.s.c. 


Ch.  XIV.  J  WAK  KENEWED  WITH  ROME. 


285 


mines,  and  had  hired  experienced  persons  from  the 
Romans,  whose  services  they  found  so  valuable  that 
when  the  period  of  the  hiring  was  expired,  they  would 
not  suffer  the  miners  to  quit  Persia  and  return  to  their 
homes.  They  are  also  said  to  have  ill-used  the  Roman 
merchants  who  traded  in  the  Persian  territories,  and 
to  have  actually  robbed  them  of  their  merchandise.1 

These  causes  of  complaint  were  not,  however,  it 
would  seem,  brought  forward  by  the  Romans,  who 
contented  themselves  with  simply  refusing  the  demand 
for  the  extradition  of  the  Christian  fugitives,  and  re- 
frained from  making  any  counter-claims.  But  their 
moderation  was  not  appreciated;  and  the  Persian 
monarch,  on  learning  that  Rome  would  not  restore  the 
refugees,  declared  the  peace  to  be  at  an  end,  and  im- 
mediately made  preparations  for  war.  The  Romans 
had,  however,  anticipated  his  decision,  and  took  the 
field  in  force  before  the  Persians  were  ready.  The 
command  was  entrusted  to  a  general  bearing  the  strange 
name  of  Ardaburius,2  who  marched  his  troops  through 
Armenia  into  the  fertile  province  of  Arzanene,3  and 
there  defeated  Narses,4  the  leader  whom  Varahran  had 
sent  against  him.  Proceeding  to  plunder  Arzanene, 
Ardaburius  suddenly  heard  that  his  adversary  was 
about  to  enter  the  Roman  province  of  Mesopotamia, 
which  was  denuded  of  troops,  and  seemed  to  invite 


1  Socrat.  H.  E.  l.s.c. 

2  This  is  the  first  that  is  heard 
of  Ardaburius.  He  was  of  Alanian 
descent,  and  was  afterwards  em- 
ployed to  put  down  the  pretender, 
Johannes  (Socr.  vii.  24  ;  Olym- 
piodor.  ap.  Phot.  Blbliothec.  p.  197; 
Philostorg.  H.  E.  xii.  13),  whom 
he  made  prisoner  (a.d.  425).  In 
a.d.  427  he  was  consul. 

3  The  form  used  by  Socrates  is 
Azazene;  but  Theophanes  has  4  Ar- 


zane '  (p.  74,  A),  whence  we  may 
conclude  that  the  district  intended 
was  that  called  Arzanene  by  Am- 
mianus  (xxv.  7),  which  has  been 
already  identified  with  the  modern 
Kherzan.    (See  above,  p.  129.) 

4  The  name  is  given  as  Arses 
(Arsseus)  by  Theophanes  (l.s.c), 
but  as  Parses  (Narsyeus)  by  Soc- 
rates. Tabari  says  that  Narses 
was  a  brother  of  Varahran  ( Chro- 
niqite,  vol.  ii.  pp.  119  and  125). 


286 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  XIV. 


attack.  Hastily  concluding  his  raid,  he  passed  from 
Arzanene  into  the  threatened  district,  and  was  in  time 
to  prevent  the  invasion  intended  by  Narses,  who,  when 
he  found  his  designs  forestalled,  threw  himself  into  the 
fortress  of  Nisibis,  and  there  stood  on  the  defensive. 
Ardaburius  did  not  feel  himself  strong  enough  to  invest 
the  town  ;  and  for  some  time  the  two  adversaries  re- 
mained inactive,  each  watching  the  other.  It  was 
during  this  interval  that  (if  we  may  credit  Socrates) 
the  Persian  general  sent  a  challenge  to  the  Roman, 
inviting  him  to  fix  time  and  place  for  a  trial  of  strength 
between  the  two  armies.  Ardaburius  prudently  de- 
clined the  overture,  remarking  that  the  Romans  were 
not  accustomed  to  fight  battles  when  their  enemies 
wished,  but  when  it  suited  themselves.  Soon  afterwards 
he  found  himself  able  to  illustrate  his  meaning  by  his 
actions.  Having  carefully  abstained  from  attacking 
Nisibis  while  his  strength  seemed  to  him  insufficient,  he 
suddenly,  upon  receiving  large  reinforcements  from 
Theodosius,  changed  his  tactics,  and,  invading  Per- 
sian Mesopotamia,  marched  upon  the  stronghold  held 
by  Narses,  and  formally  commenced  its  siege. 

Hitherto  Varahran,  confident  in  his  troops  or  his 
good  fortun  e,  had  left  the  entire  conduct  of  the  military 
operations  to  his  general ;  but  the  danger  of  Nisibis  — 
that  dearly  won  and  highly  prized  possession 1  —  seri- 
ously alarmed  him,  and  made  him  resolve  to  take  the 
field  in  person  with  all  his  forces.  Enlisting  on  his  side 
the  services  of  his  friends  the  Arabs,  under  their  great 
sheikh,  Al-Amundarus  (Moundsir),2  and  collecting  to- 


1  See  above,  pp.  235-238. 

2  Moundsir  was  at  the  head  of 
the  Mesopotainian  or  Saracenic 
Arabs  at  this  time,  according  to 
the  Oriental  writers  (Tabari,  vol.  ii. 


pp.  110-116;  Mirkhond,  p.  328, 
who  gives  the  name  as  Mondar,  a 
form  easily  traceable  in  Al-Amun- 
darus). 


Ch.  XIV.]   SIEGES  OF  NISIBIS  AND  THEODOSIOPOLIS.  287 

gether  a  strong  body  of  elephants,1  he  advanced  to  the 
relief  of  the  beleaguered  town.  Ardaburius  drew  off 
on  his  approach,  burned  his  siege  artillery,  and  retired 
from  before  the  place.  Nisibis  was  preserved ;  but  soon 
afterwards  a  disaster  is  said  to  have  befallen  the  Arabs, 
who,  believing  themselves  about  to  be  attacked  by  the 
Roman  force,  were  seized  with  a  sudden  panic,  and, 
rushing  in  headlong  flight  to  the  Euphrates  (!),  threw 
themselves  into  its  waters,  encumbered  with  their 
clothes  and  arms,  and  there  perished  to  the  number 
of  a  hundred  thousand.2 

The  remaining  circumstances  of  the  war  are  not  re- 
lated by  our  authorities  in  chronological  sequence.  But 
as  it  is  certain  that  the  war  lasted  only  two  years,3 
and  as  the  events  above  narrated  certainly  belong  to 
the  earlier  portion  of  it,  and  seem  sufficient  for  one 
campaign,  we  may  perhaps  be  justified  in  assigning  to 
the  second  year,  a.d.  421,  the  other  details  recorded  — 
viz.,  the  siege  of  Theodosiopolis,  the  combat  between 
Areobindus  and  Ardazanes,  the  second  victory  of  Arda- 
burius, and  the  destruction  of  the  remnant  of  the  Arabs 
by  Vitianus. 

Theodosiopolis  was  a  city  built  by  the  reigning 
emperor,  Theodosius  II.,  in  the  Roman  portion  of 
Armenia,  near  the  sources  of  the  Euphrates.4  It  was 
defended  by  strong  walls,  lofty  towers,  and  a  deep 
ditch.5    Hidden  channels  conducted  an  unfailing  sup- 


1  Socrat.  H.  E.  vii.  18,  sub  fin. 

2  This  tale  is  related  both  by 
Socrates  (l.s.c.)  and  by  Theophanes 
(p.  74,  B).  It  must  have  had  some 
foundation;  but  no  doubt  the  loss 
is  greatly  exaggerated. 

3  See  the  Chronicle  of  Marcelli- 
nus,  p.  19;  and  compare  Theophanes 
(pp.  74-5),  who,  however,  makes 
the  war  last  three  years,  and  Socrat. 


H.  E.  vii.  18-20. 

4  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  59. 

5  The  authority  of  Moses  as  to 
the  strength  of  Theodosiopolis 
{Hist  Ann.  l.s.c.)  is  preferable  to 
that  of  Procopius,  who  wrote  a  cen- 
tury later.  Procopius  makes  the 
place  one  of  small  account  in  the 
time  of  Theodosius  (Be  ^Eld,  Jus- 
tinian, iii.  5). 


288 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  XIV. 


ply  of  water  into  the  heart  of  the  place,  and  the  public 
granaries  were  large  and  generally  well  stocked  with 
provisions.1  This  town,  recently  built  for  the  defence 
of  the  Roman  Armenia,  was  (it  would  seem)  attacked 
in  a.d.  421  by  Varahran  in  person.2  He  besieged  it 
for  above  thirty  days,  and  employed  against  it  all  the 
means  of  capture  wThich  were  known  to  the  military  art 
of  the  period.  But  the  defence  w^as  ably  conducted  by 
the  bishop  of  the  city,  a  certain  Eunomius,  who  was 
resolved  that,  if  he  could  prevent  it,  an  infidel  and  per- 
secuting monarch  should  never  lord  it  over  his  see. 
Eunomius  not  merely  animated  the  defenders,  but  took 
part  personally  in  the  defence,  and  even  on  one  occa- 
sion discharged  a  stone  from  a  balista  with  his  own 
hand,  and  killed  a  prince  who  had  not  confined  himself 
to  his  military  duties,  but  had  insulted  the  faith  of 
the  besieged.  The  death  of  this  officer  is  said  to 
have  induced  Varahran  to  retire,  and  not  further 
molest  Theodosiopolis.3 

While  the  fortified  towns  on  either  side  thus  main- 
tained themselves  against  the  attacks  made  on  them, 
Theodosius,  we  are  told,4  gave  an  independent  command 
to  the  patrician,  Procopius,  and  sent  him  at  the  head 
of  a  body  of  troops  to  oppose  Varahran.  The  armies 
met,  and  were  on  the  point  of  engaging  when  the 
Persian  monarch  made  a  proposition  to  decide  the  war, 
not  by  a  general  battle,  but  by  a  single  combat.  Pro- 
copius assented  ;  and  a  warrior  was  selected  on  either 
side,  the  Persians  choosing  for  their  champion  a  certain 
Ardazanes,  and  the  Romans  4  Areobindus  the  Goth,' 
count  of  the  '  Foederati.'  In  the  conflict  which  followed 
the  Persian  charged  his  adversary  with  his  spear,  but 


1  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  59. 

'2  Theodoret,  TL  E.  v.  37. 


I    3  Ibid. 

I     4  Joliann.  Malal.  xiv.  p.  25,  A. 


Ch.  XIV. J  VARAHRAN  MAKES  PEACE  WITH  ROME.  289 

the  nimble  Goth  avoided  the  thrust  by  leaning  to  one 
side,  after  which  he  entangled  Ardazanes  in  a  net,  and 
then  despatched  him  with  his  sword.1  The  result  was 
accepted  by  Varahran  as  decisive  of  the  war,  and  he 
desisted  from  any  further  hostilities.  Areobindus 2  re- 
ceived the  thanks  of  the  emperor  for  his  victory,  and 
twelve  years  later  was  rewarded  with  the  consulship. 

But  meanwhile,  in  other  portions  of  the  wide  field 
over  which  the  war  was  raging,  Rome  had  obtained 
additional  successes.  Ardaburius,  who  probably  still 
commanded  in  Mesopotamia,  had  drawn  the  Persian 
force  opposed  to  him  into  an  ambuscade,  and  had  de- 
stroyed it,  together  with  its  seven  generals.3  Vitianus, 
an  officer  of  whom  nothing  more  is  known,  had  extermi- 
nated the  remnant  of  the  Arabs  not  drowned  in  the 
Euphrates.4  The  war  had  gone  everywhere  against 
the  Persians ;  and  it  is  not  improbable  that  Varahran, 
before  the  close  of  a.d.  421,  proposed  terms  of  peace.5 

Peace,  however,  was  not  actually  made  till  the  next 
year.  Early  in  a.d.  422,  a  Roman  envoy,  by  name 
Maximus,  appeared  in  the  camp  of  Varahran,6  and, 
when  taken  into  the  presence  of  the  great  king,  stated 
that  he  was  empowed  by  the  Roman  generals  to  enter 
into  negotiations,  but  had  had  no  communication  with 
the  Roman  emperor,  who  dwelt  so  far  off  that  he  had 
not  heard  of  the  war,  and  was  so  powerful  that,  if  he 
knew  of  it,  he  would  regard  it  as  a  matter  of  small  ac- 
count.   It  is  not  likely  that  Varahran  was  much  im- 


1  These  details  are  given  by 
Johan.  Malal.  only;  but  the  com- 
bat is  mentioned  also  by  Socrates 
(H.  E.  vii.  18,  ad  fin.). 

2  Socrat.  l.s.c. ;  Marcellin.  Chro- 
nicon,  p.  23. 

3  Socrat.  l.s.c. 


4  Ibid. 

5  John  of  Malala  makes  Varah- 
ran propose  peace  immediately  after 
the  single  combat.  Theodoret 
makes  peace  follow  from  the  re- 
pulse suffered  at  Theodosiopolis. 

6  Socrat.  vii.  20. 


290 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


ICh.  XIV. 


pressed  by  these  falsehoods ;  but  he  was  tired  of  the 
war ;  he  had  found  that  Rome  could  hold  her  own,  and 
that  he  was  not  likely  to  gain  anything  by  prolonging 
it;  and  he  was  in  difficulties  as  to  provisions,1  whereof 
his  supply  had  run  short.  He  was  therefore  well  in- 
clined to  entertain  Maximus's  proposals  favourably. 
The  corps  of  the  4  Immortals,'  however,  which  was  in 
his  camp,  took  a  different  view,  and  entreated  to  be 
allowed  an  opportunity  of  attacking  the  Romans  un- 
awares, while  they  believed  negotiations  to  be  going  on, 
considering  that  under  such  circumstances  they  would 
be  certain  of  victory.  Varahran,  according  to  the  Ro- 
man writer  who  is  here  our  sole  authority,2  consented. 
The  Immortals  made  their  attack,  and  the  Romans 
were  at  first  in  some  danger;  but  the  unexpected 
arrival  of  a  reinforcement  saved  them,  and  the  Immor- 
tals were  defeated  and  cut  off  to  a  man.  After  this, 
Varahran  made  peace  with  Rome  through  the  instru- 
mentality of  Maximus,3  consenting,  it  would  seem,  not 
merely  that  Rome  should  harbour  the  Persian  Chris- 
tians, if  she  pleased,  but  also  that  all  persecution  of 
Christians  should  henceforth  cease  throughout  his 
own  empire.4 

The  formal  conclusion  of  peace  was  accompanied, 
and  perhaps  helped  forward,by  the  well-judging  charity 
of  an  admirable  prelate.  Acacius,  bishop  of  Amida, 
pitying  the  condition  of  the  Persian  prisoners  whom  the 
Romans  had  captured  during  their  raid  into  Arzanene, 


1  Socrat.  vii.  20. 

2  Socrates.  The  destruction  of 
the  i  Immortals '  is  mentioned  also 
by  Theophanes  (p.  74,  B),  but 
vaguely  and  without  any  details. 

3  The  actual  negotiator  was,  ac- 
cording to  Socrates,  Maximus  only. 


Others  mention,  as  concerned  in  the 
negotiations,  Helion,  Anatolius,  and 
Procopius.  (See  Theophan.  p.  75, 
B;  Cedren.  p.  341,  D;  Sidon. 
Apollin.  Paneg.  Anthem.  1.  75.) 

4  Theophan.  l.s.c. ;  Socrat.  H.  E. 
vii.  21. 


Ch.  XIV.]        CONDUCT  OF  BISHOP  ACACIUS, 


291 


and  were  dragging  off  into  slavery,  interposed  to  save 
them ;  and,  employing  for  the  purpose  all  the  gold  and 
silver  plate  that  he  could  find  in  the  churches  of  his 
diocese,  ransomed  as  many  as  seven  thousand  captives, 
supplied  their  immediate  wants  with  the  utmost  ten- 
derness, and  sent  them  to  Varahran,1  who  can  scarcely 
have  failed  to  be  impressed  by  an  act  so  unusual  in 
ancient  times.  Our  sceptical  historian  remarks,  with 
more  apparent  sincerity  than  usual,  that  this  act  was 
calculated  4  to  inform  the  Persian  king  of  the  true 
spirit  of  the  religion  which  he  persecuted,'  and  that  the 
name  of  the  doer  might  well  'have  dignified  the  saintly 
calendar.' 2  These  remarks  are  just ;  and  it  is  certainly 
to  be  regretted  that,  among  the  many  unknown  or 
doubtful  names  of  canonised  Christians  to  which  the 
Church  has  given  her  sanction,  there  is  no  mention 
made  of  Acacius  of  Amida. 

Varahran  was  perhaps  the  more  disposed  to  conclude 
his  war  with  Rome  from  the  troubled  condition  of  his 
own  portion  of  Armenia,  which  imperatively  required 
his  attention.  Since  the  withdrawal  from  that  region 
of  his  brother  Sapor 3  in  a. d.  418  or  419,  the  country 
had  had  no  king.  It  had  fallen  into  a  state  of  complete 
anarchy  and  wretchedness ;  no  taxes  were  collected;  the 
roads  were  not  safe  ;  the  strong  robbed  and  oppressed 
the  weak  at  their  pleasure.4  Isaac,  the  Armenian 
patriarch,  and  the  other  bishops,  had  quitted  their  sees 
and  taken  refuge  in  Roman  Armenia,5  where  they  were 


1  Socrat.  l.s.c. 

2  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol. 
iv.  p.  167. 

3  See  above,  p.  277. 

4  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  56:  '  Fiebat  ut 
regio  nostra,  propter  tumultuosa 
atque  turbulentissima  tempora,  per 


tres  annos  ab  rectore  vacua  fuerit, 
et  mi  sere  spoliata,  adeo  ut  vecti- 
galia  regia  defieerent,  et  plebis 
itinera  intercluderentur,  omnisque 
omnium  re  rum  ordo  perturbaretur.' 
(Whiston's  translation.) 
5  Ibid.  iii.  57. 


292 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  XIV 


received  favourably  by  the  prefect  of  the  East,  Anato- 
lius,  who  no  doubt  hoped  by  their  aid  to  win  over  to 
his  master  the  Persian  division  of  the  country.  Varah- 
ran's  attack  on  Theodosiopolis  had  been  a  counter 
movement,  and  had  been  designed  to  make  the  Romans 
tremble  for  their  own  possessions,  and  throw  them  back 
on  the  defensive.  But  the  attack  had  failed;  and  on 
its  failure  the  completeloss  of  Armeniaprobablyseemed 
imminent.  Varahran  therefore  hastened  to  make  peace 
with  Rome,  and,  having  so  done,  proceeded  to  give 
his  attention  to  Armenia,  with  the  view  of  placing 
matters  there  on  a  satisfactory  footing.  Convinced  that 
he  could  not  retain  Armenia  unless  with  the  good-will 
of  the  nobles,1  and  believing  them  to  be  deeply  attached 
to  the  royal  stock  of  the  Arsacids,  he  brought  forward 
a  prince  of  that  noble  house,  named  Artases,  a  son  of 
Varahran-Sapor,and,  investing  him  with  the  ensigns  of 
royalty,  made  him  take  the  illustrious  name  of  Arta- 
xerxes,  and  delivered  into  his  hands  the  entire  govern- 
ment of  the  country.  These  proceedings  are  assigned 
to  the  year  a.d.  42 2, 2  the  year  of  the  peace  with  Rome, 
and  must  have  followed  very  shortly  after  the  signa- 
ture of  the  treaty. 

It  might  have  been  expected  that  this  arrangement 
would  have  satisfied  the  nobles  of  Armenia,  and  have 
given  that  unhappy  country  a  prolonged  period  of  re- 
pose. But  the  personal  character  of  Artaxerxes  was, 
unfortunately,  bad;  the  Armenian  nobles  were,  perhaps, 
capricious ;  and  after  a  trial  of  six  years  it  was  resolved 
that  the  rule  of  the  Arsacid  monarch  could  not  be  en- 


1  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  58:  '  Rex  Per- 
sarum  Veramus,  sine  satrapis  Ar- 
meniis  regionem  earn  se  tenere  non 
posse  intelligens,  de  pace  egerat.' 


2  See  St.  Martin,  Memoir es  sur 
V  Armenie,  vol.  i.  p.  410;  Notes  to 
Le  Beau's  B as-Empire,  vol.  vi.  p.  32. 


Gh.  XIV.  1  ABSORPTION  OF  PEKS ARMENIA  INTO  PERSIA.  293 

dured,  and  that  Varahran  should  be  requested  to  make 
Armenia  a  province  of  his  empire,  and  to  place  it  under 
the  government  of  a  Persian  satrap.1  The  movement 
was  resisted  with  all  his  force  by  Isaac,  the  patriarch, 
who  admitted  the  profligacy  of  Artaxerxesand  deplored 
it,  but  held  that  the  rule  of  a  Christian,  however  lax  he 
might  be,  was  to  be  preferred  to  that  of  a  heathen,  how- 
ever virtuous.2  The  nobles,  however,  were  determined; 
and  the  opposition  of  Isaac  had  no  other  result  than  to 
involve  him  in  the  fall  of  his  sovereign.  Appeal  was 
made  to  the  Persian  king ; 3  and  Varahran,  in  solemn 
state,  heard  the  charges  made  against  Artaxerxes  by 
his  subjects,  and  listened  to  his  reply  to  them.  At  the 
end  he  gave  his  decision.  Artaxerxes  was  pronounced 
to  have  forfeited  his  crown,  and  was  deposed  ;  his  prop- 
erty was  confiscated,  and  his  person  committed  to 
safe,  custody.  The  monarchy  was  declared  to  be  at  an 
end ;  and  Persarmenia  was  delivered  into  the  hands  of 
a  Persian  governor.4  The  patriarch  Isaac  was  at  the 
same  time  degraded  from  his  office  and  detained  in 
Persia  as  a  prisoner.  It  was  not  till  some  years  later 
that  he  was  released,  allowed  to  return  into  Armenia, 
and  to  resume,  under  certain  restrictions,  his  episcopal 
functions.5 

The  remaining  circumstances  of  the  reign  of  Varah- 


1  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  63. 

2  The  reply  of  Isaac  to  the  nobles 
is  not  ill  rendered  by  Gibbon:  '  Our 
king  is  too  much  addicted  to  licen- 
tious pleasures;  but  he  has  been 
purified  in  the  holy  waters  of  bap- 
tism. He  is  a  lover  of  women; 
but  he  does  not  adore  the  fire  or 
the  elements.  He  may  deserve  the 
reproach  of  lewdness;  but  he  is 
an  undoubted  Catholic,  and  his 
faith  is  pure  though  his  manners 
are  flagitious.     I  will  never  con- 


sent to  abandon  my  sheep  to  the 
rage  of  devouring  wolves;  and  you 
would  soon  repent  your  rash  ex- 
change of  the  infirmities  of  a  be- 
liever for  the  specious  virtues  of  a 
heathen.'  (Decline  and  Fall,  vol. 
iv.  p.  169.) 

3  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  64. 

4  Ibid.  The  name  of  the  first 
governor,  according  to  Moses,  was 
Vi  miner-Sapor. 

5  Ibid.  iii.  65. 


294 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  XIV. 


ran  V.  come  to  us  wholly  through  the  Oriental  writers, 
amid  whose  exaggerations  and  fables  it  is  very  difficult 
to  discern  the  truth.  There  can,  however,  be  little 
doubt  that  it  was  during  the  reign  of  this  prince  that 
those  terrible  struggles  commenced  between  the  Per- 
sians and  their  neighbours  upon  the  north-east  which 
continued,  from  the  early  part  of  the  fifth  till  the  middle 
of  the  sixth  century,  to  endanger  the  very  exist- 
ence of  the  empire.  Various  names  are  given  to  the 
people  with  whom  Persia  waged  her  wars  during  this 
period.  They  are  called  Turks,1  Huns,2  sometimes  even 
Chinese ; 3  but  these  terms  seem  to  be  used  in  a 
vague  way,  as  1  Scythian  '  was  by  the  ancients  ;  and 
the  special  ethnic  designation  of  the  people  appears  to 
be  quite  a  different  name  from  any  of  them.  It  is  a 
name  the  Persian  form  of  which  is  Haithal  or  Hai- 
atlMeli*  the  Armenian  Hephthaghf  and  the  Greek 
c  Ephthalites,'  or  sometimes  4  Nephthalites.' 6  Different 
conjectures  have  been  formed  as  to  its  origin  ;  but  none 
of  them  can  be  regarded  as  more  than  an  ingenious 
theory.7    All  that  we  know  of  the  Ephthalites  is,  that 


1  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  119;  Macoudi, 
vol.  ii.  p.  190;  Mirkhond,  p.  335; 
Modjmel-al-Tewarikh,  p.  516. 

2  Procop.  Be  Bell.  Pers.  i.  3; 
Cosmas  Indicopleust.  in  Montfau- 
con's  Collectio  nova  Patrum,  torn.  ii. 
pp.  337-9;  Abulpharag.  Chronicon, 
torn.  ii.  p.  77;  Elisee,  p.  12. 

3  Mirkhond  calls  the  invader  '  the 
Khacan  of  China '  (p.  334),  though 
he  speaks  of  the  army  as  composed 
of  Turks. 

4  Mirkhond,  p.  343;  Modjmel-al- 
Tewarikh,  p.  517;  Tabari,  vol.  ii. 
p.  128. 

5  Mos.  Chor.  Geogr.  Armen.  §  92. 
I  take  this  form  from  M.  Vivien 
St.  Martin,  to  whose  little  work  on 
the  Ephthalites  (Les  Huns  Blancs 


ou  Ephthalites,  Paris,  1849)  I  own 
myself  much  indebted.  Whiston's 
translation  gives  the  word  as  Heph- 
thal  [ii]. 

0  Both  readings  occur  in  the 
MSS.  of  Procopius.  (See  the  note 
of  Dindorf  in  the  edition  of  Nie- 
buhr,  p.  15.)  Theophanes  has 
Nffpda'Mrai  only  (Chronograph,  pp. 
105-6).  NeydaXlrai  is  also  the  form 
used  by  Agathias  (iv.  27).  Menan- 
der  Protector  has  'EpValirai  (Frs.  9 
and  18). 

7  M.  Vivien  St.  Martin  seeks  to 
identify  the  Ephthalites  with  the 
Yue-chi,  one  form  of  whose  name  he 
believes  to  have  been  Yi-ta,  or  Fe- 
tha  (Les  Huns  Blancs,  pp.  37-69). 
Others,  e.g.  Deguignes,  have  seen 


Ch.  XIV.]  COMMENCEMENT  OF  EPHTHALITE  WARS.  295 

they  were  established  in  force,  during  the  fifth  and 
sixth  centuries  of  our  era,  in  the  regions  east  of  the 
Caspian,  especially  in  those  beyond  the  Oxus  river,  and 
that  they  were  generally  regarded  as  belonging  to  the 
Scythic  or  Finno-Turkic  population,  which,  at  any 
rate  from  B.C.  200,  had  become  powerful  in  that  region. 
They  were  called  L  White  Huns 1  by  some  of  the  Greeks ; 1 
but  it  is  admitted  that  they  were  quite  distinct  from  the 
Huns  who  invaded  Europe  under  Attila ; 2  and  it  may 
be  doubted  whether  the  term  L  Hun  '  is  more  appro- 
priate to  them  than  that  of  Turk  or  even  of  Chinese. 
The  description  of  their  physical  character  and  habits 
left  us  by  Procopius,  who  wrote  when  they  were  at 
the  height  of  their  power,  is  decidedly  adverse  to  the 
view  that  they  were  really  Huns.  They  were  a  light- 
complexioned  race,  whereas  the  Huns  were  decidedly 
swart ; 3  they  were  not  ill-looking,  whereas  the  Huns 
were  hideous ;  they  were  an  agricultural  people,  while 
the  Huns  were  nomads ;  they  had  good  laws,  and  were 
tolerably  well  civilised,  but  the  Huns  were  savages.  It 
is  probable  that  they  belonged  to  the  Thibetic  or  Tur- 
kish stock,  which  has  always  been  in  advance  of  the 
Finnic,  and  has  shown  a  greater  aptitude  for  political 
organisation  and  social  progress. 

We  are  told  that  the  war  of  Varahran  V.  with  this 
people  commenced  with  an  invasion  of  his  kingdom  by 
their  Khacan,  or  Khan,4  who  crossed  the  Oxus  with  an 


in  the  word  Ephthalite  a  root 
Tie-le,  which  they  regard  as  equiva- 
lent to  Turk. 

1  As  Procopius  (l.s.c),  Theo- 
phanes  (p.  105,  C),  and  Cosmas 
(l.s.c). 

2  Procop.  l.s.c 

3  Jornandes,  De  Gothorum  rebus 
(j  est  is,  §  35. 


4  '  Khan '  is  the  modern  con- 
tracted form  of  the  word  which  is 
found  in  the  middle  ages  as  Khagan 
or  Chagan,  and  in  the  Persian  and 
Arabic  writers  as  Khakan  or  Kha- 
can. Its  original  root  is  probably 
the  Khakj  which  meant  '  King  '  in 
ancient  Susianian,  in  Ethiopic  (Tir- 
hakah),  and  in  Egyptian  (Uyk-sos). 


296 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


ICh.  XIV. 


army  of  25,000  (or,  according  to  others,  of  250,000) 
men,1  and  carried  fire  and  sword  into  some  of  the  most 
fertile  provinces  of  Persia.  The  rich  oasis,  known  as 
Meru  or  Merv,  the  ancient  Margiana,  is  especially  men- 
tioned as  overrun  by  his  troops,2  which  are  said  by 
some  to  have  crossed  the  Elburz  range  into  Khorassan 
and  to  have  proceeded  westward  as  far  as  Rei,  or 
Rhages.3  When  news  of  the  invasion  reached  the  Per- 
sian court,  the  alarm  felt  was  great ;  V arahran  was 
pressed  to  assemble  his  forces  at  once  and  encounter 
the  unknown  enemy ;  he,  however,  professed  complete 
indifference,  said  that  the  Almighty  would  preserve  the 
empire,  and  that,  for  his  own  part,  he  was  going  to 
hunt  in  Azerbijan,4  or  Media  Atropatene.  During  his 
absence  the  government  could  be  conducted  by  Narses, 
his  brother.  All  Persia  was  now  thrown  into  conster- 
nation ;  Varahran  was  believed  to  have  lost  his  senses ; 
and  it  was  thought  that  the  only  prudent  course  was  to 
despatch  an  embassy  to  the  Khacan,  and  make  an  ar- 
rangement with  him  by  which  Persia  should  acknowl- 
edge his  suzerainty  and  consent  to  pay  him  a  tribute.5 
Ambassadors  accordingly  were  sent ;  and  the  invaders, 
satisfied  with  the  offer  of  submission,  remained  in  the 
position  which  they  had  taken  up,  waiting  for  the  trib- 
ute, and  keeping  slack  guard,  since  they  considered 
that  they  had  nothing  to  fear.  Varahran,  however, 
was  all  the  while  preparing  to  fall  upon  them  unawares. 
He  had  started  for  Azerbijan  with  a  small  body  of 


1  The  moderate  estimate  of  25,000 
is  found  in  Mirkhond  (p.  334)  and 
in  the  Rozut-ul-Suffa  (Malcolm,  vol. 
i.  p.  117).  Tabari  (vol.  ii.  p.  119) 
and  the  Zeenut-al-Tewarikh  have 
250,000. 

2  Mirkhond,  pp.  334  and  336. 


3  Ibid.  p.  334.  Compare  Ma- 
coudi,  vol.  ii.  p.  190. 

4  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  119;  Modj- 
mel-al-Teivarikh,  p.  516;  Mirkhond, 
p.  334. 

5  Tabari,  l.s.c. ;  Mirkhond,  p.  335. 


Ch.  XIV.]  VARAHRAN  DEFEATS  THE  EPHTHALITES.  297 

picked  warriors ; 1  he  had  drawn  some  further  strength 
from  Armenia ; 2  he  proceeded  along  the  mountain  line 
through  Taberistan,  Hyrcania,  and  Nissa  (Nishapur),3 
marching  only  by  night,  and  carefully  masking  his 
movements.  In  this  way  he  reached  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Merv  unobserved.  He  then  planned  and  exe- 
cuted a  night  attack  on  the  invading  army  which  was 
completely  successful.  Attacking  his  adversaries  sud- 
denly and  in  the  dark  —  alarming  them,  moreover,  with 
strange  noises,4  and  at  the  same  time  assaulting  them 
with  the  utmost  vigour  —  he  put  to  flight  the  entire 
Tatar  army.  The  Khan  himself  was  killed ; 6  and  the 
flying  host  was  pursued  to  the  banks  of  the  Oxus.  The 
whole  of  the  camp  equipage  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
victors ;  and  Kh&toun,  the  wife  of  the  great  Khan,  was 
taken.6  The  plunder  was  of  enormous  value,  and  com- 
prised the  royal  crown  with  its  rich  setting  of  pearls.7 
After  this  success,  Varahran,  to  complete  his  victory, 
sent  one  of  his  generals  across  the  Oxus  at  the  head  of 
a  large  force,  and  falling  upon  the  Tatars  in  their  own 
country  defeated  them  a  second  time  with  great 
slaughter.8  The  enemy  then  prayed  for  peace,  which 
was  granted  them  by  the  victorious  Varahran,  who  at 


1  Tabari  makes  the  number  only 
300  (vol.  ii.  p.  119);  but  Mir- 
khond  gives  the  more  probable 
figure  of  7,000  (p.  336). 

2  Mirkhond,  p.  335. 

3  Ibid.  p.  336. 

4  The  noise  was  made,  we  are 
told,  by  filling  the  dried  skins  of 
oxen  with  pebbles,  and  attaching 
them  to  the  necks  of  the  horses, 
which,  as  they  charged,  made  the 
stones  rattle  (Mirkhond,  l.s.c. ; 
Malcolm,  vol.  i.  p.  118).  Some 
authors  make  Varahran  catch  a 
number  of  wild  beasts  and  let  them 
loose  upon  the  Tatars  iModjmel-al 


Tewarikh,  p.  517). 

5  Macoudi,  vol.  ii.  p.  190;  Mir- 
khond, p.  337. 

0  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  121. 

7  According  to  Tabari  (p.  120), 
the  crown  was  ornamented  with 
several  thousands  of  pearls.  Com- 
pare the  pearl  ornamentation  of  the 
Sassanian  crowns  upon  the  coins, 
especially  those  of  Sapor  II. 

8  Tabari,  l.s.c;  Modjmel-al-Te- 
warikh,  p.  517.  The  latter  work 
expressly  calls  this  an  invasion  of 
the  country  of  Heyathelah  (i.e.  of 
the  Ephthaiites). 


298  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [Ch.  XIV. 


the  same  time  erected  a  column  to  mark  the  boundary 
of  his  empire  in  this  quarter,1  and  appointing  his 
brother  Narses  governor  of  Khorassan,  ordered  him  to 
fix  his  residence  at  Balkh,  and  to  prevent  the  Tatars 
from  making  incursions  across  the  Oxus.2  It  appears 
that  these  precautions  were  successful,  for  we  hear 
nothing  of  any  further  hostilities  in  this  quarter  during 
the  remainder  of  Varahran's  reign, 

The  adventures  of  Varahran  in  India,  and  the  en- 
largement of  his  dominions  in  that  direction  by  the  act 
of  the  Indian  king,  who  is  said  to  have  voluntarily 
ceded  to  him  Mekran  and  Scinde  in  return  for  his  ser- 
vices against  the  Emperor  of  China,3  cannot  be  re- 
garded as  historical.  Scarcely  more  so  is  the  story  that 
Persia  had  no  musicians  in  his  day,  for  which  reason 
he  applied  to  the  Indian  monarch,  and  obtained  from 
him  twelve  thousand  performers,  who  became  the  an- 
cestors of  the  Lurs.4 

After  a  reign  which  is  variously  estimated  at  nine- 
teen, twenty,  twenty-one,  and  twenty-three  years,5  Va- 
rahran died  by  a  death  which  would  have  been  thought 
incredible,  had  not  a  repetition  of  the  disaster,  on  the 
traditional  site,  been  witnessed  by  an  English  traveller 
in  comparatively  recent  times.  The  Persian  writers 
state  that  Varahran  was  engaged  in  the  hunt  of  the 
wild  ass,  when  his  horse  came  suddenly  upon  a  deep 


1  Modjmel-al-Tewarikh,  p.  517  ; 
Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  120  ;  Mirkhond, 
p.  337. 

2  Tabari,  l.s.c. 

3  Ibid.  vol.  ii.  pp.  124-5.  Com- 
pare Macoudi,  vol.  ii.  p.  191;  Modj- 
mel-al-Tewarikh, p.  516;  Mirkhond, 
pp.  337-340. 

4  Modjmel-al-Tewarikh,  p.  515. 

5  Eutycbius  (vol.  i.  p.  SO)  says 
eighteen  years  and  eleven  months; 


the  Modjmel-al-Tewarikh  mentions 
nineteen  years,  but  prefers  twenty- 
three  (p.  514);  Agathias  (iv.  27), 
Theophanes  (p.  71,  D),  and  Abnl- 
pharagius  (p.  91)  say  twenty;  Pat- 
kanian  (Journ.  Asiatique  for  1866, 
p.  161)  prefers  twenty-one;  Ma- 
coudi (vol.  ii.  p.  190)  and  Tabari 
(vol.  ii.  p.  126)  agree  with  the 
Modjmel-al-Tewarikh  in  giving  the 
number  as  twenty-three. 


Ch.  XIV.]  DEATH  OF  VARAHRAN  V.  —  HIS  COINS.  299 


pool,  or  spring  of  water,  and  either  plunged  into  it,  or 
threw  his  rider  into  it,  with  the  result  that  Varahran 
sank  and  never  reappeared.1  The  supposed  scene  of 
the  incident  is  a  valley  between  Ispahan  and  Shiraz. 
Here,  in  1810,  an  English  soldier  lost  his  life  through 
bathing  in  the  spring  traditionally  declared  to  be  that 
which  proved  fatal  to  Varahran.2  The  coincidence  has 
caused  the  general  acceptance  of  a  tale  which  would 
probably  have  been  otherwise  regarded  as  altogether 
romantic  and  mythical. 

The  coins  of  Varahran  V.  are  chiefly  remarkable  for 
their  rudeand  coarse  workmanshipandforthe  numberof 
the  mints  from  which  they  were  issued.  The  mint-marks 
include  Ctesiphon,  Ecbatana,  Isaphan,  Arbela,  Ledan, 
Nehavend,  Assyria,  Chuzistan,  Media,  and  Kerman,  or 
Carmania.3  The  ordinary  legend  is,  upon  the  obverse, 
Mazdisn  bag  Varahran  malka,  or  Mazdisn  bag  Varahran 
rasti  malka,  and  on  the  reverse,  '  Varahran,'  together 
with  a  mint-mark.  The  head-dress  has  the  mural  crown 
in  front  and  behind,  but  interposes  between  these  two 
detached  fragments  a  crescent  and  a  circle,  emblems, 
no  doubt,  of  the  sun  and  moon 
gods.  The  reverse  shows  the  usual 
fire-altar,  with  guards,  or  attendants, 
watching  it.  The  king's  head  ap- 
pears in  the  flame  upon  the  altar. 

According  to  the  Oriental  writers, 
Varahran  V.  was  one  of  the  best  of 
the  Sassanian  princes.    He  carefully 
administered  justice  among  his  numerous  subjects,  re- 
mitted arrears  of  taxation,  gave  pensions  to  men  of 

1  Tabari,  p.  126;  Mirkhond,  p.  |  vol.  i.  p.  121,  note. 

341.  3  Mordtmann,  in  the  Zcitschrift, 

2  Malcolm,   History   of  Persia,  |  vol.  viii.  pp.  68-70. 


COI!Sr  OF  VARAHllAN  V 


300 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Cii.  XIV. 


science  and  letters,  encouraged  agriculture,  and  was 
extremely  liberal  in  the  relief  of  poverty  and  distress.1 
His  faults  were,  that  he  was  over-generous  and  over- 
fond  of  amusement,  especially  of  the  chase.  The  nick- 
name of  1  Bahram-Gur,'  by  which  he  is  known  to  the 
Orientals,  marks  this  last-named  predilection,  transfer- 
ring to  him,  as  it  does,  the  name  of  the  animal  which 
was  the  especial  object  of  his  pursuit.2  But  he  was 
almost  equally  fond  of  dancing  and  of  games.3  Still  it 
does  not  appear  that  his  inclination  for  amusements  ren- 
dered him  neglectful  of  public  affairs,  or  at  all  interfered 
with  his  administration  of  the  State.  Persia  is  said  to 
have  been  in  a  most  flourishing  condition  during  his 
reign.4  He  may  not  have  gained  all  the  successes  that 
are  ascribed  to  him  ;  but  he  was  undoubtedly  an  active 
prince,  brave,  energetic,  and  clear-sighted.  He  judi- 
ciously brought  the  Roman  war  to  a  close  when  a  new 
and  formidable  enemy  appeared  on  his  north-eastern 
frontier  ;  he  wisely  got  rid  of  the  Armenian  difficulty, 
which  had  been  a  stumbling-block  in  the  way  of  his 
predecessors  for  two  hundred  years ;  he  inflicted  a 
check  on  the  aggressive  Tatars,  which  indisposed  them 
to  renew  hostilities  with  Persia  for  a  quarter  of  a  cen- 
tury. It  would  seem  that  he  did  not  much  appreciate 
art  ;5  but  he  encouraged  learning,  and  did  his  best  to 
advance  science.6 


1  Modjmel-al-Tewarikh,  p.  515; 
Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  118;  Mirkhond, 
pp.  332-3;  Macoudi,  vol.  ii.  p.  190. 

2  The  wild  ass  is  called  by  the 
Persians  guv  or  gour.  Eutychius, 
in  speaking  of  Varahran  V.,  writes 
the  word  jaur  (vol.  ii.  pp.  80  and 
83). 

*»  Mirkhond,  p.  334. 


4  Ibid.  p.  333;  Tabari,  p.  118. 

5  The  sculptures  which  Ker 
Porter  assigned  to  this  prince 
(Travels,  vol.  i.  pp.  533-540)  have 
nothing  that  really  connects  them 
with  him.  In  none  of  them  is  the 
head-dress  of  the  king  that  which 
appears  on  the  coins  of  Varahran  V. 

e  Mirkhond,  p.  332. 


Ch.  xv.j         accession  of  ISDIGEKD  II,  301 


CHAPTER  XV. 

Reign  of  Tsdigerd  FT.  His  War  with  Rome.  His  Nine  Years'  War 
with  the  Ephthalites.  His  Policy  towards  Armenia.  His  Second  Eph- 
thalite  War.    His  Character.    His  Coins. 

Ovapapavqc  .  .  .  izapadiduoi,  ttjv  ^aatKuav  '[Gdiyepdy  darepG)  tgj  oike'll)  Txaidi. 

Agathias,  iv.  27;  p.  137,  C. 

The  successor  of  Varahran  V.  was  his  son,  Isdigerd  the 
Second,  who  ascended  the  Persian  throne  without  op- 
position in  the  year  a.d.  440. 1  His  first  act  was  to 
declare  war  against  Rome.  The  Roman  forces  were,  it 
would  seem,  concentrated  in  the  vicinity  of  Nisibis ; 2 
and  Isdigerd  may  have  feared  that  they  would  make 
an  attack  upon  the  place.  He  therefore  anticipated 
them,  and  invaded  the  empire  with  an  army  composed 
in  part  of  his  own  subjects,  but  in  part  also  of  troops 
from  the  surrounding  nations.  Saracens,  Tzani,  Isau- 
rians,  and  Huns  (Ephthalites  ?)  served  under  his  stand- 
ard ; 3  and  a  sudden  incursion  was  made  into  the  Roman 
territory,  for  which  the  imperial  officers  were  wholly 
unprepared.  A  considerable  impression  would  prob- 
ably have  been  produced,  had  not  the  weather  proved 
exceedingly  unpropitious.  Storms  of  rain  and  hail 
hindered  the  advance  of  the  Persian  troops,  and  allowed 


1  See  Clinton,  F.  R.  vol.  i.  p. 
546.  Mordtmann  puts  his  accession 
in  a.d.  444  (Zeitschrift,  vol.  viii. 
p.  70) ;  Patkanian  {Journ.  Asia- 
tique,  1866,  p.  167)  in  a.d.  438. 
But  a  comparison  of  Marcellinus 


(p.  25)  with  Moses  of  Chorene 
(iii.  67,  ad  init.)  shows  Clinton  to 
be  right. 

2  Mos.  Chor.  l.s.c. 

3  Marcellinus,  Chron.  l.s.c. 


302 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  XV. 


the  Roman  generals  a  breathing  space,  during  which 
they  collected  an  army.1  But  the  Emperor  Theodosius 
was  anxious  that  the  flames  of  war  should  not  be  re- 
lighted in  this  quarter ;  and  his  instructions  to  the 
prefect  of  the  East,  the  Count  Anatolius,2  were  such  as 
speedily  led  to  the  conclusion,  first  of  a  truce  for  a  year, 
and  then  of  a  lasting  treaty.  Anatolius  repaired  as 
ambassador  to  the  Persian  camp,  on  foot  and  alone,  so 
as  to  place  himself  completely  in  Isdigerd's  power — an 
act  which  so  impressed  the  latter  that  (we  are  told)  he 
at  once  agreed  to  make  peace  on  the  terms  which  Ana- 
tolius suggested.*  The  exact  nature  of  these  terms  is 
not  recorded ;  but  they  contained  at  least  one  unusual 
condition.  The  Romans  and  Persians  agreed  that 
neither  party  should  construct  any  new  fortified  post 
in  the  vicinity  of  the  other's  territory  —  a  loose  phrase 
which  was  likely  to  be  variously  interpreted,  and  might 
easily  lead  to  serious  complications. 

It  is  difficult  to  understand  this  sudden  conclusion  of 
peace  by  a  young  prince,  evidently  anxious  to  reap 
laurels,  who  in  the  first  year  of  his  reign  had,  at  the 
head  of  a  large  army,  invaded  the  dominions  of  a  neigh- 
bour. The  Roman  account,  that  he  invaded,  that  he 
was  practically  u  nopposed,  and  that  then,  out  of  polite- 
ness towards  the  prefect  of  the  East,  he  voluntarily 
retired  within  his  own  frontier,  c  having  done  nothing 
disagreeable,' 4  is  as  improbable  a  narrative  as  we  often 
meet  with,  even  in  the  pages  of  the  Byzantine  historians. 


1  Theodoret,  H.  K  v.  37.  The 
invasion  is  wrongly  assigned  by  this 
writer  to  the  reign  of  Varahran  V., 
which  was  just  ended. 

2  Procop.  Be  Hell.  Pers.  i.  2. 
Anatolius  is  also  mentioned  as  con- 
cluding the  peace  by  Marcellinus 


(l.s.c). 

3  Procop.  l.s.c:  Tyv  dpyvjjv 
ZvvEXuprjoev   ovrcoc   cjancp    ' kvaroTiioQ 

TTpOf  aVTOV  £XPy&V' 

4  *Edpaoe  6e  ovdev  uxapi.  (Procop. 
l.s.c.) 


Ch.  XV.] 


HIS  ROMAN  WAR. 


303 


Something  has  evidently  been  kept  back.  If  Isdigerd 
returned,  as  Procopius  declares,  without  effecting  any- 
thing, he  must  have  been  recalled  by  the  occurrence  of 
troubles  in  some  other  part  of  his  empire.1  But  it  is, 
perhaps,  as  likely  that  he  retired,  simply  because  he 
had  effected  the  object  with  which  he  engaged  in  the 
war.  It  was  a  constant  practice  of  the  Romans  to  ad- 
vance their  frontier  by  building  strong  towns  on  or 
near  a  debatable  border,  which  attracted  to  them  the 
submission  of  the  neighbouring  district.  The  recent 
building  of  Theodosiopolis2  in  the  eastern  part  of  Ro- 
man Armenia  had  been  an  instance  of  this  practice.  It 
was  perhaps  being  pursued  elsewhere  along  the  Per- 
sian border,  and  the  invasion  of  Isdigerd  may  have 
been  intended  to  check  it.  If  so,  the  proviso  of  the 
treaty  recorded  by  Procopius  would  have  afforded  him 
the  security  which  he  required,  and  have  rendered  it 
unnecessary  for  him  to  continue  the  war  any  longer. 

His  arms  shortly  afterwards  found  employment  in 
another  quarter.  The  Tatars  of  the  Transoxianian 
regions  were  once  more  troublesome ;  and  in  order  to 
check  or  prevent  the  incursions  which  they  were  always 
ready  to  make,  if  they  were  unmolested,  Isdigerd  under- 
took a  long  war  on  his  north-eastern  frontier,  which  he 
conducted  with  a  resolution  and  perseverance  not  very 
common  in  the  East.  Leaving  his  vizier,  Mihr-Narses, 
to  represent  him  at  the  seat  of  government,  he  trans- 
ferred his  own  residence  to  Nishapur,3  in  the  moun- 
tain region  between  the  Persian  and  Kharesmian 
deserts,  and  from  that  convenient  post  of  observation 
directed  the  military  operations  against  his  active 


1  So  Tillemont  suspects  {Hist, 
des  Empereurs,  torn.  vi.  pp.  39-40). 

2  See  above,  p.  287. 


3  Patkanian  in  the  Journal  Asia- 
tique  for  1866,  pp.  164-6. 


304 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  XV. 


enemies,  making  a  campaign  against  them  regularly 
every  year  from  a.d.  443  to  451.  In  the  year  last 
mentioned  he  crossed  the  Oxus,  and,  attacking  the 
Ephthalites  in  their  own  territory,  obtained  a  complete 
success,  driving  the  monarch  from  the  cultivated  por- 
tion of  the  country,  and  forcing  him  to  take  refuge  in 
the  desert,1  So  complete  was  his  victory  that  he  seems 
to  have  been  satisfied  with  the  result,  and,  regarding  the 
war  as  terminated,  to  have  thought  the  time  was  come 
for  taking  in  hand  an  arduous  task,  long  contemplated, 
but  not  hitherto  actually  attempted. 

This  was  no  less  a  matter  than  the  forcible  conver- 
sion of  Armenia  to  the  faith  of  Zoroaster.  It  has  been 
already  noted 2  that  the  religious  differences  which  — 
from  the  time  when  the  Armenians,  anticipating  Con- 
stantine,  adopted  as  the  religion  of  their  state  and 
nation  the  Christian  faith  (ab.  a.d.  300)  —  separated  the 
Armenians  from  the  Persians,  were  a  cause  of  weak- 
ness to  the  latter,  more  especially  in  their  contests  with 
Rome.  Armenia  was  always,  naturally,  upon  the 
Roman  side,  since  a  religious  sympathy  united  it  with 
the  court  of  Constantinople,  and  an  exactly  opposite 
feeling  tended  to  detach  it  from  the  court  of  Ctesiphon. 
The  alienation  would  have  been,  comparatively  speak- 
ing, unimportant,  after  the  division  of  Armenia  be- 
tween the  two  powers,  had  that  division  been  regarded 
by  either  party  as  final,  or  as  precluding  the  formation 
of  designs  upon  the  territory  which  each  had  agreed 
should  be  held  by  the  other.  But  there  never  yet  had 
been  a  time  when  such  designs  had  ceased  to  be  enter- 
tained ;  and  in  the  war  which  Isdigerd  had  waged  with 


1  Patkanian  in  the  Journal  Asiatique  for  1866,  p.  164. 

2  Supra,  p.  251. 


Ch.  XV.] 


HIS  POLICY  IN  ARMENIA. 


305 


Theodosius  at  the  beginning  of  his  reign,  Roman  in- 
trigues in  Persarmenia  had  forced  him  to  send  an  army 
into  that  country.1  The  Persians  felt,  and  felt  with 
reason,  that  so  long  as  Armenia  remained  Christian  and 
Persia  held  to  the  faith  of  Zoroaster,  the  relations  of 
the  two  countries  could  never  be  really  friendly ;  Per- 
sia would  always  have  a  traitor  in  her  own  camp ; 
and  in  any  time  of  difficulty  — -  especially  in  any  dif- 
ficulty with  Rome  —  might  look  to  see  this  portion  of 
her  territory  go  over  to  the  enemy.  We  cannot  be 
surprised  if  Persian  statesmen  were  anxious  to  termi- 
nate so  unsatisfactory  a  state  of  things,  and  cast  about 
for  a  means  whereby  Armenia  might  be  won  over, 
and  made  a  real  friend  instead  of  a  concealed  enemy. 

The  means  which  suggested  itself  to  Isdigerd  as  the 
simplest  and  most  natural,  was,  as  above  observed,  the 
conversion  of  the  Armenians  to  the  Zoroastrian  religion. 
In  the  early  part  of  his  reign,  he  entertained  a  hope  of 
effecting  his  purpose  by  persuasion,  and  sent  his  vizier, 
Mihr-Narses,  into  the  country,  with  orders  to  use  all 
possiblepeacefulmeans — gifts,  blandishments,  promises, 
threats,  removal  of  malignant  chiefs — to  induce  Arme- 
nia to  consent  to  a  change  of  religion.2  Mihr-Narses 
did  his  best,  but  failed  signally.  He  carried  off  the 
chiefs  of  the  Christian  party,  not  only  from  Armenia, 
but  from  Iberia  and  Albania,  telling  them  that  Isdigerd 
required  their  services  against  the  Tatars,  and  forced 
them  with  their  followers  to  take  part  in  the  Eastern 
war.3  He  committed  Armenia  to  the  care  of  the  Mar- 
grave, Vasag,  a  native  prince  who  was  well  inclined  to 


1  The  entrance  of  the  army  is 
noted  by  Moses  of  Chorene  (Hist. 
Armen.  iii.  6S).  We  can  scarcely 
be  mistaken  in  regarding  its  en- 
trance as  required  on  account  of 


Roman  intrigues. 

2  St.  Martin,  Becherches  sur 
VArmenie,  torn.  i.  p.  322. 

3  Ibid.  p.  323. 


306 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  XV. 


the  Persian  cause,  and  gave  him  instructions  to  bring 
about  the  change  of  religion  by  a  policy  of  conciliation. 
But  the  Armenians  were  obstinate.  Neither  threats, 
nor  promises,  nor  persuasions  had  any  effect.  It  was 
in  vain  that  a  manifesto  was  issued,  painting  the  religion 
of  Zoroaster  in  the  brightest  colours,  and  requiring  all 
persons  to  conform  to  it.  It  was  to  no  purpose  that 
arrests  were  made,  and  punishments  threatened.  The 
Armenians  declined  to  yield  either  to  argument  or  to 
menace ;  and  no  progress  at  all  was  made  in  the 
direction  of  the  desired  conversion. 

In  the  year  a.d.  450,  the  patriarch  Joseph,  by  the 
general  desire  of  the  Armenians,  held  a  great  assembly, 
at  which  it  was  carried  by  acclamation,  that  the  Arme- 
nians were  Christians,  and  would  continue  such,  what- 
ever it  might  cost  them.  If  it  was  hoped  by  this  to 
induce  Isdigerd  to  lay  aside  his  proselytising  schemes, 
the  hope  was  a  delusion.  Isdigerd  retaliated  by  sum- 
moning to  his  presence  the  principal  chiefs,  viz.,  Vasag, 
the  Margrave  ; 1  the  Sparapet,  or  commander-in-chief, 
Vartan,  the  Mamigonian ;  Vazten,  prince  of  Iberia ; 
Vatche,  king  of  Albania,  &c. ;  and  having  got  them  into 
his  power,  threatened  them  with  immediate  death, 
unless  they  at  once  renounced  Christianity  and  made 
profession  of  Zoroastrianism.  The  chiefs,  not  having 
the  spirit  of  martyrs,  unhappily  yielded,  and  declared 
themselves  converts ;  whereupon  Isdigerd  sent  them 
back  to  their  respective  countries,  with  orders  to  force 
everywhere  on  their  fellow-countrymen  a  similar 
change  of  religion. 

Upon  this,  the  Armenians  and  Iberians  broke  out  in 


1  The  Armenian  term  is  Marz- 
pan,  4  Protector  of  the  Border,' 
with  which  Patkanian  well  com- 


pares *  Margrave '  (Journ.  Asia- 
tique,  I860,  p.  114). 


Ch.  XV.]  ARMENIAN  WAR  OF  RELIGION.  307 

open  revolt.  Vartan,  the  Mamigonian,  repenting  of 
his  weakness,  abjured  his  new  creed,  resumed  the  pro- 
fession of  Christianity,  and  made  his  peace  with  Joseph, 
the  patriarch.1  He  then  called  the  people  to  arms,  and 
in  a  short  time  collected  a  force  of  a  hundred  thousand 
men.  Three  armies  were  formed,  to  act  separately 
under  different  generals.  One  watched  Azerbijan,  or 
Media  Atropatene,  whence  it  was  expected  that  their 
main  attack  would  be  made  by  the  Persians ;  another, 
under  Vartan,  proceeded  to  the  relief  of  Albania,  where 
proceedings  were  going  on  similar  to  those  which  had 
driven  Armenia  into  rebellion  ;  the  third,  under  Vasag, 
occupied  a  central  position  in  Armenia,  and  was  in- 
tended to  move  wherever  danger  should  threaten.2  An 
attempt  was  at  the  same  time  made  to  induce  the 
Roman  emperor,  Marcian,  to  espouse  the  cause  of 
the  rebels,  and  send  troops  to  their  assistance ;  but  this 
attempt  was  unsuccessful.  Marcian  had  but  recently 
ascended  the  throne,3  and  was,  perhaps,  scarcely  fixed 
in  his  seat.  He  was  advanced  in  years,  and  naturally 
unenterprising.  Moreover,  the  position  of  affairs  in 
Western  Europe  was  such,  that  Marcian  might  expect 
at  any  moment  to  be  attacked  by  an  overwhelming 
force  of  northern  barbarians,  cruel,  warlike,  and  un- 
sparing. Attila  was  in  a.d.  451  at  the  height  of  his 
power ;  he  had  not  yet  been  worsted  at  Chalons ; 4  and 
the  terrible  Huns,  whom  he  led,  might  in  a  few  months 
destroy  the  Western,  and  be  ready  to  fall  upon  the 


1  St.  Martin,  Becker  dies,  p.  324. 

2  Ibid.  p.  326. 

8  Marcian  became  emperor  in 
August,  a.d.  450.  The  application 
to  him  for  aid  was  made,  according 
to  St.  Martin,  towards  the  end  of 
A.D.  450,  or  early  in  a.d.  451. 


4  The  battle  of  Chalons  was 
fought  in  the  autumn  of  a.d.  451 
(Clinton,  F.  B.  vol.  i.  p.  642).  On 
the  power  of  Attila  at  this  time, 
see  Gibbon  (Decline  and  Fall, 
vol.  iv.  pp.  231-6). 


308 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


ICh.  XV. 


Eastern  empire.  Armenia,  consequently,  was  left  to  her 
own  resources,  and  had  to  combat  the  Persians  single- 
handed.  Even  so,  she  might  probably  have  succeeded, 
have  maintained  her  Christianity,  or  even  recovered  her 
independence,  had  her  people  been  of  one  mind,  and 
had  no  defection  from  the  national  cause  manifested 
itself.  But  Vasag,  the  Marzpan,  had  always  been  half- 
hearted in  the  quarrel;  and,  now  that  the  crisis  was 
come,  he  determined  on  going  wholly  over  to  the 
Persians.  He  was  able  to  carry  with  him  the  army 
which  he  commanded  ;  and  thus  Armenia  was  divided 
against  itself:  and  the  chance  of  victory  was  well-nigh 
lost  before  the  struggle  had  begun.  When  the  Per- 
sians took  the  field,  they  found  half  Armenia  ranged 
upon  their  side ;  and,  though  a  long  and  bloody  con- 
test followed,  the  end  was  certain  from  the  beginning. 
After  much  desultory  warfare,  a  great  battle  was  fought 
in  the  sixteenth  year  of  Isdigerd  (a.d.  455  or  456),  be- 
tween the  Christian  Armenians  on  the  one  side,  and 
the  Persians,  with  their  Armenian  abettors,  on  the  other. 
The  Persians  were  victorious ;  Vartan,  and  his  brother, 
Hemaiag,  were  among  the  slain ;  and  the  patriotic 
party  found  that  no  further  resistance  was  possible.1 
The  patriarch,  Joseph,  and  the  other  bishops,  were 
seized,  carried  off  to  Persia,  and  martyred.  Zoroastri- 
anism  was  enforced  upon  the  Armenian  nation.  All 
accepted  it,  except  a  few,  who  either  took  refuge  in 
the  dominions  of  Rome,  or  fled  to  the  mountain  fast- 
nesses of  Kurdistan.2 

The  resistance  of  Armenia  was  scarcely  overborne, 
when  war  once  more  broke  out  in  the  East,  and  Isdi- 
gerd was  forced  to  turn  his  attention  to  the  defence  of 

1  St.  Martin,  Recherches  sur  UAnnenie,  vol.  i.  p.  327.  2  Ibid. 


Ch.  XV.]     SECOND  WAR  WITH  THE  EPHTHALITES.  309 

his  frontier  against  the  aggressive  Ephthalites,  who,  after 
remaining  quiet  for  three  or  four  years,  had  again  flown 
to  arms,  had  crossed  the  Oxus,  and  invaded  Khorassan 
in  force.1  On  his  first  advance,  the  Persian  monarch 
was  so  far  successful,  that  the  invading  hordes  seem  to 
have  retired,  and  left  Persia  to  itself ;  but  when  Isdi- 
gerd,  having  resolved  to  retaliate,  led  his  own  forces 
into  the  Ephthalite  country,  they  took  heart,  resisted 
him,  and,  having  tempted  him  into  an  ambuscade,  suc- 
ceeded in  inflicting  upon  him  a  severe  defeat.  Isdi- 
gerd  was  forced  to  retire  hastily  within  his  own 
borders,  and  to  leave  the  honours  of  victory  to  his 
assailants,  whose  triumph  must  have  encouraged  them 
to  continue  year  after  year  their  destructive  inroads 
into  the  north-eastern  provinces  of  the  empire. 

It  was  not  long  after  the  defeat  which  he  suffered  in 
this  quarter,  that  Isdigerd's  reign  came  to  an  end.  He 
died  a.d.  457,  after  having  held  the  throne  for  seven- 
teen or  (according  to  some)  for  nineteen  years.2  He 
was  a  prince  of  considerable  ability,  determination,  and 
courage.  That  his  subjects  called  him  1  the  Clement 7  3 
is  at  first  sight  surprising,  since  clemency  is  certainly 
not  the  virtue  that  any  modern  writer  would  think  of 
associating  with  his  name.  But  we  may  assume  from 
the  application  of  the  term,  that,  where  religious  con- 
siderations did  not  come  into  play,  he  was  fair  and 
equitable,  mild-tempered,  and  disinclined  to  harsh 
punishments.    Unfortunately,  experience  tells  us  that 


1  Patkanian,  in  the  Journal  A sia- 
tique  for  1866,  p.  165. 

2  Tabari  (vol.  ii.  p.  127)  says  he 
reigned  eighteen  years;  Macoudi 
(vol.  ii.  p.  195)  nineteen;  Agathias 
(iv.  27)  seventeen.  The  statement 
of  Agathias  is  preferred  by  Clinton 


(F.  R.  vol.  i.  p.  546);  that  of 
Macoudi  by  Patkanian  (p.  167)  and 
Thomas  (Num.  Chron.  New  Series, 
No.  xlv.  p.  45).  All  moderns 
agree  that  he  died  a.d.  457. 
8  So  Tabari,  l.s.c. 


310 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  XV. 


natural  mildness  is  no  security  against  the  acceptance 
of  a  bigot's  creed ;  and,  when  a  policy  of  persecution 
has  once  been  adopted,  a  Trajan  or  a  Valerian  will  be 
as  unsparing  as  a  Maximin  or  a  Galerius.  Isdigerd 
was  a  bitter  and  successful  persecutor  of  Christianity, 
which  he  —  for  a  time  at  any  rate  —  stamped  out,  both 
from  his  own  proper  dominions,  and  from  the  newly- 
acquired  province  of  Armenia.  He  would  have  pre- 
ferred less  violent  means ;  but,  when  they  failed,  he  felt 
no  scruples  in  employing  the  extremest  and  severest 
coercion.  He  was  determined  on  uniformity ;  and  uni- 
formity he  secured,  but  at  the  cost  of  crushing  a  peo- 
ple, and  so  alienating  them  as  to  make  it  certain  that 
they  would,  on  the  first  convenient  occasion,  throw  off 
the  Persian  yoke  altogether. 

The  coins  of  Isdigerd  II.  nearly  resemble  those  of 
his  father,  Varahran  V.,  differing  only 
in  the  legend,  and  in  the  fact  that  the 
mural  crown  of  Isdigerd  is  complete,1 
The  legend  is  remarkably  short,  being 
either  Masdisn  kadi  Yezdikerti,  or 
merely  Kadi  Yezdikerti  —  i.e.  4  the  Or- 
mazd-worshipping  great  Isdigerd ; '  or 
1  Isdigerd  the  Great,'  The  coins  are  not  very  numerous, 
and  have  three  mint-marks  only,  which  are  interpreted 
to  mean  'Khuzistan,'  c  Ctesiphon,'  and  1  Nehavend.' 2 


COIN  OF  ISDIGERD  II. 


1  See  Mordtmann  in  the  Zeit- 
schrifty  vol.  viii.  pp.  70-1.  Long- 
perier  has  mistakenly  assigned  to 
Isdigerd  I.  two  coins  (PI.  viii.,  ISos. 


3  and  4)  which  really  belong  to 
Isdigerd  II. 
2  'Mordtmann,  l.s.c. 


Ch.  XVI.  ] 


ACCESSION  OF  HORMISDAS  111. 


311 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

Right  of  Succession  disputed  between  the  two  Sons  of  Isdigerd  II.,  Perozes 
(or  Firuz)  and  Hormisdas.  Civil  War  for  two  years.  Success  of 
Perozes,  through  aid  given  him  by  the  Ephthalites.  Great  Famine. 
Perozes  declares  War  against  the  Ephthalites,  and  makes  an  Expedition 
into  their  Country.  His  ill  success.  Conditions  of  Peace  granted  him. 
Armenian  Revolt  and  War.  Perozes,  after  some  years,  resumes  the 
Ephthalite  War.  His  attack  fails,  and  he  is  slain  in  battle.  Summary 
of  his  Character.  Coins  of  Hormisdas  III.  and  Perozes.  Vase  of 
Perozes. 

*  Yazdejerdo  e  medio  sublato,  de  regno  contenderunt  duo  ipsius  filii, 
Phiruz  et  Hormoz,  aliis  a  partibus  Firuzi,  aliis  ab  Hormozi  stanti- 
bus. '  — Eutych.  vol.  i.  p.  100. 

On  the  death  of  Isdigerd  II.  (a.d.  457),  the  throne  was 
seized  by  his  younger  son,1  Hormisdas,  who  appears  to 
have  owed  his  elevation,  in  a  great  measure,  to  the 
partiality  of  his  father.  That  monarch,  preferring  his 
younger  son  above  his  elder,  had  made  the  latter  gov- 
ernor of  the  distant  Seistan,  and  had  thus  removed  him 
far  from  the  court,  while  he  retained  Hormisdas  about 
his  own  person.2  The  advantage  thus  secured  to  Hor- 
misdas enabled  him  when  his  father  died  to  make  him- 
self king ;  and  Perozes  was  forced,  we  are  told,  to  fly  the 


1  The  Armenian  historians  make 
Hormisdas  the  elder,  and  Perozes 
the  younger  son  (Patkanian  in  the 
Journal  Asiatiqne  for  1866,  p.  169); 
but  Tabari  (Chronique,  vol.  ii.  p. 
127),  Mirkhond  (p.  342),  and  the 
Persian  writers  generally,  declare 
the  reverse  to  have  been  the  case. 
They  give  details  which  support 


their  view. 

2  Tabari,  l.s.c.  Mirkhond  says 
that  Isdigerd  regarded  Hormisdas 
as  better  qualified  to  govern  than 
Perozes,  since  he  had  more  sweet- 
ness, modesty,  and  intelligence, 
whereas  in  favour  of  Perozes  were 
only  his  age  and  his  advantages  of 
person  (pp.  342-3). 


312 


THE  SEVENTH  MONAKCHY. 


[Ch.  XYL 


country,  and  place  himself  under  the  protection  of 
the  Ephthalite  monarch,  who  ruled  in  the  valley  of  the 
Oxus,  over  Bactria,  Tokaristan,  Badakshan,  and  other 
neighbouring  districts.1  This  king,  who  bore  the  name 
of  Khush-new&z,2  received  him  favourably,  and  though 
at  first,  out  of  fear  for  the  power  of  Persia,  he  declined 
to  lend  him  troops,  was  induced  after  a  while  to  adopt 
a  bolder  policy.  Hormisdas,  despite  his  epithet  of 
Ferzan,  4  the  Wise,' 3  was  soon  at  variance  with  his 
subjects,  many  of  whom  gathered  about  Perozes  at  the 
court  which  he  was  allowed  to  maintain  in  Taleqan, 
one  of  the  Ephthalite  cities.  Supported  by  this  body  of 
refugees,  and  by  an  Ephthalite  contingent,4  Perozes  ven- 
tured to  advance  against  his  brother.  His  army,  which 
was  commanded  bv  a  certain  Raham,  or  Ram,  a  noble 
of  the  Mihran  family,  attacked  the  forces  of  Hormisdas, 
defeated  them,  and  made  Hormisdas  himself  a  prisoner.5 
The  troops  of  the  defeated  monarch,  convinced  by  the 
logic  of  success,  deserted  their  late  leader's  cause,  and 
went  over  in  a  body  to  the  conqueror.  Perozes,  after 
somewhat  more  than  two  years  of  exile,  was  acknowl- 
edged as  king  by  the  whole  Persian  people,  and,  quit- 
ting Taleqan,  established  himself  at  Ctesiphon,  or  Al 
Modain,  which  had  now  become  the  main  seat  of  gov- 
ernment. It  is  uncertain  what  became  of  Hormisdas. 
According  to  the  Armenian  writers,6  Raham,  after  .de- 
feating him,  caused  him  to  be  put  to  death ;  but  the 
native  historian,  Mirkhond,  declares  that,  on  the  con- 


1  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  137. 

2  The  Greeks  shortened  the  name 
into  Cunchas  (Kovyxag).  See  Pris- 
cus  Panites,  Fr.  33. 

3  So  explained  by  Mirkhond  (p. 
344). 

4  Amounting,  according  to  Mir- 
khond to  no  fewer  than  30,000  men 


(ibid.). 

5  Patkanian  in  the  Journal  Asia- 
tique  for  1866,  p.  168. 

0  Elisee,  p.  153;  Moyse  de  Ka- 
ghank,  i.  10.  These  writers  are 
supported  by  Tabari,  who  says 
briefly,  '  Firouz  combattit  son  frere 
Hormouz,  etle  tua'  (p.  128). 


Ch.  XVI.]  HORMISDAS  III.  SUCCEEDED  BY  PEROZES.  313 

traiy,  Perozes  forgave  him  for  having  disputed  the  suc- 
cession, and  amiably  spared  his  life.1 

The  civil  war  between  the  two  brothers,  short  as  it 
was,  had  lasted  long  enough  to  cost  Persia  a  province. 
Vatche,  king  of  Aghouank  (Albania),2  took  advantage 
of  the  time  of  disturbance  to  throw  off  his  allegiance, 
and  succeeded  in  making  himself  independent.3  It  was 
the  first  object  of  Perozes,  after  establishing  himself 
upon  the  throne,  to  recover  this  valuable  territory. 
He  therefore  made  war  upon  Vatche,  though  that 
prince  was  the  son  of  his  sister,  and  with  the  help  of 
his  Ephthalite  allies,  and  of  a  body  of  Alans  whom  he 
took  into  his  service,  defeated  the  rebellious  Albanians 
and  completely  subjugated  the  revolted  country.4 

A  time  of  prosperity  now  ensued.  Perozes  ruled 
with  moderation  and  justice.5  He  dismissed  his  Eph- 
thalite allies  with  presents  that  amply  contented  them,6 
and  lived  for  five  years  in  great  peace  and  honour.  But 
in  the  seventh  year T  from  the  death  of  his  father,  the 
prosperity  of  Persia  was  suddenly  and  grievously  inter- 
rupted by  a  terrible  drought,  a  calamity  whereto  Asia 
has  in  all  ages  been  subject,  and  which  often  produces 
the  most  frightful  consequences.  The  crops  fail ;  the 
earth  becomes  parched  and  burnt  up  ;  smiling  districts 
are  changed  into  wildernesses  ;  fountains  and  brooks 
cease  to  flow  ;  then  the  wells  have  no  water ;  finally 


1  Mirkhond,  p.  344. 

2  On  the  identity  of  Aghouank 
with  Albania,  see  St.  Martin's  Re- 
cherches  sur  VArmenie,  torn.  i.  p. 
214,  and  torn.  ii.  pp.  358-9. 

3  Patkanian,  p.  168. 

4  Ibid.  p.  170. 

5  Mirkhond,  p.  345;  Tabari,  p. 
128. 

"  Mirkhond,  p.  344;  Tabari,  l.s.c. 


7  So  Tabari.  The  statement  is 
confirmed  by  the  remarkable  fact 
that  his  coins,  which  are  abundant 
up  to  his  seventh  year,  then  fail 
entirely  for  five  years,  after  which 
they  reappear  and  are  once  more 
plentiful.  (See  Thomas  in  Numis- 
matic Chronicle  for  1873,  vol.  xiii., 
No.  51,  p.  224.) 


314 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [Ch.  XVI. 


even  the  great  rivers  are  reduced  to  threads,  and  contain 
only  the  scantiest  supply  of  the  life-giving  fluid  in  their 
channels.  Famine  under  these  circumstances  of  neces- 
sity sets  in ;  the  poor  die  by  hundreds ;  even  the  rich 
have  a  difficulty  in  sustaining  life  by  means  of  food 
imported  from  a  distance.  We  are  told1  that  the 
drought  in  the  reign  of  Perozes  was  such  that  at  last 
there  was  not  a  drop  of  water  either  in  the  Tigris  or 
the  Oxus ;  all  the  sources  and  fountains,  all  the  streams 
and  brooks  failed ;  vegetation  altogether  ceased  ;  the 
beasts  of  the  field  and  the  fowls  of  the  air  perished ; 
nowhere  through  the  whole  empire  was  a  bird  to  be 
seen  ;  the  wild  animals,  even  the  reptiles,  disappeared 
altogether.  The  dreadful  calamity  lasted  for  seven 
years,2  and  under  ordinary  circumstances  the  bulk  of 
the  population  would  have  been  swept  off ;  but  such 
were  the  wisdom  and  the  beneficence  of  the  Persian 
monarch,  that  during  the  entire  duration  of  the  scourge 
not  a  single  person,  or,  according  to  another  account, 
but  one  person,3  perished  of  hunger.  Perozes  began  by 
issuing  general  orders  that  the  rich  should  come  to  the 
relief  of  their  poorer  brethren ;  he  required  the  governors 
of  towns,  and  the  head-men  of  villages,  to  see  that  food 
was  supplied  to  those  in  need,  and  threatened  that  for 
each  poor  man  in  a  town  or  village  who  died  of  want, 
he  would  put  a  rich  man  to  death.  At  the  end  of  two 
years,  finding  that  the  drought  continued,  he  declined 
to  take  any  revenue  from  his  subjects,  remitting  taxes 
of  all  kinds,  whether  they  were  money  imposts  or  con- 
tributions in  kind.    In  the  fourth  year,  not  content 


1  Tabari,  Chronique,  ii.  p.  130. 

2  Ibid.  Compare  Mirkhond,  p. 
345. 

3  Tabari  says  in  one  place  that 


no  one  died  of  want  during  the 
famine  (ii.  p.  130)  ;  but  in  another, 
admits  that  one  died  (ib.  p.  129). 
So  Mirkhond,  p.  346. 


Ch.  XVX] 


GREAT  FAMINE  IN  PERSIA. 


315 


with  these  measures,  he  went  further ;  opened  the  tr  eas- 
ury doors  and  made  distributions  of  money  from  his 
own  stores  to  those  in  need.  At  the  same  time  he  im- 
ported corn  from  Greece,  from  India,  from  the  valley 
of  the  Oxus,  and  from  Abyssinia,  obtaining  by  these 
means  such  ample  supplies  that  he  was  able  to  furnish 
an  adequate  sustenance  to  all  his  subjects.1  The  result 
was  that  not  only  did  the  famine  cause  no  mortality 
among  the  poorer  classes,  but  no  one  was  even  driven 
to  quit  the  country  in  order  to  escape  the  pressure  of 
the  calamity. 

Such  is  the  account  which  is  given  by  the  Oriental 
authors  of  the  terrible  famine  which  they  ascribe  to 
the  early  part  of  the  reign  of  Perozes.  It  is  difficult, 
however,  to  suppose  that  the  matter  has  not  been  very 
much  exaggerated,  since  we  find  that,  as  early  as  a.d. 
464-5,  when  the  famine  should  have  been  at  its  height, 
Perozes  had  entered  upon  a  great  war  and  was  hotly 
engaged  in  it,  his  ambassadors  at  the  same  time  being 
sent  to  the  Greek  court,  not  to  ask  supplies  of  food, 
but  to  request  a  subsidy  on  account  of  his  military  ope- 
rations.2 The  enemy  which  had  provoked  his  hostility 
was  the  powerful  nation  of  the  Ephthalites,  by  whose 
aid  he  had  so  recently  obtained  the  Persian  crown. 
According  to  a  contemporary  Greek  authority,  more 
worthy  of  trust  than  most  writers  of  his  age  and  nation,3 
the  origin  of  the  war  was  a  refusal  on  the  part  of  the 


1  See  Tabari,  ii.  pp.  129,  130. 

2  Priscus  Panites,  Fr.  31. 

3  On  the  superiority  of  Priscus  to 
the  general  run  of  Byzantine  his- 
torians, see  the  remarks  of  Niebuhr 
in  his  collection  of  the  Byzantine 
historians  (Bonn,  1829) :  "  *  Longe 
optimus  omnium  sequioris  sevihis- 
toricorum  [Priscns]  ;  ingenio,  fide. 


sapientia,  nulli  vel  optimorum  post- 
habendus:  elegans  quoque  et  ser- 
mone  satis  puro  usns,  laudem  atque 
gloriam  quum  aptid  cosevos  turn 
inter  postero  merito  adeptus  est; 
cui  etiam  a  Valesio  etGibbono,  sum- 
mis  viris,  laudari  contigit.'  Com- 
pare Smith's  Diet,  of  Biography, 
vol.  iii.  p.  526. 


316 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  XVI. 


Ephthalites  to  make  certain  customary  payments,  which 
the  Persians  viewed  in  the  light  of  a  tribute.1  Perozes 
determined  to  enforce  his  just  rights,  and  marched  his 
troops  against  the  defaulters  with  this  object.  But  in 
his  first  operations  he  was  unsuccessful,  and  after  a 
time  he  thought  it  best  to  conclude  the  war,  and  con- 
tent himself  with  taking  a  secret  revenge  upon  his 
enemy,  by  means  of  an  occult  insult.  He  proposed  to 
Khush-new&z  to  conclude  a  treaty  of  peace,  and  to 
strengthen  the  compact  by  adding  to  it  a  matrimonial 
alliance.  Khush-new&z  should  take  to  wife  one  of  his 
daughters,  and  thus  unite  the  interests  of  the  two 
reigning  families.  The  proposal  was  accepted  by  the 
Ephthalite  monarch ;  and  he  readily  espoused  the 
young  lady  who  was  sent  to  his  court  apparelled  as 
became  a  daughter  of  Persia.  In  a  little  time,  however, 
he  found  that  he  had  been  tricked :  Perozes  had  not 
sent  him  his  daughter,  but  one  of  his  female  slaves ; 2 
and  the  royal  race  of  the  Ephthalite  kings  had  been 
disgraced  by  a  matrimonial  union  with  a  person  of 
servile  condition.  Khush-new&z  was  justly  indignant ; 
but  dissembled  his  feelings,  and  resolved  to  repay  guile 
with  guile.  He  wrote  to  Perozes  that  it  was  his  inten- 
tion to  make  war  upon  a  neighbouring  tribe,  and  that 
he  wanted  officers  of  experience  to  conduct  the  military 
operations.  The  Persian  monarch,  suspecting  nothing, 
complied  with  the  request,  and  sent  three  hundred  of 
his  chief  officers  to  Khush-new&z,  who  immediately 
seized  them,  put  some  to  death,  and,  mutilating  the  re- 
mainder, commanded  them  to  return  to  their  sovereign, 
and  inform  him  that  the  king  of  the  Ephthalites  now 

1  Priscus  Panites,  Fr.  39.  |  been  played  off  by  Amasis  upon 

2  Compare  with  this  trick  the  j  Cambyses  (Herod,  iii.  1). 
somewhat  similar  one  said  to  have 


\ 


Ch.  XVI.  J  EPHTHALITE  EXPEDITION  OF  PEROZES.  317 

felt  that  he  had  sufficiently  avenged  the  trick  of  which 
he  had  been  the  victim.1  On  receiving  this  message, 
Perozes  renewed  the  war,  advanced  towards  the  Eph- 
thalite  country,  and  fixed  his  head-quarters  in  Hyrca- 
nia,  at  the  city  of  Gurg&n.2  He  was  accompanied  by 
a  Greek  of  the  name  of  Eusebius,3  an  ambassador  from 
the  Emperor  Zeno,  who  took  back  to  Constantinople 
the  following  account  of  the  campaign. 

When  Perozes,  having  invaded  the  Ephthalite  terri- 
tory, fell  in  with  the  army  of  the  enemy,  the  latter  pre- 
tended to  be  seized  with  a  panic,  and  at  once  took  to 
flight.  The  retreat  was  directed  upon  a  portion  of  the 
mountain  region,  w^here  a  broad  and  good  road  led  into 
a  spacious  plain,  surrounded  on  all  sides  by  wooded 
hills,  steep  and  in  places  precipitous.  Here  the  mass 
of  the  Ephthalite  troops  was  cunningly  concealed  amid 
the  foliage  of  the  woods,  while  a  small  number  remain- 
ing visible,  led  the  Persians  into  the  cul-de-sac,  the 
whole  army  unsuspectingly  entering,  and  only  learning 
their  danger  when  they  saw  the  road  whereby  they  had 
entered  blocked  up  by  the  troops  from  the  hills.  The 
officers  then  apprehended  the  true  state  of  the  case,  and 
perceived  that  they  had  been  cleverly  entrapped ;  but 
none  of  them,  it  would  seem,  dared  to  inform  the 
monarch  that  he  had  been  deceived  by  a  stratagem. 
Application  was  made  to  Eusebius,  whose  ambassadorial 
character  would  protect  him  from  an  outbreak,  and  he 
was  requested  to  let  Perozes  know  how  he  was  situated, 


1  Priscus  Panites,  Fr.  33. 

2  Called  Gorgo  by  Priscus  (l.s.c.) 
and  Procopius  (Bell.  Peru.  i.  4). 
The  old  Persian  Varkana  and  the 
Greek  Hyrcania  are  variants  of  the 
same  word.  Some  ruins  of  Gurgan 
still  exist  in  the  valley  of  the  Gur- 
gan river  (lat,  37°20/,  lon<?.  55°15') 


not  far  from  Asterabad. 

3  So  Procopius,  Bell.  Pers.  i.  3. 
Priscus  makes  the  patrician  Con- 
stantius  ambassador  from  Zeno  to 
Perozes  about  this  period  (Frs.  31, 
32,  and  33) :  probably  Eusebius  suc- 
ceeded him. 


318 


THE  SEVEKTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  XVI. 


and  exhort  him  to  endeavour  to  extricate  himself  by 
counsel  rather  than  by  a  desperate  act.  Eusebius  upon 
this  employed  the  Oriental  methodof  apologue,  relating 
to  Perozes  how  a  lion  in  pursuit  of  a  goat  got  himself 
into  difficulties,  from  which  all  his  strength  could  not 
enable  him  to  make  his  escape.  Perozes  apprehended 
his  meaning,  understood  the  situation,  and,  desisting 
from  the  pursuit,  prepared  to  give  battle  where  he 
stood.  Bat  the  Ephthalite  monarch  had  no  wish  to 
push  matters  to  extremities.  Instead  of  falling  on  the 
Persians  from  every  side,  he  sent  an  embassy  to  Perozes 
and  offered  to  release  him  from  his  perilous  situation, 
and  allow  him  to  return  with  all  his  troops  to  Persia,  if 
he  would  swear  a  perpetual  peace  with  the  Ephthalites 
and  do  homage  to  himself  as  his  lord  and  master,  by 
prostration.  Perozes  felt  that  he  had  no  choice  but  to 
accept  these  terms,  hard  as  he  might  think  them.  In- 
structed by  the  Magi,  he  made  the  required  prostration 
at  the  moment  of  sunrise,  with  his  face  turned  to  the 
east,  and  thought  thus  to  escape  the  humiliation  of 
abasing  himself  before  a  mortal  by  the  mental  reserva- 
tion that  the  intention  of  his  act  was  to  adore  the  great 
Persian  divinity.  He  then  swore  to  the  peace,  and  was 
allowed  to  return  with  his  army  intact  into  Persia.1 

It  seems  to  have  been  soon  after  the  conclusion  of 
this  disgraceful  treaty 2  that  serious  troubles  once  more 


1  Such  is  the  account  given  by 
Procopius  (ls.c).  The  Persian 
writers,  Tabari  (vol.  ii.  pp.  132- 
136)  and  Mirkhond  (pp.  348,  349), 
substitute  a  story  in  which  the  old 
myth  of  Zopyrus  (Herod,  iii.  154- 
158)  is  reproduced  with  little  alter- 
ation from  the  traditions  of  a  thou- 
sand years  earlier.  According  to 
this  tale,  Perozes  was  guided  to  his 
destruction  in  the  desert  of  Merv 


by  an  Ephthalite  chief,  who  muti- 
lated himself  in  order  to  deceive 
the  Persians  and  secure  the  success 
of  his  own  sovereign. 

2  The  first  Ephthalite  war  of 
Perozes  cannot  have  terminated 
earlier  that  a.d.  469,  since  in  A.D. 
468  we  hear  of  the  Persians  as 
still  having  the  advantage  in  the 
struggle  (Priscus,  Fr.  41).  The 
troubles  in  Armenia,  which  led  to 


Ch.  XVI.]  FRESH  TROUBLES  IN  ARMENIA.  319 

broke  out  in  Armenia,  Perozes,  following  out  the 
policy  of  his  father,  Isdigerd,1  incessantly  persecuted 
theChristians  of  his  northern  provinces,  especially  those 
of  Armenia,  Georgia,  and  Albania.2  So  severe  were  his 
measures,  that  vast  numbers  of  the  Armenians  quitted 
their  country,  and  placing  themselves  under  the  protec- 
tion of  the  Greek  Emperor,  became  his  subjects,  and 
entered  into  his  service.3  Armenia  was  governed  by 
Persian  officials,  and  by  apostate  natives  who  treated 
their  Christian  fellow-countrymen  with  extreme  rude- 
ness, insolence,  and  injustice.  Their  efforts  were  espe- 
cially directed  against  the  few  noble  families  who  still 
clung  to  the  faith  of  Christ,  and  had  not  chosen  to  ex- 
patriate themselves.  Among  these  the  most  important 
was  that  of  the  Mamigonians,  long  celebrated  in  Ar- 
menian history,4  and  at  this  time  reckoned  chief  among 
the  nobility.  The  renegades  sought  to  discredit  this 
family  with  the  Persians ;  and  Vahan,  son  of  Hemaiag, 
its  head,  found  himself  compelled  to  visit,  once  and 
again,  the  court  of  Persia,  in  order  to  meet  the  charges 
of  his  enemies  and  counteract  the  effect  of  their  calum- 
nies. Successful  in  vindicating  himself,  and  received 
into  high  favour  by  Perozes,  he  alloAved  the  sunshine  of 
prosperity  to  extort  from  him  what  he  had  guarded 
firmly  against  all  the  blasts  of  persecution  —  to  please 
his  sovereign,  he  formally  abjured  the  Christian  faith, 
and  professed  himself  a  disciple  of  Zoroaster.5  The 


the  revolt  in  a.d.  481  (Lazare 
Parbe,  Vie  de  Vahan  le  Mamigonien, 
p.  10),  must  have  commenced 
several  years  previously  —  probably 
about  a.d.  475. 

1  See  above,  pp.  305-308. 

2  Patkanian,  in  the  Journal  Asia- 
tique  for  1866,  p.  173. 

3  Lazare  Parbe,  Vie  de  Vahan, 


p.  6.  The  exodus  had  begun  even 
earlier  in  his  reign,  before  B.C.  464 
(Priscus,  Fr.  31). 

4  See  Faustus,  iv.  2,  11,  15,  &c. 
Zenob  de  Glag,  p.  337;  Mos.  Chor. 
ii.  81,  85;  St.  Martin,  Recherches 
sur  VArmenie,  vol.  ii.  p.  23,  &c. 
Compare  above,  pp.  256,  306,  &c. 

5  Lazare  Parbe,  p.  8. 


320 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  XVI. 


triumphof  theanti-Christian  party  seemed  nowsecured; 
but  exactly  at  this  point  a  reaction  set  in.  Vahan 
became  a  prey  to  remorse,  returned  secretly  to  his  old 
creed,1  and  longed  for  an  opportunity  of  wiping  out  the 
shame  of  his  apostasy  by  perilling  his  life  for  the 
Christian  cause.  The  opportunity  was  not  long  in  pre- 
senting itself.  In  a.d.  481  Perozes  suffered  a  defeat  at 
the  hand  of  the  barbarous  Koushans,  who  held  at  this 
time  the  low  Caspian  tract  extending  from  Asterabad 
to  Derbend.  Iberia  at  once  revolted,  slew  its  Zoroas- 
trian  king,  Vazken,  and  placed  a  Christian,  Vakhtang, 
upon  the  throne.  The  Persian  governor  of  Armenia, 
having  received  orders  to  quell  the  Iberian  rebellion, 
marched  with  all  the  troops  that  he  could  muster  into 
the  northern  province,  and  left  the  Armenians  free  to 
follow  their  own  devices.  A  rising  immediately  took 
place.  Vahan  at  first  endeavoured  to  check  the  move- 
ment, being  doubtful  of  the  power  of  Armenia  to  cope 
with  Persia,  and  feeling  sure  that  the  aid  of  the  Greek 
emperor  could  not  be  counted  on.  But  the  popular 
enthusiasm  overleaped  all  resistance ;  everywhere  the 
Christian  party  rushed  to  arms,  and  swore  to  free  itself ; 
the  Persians  with  their  adherents  fled  the  country ; 
Artaxata,  the  capital,  was  besieged  and  taken;  the 
Christians  were  completely  victorious,  and,  having 
made  themselves  masters  of  all  Persarmenia,  pro- 
ceeded to  establish  a  national  government,  placing  at 
their  head  as  king,  Sahag,  the  Bagratide,  and  ap- 
pointing Vahan,  the  Mamigonian,  to  be  Sparapet,  or 
L  Commander-in-Chief. ' 2 

Intelligence  of  these  events  recalled  the  Persian 
governor,  Ader-Veshnasp,  from  Iberia.  Returning  into 


Lazare  Parbe.  p.  9. 


2  Ibid.  pp.  10-14. 


Ch.  XVI.]         ARMENIAN  REVOLT  AND  WAR.  321 


his  province  at  the  head  of  an  army  of  no  great  size, 
composed  of  Atropatenians,  Medes,  and  Cadusians,  he 
was  encountered  by  Vasag,  a  brother  of  Vahan,  on  the 
river  Araxes,  with  a  small  force,  and  was  completely 
defeated  and  slain.1 

Thus  ended  the  campaign  of  a.d.  481.  In  a.d.  482, 
the  Persians  made  a  vigorous  attempt  to  recover  their 
lost  ground  by  sending  two  armies,  one  under  Ader- 
Nerseh  against  Armenia,  and  the  other  under  Mihran 2 
into  Iberia.  Vahan  met  the  army  of  Ader-Nerseh  in 
the  plain  of  Ardaz,  engaged  it,  and  defeated  it  after  a 
sharp  struggle,  in  which  the  king,  Sahag,  particularly 
distinguished  himself.  Mihran  was  opposed  by  Vakh- 
tang,  the  Iberian  king,  who,  however,  soon  found  him- 
self overmatched,  and  was  forced  to  apply  to  Armenia 
for  assistance.  The  Armenians  came  to  his  aid  in  full 
force ;  but  their  generosity  was  ill  rewarded.  Vakhtang 
plotted  to  make  his  peace  with  Persia  by  treacherously 
betraying  his  allies  into  their  enemies'  hands ;  and  the 
Armenians,  forced  to  fight  at  tremendous  disadvantage, 
suffered  a  severe  defeat.  Sahag,  the  king,  and  Vasag, 
one  of  the  brothers  of  Vahan,  were  slain ;  Vahan  him- 
self escaped,  but  at  the  head  of  only  a  few  followers, 
with  whom  he  fled  to  the  highland  district  of  Daik,  on 
the  borders  of  Rome  and  Iberia.  Here  he  was  4  hunted 
upon  the  mountains 7  by  Mihran,  and  would  probably 
have  been  forced  to  succumb  before  the  year  was  out, 
had  not  the  Persian  general  suddenly  received  a  sum- 
mons from  his  sovereign,  who  needed  his  aid  against 
the  Koushans  of  the  low  Caspian  region.  Mihran, 
compelled  to  obey  this  call,  had  to  evacuate  Armenia, 


1  Lazare  Parbe,  pp.  15  and  16. 

2  Compare  the  1  Meranes '  of 
Ammianus  (xxv.  1);  and  on  the 


supposed  force  of  the  word,  see 
above,  p.  224,  note  4. 


322 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  XVI. 


and  Vahan  in  a  few  weeks  recovered  possession  of  the 
whole  country.1 

The  year  a.d.  483  now  arrived,  and  another  desper- 
ate attempt  was  made  to  crush  the  Armenian  revolt. 
Early  in  the  spring  a  Persian  army  invaded  Armenia, 
under  a  general  called  Hazaravougd.  Vahan  allowed 
himself  to  be  surprised,  to  be  shut  up  in  the  city  of 
Dovin,  and  to  be  there  besieged.  After  a  while  he 
made  his  escape,  and  renewed  the  guerilla  warfare  in 
which  he  was  an  adept ;  but  the  Persians  recovered 
most  of  the  country,  and  he  was  himself,  on  more  than 
one  occasion,  driven  across  the  border  and  obliged  to 
seek  refuge  in  Roman  Armenia,  whither  his  adversary 
had  no  right  to  follow  him.  Even  here,  however,  he 
was  not  safe.  Hazaravougd,  at  the  risk  of  a  rupture 
with  Rome,  pursued  his  flying  foe  across  the  frontier ;  2 
and  Vahan  was  forsome  timeinthegreatestdanger.  But 
thePersian  system  of  constantly  changing  the  commands 
of  their  chief  officers  saved  him.  Hazaravougd  received 
orders  from  the  court  to  deliver  up  Armenia  to  a  newly 
appointed  governor,  named  Sapor,3  and  to  direct  his 
own  efforts  to  the  recovery  of  Iberia,  which  was  still  in 
insurrection.  In  this  latter  enterprise  he  was  success- 
ful ;  Iberia  submitted  to  him ;  and  Vakhtang  fled  to 
Colchis.  But  in  Armenia  the  substitution  of  Sapor  for 
Hazaravougd  led  to  disaster.  After  a  vain  attempt  to 
procure  the  assassination  of  Vahan  by  two  of  his  officers, 
whose  wives  were  Roman  prisoners,  Sapor  moved 
against  him  with  a  strong  body  of  troops ; 4  but  the 


1  Lazare  Parbe,  pp.  18-28. 

2  Ibid.  p.  31. 

3  Ibid.  p.  32. 

4  This  expression  must  be  under- 
stood relatively.  Nothing  is  more 
remarkable  in  Lazare  Parbe' s  ac- 
count of  this  war  than  the  small- 


ness  of  the  numbers  which  he  rep- 
resents as  engaged  on  either  side. 
Persian  armies  rarely  exceed  5,000 
men.  Armenian  are  still  smaller, 
and  are  generally  counted  by  hun- 
dreds ! 


Ch.  XVI. ]  SECOND  EPHTHALITE  WAR  OF  PEROZES.  323 

brave  Mamigonian,  falling  upon  his  assailant  unawares, 
defeated  him  with  great  loss,  and  dispersed  his  army.1 
A  second  battle  was  fought  with  a  similar  result ;  and 
the  Persian  force,  being  demoralised,  had  to  retreat ; 
while  Vahan,  taking  the  offensive,  established  himself  in 
Dovin,  and  once  more  rallied  to  his  side  the  great  mass 
of  the  nation.2  Affairs  were  in  this  state,  when  sud- 
denly there  arrived  from  the  east  intelligence  of  the 
most  supreme  importance,  which  produced  a  pause  in 
the  Armenian  conflict  and  led  to  the  placing  of  Arme- 
nian affairs  on  a  new  footing. 

Perozes  had,  from  the  conclusion  of  his  treaty  with  the 
Ephthalite  monarch (ab.  a.d.  470),  been  tormented  with 
the  feeling  that  he  had  suffered  degradation  and  dis- 
grace.3 He  had,  perhaps,  plunged  into  the  Armenian 
and  other  wars 4  in  the  hope  of  drowning  the  recollec- 
tion of  his  shame,  in  his  own  mind  as  well  as  in  the 
minds  of  others.  But  fortune  had  not  greatly  smiled 
on  him  in  these  struggles ;  and  any  credit  that  he  ob- 
tained from  them  was  quite  insufficient  to  produce  for- 
getfulness  of  his  great  disaster.  Hence,  as  time  went 
on,  he  became  more  and  more  anxious  to  wipe  out  the 
memory  of  the  past  by  a  great  and  signal  victory  over 
his  conquerors.  He  therefore  after  some  years 5  deter- 
mined to  renew  the  war.  It  was  in  vain  that  the  chief 
Mobed  opposed  himself  to  this  intention ;  6  it  was  in 
vain  that  his  other  counsellors  sought  to  dissuade  him, 


1  Lazare  Parbe,  p.  33. 

2  Ibid.  p.  35. 

3  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  137;  Mir- 
khoncl,  pp.  349-350;  Malcolm,  His- 
tory of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p.  129. 

4  Wars  of  Perozes  with  the 
Sagaruri,  Acatiri,  and  others,  are 
indicated  by  Priscus  Panites  (Fr. 
37).    A  great  war  with  the  Kou- 


shans  is  witnessed  to  by  Lazare 
Parbe  (p.  10). 

5  Xpovu  ov  noXAu  varepov  (Procop. 
Bell.  Pers.  i.  4).  The  first  war 
seems  to  have  terminated  about 
a.d.  470,  the  second  to  have  com-,, 
menced  in  a.d.  481.  (See  Lazare 
Parbe,  l.s.c.)  ._; 

6  Tabari,  l.s.c. 


324 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  XVI. 


that  his  general,  Bahram,  declared  against  the  infrac- 
tion of  the  treaty,1  and  that  the  soldiers  showed  them- 
selves reluctant  to  fight.  Perozes  had  resolved,  and 
was  not  to  be  turned  from  his  resolution.  He  collected 
from  all  parts  of  the  empire  a  veteran  force,2  amounting, 
it  is  said,3  to  100,000  men,  and  500  elephants,  placed 
thj  direction  of  affairs  at  the  court  in  the  hands  of 
Balas  (Palash),  his  son  or  brother,4  and  then  marched 
upon  the  north-eastern  frontier,  witti  the  determination 
to  attack  and  defeat  the  Ephthalites  or  perish  in  the 
attempt.  According  to  some  Oriental  writers,5  he  en- 
deavoured to  escape  the  charge  of  having  falsified  his 
engagements  by  a  curious  subterfuge.  The  exact  terms 
of  his  oath  to  Khush-new&z,  the  Ephthalite  king,  had 
been  that  he  would  never  march  his  forces  past  a  cer- 
tain pillar  which  that  monarch  had  erected  to  mark 
the  boundary  line  between  the  Persian  and  Ephthalite 
dominions.  Perozes  persuaded  himself  that  he  would 
sufficiently  observe  his  engagement  if  he  kept  its  letter; 
and  accordingly  he  lowered  the  pillar,  and  placed  it 
upon  a  number  of  cars,  which  were  attached  together 
and  drawn  by  a  train  of  fifty  elephants,  in  front  of  his 
army.  Thus,  however  deeply  he  invaded  the  Ephtha- 
lite country,  he  never  c  passed  beyond 7  the  pillar  which 
he  had  sworn  not  to  pass.  In  his  own  judgment  he 
kept  his  vow,  but  not  in  that  of  his  natural  advisers. 
It  is  satisfactory  to  find  that  the  Zoroastrian  priesthood, 
speaking  by  the  mouth  of  the  chief  Mobed,  disclaimed 
and  exposed  the  fallacy  of  this  wretched  casuistry.6 


1  Patkanian,  from  the  Armenian 
authorities,  Journal  Asiatique,  1866, 
p.  171. 

2  4  Une  armee  agueme^  (Mir- 
kliond  in  De  Sacy's  translation,  p. 
350.) 


3  Tabari,  p.  138. 

4  On  the  true  relation  of  Balas 
to  Perozes,  see  below,  p.  331. 

5  As  Tabari,  p.  139. 

6  Ibid. 


Ch.  XVI.]  GREAT  BATTLE  —  DEFEAT  OF  PEROZES.  325 

The  Ephthalite  monarch,  on  learning  the  intention 
of  Perozes,  prepared  to  meet  his  attack  by  stratagem. 
He  had  taken  up  his  position  in  the  plain  near  Balkh, 
and  had  there  established  his  camp,  resolved  to  await 
the  coming  of  the  enemy.  During  the  interval  he 
proceeded  to  dig  a  deep  and  broad  trench 1  in  front  of 
his  whole  position,  leaving  only  a  space  of  some  twenty 
or  thirty  yards,  midway  in  the  work,  untouched.  Having 
excavated  the  trench,  he  caused  it  to  be  filled  with 
water,2  and  covered  carefully  with  boughs  of  trees, 
reeds,  and  earth,  so  as  to  be  undistinguishable  from 
the  general  surface  of  the  plain  on  which  he  was  en- 
camped. On  the  arrival  of  the  Persians  in  his  front, 
he  first  of  all  held  a  parley  with  Perozes,  in  which, . 
after  reproaching  him  with  his  ingratitude  and  breach 
of  faith,  he  concluded  by  offering  to  renew  the  peace. 
Perozes  scornfully  refused ;  whereupon  the  Ephthalite 
prince  hung  on  the  point  of  a  lance  the  broken  treaty,a 
and,  parading  it  in  front  of  the  Persian  troops,  exhorted 
them  to  avoid  the  vengeance  which  was  sure  to  fall  on 
the  perjured  by  deserting  their  doomed  monarch.  Upon 
this,  half  the  army,  we  are  told,4  retired ;  and  Khush- 
newSz  proceeded  to  effect  the  destruction  of  the  remain- 
der by  means  of  the  plan  which  he  had  so  carefully  pre- 
pared beforehand.  He  sent  a  portion  of  his  troops 
across  the  ditch,  with  orders  to  challenge  the  Persians 
to  an  engagement,  and,  when  the  fight  began,  to  fly 
hastily,  and,  returning  within  the  ditch  by  the  sound 


1  TaQpov  ffadelav  re  nai  evpovg 
inavtig  exovoav.  (Procop.  B.P.  i.  4.) 
Tabari  says  it  was  fifteen  feet  deep 
and  thirty  wide  (vol.  n.  p.  139). 

2  So  Tabari  (I.s.c.).  Neither  Pro- 
copius  nor  Mirkhond  mentions  this 
circumstance. 


3  Mirkhond,  p.  350;  Tabari,  ii. 
p.  141.  Procopius  states,  instead 
of  this,  that  the  salt  by  which 
Perozes  had  sworn,  was  suspended 
from  the  extreme  point  of  the  royal 
standard. 

4  Tabari,  l.s.c. 


326 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  XVI. 


passage,  unite  themselves  with  the  main  army.  The 
entire  Persian  host,  as  he  expected,  pursued  the  fugi- 
tives, and  coming  unawares  upon  the  concealed  trench 
plunged  into  it,  was  inextricably  entangled,  and  easily 
destroyed,  Perozes  himself,  several  of  his  sons,1  and 
most  of  his  army,  perished.  Firuz-docht,  his  daughter, 
the  chief  Mobed,  and  great  numbers  of  the  rank  and 
file  were  made  prisoners.  A  vast  booty  was  taken.2 
Khush-new&z  did  not  tarnish  the  glory  of  his  victory 
by  any  cruelties ;  he  treated  the  captives  tenderly,  and 
caused  search  to  be  made  for  the  body  of  Perozes, 
which  was  found  and  honourably  interred. 

Thus  perished  Perozes,  after  a  reign  of  (probably) 
twenty-six  years.3  He  was  undoubtedly  a  brave  prince, 
and  entitled  to  the  epithet  of  Al  Merdaneh,  c  the  Coura- 
geous,' which  he  received  from  his  subjects.4  But 
his  bravery,  unfortunately,  verged  upon  rashness,5  and 
was  unaccompanied  (so  far  as  appears)  by  any  other 
military  quality.  Perozes  had  neither  the  sagacity 
to  form  a  good  plan  of  campaign,  nor  the  ability  to 
conduct  a  battle.  In  all  the  wars  wherein  he  was  per- 
sonally engaged  he  was  unsuccessful,  and  the  only  tri- 


1  Thirty,  according  to  Procopius, 

i.  4  (p.  19). 

2  A  magnificent  pearl  which 
Perozes  wore  as  an  earring,  and  an 
amulet  which  he  carried  as  a  brace- 
let, are  particularly  mentioned 
(Procop.  i.  4;  pp.  21-24;  Tabari, 

ii.  p.  142). 

3  Tabari  (l.s.c. )  makes  the  exact 
length  of  his  reign  twenty-six  years 
and  five  months.  Mirkhond  says 
twenty-six  years  (p.  351);  Euty- 
chius  (vol.  L  p.  100;  vol.  ii.  p.  127) 
twenty-seven;  Macoudi  (vol.  ii.  p. 
195)  twenty-nine;  Agathias  (iv. 
27)  twenty-four.  The  '  twenty- 
four  years '  of  Agathias  have  per- 
haps come  from  a  writer  who 
assigned  the  first  two  years  after 


the  death  of  Isdigerd  II.  to  Hormis- 
das.  The  true  chronology  appears 
to  be  the  following:  —  Isdigerd  II. 
died  early  in  a.d.  457.  Both 
Perozes  and  Hormisdas  claimed 
the  throne  and  reckoned  themselves 
kings  from  this  time.  Hormisdas 
succumbed  in  A.D.  459.  Perozes 
was  killed  late  in  a.d.  483,  twenty- 
six  years  and  five  months  after  the 
death  of  his  father,  twenty-four 
years  after  the  death  (or  dethrone- 
ment) of  Hormisdas. 

4  Mirkhond,  p.  351;  Malcolm, 
History  of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p.  130. 

5  Compare  Agath  i as  (l.s.c):  — 
dvr/p  toA/llt/t'uk;  fiev  ayov  nal  (biAo- 
nuXefAO^  —  and  again  tt'Mov  rjv  avru 
rov  fiov'Aevofiivov  to  Opaovvov. 


Ch.  XVI.]  DEATH  OF  PEROZES  —  HIS  CHARACTER.  327 

umphs  which  gilded  his  arms  were  gained  by  his  gen- 
erals. In  his  civil  administration,  on  the  contrary,  he 
obtained  a  character  for  humanity  and  justice  ; 1  and,  if 
the  Oriental  accounts  of  his  proceedings  during  the 
great  famine 2  are  to  be  regarded  as  trustworthy,  we 
must  admit  that  his  wisdom  and  benevolence  were 
such  as  are  not  commonly  found  in  those  who  bear 
rule  in  the  East.  His  conduct  towards  Khush-new&z 
has  generally  been  regarded  as  the  great  blot  upon  his 
good  fame ; 3  and  it  is  certainly  impossible  to  justify  the 
paltry  casuistry  by  which  he  endeavoured  to  reconcile 
his  actions  with  his  words  at  the  time  of  his  second  in- 
vasion. But  his  persistent  hostility  towards  the  Eph- 
thalites  is  far  from  inexcusable,  and  its  motive  may 
have  been  patriotic  rather  than  personal.  He  probably 
felt  that  the  Ephthalite  power  was  among  those  from 
which  Persia  had  most  to  fear,  and  that  it  would  have 
been  weak  in  him  to  allow  gratitude  for  a  favour  con- 
ferred upon  himself  to  tie  his  hands  in  a  matter  where 
the  interests  of  his  country  were  vitally  concerned.  The 
Ephthalites  continued  for  nearly  a  century  more  to  be 
among  the  most  dangerous  of  her  neighbours  to  Per- 
sia ;  and  it  was  only  by  frequent  attacks  upon  them  in 
their  own  homes  that  Persia  could  reasonably  hope  to 
ward  off  their  ravages  from  her  territory. 

It  is  doubtful  whether  we  possess  any  coins  of  Hor- 
misdas  III.,  the  brother  and  predecessor  of  Perozes. 
Those  which  are  assigned  to  him  by  Mordtmann 4  bear 
a  name  which  has  no  resemblance  to  his ;  and  those 


1  Tabari,  ii.  p.  128;  Mirkhond, 
p.  345. 

2  See  above,  pp.  314-5. 

3  Malcolm,  vol.  i.  pp.  129-130; 
Gibbon,  vol.  v.  p.  85. 


4  Zeitschrift,  vol.  viii.  p.  71; 
vol.  xii.  p.  12.  The  name  on  these 
coins  is  read  as  Chodad-Varda, 
Chodar-Varda,  or  Chatar-Varda. 


328 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  XVL 


bearing  the  name  of  Ram,  which  Mr.  Taylor  considers 
to  be  coins  of  Hormisdas,1  cannot  have  been  issued 
under  his  authority,  since  Ram  was  the  guardian  and 
general,  not  of  Hormisdas,  but  of  his  brother.2  Perhaps 

the  remarkable  specimen  figured 
by  M.  Longperier  in  his  valuable 
work,3  which  shows  a  bull's  head 
in  place  of  the  usual  inflated  ball, 
may  really  belong  to  this  prince. 
The  legend  upon  it  is  read  without 
any  doubt  as  Auhrimazd,  or  '  Hor- 
misdas ; '  and  in  general  charac- 
ter it  is  certainly  Sassanian,4  and  of 
about  this  period. 
The  coins  of  Perozes  are  undoubted,  and  are  very 
numerous.  They  are  distinguished  generally  by  the 
addition  to  the  ordinary  crown  of  two  wings,  one  in 
front  of  the  crown,  and  the  other  behind  it,5  and  bear 
the  legend,  Kadi  Piruzi*  or  Mazdisn  Kadi  Piruzi,  i.e. 
4  King  Perozes,'  or  4  the  Ormazd- worshipping  king 
Perozes.'  The  earring  of  the  monarch  is  a  triple  pen- 
dant.7 On  the  reverse,  besides  the  usual  fire-altar  and 
supporters,  we  see  on  either  side  of  the  altar-flame  a 


COIN  OF  HORMISDAS  III. 

(doubtful). 


1  Num.  Chron.  for  1873,  No. 
51  (New  Series),  pp.  225-7. 

2  See  above,  p.  312.  Mr.  Tbomas 
speaks  of  Ram  (or  Raham)  as  *  the 
paternally  nominated  guardian  and 
administrator'  of  Hormisdas  (p. 
226).  But  the  authors  whom  he 
quotes,  Elisee  and  Moyse  de  Ka- 
ghank,  state  exactly  the  reverse  — 
that  he  governed  for  Perozes,  de- 
feated Hormisdas,  and  put  him  to 
death. 

3  Medailles  des  Sassanides,  pi.  ix. 
fig.  1. 

4  Mordtmann  denies  this  (Zeit- 
schrift,  vol.  viii.  p.  71),  but,  as  it 


appears  to  me,  without  sufficient 
reason. 

5  These  wings,  which  were  now 
first  introduced,  became  the  dis- 
tinguishing feature  of  the  later 
coinage  from  Chosroes  II.  down- 
wards, and  passed  to  the  Arabs. 
Some  coins  of  Perozes  are  without 
the  wings  (see  Mordtmann  in  the 
Zeitschrift,  vol.  viii.  No.  172;  Long- 
perier, Medailles,  pi.  ix.  fig.  2). 

0  Mordtmann,  Zeitschrift,  vol. 
viii.  pp.  93  et  seqq.  On  the  meaning 
of  kadi,  compare  Thomas  in  Num. 
Chron.  for  1873,  pp.  229-230. 

7  Longperier,  Medailles,  p.  62. 


Ch.  XVI.  1 


COINS  OF  PEROZES. 


329 


star  and  a  crescent.  The  legend  here  is  M  —  probably 
for  malka,  1  king '  —  or  else  Kadi,  together  with  a 
mint  mark.  The  mints  named  are 
numerous,  comprising  (according  to 
Mordtmann) 1  Persepolis,  Ispahan, 
Rhages,  Nehavend,  Darabgherd,  Za- 
dracarta,  Nissa,  Behistun,  Chuzistan, 
Media,  Kerman,  and  Azerbijan  ;  or 
(according  to  Mr.  Thomas) 2  Per- 
sepolis, Rasht,  Nehavend,  Darab- 
gherd, Baiza,  Modain,  Merv,  Shiz, 
Iran,  Kerman,  Yezd,  and  fifteen 
others.  The  general  character  of 
the  coinage  is  rude  and  coarse,  the 
reverse  of  the  coins  showing  especial 
signs  of  degradation. 

Besides  his  coins,  one  other  memorial  of  the  reign  of 
Perozes  has  escaped  the  ravages  of  time.  This  is  a 
cup  or  vase,  of  antique  and  elegant  form,  engraved 
with  a  hunting-scene,  which  has  been  thus  described 
by  a  recent  writer  :  —  L  This  cup,  which  comes  from 
Russia,  has  a  diameter  of  thirty-one  centimetres,  and 
is  shaped  like  a  ewer  without  handles.  At  the  bottom 
there  stands  out  in  relief  the  figure  of  a  monarch  on 
horseback,  pursuing  at  full  speed  various  wild  animals ; 
before  him  fly  a  wild  boar  and  wild  sow,  together  with 
their  young,  an  ibex,  an  antelope,  and  a  buffalo.  Two 
other  boars,  an  ibex,  a  buffalo,  and  an  antelope  are 
strewn  on  the  ground,  pierced  with  arrows.  .  .  .  The 


COIN  OF  PEROZES. 


1  Zeitschrift,  vol.  viii.  pp.  73-78;  |  much  of  the  diversity  in  the  above 


vol.  xii.  p.  12. 

2  Num.  Chron.  for  1873,  p.  223. 
The  abbreviated  form  of  most  of 
the  mint-marks  renders  their  attri- 
bution more  or  less  doubtful ;  hence 


lists.  The  general  tendency  to  ex- 
tend more  and  more  widely  the 
principle  of  local  mints,  as  time 
went  on,  is,  however,  quite  beyond 
dispute. 


330 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [Ch.  XVI. 


king  has  an  aquiline  nose,  an  eye  which  is  very  wide 
open,  a  short  beard,  horizontal  moustaches  of  consider- 
able length,  the  hair  gathered  behind  the  head  in  quite 
a  small  knot,  and  the  ear  ornamented  with  a  double 
pendant,  pear-shaped ;  the  head  of  the  monarch  sup- 
ports a  crown,  which  is  mural  at  the  side  and  back, 
while  it  bears  a  crescent  in  front ;  two  wings  surmount- 
ing a  globe  within  a  crescent  form  the  upper  part 
of  the  head-dress.  .  .  .  On  his  right  the  king  car- 
ries a  short  dagger  and  a  quiver  full  of  arrows,  on 
his  left  a  sword.  .  .  .  Firuz,  who  has  the  finger-guard 
of  an  archer  on  his  right  hand,  is  represented  in  the  act 
of  bending  a  large  bow  made  of  horn.' 1  There  would 
seem  to  be  no  doubt  that  the  work  thus  described  is 
rightly  assigned  to  Perozes. 

1  See  the  Annates  de  VInstitut  Archeologique  for  1843,  vol.  xv.  p.  105. 


Ch.  XYIL] 


ACCESSION  OF  BALAS, 


331 


4 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

Accession  of  Balas  or  Palash.  His  Relationship  to  Perozes.  Peace  made 
ivith  the  Ephthalites.  Pacification  of  Armenia  and  General  Edict  of 
Toleration.  Revolt  of  Zareh,  Son  of  Perozes,  and  Suppression  of  the 
Revolt  with  the  help  of  the  Armenians.  Flight  of  Kobad  to  the  Eph- 
thalites. Further  Changes  in  Armenia.  Vahan  made  Governor.  Death 
of  Balas  ;  his  Character.    Coins  ascribed  to  him- 

"Bdlag  .  .  .  km  rrjv  apxvv  uvaftuc;,  ovdiv  ri  (paiverai  a^KKpf/yr/Tov  dpacaq  noTieuov 
eveKa  Kai  napara^EG)v.  — AGATHIAS,  iv.  27 ;  p.  137,  D. 

Perozes  was  succeeded  by  a  prince  whom  the  Greeks 
call  Balas,  the  Arabs  and  later  Persians  Palash,  but 
whose  real  name  appears  to  have  been  Val&khesh1  or 
Volagases.  Different  accounts  are  given  of  his  relation- 
ship to  his  predecessor,  the  native  writers  unanimously 
representing  him  as  the  son  of  Perozes  and  brother  of 
Kobad,2  while  the  G  reeks3  and  the  contemporary  Arme- 
nians4  declare  with  one  voice  that  he  was  Kobad's 
uncle  and  Perozes'  brother.  It  seems  on  the  whole 
most  probable  that  the  Greeks  and  Armenians  are 
right  ;5  and  we  may  suppose  that  Perozes,  havingnoson 
whom  he  could  trust  to  take  his  place  6  when  he  quitted 


1  This  is  M.  Longperier's  reading 
of  the  legend  upon  the  coin  which 
he  ascribes  to  Balas  (Me'dailles,  p. 
65).  M.  Bartholomeei  substantially 
agrees  with  him.  Mordtmann  dif- 
fers (Zeitschrift,  vol.  viii.  p.  71).  It 
is  generally  allowed,  however,  that 
the  name,  whatever  its  native  form, 
represented  the  old  Parthian  Vol- 
gasu  or  Volagases. 

2  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  pp.  138,  142, 


144;  Mirkhond,  p.  351.  So  Ma- 
coucli,  vol.  ii.  p.  195. 

3  Agathias,  iv.  27;  p.  137,  D; 
Theophan.  Chronograph,  p.  106,  A. 

4  Patkanian  in  the  Journal  Asia- 
tique  for  1866,  p.  177. 

5  Compare  Malcolm,  History  of 
Persia,  vol.  i.  p.  131,  note;  Pat- 
kanian (1  s.c),  &c. 

6  The  Greeks  make  him  father  of 
a  numerous  family  of  grown-up 


332 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


ICh.  XVII. 


his  capital  in  order  to  take  the  management  of  the 
Ephthalite  war,  put  the  regency  and  the  guardianship 
of  his  children  into  the  hands  of  his  brother,  Vol&khesh, 
who  thus,  not  unnaturally,  became  king  when  it  was 
found  that  Perozes  had  fallen. 

The  first  efforts  of  the  new  monarch  were  of  neces- 
sity directed  towards  an  arrangement  with  the  Ephtha- 
lites,  whose  signal  victory  over  Perozes  had  laid  the 
north-eastern  frontier  of  Persia  open  to  their  attack. 
Balas,  we  are  told,1  employed  on  this  service  the  arms 
and  arts  of  an  officer  named  Sukhra  or  Sufrai,  who  was 
at  the  time  governor  of  Seistan.  Sukhra  collected  an 
imposing  force,  and  conducted  it  to  the  Ephthalite 
border,  where  he  alarmed  Khush-new&z  by  a  display 
of  his  own  skill  with  the  bow.2  He  then  entered  into 
negotiations  and  obtained  the  release  of  Firuz-docht, 
of  the  Grand  Mobed,  and  of  the  other  important  pris- 
oners, together  with  the  restoration  of  a  large  portion 
of  the  captured  booty,  but  was  probably  compelled  to 
accept  on  the  part  of  his  sovereign  some  humiliating 
conditions.  Procopius  informs  us  that,  in  consequence 
of  the  defeat  of  Perozes,  Persia  became  subject  to  the 
Ephthalites  and  paid  them  tribute  for  two  years  ;3  and 
this  is  so  probable  a  result,  and  one  so  likely  to  have 
been  concealed  by  the  native  writers,  that  his  authority 
must  be  regarded  as  outweighing  the  silence  of  Mir- 
khond  and  Tabari.  Balas,  we  must  suppose,  consented 
to  become  an  Ephthalite  tributary,  rather  than  renew 
the  war  which  had  proved  fatal  to  his  brother.    If  he 

sons,  whom  he  took  with  him  to  1  1  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  142;  Mir- 
the  Ephthalite  war  (Procop.  B.P.    khond,  p.  351. 


i.  4;  p.  11,  A),  and  who  perished 
there  (ibid.  p.  12,  C);  but  the 
existence  of  these  persons  is  un- 
known to  the  native  historians. 


2  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  143. 
8  Procop.  Bell.  Pers.  i.  4,  ad  Jin. 
Compare  Theophanes,  Chronograph* 
p.  106,  A;  Cedrenus,  p.  355,  D. 


Ch.  XVII.] 


PACIFICATION  OF  ARMENIA. 


333 


accepted  this  position,  we  can  well  understand  that 
Khush-new&z  would  grant  him  the  small  concessions 
of  which  the  Persian  writers  boast ;  while  otherwise 
the  restoration  of  the  booty  and  the  prisoners  without 
a  battle  is  quite  inconceivable. 

Secure,  so  long  as  he  fulfilled  his  engagements,  from 
any  molestation  in  this  quarter,  Balas  was  able  to  turn 
his  attention  to  the  north-western  portion  of  his  domin- 
ions, and  address  himself  to  the  difficult  task  of  paci- 
fying Armenia,  and  bringing  to  an  end  the  troubles 
which  had  now  for  several  years  afflicted  that  unhappy 
province.  His  first  step  was  to  nominate  as  Marzpan, 
or  governor,  of  Armenia,  a  Persian  who  bore  the  name 
of  Nikhor,  a  man  eminent  for  justice  and  moderation.1 
Nikhor,  instead  of  attacking  V ahan,  who  held  almost 
the  whole  of  the  country,  since  the  Persian  troops  had 
been  withdrawn  on  the  news  of  the  death  of  Perozes,2 
proposed  to  the  Armenian  prince  that  they  should 
discuss  amicably  the  terms  upon  which  his  nation 
would  be  content  to  end  the  war  and  resume  its  old 
position  of  dependence  upon  Persia.  Vahan  expressed 
his  willingness  to  terminate  the  struggle  by  an  arrange- 
ment, and  suggested  the  following  as  the  terms  on 
which  he  and  his  adherents  would  be  willing  to  lay 
down  their  arms  :  — 

(1)  The  existing  fire-altars  should  be  destroyed,  and 
no  others  should  be  erected  in  Armenia. 

(2)  The  Armenians  should  be  allowed  the  full  and 
free  exercise  of  the  Christian  religion,  and  no  Arme- 
nians should  be  in  future  tempted  or  bribed  to  declare 
themselves  disciples  of  Zoroaster. 


1  Lazare  Parbe,  p.  38. 

2  Sapor  and  Hazaravougd  had 
been  both  required  to  march  with 


all  their  forces  to  Ctesiphon  (ib.  p. 

36). 


334 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  XVII. 


(3)  If  converts  were  nevertheless  made  from  Chris- 
tianity to  Zoroastrianism,  places  should  not  be  given 
to  them. 

(4)  The  Persian  king  should  in  person,  and  not  by 
deputy,  administer  the  affairs  of  Armenia.1  Nikhor 
expressed  himself  favourable  to  the  acceptance  of  these 
terms;  and,  after  an  exchange  of  hostages,  Vahan 
visited  his  camp  and  made  arrangements  with  him  for 
the  solemn  ratification  of  peace  on  the  aforesaid  condi- 
tions. An  edict  of  toleration  was  issued,  and  it  was 
formally  declared  that  L  every  one  should  be  at  liberty 
to  adhere  to  his  own  religion,  and  that  no  one  should 
be  driven  to  apostatise.' 2  Upon  4these  terms  peace 
was  concluded  between  Vahan  and  Nikhor,3  and  it  was 
only  necessary  that  the  Persian  monarch  should  ratify 
the  terms  for  them  to  become  formally  binding. 

While  matters  were* in  this  state,  and  the  consent  of 
Balas  to  the  terms  agreed  upon  had  not  yet  been 
positively  signified,  an  important  revolution  took  place 
at  the  court  of  Persia.  Zareh,  a  son  of  Perozes, 
preferred  a  claim  to  the  crown,  and  was  supported 
in  his  attempt  by  a  considerable  section  of  the 
people.4  A  civil  war  followed;  and  among  the  officers 
employed  to  suppress  it  was  Nikhor,  the  governor  of 
Armenia.  On  his  appointment  he  suggested  to  Vahan 
that  it  would  lend  great  force  to  the  Armenian  claims, 
if  under  the  existing  circumstances  the  Armenians 
would  furnish  effective  aid  to  B^las,  and  so  enable 
him  to  suppress  the  rebellion.    Vahan  saw  the  im- 


1  See  Lazare  Parbe,  pp.  38-39. 

2  Patkanian  (Journal  Asiatique, 
1866,  p.  176). 

3  Lazare  Parbe,  p.  39. 

4  The  revolt  of  Zareh,  and  his 
relationship  to  Perozes,  rest  wholly 


on  the  testimony  of  the  Armenian 
writers,  who,  however,  can  hardly 
have  been  mistaken  in  the  matter. 
(See  Lazare  Parbe,  p.  42;  and  com- 
pare Patkanian,  ut  supra,  p.  175.) 


Ch.  XVII.  ] 


PACIFICATION  OF  ARMENIA. 


335 


portance  of  the  conjuncture,  and  immediately  sent  to 
Nikhor's  aid  a  powerful  body  of  cavalry  under  the 
command  of  his  own  nephew,  Gregory.  Zareh  was 
defeated,  mainly  in  consequence  of  the  great  valour 
and  excellent  conduct  of  the  Armenian  contingent. 
He  fled  to  the  mountains,  but  was  pursued,  and  was 
very  shortly  afterwards  made  prisoner  and  slain.1 

Soon  after  this,  Kobad,  son  of  Perozes,  regarding  the 
crown  as  rightfully  his,  put  forward  a  claim  to  it,  but, 
meeting  with  no  success,  was  compelled  to  quit  Persia 
and  throw  himself  upon  the  kind  protection  of  the 
Ephthalites,2  who  were  always  glad  to  count  among 
their  refugees  a  Persian  pretender.  The  Ephthalites, 
however,  made  no  immediate  stir  —  it  would  seem  that 
so  long  as  Balas  paid  his  tribute  they  were  content, 
and  felt  no  inclination  to  disturb  what  seemed  to  them 
a  satisfactory  arrangement. 

The  death  of  Zareh  and  the  flight  of  Kobad  left 
Balas  at  liberty  to  resume  the  work  which  their  rebel- 
lions had  interrupted  —  the  complete  pacification  of 
Armenia.  Knowing  how  much  depended  upon  Vahan, 
he  summoned  him  to  his  court,  received  him  with  the 
highest  honours,  listened  attentively  to  his  represen- 
tations, and  finally  agreed  to  the  terms  which  Yahan 
had  formulated.3  At  the  same  time  he  replaced  Nikhor 
by  a  governor  named  Antegan,  a  worthy  successor, 
1  mild,  prudent,  and  equitable ; 7  4  and,  to  show  his 
confidence  in  the  Mamigonian  prince,  appointed  him 
to  the  high  office  of  Commander-in-Chief,  or  'SparapeV 
This  arrangement  did  not,  however,  last  long.  Antegan, 
after  ruling  Armenia  for  a  few  months,  represented  to 


1  Patkanian,  p.  176. 

2  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  145;  Mir- 
khond,  p.  352. 


3  See  above,  pp.  333-4. 

4  Lazare  Parbe,  p.  44. 


336 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[Ch.  XVII. 


his  royal  master  that  it  would  be  the  wisest  course  to 
entrust  Vahan  with  the  government,1  that  the  same 
head  which  had  conceived  the  terms  of  the  pacification 
might  watch  over  and  ensure  their  execution.  Ante- 
gan's  recommendation  approved  itself  to  the  Persian 
monarch,  who  proceeded  to  recall  his  self-denying 
councillor,  and  to  install  Vahan  in  the  vacant  office. 
The  post  of  Sparapet  was  assigned  to  Vart,  Vahan's 
brother.  Christianity  was  then  formally  re-established 
as  the  State  religion  of  Armenia ;  the  fire-altars  were 
destroyed ;  the  churches  reclaimed  and  purified ;  the 
hierarchy  restored  to  its  former  position  and  powers. 
A  reconversion  of  almost  the  whole  nation  to  the 
Christian  faith  was  the  immediate  result ;  the  apostate 
Armenians  recanted  their  errors,  and  abjured  Zoroas- 
trianism ;  Armenia,  and  with  it  Iberia,  were  pacified; 2 
and  the  two  provinces  which  had  been  so  long  a  cause 
of  weakness  to  Persia  grew  rapidly  into  main  sources 
of  her  strength  and  prosperity. 

The  new  arrangement  had  not  been  long  completed 
when  Balas  died  (a.d.  487).  It  is  agreed  on  all  hands 
that  he  held  the  throne  for  no  more  than  four  years, 3and 
generally  allowed  that  he  died  peaceably  by  a  natural 
death.4  He wasawise  andjustprince,5mildinhistemper,6 


1  Lazare  Parbe,  p.  45. 

2  Ibid.  p.  46. 

3  Agathias,  iv.  27  ;  p.  138,  A  ; 
Eutych.  ii.  p.  127;  Syncellus,  p. 
360,  D;  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  144; 
Mirkhond,  p.  352;  Maeoudi,  vol.  ii. 
p.  195;  Lazare  Parbe,  p.  46;  Pat- 
kanian,  p.  176,  &c.  The  four  years 
were  probably  not  complete,  Balas 
ascending  the  throne  in  a.d.  484, 
and  dying  before  the  termination  of 
a.d.  487. 

4  There  is  not  the  same  universal 
agreement  here.  Tabari  (p.  144), 
Mirkhond    (p.     352),  Eutychius 


(l.s.c. ),  and  Agathias  (l.s.c),  speak 
of  Balas  as  dying  a  natural  death. 
Lazare  Parbe  makes  him  dethroned 
by  his  subjects  as  too  peaceful  (p. 
46).  Procopius  (B.  P.  i.  5  and  6) 
and  others  (Theophan.  p.  106,  A; 
Cedrenus,  p.  356,  C)  confound  Balas 
with  Zamaspes,  and  say  that  he 
was  dethroned  and  blinded  by 
Kobad. 

5  Mirkhond,  p.  351;  Tabari,  ii. 
p.  144. 

6  Agathias,  iv.  27:  Upaog  rovq 
rponovc  Kal  jjiuoc;. 


Cff.  XVII.]  CHARACTER  OF  BALAS. 


337 


averse  to  military  enterprises,1  and  inclined  to  expect 
better  results  from  pacific  arrangements  than  from  wars 
and  expeditions.  His  internal  administration  of  the 
empire  gave  general  satisfaction  to  his  subjects ;  he 
protected  and  relieved  the  poor,  extended  cultivation, 
and  punished  governors  who  allowed  any  men  in  their 
province  to  fall  into  indigence.2  His  prudence  and 
moderation  are  especially  conspicuous  in  his  arrange- 
ment of  the  Armenian  difficulty,  whereby  he  healed  a 
chronic  sore  that  had  long  drained  the  resources  of  his 
country.  His  submission  to  pay  tribute  to  the  Eph- 
thalites  may  be  thought  to  indicate  a  want  of  courage 
or  of  patriotism ;  but  there  are  times  when  the  pur- 
chase of  a  peace  is  a  necessity ;  and  it  is  not  clear  that 
Balas  was  minded  to  bear  the  obligation  imposed  on 
him  a  moment  longer  than  was  necessary.  The  writers 
who  record  the  fact  that  Persia  submitted  for  a  time 
to  pay  a  tribute  limit  the  interval  during  which  the 
obligation  held  to  a  couple  of  years.3  It  would  seem, 
therefore,  that  Balas,  who  reigned  four  years,  must,  a 
year  at  least  before  his  demise,  have  shaken  off  the 
Ephthalite  yoke  and  ceased  to  make  any  acknowledg- 
ment of  dependence.  Probably  it  was  owing  to  the 
new  attitude  assumed  by  him,  that  the  Ephthalites, 
after  refusing  to  give  Kobad  any  material  support  for 
the  space  of  three  years,  adopted  a  new  policy  in  the 
year  of  Balas'  death  (a.d.  487),  and  lent  the  pretender 
a  force4  with  which  he  was  about  to  attack  his  uncle 
when  news  reached  him  that  attack  was  needless,  since 
Balas  was  dead  and  his  own  claim  to  the  succession 


1  Agathias,  iv.  27.  See  the  pas- 
sage prefixed  to  this  chapter. 

2  Tabari,  l.s.c. ;  Mirkhond,  p. 
352. 


3  See  above,  p.  332,  note  3. 

4  As  Tabari  (ii.  p.  146) 
Mirkhond  (l.s.c.)  relate. 


and 


338 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [Ch.  XVII 


undisputed.  Balas  nominated  no  successor  upon  his 
death-bed,  thus  giving  in  his  last  moments  an  additional 
proof  of  that  moderation  and  love  of  peace  which 
had  characterised  his  reign. 

Coins,  which  possess  several  points  of  interest,  are 
assigned  to  Balas  by  the  best  authorities.1  They  bear 
on  the  obverse  the  head  of  the  king  with  the  usual 
mural  crown  surmounted  by  a  crescent  and  inflated 
ball.    The  beard  is  short  and  curled.    The  hair  falls 

behind  the  head,  also  in  curls. 
The  earring,  wherewith  the  ear 
is  ornamented,  has  a  double 
pendant.  Flames  issue  from  the 
left  shoulder,  an  exceptional  pe- 
culiarity in  the  Sassanian  series, 
but  one  which  is  found  also 
among  the  Indo-Scythian  kings 
with  whom  Balas  was  so  closely 
connected.  The  full  legend  upon 
the  coins  appears  to  be  Har 
Kadi  Valakdshi,  c  Volagases,  the 
Fire  King.'  The  reverse  ex- 
hibits the  usual  fire-altar,  but 
with  the  king's  head  in  the 
flames,  and  with  the  star  and  crescent  on  either  side, 
as  introduced  by  Perozes.  It  bears  commonly  the 
legend,  Valak&shi,  with  a  mint-mark.  The  mints  em- 
ployed are  those  of  Iran,  Kerman,  Ispahan,  Nisa, 
Ledan,  Shiz,  Zadracarta,  and  one  or  two  others. 


COIN  OF  BALAS. 


1  Longperier,  Medailles  des  Sassa-  I  Thomas,  Num.  Chron.  1873,  pp. 
nides,  p.  65,  and  pi.   ix.  fig.  5 ;  1 228-9. 


